RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONTN/IP/M/7
21 August 2003
(03-4339)
Council for Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights
Special Session
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held in the Centre William Rappard
on 2-3 July 2003
Chairperson:  Ambassador Eui-yong Chung (Korea)
Subjects discussed: Page No.
A. A DOPTION OF AGENDA ...............................................................................................................1
B. O BSERVER STATUS FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ............................................1
C. N EGOTIATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL SYSTEM OF
NOTIFICATION AND REGISTRATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS FOR WINES AND
SPIRITS ............................................................................................................................... .........2
D. O THER BUSINESS ......................................................................................................................17
Draft Chair's Repor t to the TNC ...............................................................................................1 7
Future Work.................................................................................................................... ..........17
_______________
A. ADOPTION OF AGENDA
1. The sixth Special Session agreed to adopt the agenda as set out in WTO/AIR/2123.
2. The Chairperson proposed to address first the issue of observer status for intergovernmental
organizations and, under "Other business", two points :  the Chair's report to the TNC and future work.
3. It was so agreed.
B. OBSERVER STATUS FOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
4. The Chairperson said that there had been no developments at the TNC and General Council
level;  he therefore proposed reverting to this ma tter at the next session in the light of any new
developments in these bodies.
5. It was so agreed.TN/IP/M/7
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C. NEGOTIATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION AND
REGISTRATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS FOR WINES AND SPIRITS
6. The Chairperson suggested that, as in previous meetings, the International Bureau of WIPO
be invited to participate in its capacity as expert in the discussions regarding issues such as
notification and registration procedures.
7. It was so agreed.
8. The Chairperson said that there were three new documents:  a revised version of the
Secretariat compilation of issues and points (TN/IP/W/7/Rev.1 and Corr.11);  the minutes of the sixth
Special Session (TN/IP/M/6);  and a communicati on from the European Communities on the issue of
legal effects (JOB(03)/123).
9. He recalled that, at the sixth Special Session, he had expressed the hope that by the July
meeting Members would be able to consider a text with a single set of ideas rather than a text withwidely divergent proposals.  He had said that, with a view to being in a position to have such a text by
the July meeting, he would continue to consult in tensively with delegates in various formats, having
regard to the need to ensure transparency.  He had accordingly held a number of informal
consultations.  The last open-ended one was on 6 June.  As foreshadowed at that meeting, he had
subsequently held informal consultations, either individually or in small groups of countries, with awide range of the most active delegations to explore the scope for finding ways forward, in particular
on the issues of legal effects and participation, with a view to assessing whether there was sufficient
flexibility to warrant him circulating a new draft before this formal session.  Based on these informal
consultations and in the light of the current state of the negotiations in the Special Session and of the
Doha Development Agenda as a whole, it was his appreciation that delegations did not as yet feel in aposition to be sufficiently flexible in their positions on the key issues of legal effects and participation
to warrant him circulating a new draft before this formal session.  This assessment had been reflected
in a fax sent to all participants on 24 June 2003.  He therefore proposed to continue the discussions on
the basis of the Draft Text contained in JOB(03)/75, and to organize them according to the structure
of the Draft Text.  He also indicated that the minutes contained in document TN/IP/M/6 recordedheading by heading the points that delegations had made on the Draft Text at the sixth Special
Session.
General Comments
10. The representative of the European Communities said that, as long as there was no progress
on the two key issues of legal effects and participati on, it would be difficult to have a clearer view as
to what ultimately would be a multilateral system despite the clear mandate given.  Little attention hadbeen paid to the usefulness of the system proposed by his delegation.  Instead, there had been a long
discussion about what would constitute a "TRIPS pl us" or a "TRIPS minus", about costs and burdens
without actually giving arguments why the Eur opean Communities proposal would be burdensome
and costly.
11. Turning to the question of legal effects of international treaties on non-participating countries,
he noted that the minutes of the sixth Special Session (TN/IP/M/6) reflected the reservation made by
his delegation with respect to the request for information made by some delegations.  In spite of his
delegation's reservation, the Secretariat had circulated, at the informal meeting of 6 June 2003, a paper
on obligations of treaties for non-participating countries.  He reiterated the questions his delegation
had posed to the Secretariat at that informal meeting.  How many international registration systems
                                                     
1 Concerns the English version only.TN/IP/M/7
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for intellectual property rights  have legal effects?  How many WTO Agreements entail legal effects?
How many WTO Agreements are voluntary?
12. The representative of Australia addressed first the question of the state of negotiations and his
delegation's position in relation to the Chairman's Draft Text (JOB(03)/75).  The aim of the Special
Session was to negotiate a multilateral system of geographical indications for wines and spirits by theCancún Ministerial Conference.  It appeared, at this stage, that the deadline was an ambitious one.
Some delegations continued to want a system that the majority of delegations considered:  as beyond
the mandate;  as violating the principle of territoriality;  as too bureaucratic;  and as too costly.  Given
that a critical mass of delegations supported a mandated system that would not increase the rights and
obligations currently found in the TRIPS Agreement and that would respect the principle of
territoriality, involve minimal bureaucracy and be far less costly, his delegation regretted that this
negotiation remained unresolved.  This negotiation was not one aimed at increasing the level ofprotection afforded to geographical indications under the TRIPS Agreement.  As already said a
number of times, his delegation would not allow it to be turned into such a negotiation.  He found it
extraordinary that those Members who refused to offer protection to third countries' geographical
indications unless they had equivalent systems of protection were the very same who wished to re-cast
the mandate in such a manner as to ensure that their own geographical indications were protectedaccording to their wishes in all other WTO markets.   He stressed that his delegation was committed to
continue working towards completion of this negotiation:  it was open-minded on the need for and
timing of future meetings.
13.  With regard to the Chair's draft report to the TNC on these negotiations, he suggested that the
following considerations be taken into account.  Australia remained committed to the mandate forthese negotiations, which had provided the Special Session with a solid set of principles on which to
base discussion both now and in the future.  The mandate called for a multilateral system of
notification and registration.  The Joint Proposal (TN/IP/W/5) laid out the elements of a system that
fulfilled this mandate.  Such elements had been highlighted in the Chairman's Draft Text and his
delegation remained supportive of that text insofar as it reflected those elements.  He recalled that hisdelegation had pointed out that notification and registration systems were not new to the WTO and
had highlighted the usefulness of systems for notification and registration such as those instituted
under the TBT Agreement.  The mandate of the Special Session did not call for the creation of a
register with the type of legal effects the demandeurs would like to see.  The system proposed under
the Joint Proposal would require those Members part icipating in the system to commit themselves to
consult the system when making decisions about the recognition and protection of geographical
indications.  This element of the Joint Proposal was also clearly reflected in the Chairman's DraftText.  The Special Session's mandate was to facilitate the existing level of protection accorded to
geographical indications by the TRIPS Agreement and to increase that level of protection.  The Joint
Proposal respected the existing balance of rights and obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.  His
delegation could not accept those elements of the Draft Text that strayed beyond the mandate.  The
mandate required a system that would be voluntary, i.e., that would allow Members to choose whetheror not they would participate in the system.  The Joint Proposal provided Members with that choice;
it did not require all WTO Members to participate nor did it prevent non-participants from accessing
the information on the system.  It was clear from the Chairman's Draft Text that there were proposals
on the table that clearly took away from WTO Member s the right to make such a choice.  Referring to
the part of the Chairman's opening statement made at the 6 June informal meeting recalling commentsto the effect that the legal effect of a registration under the Joint Proposal might not be sufficient, he
urged the Chair in further reporting to cast comments in more objective terms.  It was the proposals
made by other delegations seeking to re-write the way Members were implementing the TRIPS
Agreement in order to increase the level of protection provided to geographical indications overall
that were problematic.  There was clearly no mandate to re-write the TRIPS Agreement in such amanner.  It was clear that the system had to be both multilateral and give Members the right to choose
whether or not to participate in it.  The Joint Proposal managed this balancing act in a manner thatTN/IP/M/7
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remained true to Ministers' mandate.  Unlike some other proposals on the table, it did not render
Members' choice a nullity by interpreting multilateral as the equivalent of "universal".  For Australia,
the political wishes of a few for an increased protection should not be used to trample on, and ignore,
the principles that all Members had agreed to collectively.
14.  With regard to the Chair's report to the TNC, the representative of Australia mentioned two
elements to be included in that report.  The first element was that no middle ground had emerged from
the discussion, and that any solution must fall within the negotiating mandate.  Apart from the Joint
Proposal, no proposals reflected in the Chairman's Draft Text were so situated.  Hong Kong, China
proposal usefully articulated principles with which his delegation had indicated considerable
sympathy.  Nevertheless, it created presumptions in international law that would increase the
protection currently afforded to geographical indications by the TRIPS Agreement.  Protection for
geographical indications could be increased in two ways:  first, by strengthening Members' positiveobligations to protect geographical indications;  second, by weakening Members' rights to exempt
certain geographical indications from protection.  His delegation did not think that this was the time to
add to the suggestions made by some Members to create a stronger obligation by creating a
presumption, and to weaken Members' rights to except geographical indications from protection by
subjecting the exercise of that right to multilateral challenge procedures.  His delegation concurredwith the Chair's statement made on previous occasions that this negotiation was not about increasing
the level of protection.  The second element of the report related to participation:  the only principle
that was driving these negotiations was the voluntary nature of the system.  The more reasonable the
system, the more likely Members would participate in it.  It was not the purpose of these negotiations
to remedy the defects of the Lisbon Agreement, which had 20 members because only 20 countriesconsidered it in their interests to sign on.  It would be unprecedented if, in the name of
multilateralism, Members who had made the considered decision not to participate in WIPO
Agreements were then forced to do so in the WTO.
15.  The representative of Chile concurred with the Chair that there were still major differences
among Members.  For Chile, those differences could not be overcome by seeking alternatives that
would change the current balance of rights and obligations of the TRIPS Agreement and change the
mandate of Article 23.4 of the Agreement.  Chile could not accept a system that would undermine the
principle of territoriality, on which all forms of intellectual property were based.  Nor could it accept
new obstacles to the legitimate use of exceptions.  Chile was prepared and determined to work with
the Chairman to complete the mandate within th e time-period, and hoped that all delegations would
participate in the negotiations and consultations so as to better understand the scope of certain
proposals.  Chile and a substantial number of countries had made a proposal which was in compliancewith the mandate and which contained no mention of increasing the level of protection or changing
the balance of Members' rights and obligations.  This was the lowest common denominator and the
best one.  The proposal made by the European Communities intended to create an unprecedented
system of protection in the field of intellectual property protection systems or treaties.  The
information given by the Secretariat on other treaties and registration systems led to the sameconclusion.  For Chile, there was no reason to adopt a "super" category of intellectual property that
would restrict the ability of Members to determine at the national level what would be protected.
There were no legal or economic justifications for this.  If some Members accepted not to change the
balance of rights and obligations, this Session would be able to comply with its mandate within the
required time-frame.  Failure to carry out the manda te would mean that no flexibility had been shown
by certain Members in their unbridled ambition to achieve much more in this field than was stipulated
by the mandate and even by imposing obligations on non-participating Members.  This would be an
illegal track.
16. With regard to participation and legal effects, as well as the information given by the
Secretariat, he said that it was clear that only by accepting explicitly in writing the obligations of a
treaty would a Member enter into obligations.  The future system must be voluntary and each MemberTN/IP/M/7
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should be in a position to determine if the system would suit it or not.  If a Member were to decide not
to participate, then it could not be subject to new obligations.  Chile supported the proposal made by
Malaysia in the informal meeting of 6 June that "Each WTO Member can also elect not to participate
in the multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and
spirits and there are no legal effects or obligations on any WTO Member that has not indicated itsparticipation in the system".  Regarding the costs of the system, if it entailed additional obligations
and if non-participating Members were forced to indirectly accept new obligations, then the system
would be more onerous than one which was purel y voluntary and would facilitate protection.  He
further said that exaggerated claims might hamper chances for Cancún.  What was being proposed by
some Members was a re-opening of the TRIPS Agreem ent.  In this regard, he did not see any reason
for not re-opening other areas in the TRIPS Ag reement.  Regarding the European Communities
comments on the Secretariat paper on treaty obligations for non-participating countries, he said thatthe WTO Members had the right to have all info rmation enabling them to negotiate on a more
meaningful basis.
17. The representative of New Zealand noted the lack of flexibility from the proponents of
various proposals on the table on key outstanding i ssues, the strong concerns expressed by potential
non-participating Members, and the concerns voiced by some developing countries about theimplications of this negotiation and of some of the proposals on the table.  In such a context, it was
therefore appropriate to continue the negotiation on the basis of the Chairman's Draft Text of
16 April 2003 (JOB(03)/75).  While it was regrettable that the Special Session was not ready for a
new text from the Chair, there were clearly issues that needed to be resolved before moving to that
stage.  New Zealand was not in a position to contemplate proposals, whether in their entirety or intheir individual components, which were outside the mandate.  The component parts of the mandate
had been clearly articulated by a large number of delegations throughout the course of this
negotiation.  That included the Chairman's statement at an early stage in the  discussion that the
objective of the negotiation – an important element of the mandate - was not to increase the level of
protection already provided for geographical indications in Section 3 of Part II of the TRIPSAgreement.  This and other elements of the mandate already mentioned were the thresholds that her
delegation applied when making comments regarding the proposals on the table.  These thresholds
had helped show how far beyond the mandate many of the proposals on the table in fact were.
However, this did not mean that the mandate was insufficient.  It meant that more effort must be made
to find solutions within the mandate of Article 23.4 as it was confirmed at Doha.  New Zealand
supported the proposal that was within the mandate, namely the Joint Proposal  (TN/IP/W/5).  It was
unfortunate that a limited group of Members had rema ined unwilling to show any flexibility regarding
a proposal that both met the mandate to facilitate the protection of individual geographical indications
and attracted the support of a large number of interested parties.  The Joint Proposal would have a
legal effect on Members, contributing to their ability to fulfil their existing obligations under
Section 3 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement and, accordingly, to facilitate the protection of
geographical indications.  The proposal therefore warranted further serious consideration by allMembers.  Her delegation would welcome any ideas by other Members on how the proposal might
even further facilitate protection in a way consistent with the mandate.  She pointed out that proposals
with legal effects outside the mandate, for example those creating presumptions in international law
on aspects of geographical indication protection currently applied at a national/territorial level and
those creating legal effects for non-participants would run the risk of attracting few participants.  Thiswould fail to clearly distinguish the results of this negotiation from the existing Lisbon Agreement
that had a low level of participation and therefore a very low level of utility.  Regarding deadlines, she
noted that for this area as well as others where deadlines had been missed, her delegation would be
ready and willing, if necessary, to continue the work after Cancún to finalize this negotiation within
the original mandate.
18. In relation to the third question posed by the European Communities ("How many WTO
Agreements entail legal effects?"), she repeated a question she had already posed at the last informalTN/IP/M/7
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meeting of 6 June 2003:  "Which WTO Agreements contain general overarching provisions like TBT,
SPS and which Agreements apply to particular product sectors?"
19. The representative of Barbados referred to several comments she had made at the 6 June
informal meeting.  First, the analysis made by th e Secretariat of the state of international public law
on the application of treaties to third States was in complete accord with Barbados' own legalassessment of the situation, namely that treaties/international agreements could not have binding
effects on third parties unless these third parties expressly consented to being so bound.  Second, her
delegation insisted that any multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical
indications could not have any obligations for non-participating Members.  Third, participation was a
matter to be determined on an individual basis by each Member.  Her delegation was sympathetic to
the general approach taken by Hong Kong, China.  In particular, it strongly felt that any system
should be as non-intrusive as possible vis-à-vis the national system of protection for geographicalindications and should not involve significant additional administrative or financial burdens for
Members.
20. The representative of the United States expressed the view that it was still possible to meet
the deadline set by Ministers.  However, this would only be possible if delegations respected the
scope of the system that was agreed in the Uruguay Round.  Some delegations had said that there wasa problem with the mandate.  For her delegation, there was none.  The mandate was very clear:  it
concerned a multilateral system of notification and registration that facilitated the existing protection
provided under the TRIPS Agreement for those Member s who were interested in participating in the
system.  It was not a system with "TRIPS-plus" legal implications the demandeurs  would like to
impute to the mandate.  What was making difficult the conclusion of the negotiation was not theabsence of proposals fulfilling the mandate but a concerted effort by a minority of Members to
renegotiate the mandate under Article 23.4 itself.  The system put forward as the Joint Proposal
(TN/IP/W/5) had several elements that would facilitate protection by making readily available
information on foreign geographical indications and by requiring domestic legal authorities to
consider that information, which they currently were not required to do.  As outlined by Australia, thiswas significant.  Her delegation disagreed with suggestions that characterized the Joint Proposal as
lacking in legal effects.  Any report should distinguish between proposals that facilitated protection as
a procedural matter like the Joint Proposal and those that increased the level of protection.
21. The mandate envisaged a voluntary system, one in which there would be two classes of
Members:  participants and non-participants.  Referring to the concern that the European
Communities had with information provided by the Secretariat, she said that it was the Chair's
prerogative to ask for research from the Secretariat.  Her delegation had an additional question:  "Inwhich WTO Agreements are there different classes of Members with different kinds of obligations?"
The Joint Proposal allowed, but did not require, all Members to join the multilateral system, and also
allowed all non-participants to have access to the information on foreign geographical indications,
should they wish to consult the register.  It was useful for non-participants because they would have
the information without any obligations.  The manda te mentioned a "multilateral system".  Some of
the demandeurs  had said that the Joint Proposal would be a plurilateral rather than a multilateral
system.  As delegates had pointed out, the term "multilateral" did not mean "universal".  If that were
the case, the reference in the mandate of Article 23.4 to "Members choosing to participate in the
system" would have no meaning.  This would be contrary to the plain meaning of the words in the
TRIPS Agreement.
22. Her delegation also had some general concerns as to how these talks were being
characterized.  Several options had been laid out, as though on a scale, and as though assuming that
the problem could be solved by choosing some middle ground.  Her delegation strongly disagreed
with such a characterization.  In fact, all the optio ns beyond the Joint Proposal suggested systems that
would be outside the mandate to the extent that th ey provided for a legal presumption.  FurthermoreTN/IP/M/7
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they would create conflicts with prior trademarks, trade names or company names.  For her
delegation, it was inconceivable to hear that such a system did not change the substantive rights under
the TRIPS Agreement.  It would involve a fundamental  re-write of Section 2 of Part II of the TRIPS
Agreement.  The European Communities proposal required the elimination of Article 24.6 - relating
to the ability of Members to refuse protection to generic terms after a brief period of 18 months andwas recommending a significant roll-back of Article 24.5 – relating to prior trademarks.  Both
provisions were safeguard and balance provisions.  The "middle ground" might not lie in the Joint
Proposal, but it must lie within the mandate.  So far,  there had not been any other alternative that lay
within it.  Her delegation would therefore disagree with any report suggesting that the so-called
"middle ground" might lie in the Hong Kong, China proposal, or any other that went beyond that
proposal in terms of favourable presumptions.
23. With regard to the idea of a "critical mass of participants", she said that this was not required
by the mandate.  The more reasonable the system, the more Members would sign on as participants.
If the European Communities and other demandeurs  really wanted a useful agreement with critical
mass, they should spell it out so that there would be a discussion on what terms the agreement should
have so as to be most useful and have the most participants.  If the issue of number of participants was
not so important to the European Communities, then it would not be the role of other negotiators toguarantee a maximum of satisfaction to the demandeurs .  Their role was to satisfy the mandate in a
workable fashion.  She further said that some were assuming in this negotiation that the same kind of
legal effects as under the Lisbon Agreement would be foisted on all WTO Members and not merely
on those who chose to participate in the system.  This was not a logical interpretation of the mandate.
For her delegation, it would be possible to meet the deadline given by Ministers if delegations workedon the principle of usefulness.
24.   The representative of Canada associated his delegation with the comments made by
Australia, Chile, New Zealand and the United States.  The current mandate of the Special Session was
clear and balanced, and there was no need to change it.  What was necessary was to work harder and
for both sides to show some flexibility and realism.  Canada was not ready to work on a proposal thatwent beyond the mandate;  only the Joint Proposal fit within the mandate.  In response to the EC
suggestion that the Joint Proposal might not meet the mandate and that participants should get the
negotiations back to the basics and focus on the value of a registration system, he explained how the
Joint Proposal, and it alone, would fulfil the mandate.  Members would establish a searchable system
of notification and registration for all geographical indications for wines and spirits that would be
notified by participating Members.  The system would be available to Members in hard copy and on
the WTO's internet web site, and would be updated as required.  Decisions to grant protection forgeographical indications for wines and spirits would continue to occur entirely at the national level,
consistent with Article 1.1 and Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the TRIPS Agreement.  In making those
decisions, WTO Members who had chosen to partic ipate in the system would commit to consult the
register, along with other sources of information, so  the information put in the system would be taken
into account by the national authorities when making decisions.  For example, the intellectualproperty offices of participating Members would consult the system when making decisions on
applications for protection of a geographical indication or a trademark, or in regard to labels on
imported wines and spirits.  No such broad-based "register" of geographical indications currently
existed.  The information available in the register would thus facilitate the protection of geographical
indications for wines and spirits by making available to Members much more information on thestatus of names used to describe wines and spirits around the world.  This would assist and facilitate
their decision-making with respect to the validity  or eligibility of geographical indications and
trademarks within their own territory, according to their existing TRIPS obligations and their own
domestic procedures.
25. The Joint Proposal involved voluntary participation.  What did this mean for legal effects on
Members who had chosen not to participate in the system in accordance with Article 23.4?  Under theTN/IP/M/7
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Joint Proposal, there would be no legal effect of any kind on Members who had chosen not to
participate.  Those Members choosing to particip ate in the system would commit to refer to the
register when making decisions regarding geographical indications under domestic law.  All decisions
regarding the protection of geographical indications would continue to be made in accordance with
the domestic law of each WTO Member, consistent  with the current obligations in the TRIPS
Agreement.  The legal effect of the Joint Proposal would therefore be consistent with current rights
and obligations in the TRIPS Agreement.  It woul d not be a "TRIPS-plus".  Each Member would have
the right to decide whether or not to participate in  the system, including by determining for itself its
capacity to operate within the system.  A Member could decide to participate in and withdraw from
the system at any time.
26. The representative of Hungary said that the Chair's opening statement at the 6 June informal
consultation gave a fair description of the range of options for legal effects.  She expressed however
Hungary's disappointment that the Chairperson was unable to come forward with a common
negotiating text, which would enable the Special Session to move forward.  Progress could be
achieved if all participants showed flexibility.   Hungary had on several occasions indicated its
flexibility regarding legal effects, and would expect other delegations to show the same amount of
flexibility.  She finally said that the questions posed by the EC were useful and would providevaluable information.
27. The representative of Cyprus said that her country and its economy were so small that none of
its products or practices could have a major impact on international trade.  It had nevertheless decided
to joint the liberalization process and "be part of the game".  This game must however be played by
the rules, otherwise small players like Cyprus would have no fair chance on the outcome or eventualbenefits of liberalization, let alone a fair chance to win.  For that reason, Cyprus wanted a register that
would entail legal effects on all Members and be multilateral in the same way as the TRIPS
Agreement.  Although a small country, Cyprus  was proud of its traditions, know-how and
specificities, all of which characterized the quality of its products and made them extensively known
abroad.  Cyprus did not only intend to safeguard these characteristics for the next generation but hadno other choice or duty but to do so.  Given its size and real potential, Cyprus was engaging
considerable efforts and resources and, to do so, it needed a multilateral register, where it would
occupy a small place but which would ensure to the whole Membership the adequate legal protection
that could reasonably be expected from any WTO Agreement.
28. Cyprus supported an approach to a multilateral register based on binding legal effects through
the co-sponsoring of document TN/IP/W/3 of 24 June 2002.  This should not have been a surprise to
anyone, as Cyprus was not new in the business of wine-making.  It ranked among the oldest wine-
producing countries of the world.  Very few places were so ideally situated as Cyprus for the growing
of the vine.  The quality of the soil, the Mediterranean sunshine and the right climatic conditions of
Cyprus were all ideal for the production of quality grapes.  Several archaeological findings, ancient
references and writings had proved that the wine-making in Cyprus had a tradition so old that its
beginning was practically impossible to trace.  In this sense, there was Homer's reference to theexcellent quality of Cypriot wines or other authors' writings which placed the cultivation of the grape
vine in Cyprus back to the early days of the island's colonization (3,000 BC).  From ancient and
mediaeval references and writings, it was evident that Cypriot wines enjoyed a high reputation in both
classical and mediaeval times.  Tomasso Poreacchi, a scholar and writer, in his "Famous Island of the
World", published in Venice in 1576, described the wines of Cyprus as "very luscious andwholesome, fragrant and of pleasant taste" and "appreciated accordingly in Venice and Rome".
Cypriot wines carried  names such as "Commandaria" , named after the area that belonged to the lands
of the order of the Knights Templars, or "Laona" and "Afames",  from the mountains on the southern
slopes of the Troodos.  They were sold in places as distant as Japan, Russia, the United States, most
European countries and Canada, and denoted invest ment and promotion campaigns that were worth
protecting, particularly given the size of Cyprus.  It was therefore not surprising that Cyprus had anTN/IP/M/7
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interest in a WTO-wide effective legal protection for those place names reputed since very ancient
times.  Cyprus had no interest in a system that would not apply to all WTO Members.  The TRIPS
Agreement did apply to all WTO Members, including Section 3 of Part II.  Therefore, the protection
to be facilitated, namely that under Section 3, should also concern all WTO Members.  Any other
solution would constitute an unacceptable derogation from the WTO fundamental principle ofmultilateralism.  As far as Cyprus was concerned, what was being proposed by some delegations
might well be a first step towards the gradual erosio n of that principle.  Delegations should not work
towards debasing the WTO but work towards making rules acceptable to all.  A system without any
legal effects would be a non-starter for many delegations.  She also recalled that the European
Communities had made two proposals, one in 1998 and another in 2000, which were significantly
different.  The 1998 proposal advanced a system of state enforcement, which was a non-starter for
many;  the 2000 one did not.  For Cyprus, this was a significant step to allay the concerns of a numberof delegations.  On the other side, the various proposals made for a voluntary database system
continued to be the same:  no legal effects, no security and no voluntary participation.  This did not
seem a good spirit of  approach to negotiations.  Cyprus remained unconvinced that a system without
legal effects would meet the Doha mandate and that it would really "facilitate" protection in
accordance with Article 23.4.  It would like to know how protection would be ensured through thesystems of those countries promoting voluntary participation, the more so since one delegation had
explained that its domestic authorities would not be bound by such a register.  This would mean that
protection might, but also might not, be facilitated.
29. The representative of the Slovak Republic expressed his delegation's disappointment
regarding the lack of progress.  The main objective of the TRIPS Agreement was to reduce distortions
in international trade and to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property.  The
register of geographical indications would achieve those objectives.  There would be greater certainty
for producers, who would have a better picture of where their geographical indications were
protected.  The combination of two elements, the lack of legal effects and the voluntary participation,
would not give any value to the creation of such a register.  The system of improving the protection ofgeographical indications should be prevailing, and should apply to all WTO Members, otherwise it
would not achieve the aim of a "multilateral" system.  He finally added that an historical interpretation
of Article 23.4 might not result in a voluntary register.
30. The representative of the European Communities said, in response to comments made on the
mandate, that every delegation might well believe that its proposal fell within the mandate.  A system
that would give WTO Members the choice whether or not to attach legal effects to an international
registration system did not ensure that protection would be facilitated.  For his delegation, such asystem did not provide the type of predictability it was aiming at and could hardly be the object of
negotiations.  It was as if commitments were agreed upon in market access without defining the
commitments and Members were left free to honour th em or to change them.  This was exactly the
major problem with the Joint Proposal.
31. With respect to the Hong Kong, China proposal, the question was whether it contained any
presumption regarding the non-applicability of any exception other than the one under Article 24.9 of
the TRIPS Agreement.  It advanced a presumption that the definition of Article 22.1 was met.  Thus,
if a certain term was presumed to be a geographic al indication, would there also be a presumption that
it was not generic, and the exception under Article 24.6 would not apply?  Regarding the observation
made that under the Hong Kong, China proposal a multilateral examination procedure would not benecessary, he said that, given that legal effects were reduced to a mere presumption of protection, a
multilateral examination and opposition system was not really necessary.  Indeed, such a presumption
could always be rebutted at the national level.  However, his delegation believed that a multilateral
opposition system could be envisaged on a voluntary basis.  Certain Members might find it useful to
use an opposition system on a voluntary basis in or der to prevent the presumption of protection from
becoming effective at the national level.  Also, th e main problem with the Hong Kong, China proposalTN/IP/M/7
Page 10
was its voluntary character.  No matter what legal effects were attached to the act of registration under
that proposal, any WTO Member would be able to si mply opt out.  This would not only be at odds
with the mandated multilateral char acter of such a register but would fundamentally undermine the
purpose of facilitating protection of geographical indications in all Members.
32. With regard to legal effects, the models described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Chair's
opening statement at the 6 June meeting did not diff er from the Hong Kong, China proposal.  Both the
European Communities and the Hong Kong, China proposals provided for a presumption that a
registered geographical indication met the Article 22.1 definition.  In this sense and contrary to what
was implied in the Chair's statement, there was no presumption that a geographical indication did not
fall under one of the Article 24 exceptions.  For example, a geographical indication might well meet
the definition of Article 22.1 and be presumed as entitled to protection under Articles 22 and 23.  Yet
this would not imply that there was a presumption that certain uses of the geographical indication in
third countries did not fall under Article 24.  For example, if there were uses falling under the
Article 24.4 exception, the protection of Articles 22 a nd 23 would simply not be operational vis-à-vis
those uses but would be operational vis-à-vis other uses that did not fall under that exception.  He
further clarified that the request to enter into negotiations in case of a challenge was nothing more
than a repetition of the existing obligations contained in Article 24.1.
33. With regard to participation as indicated in paragraph 13 of the Chair's opening statement, he
said that the degree of participation was an esse ntial element.  The European Communities had always
thought of this register as a WTO instrument, othe rwise there would not be any need to negotiate in
the WTO since there was already such a plurilateral instrument in the Lisbon Agreement.  Reference
had been made to a "universal" agreement, which was not a common term in the WTO.  The TRIPSAgreement established certain requirements for the legal protection of geographical indications that
applied to all Members and the multilateral register should not be different.  While appreciating the
Chair's idea of a critical mass, the European Communities were not ready to deviate from the
principle of multilateralism.  The future multilateral system must be part of the WTO package for
present and future WTO Members, otherwise there would be an erosion of the WTO buildingprinciples.  If the WTO Members were to be deprived of the fundamental principle of multilateralism
in this area, they should also be prepared to have opt-out clauses in other WTO areas of negotiation.
This should be borne in mind for the Chair's draft report.  The report should be factual and should not
contain phrases which indicated that a proposal fell within or outside the mandate.
34. The representative of Switzerland said that her delegation failed to understand why some
delegations kept finding that a system with legal effects would contravene Article 23.4 in spite of all
the clarifications given.  It would be impossible to fulfil the mandate, i.e., to establish a systemfacilitating the protection of geographical indications, if the system did not entail the legal effect of
facilitating such protection.  The examination system would take into account the concerns related to
territoriality.  If a country believed that a geographical indication did not comply with the conditions
of protectability, it could challenge it.  The effects of the registration would then be suspended in that
country until the difference was resolved.  In the event of a simple database which authorities wouldonly refer to, it would be impossible to know how th e domestic authorities' work would be facilitated
by such a system.  Switzerland only wanted a syst em that would simply transcribe into operational
terms the current level of protection which was already incumbent on all Members.  The system
should be multilateral like the TRIPS Agreement:  non-participating WTO Members would not be
bound by the future system.  With regard to the idea of a critical mass, her delegation did not thinkthat this would be an appropriate solution because the establishment of the multilateral system was
part of a single undertaking.  She finally said that the draft report to the TNC should be a factual one.
35. The representative of Hong Kong, China said, in response to a comment made by the
European Communities regarding his delegation's proposal (TN/IP/W/8), that the presumption created
by a registered geographical indication would not affect the Article 24 exceptions, except as it relatedTN/IP/M/7
Page 11
to Article 24.9.  As regards the relationship between Articles 22.1. and 24.6, he said under the former
there would be a general presumption that the geographical indication met the requirements of
Article 22.1, and under the latter the circumstances of each specific case had to be taken into account.
This matter would be left to the domestic courts.
36. The representative of Argentina associated her delegation with the comments made by
Australia, Canada, Chile and New Zealand on the cont ent of this negotiation.  Having participated in
the discussions since the beginning, her delegation noted that negotiations had not made headway
because some delegations had been including points outside the mandate.  In this context, she recalled
that there was no mandate to change the existing balance of rights and obligations.  Argentina was not
in a position to accept solutions that would modify the current rights and obligations contained in the
Agreement.  She concurred with the representative of Chile that there was no possibility of striking a
balance within Section 3 of Part II of the TRIPS Ag reement.  If that section were to be reopened, then
her delegation would wish to have other elements included as well:  for example, an international
system to facilitate trademark protection, or competition policy rules to avoid intellectual property
becoming a trade barrier. She further indicated that, when discussing JOB(03)/75 paragraph by
paragraph, her delegation would refrain from repeating the same points but silence should not be
taken to mean acquiescence.
37. The representative of Turkey expressed his delegation's commitment to the Doha mandate,
namely to create a multilateral register which would be useful and have a binding character.  His
delegation had some difficulty in accepting the interpretation that Ministers had agreed to a
registration system which would be a mere repetition of the Lisbon Agreement.
38. The representative of the European Communities said that his delegation had shown a
significant degree of flexibility.  It had first made a proposal in 1998, and revised it.  As regards
Chile's comment that the European Communities proposal would entail an amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement and reopen the whole Agreement, he said that the proposal only aimed at putting into
effect Article 23.4 and not at amending the rest of Section 3 of Part II of the Agreement.  Such a
mandate had been given by Ministers at Doha.  He further said that the Joint Proposal would actuallynot bring any added value but would even be dangerous because any Member would be able to notify
any geographical indication even if it was not entitled to do so, and there was no procedure to resolve
conflicts raised by conflicting notifications.
39. The representative of the Czech Republic expressed support for the statements made by the
European Communities and Switzerland that only a multilateral system with legal effects on all
Members could fulfil the mandate of Article 23.4 and of the Doha Declaration.
40.  The representative of Canada, responding to the European Communities remark that the Joint
Proposal would entail dangerous consequences, said that all geographical indications notified under
that proposal would be entered into the system, and any WTO Member or private party in that
Member wishing to challenge the legitimacy of a notified geographical indication could do so in
accordance with domestic procedures of that Member.  Concerns about the legitimacy of a
geographical indication, for example whether or not it met the definition of Article 22.1 or theexceptions under Article 24, would simply be resolved domestically rather than through a new system
of dispute settlement with compulsory negotiations.  There would be no need to establish a new
dispute settlement procedure at the international level as the European Communities had proposed:  if
a Member believed that another Member was not complying with the TRIPS provisions, it could
make use of the WTO dispute settlement procedure.
41. The representative of the Secretariat said, in relation to the first question raised by the
European Communities ("How many international registration systems for intellectual property rights
have legal effects?") that the Secretariat paper on multilateral notification and registration systemsTN/IP/M/7
Page 12
(TN/IP/W/4) already provided information on this matter.  Paragraph 8 of that document as well as
the synoptic tables on pages 5-14 for example dealt with the legal effects provided in various
multilateral registration systems.  With regard to the second question ("How many WTO Agreements
entail legal effects?"), he asked whether he was correct in understanding that the question related to
WTO agreements which contained obligations on the national laws that Members should establish ontrade and intellectual property within their territories.  On the third issue ("How many WTO
Agreements are voluntary?"), he asked whether he was correct in understanding that this related to
agreements to which Members had the option of whether or not to join.  Regarding the question posed
by New Zealand, he understood it to refer to WTO agreements which contained provisions that
applied generally to trade in goods as opposed to agreements that related to particular sectors of trade
in goods or services or of intellectual property.  He understood the question posed by the United
States as relating to WTO agreements which provided for different obligations for different classes ofMembers, e.g., developing countries.
42.  The representative of the United States further clarified that her question covered specific
situations in which some Members and not others were expected to take on some obligations.  She
added another question:  "Are there any WTO Agreements that require national governments to
instruct their courts to impose presumptions of a legal nature in their domestic court system?"
43.  The Chairperson asked whether it would be agreeable to delegations to ask the Secretariat to
provide information on the questions posed by the delegations of the European Communities, New
Zealand and the United States.
44. It was so agreed.
Chairperson's Draft Text (JOB(03)/75)
Paragraph 4:  Legal Effects in Participating Members
45. The representative of New Zealand offered some comments on the legal effects suggested by
Hong Kong, China in TN/IP/W/8.  Hong Kong, China had proposed that the registration create a
presumption that the geographical indication met the definition under Article 22.1.  The effect of this
presumption - the reversal of the burden of proof - was a cause for practical concern for herdelegation:  it claimed that persons who had rights to a term and had registered that term in the
multilateral system would benefit from the presumption that the registered term met the definition of a
geographical indication.  To show the effect of the proposal, she gave the example of a court case in
New Zealand regarding the term "Champagne".  In that instance, the French Champagne-makers
produced evidence that French Champagne had certain characteristics, reputation and quality that
were attributable to a certain region in France while the other sparkling wine from New Zealand did
not.  It seemed logical that French producers had to prove that "Champagne" was "Champagne".They did that convincingly in the court case.  Ho wever, how could one expect the defendants in this
case to come up with evidence that the French Champagne did not have the specific characteristics,
quality and reputation that was attributable to its geographical origin?  The defendants might have
evidence on why their product was not substantially different from the French Champagne as it too
had bubbles, taste and a certain colour.  Reversing the burden of proof would make it impossible forthe defendants to ever win.  This substantial point shifted the balance of rights and obligations and
was outside the Special Session mandate.  She believed this was not the intention of Hong Kong,
China, who had explained that the proposed prima facie evidence would have a procedural rather than
a substantive effect.  This was however the practical result of what Hong Kong, China was proposing.
46. The representative of Colombia took note of New Zealand's comments on the Hong Kong,
China proposal.  She further asked whether the proposal, in particular with regard to the reversal of
burden of proof, would not imply amending national legislation.TN/IP/M/7
Page 13
47. The representative of Argentina asked for clarifications regarding JOB(O3)/123 (non-paper
on legal effects from the European Communities).  This document clearly showed that there was no
difference between legal effects in participatin g Members and those in non-participating Members.
Referring to Article 24, which dealt with exceptions and acquired rights by third parties, she
wondered whether it would really be a sign of flex ibility to say that participating Members might use
it freely and that non-participating Members might use it to "modulate" the protection under Articles
22 and 23.  All Members had full right to apply the exceptions at the national level;  exceptions were a
guarantee of the legitimate and prior usage by others.  She asked for clarification of the term "to
modulate" in the fifth and sixth rows of the table in JOB(03)/123.
48. Turning to the seventh row of the table in JOB(03)/123, where it was said that "This could be
used both to expunge a GI from the register and to deny any 'presumed' protection for a notified GI",
she asked whether geographical indications that were not protected in the country of notificationcould nevertheless be notified and registered.
49. With regard to the last paragraph of JOB(03)/123 on the effects of a challenge, she observed
that one possibility would be for all Members to challenge a notified geographical presumption
merely from a preventive point of view and have subsequently a national examination.  She wondered
whether it should not be specified in the notification that it would be subject to a prior process ofexamination in a country so that this country could really challenge the notification.  She also
wondered how it was possible to give Members the sovereign right of determining at a national level
whether or not a geographical indication fell under an Article 24 exception and at the same time to
submit the geographical indication to bilateral negotiations.  This would render the right relative.
50. Regarding bilateral negotiations, she asked how the MFN clause would apply to the results of
the negotiation between two Members.
51. Turning to homonymous geographical indications, she asked on what basis it would be
determined which of two or several notifying Members would have the homonymous term.  In the
event that there were no challenges by third countries, would the registered homonymous
geographical indications have the same legal effects in those third countries?  Would third countrieshave to wait until the bilateral negotiations were finalized?
52. The representative of the United States asked for clarification on the role of non-participating
Members under the European Communities proposal.  It was not clear to his delegation what the
benefits would be in terms of legal effects.  In JOB(03)/60 (Chairman's Note on Possible
Elements/Options), it was stated that, under the option covered by paragraph 14(b), a non-participant
might refuse protection of a registered geographical indication if the non-participant was referred to in
an annotation to the registration.  Would this mean that non-participants must file a challenge to eachand every geographical indication to ensure that they would not have to provide protection under the
system?  It this were the case, what would then be the benefit of being a non-participant?
53. He further asked for clarifications regarding JOB(03)/123.  The first question related to the
fourth row of the table.  On what basis was the European Communities making the assertion that
"providing WTO Members with a possibility to verify whether notifications comply with thedefinition must lead to assurances for a right holder that he will be entitled to protection in case of no
opposition"?
54. Second, why must Members be forced to undertake new obligations just for being given the
opportunity to verify if a geographical indication was eligible for protection?  Nothing in the mandate
of the Special Session said whether and why it should be done within 18 months.TN/IP/M/7
Page 14
55. Third, why should Members have, as specified in the third row, only 18 months for opposing
a notified geographical indication on the basis of the genericness exception of Article 24.6?  For his
delegation, Members should never lose the right to invoke Article 24.6.
56. Fourth, what was the meaning of "to modulate th e 'presumed' protection of Articles 22.3 and
23.2" in the fifth and sixth rows?
57. Fifth, would Members be required to enter into negotiation to resolve a dispute over a notified
geographical indication and in what circumstances?
58. He finally said that his delegation disagreed with the European Communities that Article 24.5
established coexistence of the prior trademark with the geographical indication.
59. The representative of the European Comm unities said that the paper contained in
JOB(03)/123 attempted to bring clarity to the legal effects proposed under the EC approach.  On the
first page under "legal effect", the paper reflected the language used in IP/C/W/107/Rev.1 as well assome previous statements made by his delegation on this issue.  It attempted to explain in a table
format how those legal effects related to each and every one of the TRIPS provisions.  In the first
column, the various legal effects had been specif ied.  The second and third columns showed how the
legal effects applied to participating and non-participating Members.  The fourth column contained
comments as to the rationale behind the legal effect specified in the first column.  He also clarifiedthat the language used in the columns on "legal effects" and "comments" was not necessarily the
language of the European Communities proposal.  This should not mean that the European
Communities had changed their proposal or position.  They had only tried to make some genuine
effort to explain the same things without using th e same words in order to avoid the same questions
being raised again.  On the last section of this paper, "effects of a challenge (i.e. opposition)", thepaper attempted to give:  some insight into what the effects were of a challenge;  some views on how
the process of examination and verification of different notifications could be done through existing
national systems;  and what would happen if there was a divergence in time-lengths between national
laws and between the European Communities proposal.  The launching of a challenge by the other
Member - and ensuing consultations and negotiation  - would not be an automatic process:  that
Member would have first to finalize its domestic examination of the notified geographical indication.
If the examination had led to the conclusion that protection should not be granted, and a challenge
were made, then it should be possible to invoke Article 24.1 directly.
60. In response to the first question posed by the United States about the advantage of being a
non-participant under the European Communities proposa l, he said that the future register would
apply to all WTO Members.  The difference between participating and non-participating Members
was clearly set out in the table of JOB(03)/123, in the fourth row:  participating Members would haveto provide for presumption of eligibility for protection, while non-participating Members would not.
Non-participating Members would only be concerned by legal effects described in the first, second
and third rows, namely regarding the situations dealt with under Articles 22.1 (definition of a
geographical indication), 22.4 (false homonymous geographical indications) and 24.6 (generic terms).
Non-participating Members would not need to offer the presumption of eligibility.  Being part of theregister even for non-participants could be of benefit to them.  Taking the example of Article 23.2 of
the TRIPS Agreement, which provided that trademarks containing geographical indications should
not be registered, he said that this provisions did not seem to be often applied because countries did
not know what terms were geographical indications.  Under the European Communities proposal, a
trademark examiner would simply look at the register, see what terms were geographical indicationsand refuse registration of those trademarks containing such terms.
61. In response to the comment made that the obligation to verify whether a term met the
definition of a geographical indication or not was a new one, he said that the European Communities'TN/IP/M/7
Page 15
system would only provide protection to terms that fulfilled the requirements for protection as
geographical indications.  A country might wish to examine whether a term met the definition and, if
not, it could lodge an opposition.  If a country did no t make such an examination and wished to grant
protection independently of whether or not the term met the definition, this would be that country's
choice.
62. In response to the question of why Members should be obliged to accept a time-limit of
18 months for challenging a geographical indication on the basis of genericness, he said that a
producer who was seeking for protection in each a nd every Member would know after this time-limit
whether the term was generic or not in certain Members and that protection would be denied in those
Members in accordance with Article 24.6.  He pointed out that the wording of this Article seemed to
suggest that the determination of whether a term was generic or not should be done at the date of the
notification and not later on.
63. Regarding the meaning of "to modulate the 'presumed' protection" of Articles 22 and 23, he
said that the term "modulate" was used to explain how the presumption would work vis-à-vis the
exception under Article 24.5.  For his delegation, Article 24.5 established the principle of coexistence
of geographical indications and trademarks in certain circumstances.  This was generally accepted and
even trademark organizations like INTA (Internati onal Trademark Association) had confirmed this.  If
indeed in certain circumstances a geographical indication and a trademark must coexist, then it would
mean that the protection that was exclusive for each right would be "modulated" to accommodate
each other's use of the same sign under the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.  In other
words, the exclusive protection that a geographical indication might otherwise enjoy would be eroded
or modulated by the prior trademark.
64. As far as the proposal for entering into negotiation was concerned, he recalled that
Article 24.1 already provided that Members must not refuse to enter into negotiation with a view to
increase protection of individual geographical indications.  The European Communities only
reiterated the obligation in their proposal.  The notifying Member could therefore ask the challenging
Member to enter into negotiation.  In practice, this would require the challenging Member to accept it.In the European Communities' view, consultations might be counter-productive for the notifying
Member.
65. Regarding protection in the country of origin, he said that the European Communities
proposal did not impinge on the possibility of invoki ng Article 24.9 at the national level.  In other
words, if a geographical indication was notified and later registered and for some reason ceased to be
protected in the country of origin, nothing in the European Communities proposal prevented a private
party in a third country from invoking the fact that the registered geographical indication had ceasedto be protected in the country of origin in order to nullify the protection or any presumption that
resulted from registration in that third country.  In other words, Article 24.9 could be invoked in order
to expunge the geographical indication from the register.  However, if this had not occurred, any
private party would still be able to invoke Article 24.9 in a third country under the national law if it
believed that the registered geographical indication had ceased to be protected or had fallen intodisuse.
66. With respect to opposition, and as had been explained, countries could already use existing
domestic systems to process international applications for registrations of geographical indications in
order to undertake the examination that would be required under the European Communities proposal.
He observed that, under Argentinian law, a domestic application would be processed within 90 days;the time-limit of 18 months proposed by the European Communities proposal therefore seemed
feasible.TN/IP/M/7
Page 16
67. The representative of Australia said that the responses given by the European Communities
gave his delegation little comfort.  The one and only real issue was whether the European
Communities proposal would lead to an increase of the level of protection for geographical
indications compared to the one currently afforded under the TRIPS Agreement.  For his delegation,
this would be the case.  There were two ways of in creasing the level of protection:  one would consist
in increasing a Member's obligation to protect geographical indications, and the other in limiting a
Member's ability to exempt certain geographical indications from protection.  With their proposal, the
European Communities had highlighted how they proposed to complete both objectives.  First, the
proposal increased a Member's obligation throug h establishing an irrebuttable presumption of
protection.  Secondly, the proposed legal effects were aimed at weakening a Member's ability to
exempt certain geographical indications from protection.  The TRIPS Agreement as it was agreed at
the end of the Uruguay Round had clearly articulated time-frames for the use of certain exceptions.There was no agreement that TRIPS exceptions should be invoked in a 18-month time-frame.  What
Members had elected to do in other intellectual property treaties or frameworks was of little relevance
here.  Ultimately, an agreement to invoke the ex ception within 18 months would mean that for certain
geographical indications the exceptions would be completely phased out.  Nothing in the TRIPS
Agreement said that a Member's right to invoke an exception should be subject to any type ofchallenge procedure.  Had Members agreed to subject the use of the TRIPS Agreement to this type of
situation, they could have done so for example for homonymous geographical indications, which
provided for bilateral or plurilateral consultations.  Clearly, that language was never agreed.  The
obligation to submit to a challenge procedure was not part of the TRIPS Agreement, but enshrined the
principle that intellectual property rights were private rights with territorial application.  That was whythe European Communities did little to allay Australia's concerns.
68. The representative of the European Communities said, in response to the Australian
delegation's comments, that the initial intention of his delegation was to propose a shorter time-limit
for challenges which would curtail the period of uncertainty for the notifying Member.  Thus, the
proposed time-limit of 18 months was a reasonable one.  He also observed that nothing in Article 23.4said that a database should be established.
69. The representative of Morocco said that Article 23.4 expressly stated that Members would
create a multilateral register to facilitate the protection of geographical indications.  The protection
was already provided by Article 23.  It was therefore surprising to hear some delegations say that the
legal effects of the multilateral system would lead to new obligations.  For his delegation, the balance
of rights and obligations should be respected;  in this connection, the register would have a useful
effect, namely to facilitate the protection of right holders of geographical indications on an existingbasis.  Without legal effects, the multilateral system would not have any real effect and would be
similar to the Lisbon Agreement.  It was important to understand producers' concerns:  they needed
the necessary means to get an efficient implementation of the protection of geographical indications in
case of confusion or undue usage.  It was therefore necessary to create a legal context in which the
owners of geographical indications could have their rights protected not only for wines and spirits butalso for other products.  There should be insuperable obstacles to undue usage of geographical
indications by producers outside the country of the geographical indication, otherwise producers in
that country would give up seeking protection in other countries.  This would be most unfortunate
because many products which represented a Member's cultural heritage would not find a place on
markets that corresponded to their just value.
Paragraph 5:  Legal Effects on Non-participating Members
70. The representative of Morocco proposed that the Draft Text provide that non-participating
Members be obliged to not refuse the protection of a geographical indication on the basis of
Articles 21.1, 22.4 and 24.6 of the TRIPS Agreement.TN/IP/M/7
Page 17
Paragraph 11:  Administering Body
71. The representative of Morocco said that the administering body should be the WTO
Secretariat because of the availability of the WTO multilateral dispute settlement system.
D. OTHER BUSINESS
Draft Chair's Report to the TNC
72. The Chairperson said that the Chairs of all the negotiating bodies were required to submit to
the TNC of 14-15 July reports on the state of play in their respective areas.  He would give
delegations an opportunity to look at his draft report and make comments.  The report would indicate
that positions remained far apart on many issues, in particular with regard to legal effects and
participation and that these differences would need to be resolved at the Ministerial Conference at
Cancún.  The report, which would be brief and factual, would be on his own responsibility and be
without prejudice to the positions of delegations.
Future Work
73. The Chairperson recalled that the Doha mandate of the Special Session was to complete the
negotiation of a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for
wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference.  He noted however that positions
remained far apart, in particular with regard to legal effects and participation.  He saw no option but tocontinue with the work in the run-up to Cancún.  In this regard, he referred to the coming meetings of
the TNC (14-15 July) and of the General Council (24-25 July), which would deal with the
organization of the further work prior to Cancún.
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