RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/SG/M/19
16 October 2002
(02-5596)
Committee on Safeguards
MINUTES OF THE REGULAR MEETING
HELD ON 29–30 APRIL 2002
Chairman Mr. Martin Pospíšil (Czech Republic)
1. The Committee on Safeguards (the "Committee") held a regular meeting on 29-30 April 2002.
2. The following agenda was adopted:
Page
A. NATIONAL LEGISLATION - REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS OF NEW
OR AMENDED LEGISLATION OR REGULATIONS NOT PREVIOUSLYREVIEWED BY THE COMMITTEE (including supplemental notifications
of existing provisions not previously reviewed)..........................................................3
(a) Georg ia ..............................................................................................................3
(b) Korea .................................................................................................................3(c) Lithuania............................................................................................................3
(d) Moldova.............................................................................................................3
(e) Poland................................................................................................................3
B. NOTIFICATIONS OF ACTIONS RELATED TO SAFEGUARD
MEASUR ES ................................................................................................................4
(a) Bulgaria – Crown Corks....................................................................................4
(b) Bulgaria – Ammonium Nitrate ..........................................................................4
(c) Canada – Steel ...................................................................................................4
(d) Chile – Steel ......................................................................................................5
(e) Chile – Lighters .................................................................................................5
(f) Costa Rica – Rice .............................................................................................5
(g) Czech Republic – Cocoa Powder .....................................................................6
(h) Czech Republic – Citric Acid ...........................................................................6
(i) Czech Republic – Wire, Ropes and Cables ......................................................6
(j) Czech Republic – Tubes and Pipes ...................................................................6(k) European Commun ities – St eel ........................................................................6
(l) India – Phenol ....................................................................................................... 8
(m) India – Acetone .................................................................................................8
(n) India – Gamma Ferric Oxide / Magnetic Iron Oxide .......................................8
(o) India – Epichl orohydrin ....................................................................................8
(p) Japan – Tatami-Omote, Welsh Onion and Shiitake Mushrooms ......................8
(q) Jordan – Magnetic Tapes ..................................................................................8
(r) Lithuania – Pa stry Yeast ...................................................................................8
(s) Morocco – Rubber.............................................................................................9
(t) Philippines – Grey  Portland Cement ................................................................... 9G/SG/M/19
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(u) Philippines – Ce ramic T iles .................................................................................. 9
(v) Philippines – To mato Paste ................................................................................. 10
(w) Poland – Calcium Carbide .................................................................................. 10
(x) El Salvador – Fertiliz er ....................................................................................... 10
(y) Slovak Republic  – Sugar ..................................................................................... 10
(z) United States – Cert ain Steel Products ............................................................... 10
(aa) United States – Lamb Meat ................................................................................ 14
(bb) United States – Wire Rod ................................................................................... 14
(cc) Venezuela – Paper ............................................................................................... 14
(dd) Venezuela – Iron / Steel U Sections ................................................................... 14
C. NIGERIA – PRE-EX ISTING MEASURES...............................................................15
D. SYSTEMIC ISSUES REGARDING THE OPERATION OF
ARTICLES 8.2 AND 8.3...........................................................................................15
E. IMPLEMENTATION – TIRET 84............................................................................19
F. OTHER BU SINESS ..................................................................................................23
1. Preparations in connection with paragraph 18 of the Protocol
on the Accession of the People's Republic of China (TransitionalReview Mechanism)........................................................................................23
2. Special and differ ential treatment....................................................................26
3. Technical assistance a nd capacity building .....................................................26
4. Notification process.........................................................................................26
5. Turkey – Safeguards inve stigations on  steel ...................................................26
6. United States – Investigati on by Ecuador on matches.....................................27
7. United States – Egypt's definitive safeguard measures on fluorescent lamps .27
G. DATE OF NEXT RE GULAR MEETING ................................................................27
H. ELECTION OF OFFICERS ......................................................................................27G/SG/M/19
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A. NATIONAL LEGISLATION
1. Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously
reviewed by the Committee (including supplemental notifications of existing provisions
not previously reviewed)
3. The Chairman recalled that questions regarding legislative notifications were to have been
submitted to the Member concerned and to the Secretariat no later than 8 April 2002.  The Chairman
noted that written questions had been submitted by the United States regarding the legislative
notifications made by Lithuania, Moldova and Poland.
4. The Chairman recalled that follow-up questions could be asked at this meeting, and that other
delegations also had an opportunity to present questions orally at this meeting.  If Members wished to
have written answers to questions, they should ensure that all questions were presented in writing tothe Member whose legislation was concerned, and to the Secretariat, no later than 20 May 2002.
Written answers to all questions submitted in writing by that deadline should be submitted to the
Secretariat no later than 10 June 2002.
(a) Georgia
5. There were no comments or questions regarding the "nil" notification submitted by Georgia in
document G/SG/N/1/GEO/1.
(b) Korea
6. There were no comments or questions regarding Japan's legislative notification contained in
document G/SG/N/1/KOR/5.
(c) Lithuania
7. Lithuania's legislative notifications are contained in documents G/SG/N/1/LTU/1 and
G/SG/N/1/LTU/2.
8. Written questions regarding this notification were received form the United States.  These
questions can be found in document G/SG/Q1/LTU/1.  Lithuania's replies are contained in document
G/SG/Q1/LTU/2.
(d) Moldova
9. Moldova's legislative notification is contained in document G/SG/N/1/MDA/1.
10. Written questions regarding this notification were received from the United States.  These
questions can be found in document G/SG/Q1/MDA/1.
(e) Poland
11. Poland's legislative notification is contained in document G/SG/N/1/POL/3.
12. Written questions regarding this notification were received from the United States.  These
questions can be found in document G/SG/Q1/POL/4.G/SG/M/19
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13. The Chairman reminded the Committee of the importance of providing written answers to
written questions posed.  As Members were aware, the exchange of written questions and answers
constituted the Committee's only record of the review of legislations.  Thus, the Committee's records
were left incomplete when written questions were not answered, or only answered long after the
meeting where the review took place.  In this context, the Chairman urged all Members to abide bythe deadlines set by the Committee for the provision of written replies to written questions.
14. The Chairman informed the Committee that there were still 33 Members that had not yet
made any legislative notification:
Albania, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, China,
Chinese Taipei, Djibouti, Gabon, the Gambia, Grenada, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Kuwait,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger,  Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts &
Nevis, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tanzania
and Togo.
15. The Chairman urged those Members to make the required notification.  The Chairman
reminded Members that, in cases where no legislation existed, only a very simple "nil" notificationwas required.
16. The Committee took note of the statements made.
B. NOTIFICATIONS OF ACTIONS RELATED TO SAFEGUARD MEASURES
17. The Chairman noted that a large number of notifications of actions related to safeguard
measures had been received since the previous meeting. In order to ensure that all of those
notifications could be reviewed in the limited time available, the Chairman suggested that the
Committee address each investigation separately, and review all notifications pertaining to each
investigation at the same time. The Chairman info rmed Members that any questions concerning the
notifications under review for which written responses were requested should be submitted to the
Member concerned and to the Secretariat no later than 20 May 2002.  Written answers should besubmitted to the Secretariat no later than 10 June 2002.
(a) Bulgaria – Crown Corks
18. The Chairman noted that the notification made by Bulgaria regarding the initiation of an
investigation on crown corks is contained in document G/SG/N/6/BGR/2.
19. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
(b) Bulgaria – Ammonium Nitrate
20. The Chairman noted that the notification made by Bulgaria regarding the initiation of an
investigation on ammonium nitrate is contained in document G/SG/N/6/BGR/3.
21. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
(c) Canada – Steel
22. The Chairman noted that Canada had notified the initiation of an investigation on steel, as set
forth in document G/SG/N/6/CAN/1.G/SG/M/19
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23. The representative of the European Communities expressed his understanding regarding the
background to the initiation of Canada's investigation.  Nevertheless, he expressed concern regarding
this investigation.  The European Communities highlighted four points of concern regarding Canada's
investigation on steel.  First, the European Commun ities considered that there had been a significant
reduction of approximately 30 per cent in the volume of imports of steel into Canada.  Second, it alsoconsidered that there was no clear definition of the like and directly competitive products in the
investigation.  Third, the European Communities noted that it was not clear what the treatment
accorded to imports from other NAFTA countries in the investigation would be. Fourth, the European
Communities also noted that some of the products subject to the safeguard investigation were already
covered by anti-dumping measures.
24. The delegate of Brazil stated that they would be closely following the development of
Canada's investigation.
25. The representative of Canada assured Members that Canada would fully abide by its
obligations in the area of safeguards.  He also asse rted that Canada's steel investigation was initiated
as a result of concerns about global steel trade and the trade diversion effect which could be caused by
measures taken by the United States, the European Communities and Mexico.
(d) Chile – Steel
26. The Chairman noted that Chile had made a number of notifications regarding its investigation
on steel, as set forth in documents G/SG/N/6/CHL/7, G/SG/N/9/CHL/5 and G/SG/N/6/CHL/8.
27. The representative of the European Communities expressed his understanding regarding the
background of Chile's investigation on steel.  The EC delegate also mentioned that he was puzzled
about the evolution of this action given that there had been an initiation, followed by a termination of
the investigation and a subsequent initiation ex officio  regarding the same product.  The EC delegate
questioned whether there were any differences in scope or any other differences that prompted the
reinitiation of the investigation.
28. The delegate of Brazil considered that some of the requirements for the adoption of a
safeguard measure were not present in the case of Chile's steel investigation.
29. The representative of Chile stated that given the latest developments in the world steel market
it was considered necessary to reinitiate the investigation and review the evolution of the imports.
(e) Chile – Lighters
30. The Chairman noted that Chile had made two notifications regarding its investigation on
steel, as set forth in documents G/SG/N/6/CHL/4 and G/SG/N/9/CHL/4.
31. There were no comments or questions regarding these notifications.
(f) Costa Rica – Rice
32. The Chairman noted that Costa Rica had made a number of notifications regarding its
investigation on rice, as set forth in document s G/SG/N/6/CRI/1, G/SG/N /7/CRI/1 and Suppl. 1.
33. The representative of the United States noted that it had strong exporter interest in this
investigation and expressed serious concern.  He also mentioned that they would submit written
questions.G/SG/M/19
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34. The representative of Costa Rica looked forward to receiving the US questions and noted that
they were working on other alternatives that would allow the termination of the measure.
(g) Czech Republic – Cocoa Powder
35. The Chairman noted that the Czech Republic had made a number of notifications regarding
its investigation on cocoa powder as set forth in documents G/SG/N/6/CZE/4, and G/SG/N/7/CZE/3.
Additional notifications regarding Article 12.3 consu ltations in respect of this investigation were
contained in documents G/SG/ 39 and G/SG/39/ Suppls.1 and 2
36. There were no comments or questions on these notifications.
(h) Czech Republic – Citric Acid
37. The Chairman noted that the Czech Republic had notified the initiation of an investigation on
citric acid, as set forth in document G/SG/N/6/CZE/5.
38. The delegate of China expressed his concern regarding this investigation.  The delegate of
China mentioned that if a measure was adopted it would hurt the interests of Czech consumers of
citric acid.  He also was of the opinion that there was no surge in imports of the product and that any
problems which the Czech domestic industry may be suffering were not attributable to imports.
39. The delegate of the Czech Republic took note of the Chinese statement.
(i) Czech Republic – Wire, Ropes and Cables
40. The Chairman noted that the Czech Republic had notified the initiation of an investigation on
wires, ropes and cables, as set forth in document G/SG/N/6/CZE/6.
41. The representative of the European Communities expressed the EC interest in the case and
mentioned that the EC expected to be consulted.  He was also of the view that the scope of the
measure was too broad.
42. The delegate of the Czech Republic took note of the EC statement.
(j) Czech Republic – Tubes and Pipes
43. The Chairman noted that the Czech Republic had notified the initiation of an investigation on
tubes and pipes, as set forth in document G/SG/N/6/CZE/7.
44. The representative of the European Communities expressed the EC interest in the case and
mentioned that the EC expected to be consulted.  He also noted that there were a number of measures
affecting this product.
(k) European Communities – Steel
45. The Chairman noted that the European Communities had made a number of notifications
regarding its investigation on steel.  These notifications were contained in documents
G/SG/N/6/EEC/1, G/SG/N/7/EEC/1, and G/SG/N/ 11/EEC/1.  Additional notifications regarding
Article 12 consultations were contained in docum ents G/SG/42, and G/SG/ 42/Suppls. 1 through 4.
46. The representative of the European Communities stated that the measure had been adopted in
order to prevent diversion resulting from US measures  on steel.  The EC delegate considered that theG/SG/M/19
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EC industry had been affected by US protectionism.  The EC representative noted that the measure
had been taken in the form of a tariff rate quota with a very high level of imports not affected by the
tariff surcharge.  The EC intention was not to indulge in protectionism but to prevent a flood of
imports.  The EC delegate noted that this was the first time that safeguard measures had been used by
the EC because it confronted an emergency situation.  Nevertheless, the EC attitude against the use ofsafeguard measures was maintained.  The EC delegate also noted that in order not to cause undue
damage to trade in steel the scope of the measure had been narrowly defined and that imports from
developing countries which were below 3 per cent of total imports were excluded even if taken
together imports under 3 per cent represented more than 9 per cent of total imports.
47. The delegate of Japan expressed that he understood that the measure had been triggered by
the US measure.  He hoped that the concerns expressed by Japan in the course of the Article 12.4
consultations with the European Communities would be taken into account, including those regardingthe definition of trade diversion.
48. The delegate of Korea also expressed understanding for the circumstances that had led to the
adoption of the EC measure.  However, he was not convinced that there were critical circumstances in
this case that would justify the adoption of a provisional measure.  Moreover, he was also not
convinced that there had been an increase in imports.
49. The delegate of India noted that, with regard to electrical sheets, capacity utilisation for the
EC industry was 105 and 98 per cent for the la st two years of the period of investigation.
Additionally, he noted that there was not a substantial price differential between the imports and the
domestic like product.  The delegate of India queried how the European Communities could have
arrived at a preliminary injury finding in such circumstances.
50. The delegate of Brazil noted that it was going to hold Article 12.4 consultations with the
European Communities and that during the consultations he would express why he considered the
measures to be questionable.
51. The delegate of the United States expressed that he considered that a safeguard measure must
stand on its own and that it could not just be a reaction to a measure taken by another Member.  The
US delegate queried the European Communities regarding the timing of the initiation notification as
he had heard that an investigation had been carried out in January – February 2002.  He also asked
what the EC interpretation of "clear evidence" was under Article 6, and queried whether this
requirement had been satisfied when the only information in the investigation had been provided by
the EC producers.  Another question by the US de legate was whether provisional measures could be
taken without following the requirements under Articles 2 and 4.  Finally, the US delegate wanted to
obtain the EC views regarding its transparency and notification obligations.
52. In response to the query posed by the Indian delegation, the representative of the European
Communities noted that the economic indicators in the resolution had to be seen as a whole and that
taken together they justified the injury determination in the resolution.  In response to the US
questions, the EC representative clarified that what was conducted prior to the 27 March date of
initiation of the investigation was an information-gathering exercise, and not a safeguardinvestigation.  On the interpretation of the term "clear evidence", the EC considered that a full
investigation was not required for the imposition of provisional measures and that the circumstances
in their current steel investigation constitute "clear evidence" under Article 6.  Regarding the
requirements under Articles 2 and 4, the EC considered that a literal interpretation of Article 6 leads
to the conclusion that the requirements in Articles 2 and 4 did not apply in the context of a provisionalmeasure.G/SG/M/19
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(l) India – Phenol
53. The Chairman noted that India had made a number of notifications regarding its investigation
on phenol, as set forth in documents G/SG/N/6/IND/7/Suppl .1, G/SG/N/8/IND/6/S uppl.2 and
G/SG/N/10/I ND/5/Suppl.1.
54. There were no comments or questions on these notifications.
(m) India – Acetone
55. The Chairman noted that India had made two notifications regarding its investigation on
acetone, as set forth in documents G/SG/N/6/IND/8/S uppl.1 and G/SG/N/ 10/IND/6/Suppl.1.
56. There were no comments or questions on these notifications.
(n) India – Gamma Ferric Oxide / Magnetic Iron Oxide
57. The Chairman noted that India had made one notification regarding its investigation on
gamma ferric oxide / magnetic iron oxide, as set forth in document G/SG/N/10/IND/7.
58. There were no comments or questions on these notifications.
(o) India – Epichlorohydrin
59. The Chairman noted that India had notified the initiation of an investigation on
epichlorohydrin. India's notification was contained in document G/SG/N/6/IND/12.
60. There were no comments or questions on this notification.
(p) Japan – Tatami-Omote, Welsh Onion and Shiitake Mushrooms
61. The Chairman noted that Japan had notified the termination of its investigation on tatami-
omote, welsh onion and shiitake mushrooms, as  set forth in documents G/SG/N/9/JPN/1 and
G/SG/N/11/JPN/1.
62. The delegate of Japan stated that they had consulted with China on this issue and concluded
that there was no need for the imposition of safeguard measures on the investigated products and had
therefore decided to terminate the investigation.
(q) Jordan – Magnetic Tapes
63. The Chairman noted that Jordan had made a number of notifications regarding its
investigation on magnetic tapes.  These notifications were contained in documents G/SG/N/6/JOR/1/,
G/SG/N/6/JOR/2, G/ SG/N/7/JOR/1 plus Corr.1 and Suppl.1.
64. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
(r) Lithuania – Pastry Yeast
65. The Chairman noted that Lithuania had made two notifications regarding its investigation on
pastry yeast.  These notifications were contained in documents G/SG/N/8/LTU/1, and
G/SG/N/10/LTU/1.  Additi onal notifications regarding Article 12.3 consultations concerning this
investigation were contained in  documents G/SG/41 and Suppl.1G/SG/M/19
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66. The delegate of Estonia stated that Estonia's only producer of this product had been greatly
affected by the measure.  Estonia had requested consultations regarding this measure but no solution
had been reached.  In the view of the Estonian delegate the Lithuanian measure was not in compliance
with the requirements of Article 4.2(b) as other factors causing injury had not been taken into account
in the investigation.  Moreover, the Lithuanian authorities had rejected additional informationsupplied by the exporters in an unjustified manner.
67. The representative of Lithuania stated that in his view the measures were taken in conformity
with the Agreement.  He noted that imports had increased 500 per cent in 4 years and had caused
more than serious injury to the Lithuanian producers of pastry yeast.  Also he confirmed that
Lithuania had consultations with Estonia on the issue and that it submitted written detailed responses
to the questions and complaints of the Estonian side.  He confirmed the readiness of Lithuania to
continue consultations upon request of the Estonian side.
(s) Morocco – Rubber
68. The Chairman noted that Morocco had notified th e termination of its investigation on rubber,
as set forth in document G/SG/N/9/MAR/1.
69. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
(t) Philippines – Grey Portland Cement
70. The Chairman noted that the Philippines had made two notifications regarding its
investigation on grey portland cement.  The notifications were contained in documents
G/SG/N/7/PHL/1 and G/SG/N/8/PHL/1.
71. There were no comments or questions regarding these notifications.
(u) Philippines – Ceramic Tiles
72. The Chairman noted that the Philippines had made a number of notifications regarding its
investigation on ceramic floor tiles.  These notifications were contained in documents
G/SG/N/7/PHL/2, G/SG /N/8/PHL/2 and Suppl.1, G/SG/N /10/PHL/1, and G/ SG/N/11/PHL/1.
Additional notifications regarding Article 12.4 cons ultations in respect of this investigation were
contained in documents G/SG/38 and Suppl.1.
73. The delegate of Indonesia expressed regret on the increased use of safeguard measures.
Regarding the measure taken by the Philippines he was of the view that these measures did not respect
Article 2.2 and that there were obvious violations of the Agreement.   He requested the delegate of the
Philippines to confirm that its legislation was in compliance with the WTO Agreements.
74. The delegate of Malaysia shared the concerns of Indonesia.
75. The representative of the Philippines noted that the legislation should not be discussed at this
point since this item did not refer to legislation review.  Questions regarding the Philippines
legislation had already been answered when the legislative review took place.  The representative of
the Philippines invited the delegate of Indonesia to provide any questions in writing.  He also assured
that the decision to impose a measure on ceramic floor tiles had been taken after careful consideration
of the facts in the investigation.G/SG/M/19
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(v) Philippines – Tomato Paste
76. The Chairman noted that the Philippines had notified the termination of its investigation on
tomato paste, as set forth in document G/SG/N/9/PHL/1.
77. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
(w) Poland – Calcium Carbide
78. The Chairman noted that Poland had notified the initiation of an investigation on calcium
carbide, as set forth in document G/SG/N/6/POL/2.
79. The delegate of the European Communities si gnalled the EC interest in the case and
mentioned that it expected to be consulted.
80. The delegate of the Slovak Republic noted that the statistics in the notification showed no
increase in imports for the period 1998-2000. The only increase showed was for the year 2001, but
statistics for this year were not complete.  The delegate of the Slovak Republic requested additionalinformation on Poland's investigation.
81. The delegate of Poland, in response to the Slovak intervention, stated that the latest statistics
for the full year 2001 show a substantial increase in imports of the product in question.  The figure for
the full year was 14,000 tons.  He considered this to show a critical circumstances situation.  In
response to the EC intervention, Poland stated that  it was aiming at a mutually agreeable solution to
the problem and proposed to hold consultations in the near future on the subject matter.
(x) El Salvador – Fertilizer
82. The Chairman noted that El Salvador had notified the termination of its investigation on
fertilizer, as set forth in document G/SG/N/9/SLV/3.
83. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
(y) Slovak Republic – Sugar
84. The Chairman noted that the Slovak Republic had made a number of notifications regarding
its investigation on sugar.  Those notifications were contained in documents G/SG/N/8/SVK/1/Suppl.1
and G/SG/N/10/ SVK/1/Suppl.1.
85. The representative of the Slovak Republic informed the Committee that, during bilateral
consultations with Poland regarding the safeguard measure imposed by Slovakia on the imports of
sugar under Article 4 of the DSU, a mutually satisfactory solution within the meaning of Article 3.6 of
the DSU had been reached and both parties had informed the DSB about this settlement in document
WT/DS235/2.  The Slovak Republic also wished to inform the Committee that, as the result of this
bilateral consultation with the Poland, Slovakia had changed the safeguard measure for the import of
sugar, which was notified on 21 December 2001 in document G/SG/N/8/SVK/1/Suppl.1.  The
increased level of quota for Poland and for other countries had been effective since 1 January 2002.
(z) United States – Certain Steel Products
86. The Chairman noted that the United States had made a number of notifications regarding its
investigation on certain steel products.  These notifications were contained in documents
G/SG/N/8/USA/8 and S uppls.1 through 3, G/SG/N/9/USA/4 and Suppl.1, G/SG/N/10/USA/6 andG/SG/M/19
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Corrs.1 and 2 plus Suppls.1 through 4, G/SG/N/11/ USA/5 and Corrs.1 and 2, plus Suppls.1 through 4.
Additional notifications regarding Article 12 consultations in respect of this investigation were
contained in documents G/SG/40, and G/SG/40/Suppls.1 through 17.
87. The representative of the United States stated that there had long been over-capacity in global
steel production; there had been a glut of low-priced steel on world markets; and, in many cases, that
had been due to government policies, subsidies, and other trade distorting practices.  So, last June the
United States launched a multilateral effort to address these root problems that have plagued the steel
industry for so long.  In addition, last June the President requested the US International Trade
Commission to conduct a safeguard investigation with respect to certain steel products.
88. The delegate of the United States noted that the US ITC was an independent agency and that
it had conducted a lengthy, voluminous, open, transparent and fair investigation.  It heard from
hundreds of interested parties, and developed a voluminous record, and after this lengthy detailedprocess the Commission found that increased imports of certain steel products were injuring, or
threatening to injure, the domestic industry.  The ITC issued a lengthy detailed report presenting its
findings and then the President spent several months reviewing the report and considering very
carefully what to do with respect to the steel issue.  The United States consulted extensively with
interested Members, and did its best to mitigate the effects of a safeguard measure, in part byexcluding the greatest possible number of developing countries, economies in transition, and by
limiting the safeguard to 3 years and, to the extent possible, addressing individual Member interests.
89. The United States was of the view that the ITC's investigation and the US steel safeguard
measure were fully consistent with the WTO Safeguard Agreement.  It took deliberate multilateral
steps to address these challenges and believed that the WTO was the right place to resolve anydifferences.  The United States had been conducting consultations under Article 12.3 with
11 Members, and these consultations were continuing.  The United States had also held some dispute
settlement consultations with several Members and noted that if there were any unresolved complaints
that Members may have, those should be resolved in the WTO under multilaterally agreed dispute
settlement procedures.  The US delegate expressed his view that any threats of unilateral traderetaliation were deeply mistaken, contrary to the Safeguards Agreement and the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.
90. The US delegate noted that the ITC had found both absolute and relative increases in steel
imports during the period examined. The US delegate was of the view that those clear findings of the
ITC should put to rest any argument that recourse  to immediate suspension of concessions could be
justified in response to the US steel safeguard under Article 8.3, and that if any Member considers that
the ITC's findings on this point were incorrect – perhaps because a Member thought that the ITCshould have examined imports under a different period – that Member must make its case through
WTO dispute settlement procedures.
91. The US representative noted that the United States had reviewed and researched other
safeguard measures and noted that there had been instances in which there had been disputes as to
whether imports had increased, absolutely or otherwise, e.g., in the Argentina – Footwear  case, and in
those cases any arguments about whether there was an increase in imports were resolved in the
dispute settlement process and not through any unila teral retaliation.  The United States had noted one
instance of a Member unilaterally retaliating in response to a safeguard measure, and that issue had
been discussed at the Committee's last meeting and in the Council for Trade in Goods, where many
Members had roundly criticized both unilateral retaliation, and the notion of one Member unilaterallydetermining that another Member had not complie d with the Safeguards Agreement.  So the US
delegate was of the view that any kind of unilateral retaliation in this case would be against the
WTO's dispute settlement rules, a violation of the Safeguards Agreement and the DSU.G/SG/M/19
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92. The representative of the European Communities read a statement on behalf of China, the EC,
Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland.  China, the EC, Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland
shared the same strong concerns about the US safeguard measure on steel.  They shared the common
view that the protectionist measures of the US violate the WTO requirement on safeguards.  They also
wished to convey their shared general concern about the systematic abuse by the United States of the
safeguard instrument despite the condemnation by the WTO Appellate Body of all six measures
applied by the United States since the entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
93. The EC delegate considered that in this case, concerning steel, the main violations of WTO
requirements included: first, the definition of a like product – the United States had hit the wide
universe of all steel products on the basis of an arbitrary definition of like products.  Second, the
requirements as regards increased imports – the US action was not justified by a certain, recent, sharp
and significant increase in imports.  Third, the causation test – the United States had failed to ensurethat the injury caused by other factors was not attributed to imports.  The analysis, as was the case for
all the safeguard measures already condemned by the WTO, was limited to showing that increased
imports were a cause of injury no less than any other cause, but other causes like increased
competition, legacy costs, a reduction in demand, and their impact on injury, were not clearly and
properly assessed.  Fourth, the proportionality principle – as a result of the flawed assessment of otherfactors the US measures were disproportionate because they go beyond the extent necessary to
remedy the injury caused by imports.  Fifth, the exclusion of certain WTO Members from the scope of
the measure – the United States had excluded imports from certain WTO Members from the measures
in a manner incompatible with the relevant WTO provisions.  The United States had violated the
MFN principle enshrined in Articles I and XIX of the GATT 1994 and Article 2 of the SafeguardsAgreement.  Furthermore, the principle of parallelism between the scope of the investigation and the
scope of the measures, so often affirmed by Panel and Appellate Body Reports, had not been
respected.  Sixth, the treatment of developing Members – the United States had failed to observe the
obligation to grant equal treatment in excluding developing Members from the protectionist measures.
94. In the view of the European Communities all these violations repeated the inconsistencies
found in the previous cases concerning US safeguards brought to the WTO.  All of the six safeguards
brought to the WTO had been condemned by the Appellate Body – Wheat Gluten , Lamb  and Line
Pipe on the basis of the Agreement on Safeguards; and Underwear , Shirts and Blouses  and Cotton
Yarn  on the basis of the safeguards provisions in the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.
95. For the EC delegate the fact that for certain products the US safeguard measures had not been
taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports was of particular concern.  Furthermore, these
measures contradicted the objective of further trade liberalization resulting from the Doha MinisterialDeclaration.  China, the EC, Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland therefore called upon the United
States for the immediate termination of their protectionist measure on steel.
96. The delegate of China emphasized that the United States had failed to observe its obligation
to grant China equal treatment in excluding developing country Members from the safeguard
measures. In the view of the representative of China, China as a developing country was entitled toenjoy the special and differential treatment under the WTO Agreements including the Agreement on
Safeguards.  He considered that reference to US domestic regulation to determine China's
development status was absolutely unfounded and unjustified.
97. The delegate of New Zealand expressed serious concerns about the action taken by the US
Government on 20 March to impose safeguard measur es on certain steel products.  New Zealand's
concerns were not limited to the specific US measur e but also related to the broader impact of the
measure on the global steel trade and the multilateral trading system.  With regards to the US
measure, New Zealand shared a number of the concerns that had been expressed about how theG/SG/M/19
Page 13
measure fits with the United States' WTO obligations and joined with other Members in calling for
the United States to remove without delay the safeguard measures applying to certain steel products.
98. New Zealand was also aware of the repercussions of the US measure for the global steel
trade.  Other countries were taking, or considering, measures to protect themselves from the
diversionary effects of the higher US tariffs.  This resulted in a high degree of uncertainty for steelexporters, and made an already difficult situation even worse.  New Zealand urged countries
considering whether to apply safeguard measures on steel, or raising tariffs by other means, to show
restraint.  In the view of New Zealand it was essential that Members contemplating safeguard action
should recognize the importance of the disciplines on safeguard measures set down in the WTO.
Such measures were designed for true emergency situations and should not be taken lightly.
99. New Zealand commented on its concerns arising from the US measure and the flow-on
effects seen in other countries.  In the view of New Zealand, the imposition of such safeguardmeasures at that time sent a bad signal about the commitment of WTO Members to fulfil the
objectives of the Organization.  This was an important time for the multilateral trading system.  The
work required to follow through and implement the work programme agreed by Ministers at Doha in
November last year had only just started to gather momentum.  Ready resort to trade remedies, rather
than the adoption of domestic measures designed to address the root causes of the problems beingfaced by the industry, was not helpful.  Actions of this sort undermined the credibility of multilateral
negotiations and the capacity to liberalize trade and strengthen trade rules.
100. The delegate of Brazil noted that Brazil and the United States had held two consultations on
this matter.  The first one took place in Washington on 1 March and the other in Geneva on 19 March.
The Brazilian Government had conveyed its concerns on what, according to its understanding,constituted inconsistencies of the US measures with the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards,
and reserved its right on the matter under the WTO Agreements.  Brazil was studying possible courses
of action admitted by these Agreements.
101. The representative of Malaysia raised his concern over the US steel safeguard measure.  This
referred to the special and differential treatment rights accorded under Article 9.1 of the Safeguards
Agreement.  According to Malaysia, this provision makes it very clear that safeguard measures shall
not be applied against a product originating in a developing country Member, as long as its share of
imports of the product does not exceed 3 per cent, and collectively 9 per cent.  The provision of
Article 9.1 of the Safeguards Agreement is classified as an obligation of results and is meant to
prevent Members from applying safeguard measures when the conditions in that provision have been
fulfilled.  Therefore, Malaysia viewed the fact that the United States imposed measures on certain
developing countries' imports as a violation of Article 9.1.  Malaysia sought some clarification fromthe United States as to what criteria they used in defining developing countries, since under the WTO
these countries had been accorded recognition of their status as developing countries, and questioned
whether this would constitute a denial of the rights of developing countries under the WTO
Agreements.  Malaysia noted that it had sought safeguard consultations with the United States, that
they had met twice in Washington, and that Malaysia was hoping for a favourable outcome on thisissue.
102. The delegate of Venezuela expressed concerns with respect to the measures taken by the
United States and the effect on Venezuela's national production.  Venezuela believed that the
measures should be closely followed.  Venezuela hoped that the United States would continue the
efforts it had made to take into account of the Members' concerns so that a solution could be foundthat was compatible with the WTO Agreement.
103. The representative of the United States noted the comments from the other delegations and
stated that the United States had been in consultations with many, if not all, of these delegations andG/SG/M/19
Page 14
had addressed many of the particular issues that had been raised.  With regard to the developing
country issue raised by Malaysia and China, the United States asserted that it identified countries as
being eligible for this exclusion based upon whether or not they appeared on the US list of GSP
beneficiaries.  By taking this approach, the United States considered it applied an objective and
certain standard that allowed all Members, importers, exporters and other interested parties to assesswhether or not they were likely to be subject to a safeguards measure.  This was an important factor in
those interested parties' decision about whether to participate in the safeguard investigation and
Article 12.3 consultations.  The United States noted that it had consistently applied the GSP test in all
safeguard measures that it had imposed since the entry into force of the Agreement.
104. With respect to the statement made by the delegate from the European Communities on
behalf of a large number of Members, the United States noted that it had addressed many of these
particular issues during consultations.  The United States was of the view that the characterisation ofthe Appellate Body reports was somewhat overstated, as these decisions on safeguard issues were
narrowly circumscribed and did not condemn US practice in general.  The United States stated that it
had taken these Appellate Body reports into account,  and had addressed specific issues that had been
identified in previous Panel and Appellate Body report s.  The United States therefore believed that the
US measure and the ITC investigation were conducted in accordance with the Agreement.
105. The United States also expressed concern about the effects of other Members' reactions on the
multilateral trading system.  The United States mentioned that it was fully committed to the
multilateral trading system and the course of trade liberalization that had been charted at Doha.  The
United States also stated that as Members worked together to dismantle the world's remaining trade
barriers, US workers and industries would continue to need the assurance that trade rules would givethem a reasonable chance to respond to the challenges and opportunities of the global marketplace.
(aa) United States – Lamb Meat
106. The Chairman noted that the United States had made a number of notifications regarding its
investigation on lamb meat.  Those notifications were contained in documents
G/SG/N/10/USA/3/ Suppl.2 and G/SG/N /11/USA/ 3/Suppl.2.
107. There were no comments or questions regarding these notifications.
(bb) United States – Wire Rod
108. The Chairman noted that the United States had made a notification regarding its investigation
on wire rod as set forth in do cuments G/SG/N/ 10/USA/4/Suppl.1.
109. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
(cc) Venezuela – Paper
110. The Chairman noted that Venezuela had notified the initiation of an investigation on paper, as
set forth in document G/SG/N/6/VEN/4.
111. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
(dd) Venezuela – Iron/Steel U Sections
112. The Chairman noted that Venezuela had notified the initiation of an investigation on
iron/steel U sections, as set forth in document G/SG/N/6/VEN/5.G/SG/M/19
Page 15
113. There were no comments or questions regarding this notification.
114. The Committee took note of the statements made.
C. NIGERIA – PRE-EXISTING MEASURES
115. The Chairman recalled that at the last regular meeting of the Committee, Nigeria was invited
to update the Committee on the status of certain "pre-existing" measures described in document
G/SG/N/2/NGA.  In its response, circulated as document G/SG/N/2/NGA/Suppl.1, Nigeria had
informed the Committee that wheat flour, sorghum, millet and kaolin were still under import
prohibition.  The Chairman noted that, in accordance with Article 11.2 of the Safeguards Agreement,
pre-existing safeguard measures shall be "phased out or brought into conformity with this Agreement
within a period not exceeding four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement".
The Chairman requested the delegation of Nigeria to inform the Committee for how long its pre-
existing measures were likely to remain in force.
116. The delegate of Nigeria informed the Committ ee that he did not have any new information
regarding the status of the four items still on the list, namely wheat flour, sorghum, millet and kaolin.
As soon as new information became available, the Nigerian delegation would notify the Committee.
117. The Committee took note of the statements made.
D. SYSTEMIC ISSUES REGARDING THE OPERATION OF ARTICLES 8.2 AND 8.3
118. The Chairman recalled that at the last regular meeting of the Committee, Members identified
a number of systemic issues regarding the operation of Articles 8.2 and 8.3 of the Safeguards
Agreement.  These issues were raised in the context of action taken by Poland under Article 8.2.
Since, similar issues had been raised by Members at the 5 October 2001 meeting of the Council for
Trade in Goods.  Subsequently, the Chairman of  the Council for Trade in Goods had undertaken to
hold informal consultations on those issues, and the Committee had agreed to revert to this issue at a
later date, following further consideration of this issue by the Council for Trade in Goods.  However,
since Poland subsequently withdrew its Article 8.2 action, the Council for Trade in Goods had not
considered those issues further.  The Chairman not ed that even though Poland withdrew its Article 8.2
action, the systemic issues raised by certain Members at the last regular meeting remained.  TheChairman asked Members whether they wished to pursue these issues, at that date, or at some future
date, in informal mode.
119. The delegation of the United States noted that, under Article 8.3, the right to suspend
concessions under Article 8.2 shall not be exercised for the first three years that the safeguard measure
is in effect, provided that the measure has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports and
that the measure conforms to the provisions of the Agreement.  Now, almost all Members understand
and accept the fact that an exporting Member cannot unilaterally determine for itself whether thesecond criteria in Article 8.3 has been met, i.e., whether a safeguard measure conforms to the
provisions of the Agreement.  Such a unilateral determination as to whether another Member had
violated the Agreement would be inconsistent with the Agreement and the DSU.  As previously noted
by the United States, this question was raised last autumn in this Committee and in the CTG with
respect to the issue between Poland and the Slovak Republic.  During that discussion a number ofMembers expressed great concern over a Member unilaterally determining for itself whether another
Member had conformed with the Agreement, and a number of Members criticized this as contrary to
the WTO as a multilateral rules-based system.
120. With respect to the first criterion of Article 8.2 regarding an absolute increase in imports, the
question had been raised as to whether in effect an exporting Member can disregard the findings ofG/SG/M/19
Page 16
the importing Member's competent authority that im ports increased in absolute terms, and whether
that affected exporting Member can, notwithstanding the determination by the competent authority,
determine for itself  whether there was an absolute increase in imports or not, and whether the measure
was taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports or not.  And then, if this affected exporting
Member unilaterally makes these determinations, whether it can then proceed unilaterally to suspendconcessions under the terms of Article 8.2, based on its unilateral determination that this limitation in
Article 8.3 does not apply.
121. The United States was of the view that such a unilateral action would breach the Agreement
and the DSU, and noted that, looking at the context of  the Agreement, there are other provisions of the
Agreement that make it clear that it is the importing Member that has the authority to determine
whether there has been an absolute increase in imports, and there is no provision of the Agreement
that exporting Members may unilaterally substitute their judgements on this issue for those of theimporting Member's competent authorities.  The United States also noted that an importing Member
under the Agreement must follow specific investigative procedures and explain its legal and factual
findings.  The ITC made a voluminous investigation and published a detailed report in the steel case.
So it would therefore be anomalous to suggest that an affected exporting Member could unilaterally
reopen these issues without being subject to any such procedural or subsequent constraints, and thensubstitute its judgement for that of the importing Member's competent authority's.
122. The United States also commented on the suggestion that whether there had been an absolute
increase in imports or not is a simple question involving a straightforward comparison of import
statistics at the beginning and end of the relevant period, and that any Member should be able to
conduct such an investigation and that there is no need for any further analysis, regardless of what theimporting Member's competent authority found.  The United States noted that this view was not
consistent with the Agreement.  Among other things, a determination as to whether there had been an
absolute increase in imports was not in fact a simple mathematical calculation.  There were a number
of steps where an importing Member must apply legal standards and judgement, and there have been
several dispute settlement reports that have dealt with the question of increased imports, and what theperiod is, and how they are determined.  As an example, the United States referred to the reports on
Argentina – Footwear and United States  – Line Pipe .  In the view of the United States, there were a
number of distinct legal considerations and various factors that competent authorities must take into
account in determining the length of the period of  time for examining whether imports had increased
in absolute terms, and beginning and ending points, and several other considerations.  So these factors
show that a case-by-case determination was required for determining whether imports increased in
absolute terms.
123. The United States was of the view that for an exporting Member to declare unilaterally that a
competent authority's finding of an absolute increa se in imports was incorrect, would be making a
determination that the Member had acted inconsistently with the Agreement.  Therefore, the exporting
Member would be prejudging the issue of whether a safeguard measure conformed to the Agreement.
As noted by the United States, this it also considered contrary to the provisions of the DisputeSettlement Understanding, which states that Members are to not make a determination to the effect
that a violation of an Agreement has occurred, and that these disputes are to be resolved under the
Agreement.
124. The United States mentioned that it had looked at the definitive safeguard measures that had
been applied, and while there had been cases in which there had been disputes as to whether there wasan absolute increase in imports, no Member had made a unilateral determination purporting to
override a competent authority's determination, and no Member had proposed unilateral retaliation
based on overriding a competent authority's finding of an absolute increase in imports.G/SG/M/19
Page 17
125. The delegate of the European Communities was of the view that the United States was indeed
correct in many of the things that it had said. Ho wever, the European Communities believed that some
different interpretations were possible with respec t to the second criteria which had been mentioned
by the United States – the lack of absolute incr ease.  The European Communities noted that the fact
that there were two criteria mentioned in Article 8.3  suggested that there must be a difference between
the two.  The difference would be that the second one is an issue of law, the WTO consistency; while
the first one is more an issue of fact.  That, in  the opinion of the European Communities, meant that
recognizing that the first criteria is an issue of fact can suggest that multilateral determination, as it
was done for legal issues, may not be necessary.  The European Communities noted that the right to
rebalance concessions was intrinsic in the safeguard provisions, as it was intrinsically linked to the
nature of safeguards.  It followed the same logic as a Member's right to withdraw concessions under
Article XXVIII of the GATT and Article XXI of GATS in the case of an unbinding procedure.Therefore, in the view of the European Communities, since Article 8.3 and the suspension of this right
for three years is an exception to the original rights to suspend concessions, this exception must be
interpreted narrowly, and therefore the exception to the exception must be interpreted broadly.
126. The European Communities was of the view that an absolute increase on imports was not an
issue that was decisive for the legality of the safeguard measure, as it was possible, under Article 2 ofthe Agreement, to impose a measure based on a relative increase.  The delegate of the European
Communities noted that Article 2 mentions that safeguard measures may be imposed when imports
are increasing in such quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production.  Therefore, a relative
increase in imports was a sufficient basis to take safeguard action and a panel could not be requested
to rule against that measure, in case such a meas ure was taken.  For the European Communities, if the
US interpretation was followed, the first condition of Article 8.3 could only apply if the Member
applying the safeguard measure itself had found a lack of absolute increase in imports, which was
very unlikely.  If the interpretation was so narrow, the safeguard action would very easily be subject
to abuse.  According to the European Communitie s, there was no specific procedure under the DSU to
make a multilateral determination of whether or not there was an absolute increase and, in addition,the absolute increase was probably the most factual issue of all the issues that were examined under
the Agreement.  A Member would have to look at  numbers in one period and in subsequent periods.
The European Communities believed therefore that these considerations may lead to a different
conclusion from the one suggested by the United States and that in certain circumstances multilateral
determination on this specific issue may not be necessary, unilateral appreciation may be sufficient
and may therefore afford to Members the right to suspend concessions.  This was considered by the
European Communities a right embodied in the Agreement, embodied in the safeguard measure, andintrinsic to their nature, and therefore any exception to this right must be interpreted very narrowly.
127. The delegate of Japan was of the view that, since there was a particular case at hand, which
the US delegation had alluded to, it was not appropriate to go too deeply into the Article 8.3 issue at
that juncture.  Japan commented that the US intervention sounded as if Article 8.3 was not a useable
provision and that it should be disregarded altogether .  If the US was hinting that the two conditions in
Article 8.3 should always be determined through the dispute settlement procedure and that there was
no possibility for these two conditions to be determined by the Members, Japan disagreed with this
interpretation.  Japan disagreed in the sense that the US interpretation was tantamount to saying that
Article 8.3 was useless, since everything should go through the dispute settlement.  Japan was of the
view that there were some cases where Members could determine a factor or existence of a condition,and that if this was not the case, then Article 8.3 would be an unnecessary provision.
128. The delegate of Brazil, like Japan, took the stance that as there was a specific case being
alluded to he would not go into too much detail.  In the view of Brazil, the main issue under
consideration was if an exporting Member could determine unilaterally that an absolute increase in
imports had not occurred subject to an ex post  multilateral control or to an ex ante  multilateral
decision.  This allowed for an undoubtedly relevant debate not only for the proper operation of theG/SG/M/19
Page 18
Agreement but also of the multilateral trading system  as a whole.  Brazil was examining the issue and
would act according to its conclusion.  Brazil also expressed concern at the multiplication of actions
under the Agreement, which raised serious doubts about their consistency with multilateral norms.
All Members, and in particular the main economic powers, shared the duty of reconciling domestic,
economic and political needs with the strict respect for multilateral rules.  For Brazil, any answer that
may be given should be necessarily compatible with the political and legal imperative of preserving
and strengthening multilateralism.
129. The delegate of India noted that there were risks involved in allowing unilateral
determinations that a safeguard measure did not conform to the provisions of the Agreement by any
affected Member country.  India felt that this had the potential of undermining the multilateral system,
and therefore would be interested in the discussion as it unfolded in the future.
130. The delegate of Japan clarified that in his previous intervention he was of the view that
through a certain reading of Article 8.3 the right subscribed in 8.2 might also be nullified.
131. In response to the question raised by the delegation from Japan, the representative of the
United States noted that, under Article 8.3, if the importing Member imposes a safeguard measure
following an investigation where the authority has found that imports have increased relative to
domestic production but has found no absolute increase in imports, so that the measure has been takennot on the basis of an absolute increase in imports but on the basis of a relative increase, then affected
exporting Members may look at the competent authority's report and the measure and determine for
themselves that, given the authority's report, the measure has not been taken as a result of an absolute
increase in imports.  Under those circumstances the Members may invoke Article 8.2 and suspend
concessions.  So, this was not a case in which there were no circumstances under which theseexceptions under Article 8.3 could apply.  Therefore,  Article 8.3 clearly is a useable provision.
132. The delegate of Poland drew the Committee's attention to some consequences of taking the
position endorsed by the United States, in light of the 90-day deadline stipulated by Article 8.2 for the
suspension of obligations.  Poland was of the view that there must be an interpretation which would at
the same time respond to two sets of concerns of the Members – one which is directly related tounacceptability of a unilateral determination of another Member's conformity or not conformity with
the WTO rules; and the other being the right of a Member affected by a safeguard measure to respond
adequately, that is to restore the balance.  If it is  indispensable to turn to panel proceedings, which
take at least a couple of months, then there may be a problem with safeguarding the basic right to
suspend equivalent concessions. Therefore, Poland asked the United States how to reconcile these two
sets of obligations and rights.
133. The representative of the United States, in response to the question posed by Poland, noted
that there had been a suggestion that a Member might forfeit its right to suspend concessions if it did
not exercise that right within the 90-day period in Article 8.2 and, therefore, a Member must notify
and exercise the suspension during the 90-day period.  The United States was confident that as a
textual matter Members would not waive their rights to suspend concessions if they did not do so
within the 90-day period.
134. The delegate of the United States noted that, as a practical matter, in previous cases Members
imposing safeguard measures and affected exporting Members had been able to reach an agreement
ensuring that the exporting Members lost no rights by waiting beyond the 90-day period.  Several
Members that had applied safeguard measures and exporting Members subject to those measures had
developed a practice of entering into bilateral agreements to extend the 90-day period until three yearsafter the safeguard measure goes into effect.  By extending this period under Article 8.2 for
suspension of concessions, Members may obser ve their obligations under Article 8.3 without
sacrificing their rights under 8.2.G/SG/M/19
Page 19
135. The United States was of the view that any doubts about whether the two Members could
agree between themselves for an extension of a WTO deadline were misplaced.  If an importing
Member agreed that an affected exporting Member had the right to suspend substantially equivalent
concessions up to a certain date, then that importing Member had committed itself to honour that
right.
136. The Committee took note of the statements made.
E. IMPLEMENTATION – TIRET  84
137. The Chairman recalled that, by virtue of paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), and section 13 of the Ministerial Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns of 14 November 2001, outstanding implementation
issues "shall be addressed as a matter of priority" by the relevant WTO bodies.  A list of these issues
was compiled in document Job (01)/152/Rev.1.  Section 9 of that document set forth tiret 84, whichcontained a proposed amendment to Article 9.1 of the Safeguards Agreement "so that safeguard
measures are not applied to imports from developing countries which individually account for less
than 7 per cent of total imports and 15 per cent collectively".  This amendment was proposed by the
delegation of Colombia.  The Chairman also recalled that, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the
Ministerial Declaration, the Safeguards Committee must report to the Trade Negotiations Committeeon this issue "by the end of 2002 for appropriate action".
138. The Chairman offered the floor to Colombia to explain the basis for its proposed amendment.
139. The delegate of Colombia clarified that a copy of the statement containing the proposal by
Colombia had been circulated to Members. She then proceeded to read the proposal, the text of which
is hereby reproduced:
"Background:  During the preparatory process for the Seattle Ministerial Conference,
Colombia submitted for consideration by Members a proposal to increase the existing
percentages indicated in Article 9 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  Then, in the run-
up to the Doha Ministerial Conference this proposal was fleshed out with the
suggestion that the figures of 3 per cent and 9 per cent in Article 9 in the SGAgreement should be replaced by 7 per cent and 15 per cent respectively in the case
of safeguards applied by a developed country to a developing country.  This would
increase by 6 percentage points the special and differential treatment provided for the
developing world's trade, with the exception of emergency measures.  It should be
pointed out that under this proposal the present limits in Article 9.1 would be retained
for cases in which a safeguard measure is applied by a developing country, and would
be increased in the case that the Member applying the measure was a developedcountry.  This proposal is taken up in general lines in the implementation issues under
tiret 84 and has been referred to this Committee for study pursuant to the Ministerial
Decision in paragraph 12 of the Doha Declar ation.  Pursuant to that Declaration, this
Committee is to report to the Trade Negotiations Committee on the results of its
analysis of this implementation-related proposal by the end of this year.
Taking this background into account, and with a view to promoting a broad debate on
this proposal, I shall now explain the reasons that prompted Colombia to propose
raising the figures in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  I shall then go on
to identify the elements that were take n into account for specifically suggesting
particular figures for this amendment of Article 9.1 of the Agreement and concludeby mentioning some other elements in addition to the percentage issue which we
believe could also be analysed in greater depth.G/SG/M/19
Page 20
So, the reasons for the proposal:  Colombia believes that there are legitimate reasons
that may force a WTO Member to suspend its multilateral commitments as a result of
disorderly domestic market conditions.  I therefore wish to reiterate that we consider
the safeguard instrument to be both legitimate and important.  Under Article 19 of the
General Agreement, two conditions are required for imports into a specific market togive rise to the application of a safeguard measure.  These requirements refer to the
quantity of imports and the conditions under which they are taking place.  As we
understand it, the thinking behind this requirement is simply recognition of an
economic reality that the introduction of small quantities in the market cannot have
the power to modify conditions on that market and therefore cannot effect the
domestic industry.  However, there can be no question that the provision with which
we are concerned in Article 9.1 is a development of the principle of special anddifferential treatment and is aimed at maintaining access conditions for developing
countries in the event that an emergency measure is adopted.  Accordingly, the
increase in the figures set out in Article 9.1, as proposed by Colombia, would simply
have the result of ensuring that if the developing countries have penetrated a specific
market where a disorderly situation arises as a result of imports from developedcountries this circumstance will not punish the developing country's export industry,
in so far as their individual share does not exceed 7 per cent of total imports of the
product covered by the investigation.
Colombia has occasionally been excluded from the application of safeguard measures
because it has fallen within the limits established in Article 9.1, and that is why weattach great importance to this provision.  We clearly appreciate its benefits and are
therefore aware that increasing the imports' share margin will have real significance
as regards market access.
The recent rise in the use of safeguards and the negotiations on market access for
non-agricultural products are circumstances which we believe make it even moredesirable to analyse this proposal.  We should point out that, despite Colombia's small
share of the world export market, in recent years our exports have been at the
receiving end of safeguard measures.  This experience has shown us that there is what
might be called a "perverse incentive" in the multilateral rules, which favours the
application of safeguards for relatively short periods – less than 3 years – since,
pursuant to Article 8.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards, compensation is allowed
only after the third year that a measure is inforced.  Now, although in cases where themeasure is not the result of an increase in imports in absolute terms, or its application
is not consistent with the Agreement, the latter allows the suspension of some
concessions.  It is not easy to avail oneself of this provision especially in the case of
developing countries.
The alternative of the dispute settlement mechanism as a way of addressing the
negative effect of a safeguard measure may also present some drawbacks because, in
a way, the delay in obtaining a final decision, in most cases on appeal, implicitly
allows a grace period during which the domestic industry may be protected at
immense cost for the exporting firms which are displaced from a given market.  In
these circumstances, during the preparatory work for the Doha MinisterialConference, Colombia submitted the implementation proposal to which we have
referred and also suggested that negotiations be held on safeguards in order to address
these and other important issues, as well as to improve special and differential
treatment for developing countries.G/SG/M/19
Page 21
I will now turn to elements of setting the limits in the proposal.  In the circumstances
described above, and in response to the question of what the limits should be for
excluding a developing country from the application of a safeguard measure, the
reference in Article 12.3 of the Agreement to "substantial interest" provides an
interesting element for this discussion.  Ac cording to the multilateral practice, it is
certainly recognised that a country has a substantial interest when its share of imports
is around 10 per cent.  Along these lines, any developed or developing Member
country with a share of less than 10 per cent would not be allowed to participate in
consultations under Article 12.3 of the SG Agreement, and this led us to consider a
share of 10 per cent as an implicit limit for a developing country share below which a
provision would be needed recognizing the marginal nature of imports at such levels
and, hence, ensuring that they be excluded from the application of any type ofmeasure.  In other words, the figure of 3 per cent could be appropriate for trade
among developing countries, but in the case of access to developed country markets it
would be more logical to raise it to a figure of around 10 per cent as the limit below
which imports would not be subject to safeguard measures.
To conclude, one or two other issues which will be analysed in connection with
implementation of Article 9.1.  Well, we should also like to draw Member's attention
to the fact that there are other elements concerning implementation of Article 9.1 that
could be the subject of an interpretive decision within the meaning of Article 9 of the
Agreement establishing the WTO, such as the definition of the time-period to be used
for calculating developing countries' shares and also the methodology to be used forcalculating the limits in the abovementioned Article."
140. The delegate of Brazil stressed the importance of expediting the discussion of this issue in
order that the deadline contained in paragraph 12 of the Doha Declaration would be met.
141. The delegate of the United States made some  preliminary comments and formulated some
questions regarding Colombia's proposal.  First, he mentioned that in terms of the mandate of the
Committee the United States noted that much of Colombia's proposal goes beyond the objective of
tiret 84.  As an example, the United States noted that the last paragraph of the proposal raised a
number of issues that seemed to go far beyond tiret 84.  The United States also noted that the proposal
itself drew a distinction between developed and developing country importing Members that was not
in Article 9 or in tiret 84.  Therefore, the United States questioned what was the basis for that
distinction and why this proposal should not apply to  developing country importing countries as well.
142. The representative of Venezuela stated that the ideas contained in Colombia's proposal were a
good point of departure for clarifying norms and disciplines in the Agreement, especially the
development and application of special and differential treatment under Article 9.1, which seeks to
maintain good access conditions for developing countries when safeguard measures are adopted.  The
delegation of Venezuela believed that the proposal from Colombia was a significant and timely
contribution to the maintenance of market access conditions for developing countries at a time whenthere appeared to be a significant increase in the use of safeguard measures.
143. The delegate of the European Communities noted that this was an issue of considerable
practical importance as experience had shown that Article 9 was often applied when safeguard
measures were imposed.  It was clear to the European Communities that Colombia's proposal would
substantially alter Article 9 since it more than doubled the de minimis  threshold for mandatory
exemption of individual developing country imports.
144. The European Communities brought to the attention of the Committee three main concerns of
that delegation.  The first one was that Colombia's proposal would result in a substantive extension ofG/SG/M/19
Page 22
a narrow exception to the general principle of erga omnes  application of safeguard measures.
Secondly, the exclusion of a substantial portion of imports from measures – according to the proposal
up to 15 per cent, which referred to imports which might be causing serious injury – could diminish
the efficiency of the instrument.  Finally, and most importantly, the European Communities
understood the proposal to apply only to safeguard measures applied by developed WTO Members.Developing countries using the instrument would enjoy lower thresholds.  In the view of the European
Communities, this would be a paradigm change unknown to current rules on trade defence
instruments in general as it would create two different categories of users of trade defence
instruments. The European Communities expressed serious concerns about this approach and did not
believe that this was a desirable way to move forward.
145. The European Communities noted that the statemen t of Colombia also referred to interesting
issues such as the determination of the reference period for thresholds under Article 9.1.  TheEuropean Communities believed that there was scope for further fruitful exchange of views on this
and expressed that it would be open to engage on a discussion of such issues.
146. The delegate of Canada formulated two preliminary questions, pending further review of
Colombia's proposal.  The first one referred to the initial proposal by Colombia which suggested
changing the figures in Article 9.1 from 3 and 9 per cent and raising them to 7 and 15 per centrespectively.  However, in the paper Colombia was noting a figure of 10 per cent.  Therefore, Canada
asked what the current position of Colombia was with regards to the figures that were currently in
Article 9.1, and whether the change in figures const ituted a revision of Colombia's original proposal.
147. In its second question Canada noted that one of the rationales put forward by Colombia for
the proposal to increase the levels set out in Article 9.1 was based upon delays associated with takinga case to dispute settlement.  Canada requested Colombia to expand upon this idea as it seemed that
Colombia was pointing to issues relating to the implementation of Article 9.1, and not the actual
levels contained in that provision.
148. The delegate of Egypt reserved the right to comment at a later stage.
149. The delegate of Japan commented that the figure proposed by Colombia was too big in the
sense that it would diminish the effectiveness of the safeguard measure, and the spirit of the
Agreement itself.  Secondly, the delegate of Japan expressed doubts as to whether Colombia's
proposal might not lead to a two-tiered system within the Agreement.  Japan understood the
obligation of special and differential (S&D) treatment, or the existence and spirit of S&D treatment,
and was willing to do the maximum possible to obtain rules for S&D treatment.  However, Japan was
of the view that respecting S&D treatment and having a two-tiered system in the Rules area, including
safeguards, was a different story.  Japan expressed doubts as to whether this course of action wouldlead to a two-tiered system in the Agreement, meaning a distinction between developing countries and
developed countries.
150. The delegate of China expressed his willingness to give a positive consideration to
Colombia's proposal.
151. The delegate of Malaysia expressed the view that since the issue was one of implementation it
was certainly incumbent upon the Committee to discuss the proposal made by Colombia.  The
Committee had a mandate to report back to the TNC and certainly it would be useful to continue the
discussion on Colombia's proposal.  Malaysia noted that Colombia had raised a number of points to
support its proposal regarding market access of developing countries in the face of safeguard
measures and the difficulty of recourse to dispute settlement by developing countries in the event ofdisputes.  Malaysia believed that Colombia had mentioned a number of points that would be useful forG/SG/M/19
Page 23
further discussion and therefore that it would be useful for the Committee to continue its discussions
at the next meeting or in an informal session.
152. The delegate of the United States, in light of the intervention by Malaysia, questioned
whether or not the proposal conforms with the mandate for the Committee as decided in the Doha
Ministerial Conference.  To the United States it seemed that Colombia's proposal incorporated
elements which reached far beyond what the Ministers contemplated when they approved the
implementation process.  Therefore, as a preliminary matter, the Committee should make a
determination as to whether or not this particular proposal fits within the mandate.  The United States
was willing to engage on informal consultations on that point.
153. The Chairman proposed to organize informal consultations on all issues raised regarding
Colombia's proposal before the next regular meeting of the Committee, where all issues regarding
consultations would be taken up including those raised by the United States.  He also proposed that, inorder to facilitate the exchange of views, Members could submit their views and questions on this
issue in writing.
154. The delegate of Colombia answered some of the questions that had been raised by Members.
Regarding whether the proposal was the same as that  which was in the list of outstanding issues on
implementation, in Colombia's view this was the proposal made for informal consultations. Colombia
believed that S&D treatment was fundamental to market access and therefore attached great
importance to raising the figures in Article 9.
155. Regarding the creation of two systems or a two- tiered system of obligations, Colombia was of
the view that this situation already exists as Ar ticle 9.1 establishes two types of treatment depending
upon whether the country is developing or not.  Colombia thought that there was a need to recognisegreater space for developing countries and this would not in principle change anything but would
increase S&D treatment.
156. Regarding the 10 per cent threshold, Colombia remarked that it had not changed its proposal.
Colombia had simply referred to the idea that around 10 per cent constitutes a substantial trade
interest in this Organization.  Colombia hoped that  the discussion would be substantially broadened in
the proposed informal consultations.
157. The Committee decided to hold informal consul tations on the implementation issue raised by
Colombia regarding Article 9 special and differential treatment.
F. OTHER BUSINESS
1. Preparations in Connection with paragraph 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of the
People's Republic of China (Transitional Review Mechanism)
158. The Chairman recalled that the issue of "Preparations in Connection with paragraph 18 of the
Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic  of China (Transitional Review Mechanism –
TRM)" had been the subject of consultations and that certain Members would like to speak in respect
of this issue.
159. The delegate of the United States was of the view that China's TRM review was properly on
the agenda of the Committee and was a subject that needed to be discussed.  The United States
thought it was important that Members understand what was involved with this issue.  The United
States was not asking the Committee to conduct its review of the TRM at this meeting.  The objective
was to develop guidelines that would allow the year's TRM review to be conducted in the most
meaningful and efficient way.G/SG/M/19
Page 24
160. The United States noted that in terms of what was required by China's Protocol of Accession,
not only for the Committee's review but also for the other TRM reviews to be conducted by WTO
councils and committees, the Protocol required China to submit information specified in Annex 1A in
advance of the TRM review.  Subsequently, Members were to submit questions to China in advance
of the TRM review, and the Protocol required China to submit responses to Members' questions inadvance of the TRM review.  China's Protocol of Accession Section 18.1, stated that China must
provide "relevant information to councils and committ ees involved in the TRM".  It did not attempt to
identify all the relevant information that must be submitted but it did state that it included the
information listed in Annex 1A of the Protocol.  For the Safeguards Committee, one item was listed –
implementation of China's regulation on safeguards.  The Protocol further provided that China must
submit this relevant information "in advance of th e review to be conducted by these councils and
committees".  It did not however state how far in advance the information had to be provided, as thatwas a decision that was left up to Members.  Next, the Protocol and Annex 1A of Part 7 explain that
Members may ask specific questions of China in connection with the TRM, that is, Members notify
their specific questions to the relevant council or committee and should do so in advance of that
body's TRM review.
161. In the view of the United States Section 18.1 confirmed that both Members' questions and
China's responses to Members' questions were to be provided in advance, as it provides that all
Annex 1A information must be submitted by China in advance, and Part 7 of Annex 1A made clear
that this included China's responses to Members' questions.  If China's responses must be submitted in
advance it meant that the question as to which China was responding must be submitted even further
in advance.  So, according to the United States th e only issue left to Members to decide was how far
in advance of the TRM meeting should Members' questions and China's responses to Members'
questions be provided. What the United States proposed to do was to reach agreement on the three
timing issues that the Protocol leaves open for Members to decide – how far in advance must China
submit the relevant information set out in Annex 1A; how far in advance must Members submit their
specific questions for China; and how far in advance must China submit its responses to Members'questions.  For the United States, these issues should not be controversial, as Members agree on these
types of issues routinely.
162. The United States noted that the US proposal was straightforward and entirely consistent with
normal WTO practice.  Under the US proposal, China would submit the information set out in
Annex 1A 90 days in advance of the Committee's TRM meeting.  After reviewing the submitted
information, Members would submit a request for information in writing 60 days in advance of the
meeting.  China would then submit written answer s and additional information 30 days in advance of
the meeting.  At the meeting, Members could submit additional questions and requests for
information, if any, to China, orally or in writ ing, and then China would submit written answers or
additional information within a timeframe set by the relevant council or committee.  In the view of the
United States, these guidelines were in everyone's interest and set forth the most reasonable and least
intrusive procedures possible to establish an effective TRM.  These guidelines would allow for ameaningful review of China's implementation efforts which would in turn help to ensure that China
fully implements its accession commitments.  The United States remarked that this was something
that China's leaders had repeatedly stated as China's goal, and it was also the goal of other Members.
163. According to the United States, a meaningful TRM would also help to avoid disputes in two
ways, which was in everyone's interest.  It would provide more clarity and help to foster a betterunderstanding among Members of China's trade regime.  Secondly, where real implementation
problems existed, a meaningful TRM would act as a safety valve and help to avoid dispute settlement
cases against China.  The United States recalled that at the end of the TRM process each year the
General Council would make recommendations and if China followed them it surely would avoid
some potential dispute settlement cases.G/SG/M/19
Page 25
164. One other more practical effect of the proposed guidelines was that, in the view of the
United States, they would lessen the burden on China and other Members.  For the United States,
nothing in the Protocol requires a council or committee to conduct its TRM work in only one meeting
per year.  Any council or committee could devote multiple meetings to the TRM, but the guidelines
proposed by the United States were designed to avoid that burden.  They were designed to allow thevarious councils and committees to complete their work in only one meeting.
165. The United States believed that if procedures could not be agreed all Members would lose.
The only option that would be left for Members was for each individual council and committee to
hold multiple meetings to carry out its TRM work.  That, according to the United States, was an
enormous waste of everyone's time and effort, which the United States wanted to avoid.  The
United States was conscious that guidelines for all councils and committees involved in the TRM
could not be agreed during the Committee's meeting, but guidelines could be agreed for theSafeguards Committee.  The United States proposed to begin informal consultations so that agreement
could be reached on these guidelines and to extend these guidelines to the other bodies involved in the
TRM.  The United States remarked that time was running short and any other approach would be
unwieldy.  In the view of the United States, Memb ers needed to be in position for the General Council
at its 13-14 May meetings to endorse general guide lines for all the bodies involved in the TRM.  If
not, the proper functioning of this year's TRM would be jeopardised, thus creating a climate of
acrimony that would jeopardise the cooperative approaches that Members had taken to date when
addressing China's implementation effort.
166. The delegate of China stated that the specific suggestions by the United States concerning the
timing arrangement went far beyond the requirement of paragraph 18 of China's Accession Protocol.
Therefore, they were unacceptable to China.  China would stand by its commitment under paragraph
18, and as a matter of fact, China was making great efforts towards that goal.  China had no difficulty
in understanding the meaning of paragraph 18 of its Accession Protocol, but was surprised to see that
some Members had put forward specific proposals and requirements far beyond what paragraph 18
stipulated.  China stated that it would not be possible for it to do more than what paragraph 18provided, because that was not part of China's obligation.
167. The delegate of China noted that if some Members were suggesting an increase in the
obligations of China in conducting the transitiona l review, China would reject it.  China understood
the rationale of some Members had argued that we should follow the routine procedure of the
Committee in dealing with this matter.  However, China pointed out that the transitional review
mechanism was not routine.  It was something very  special, something unique, as this transitional
review mechanism was required only for China.  China was the only WTO Member required to gothrough this, and therefore, normal procedures and normal routines were not applicable.  China was of
the view that the review could only be conducted strictly in accordance with paragraph 18 of its
Accession Protocol.
168. China stated that, if some other Members wanted to submit questions in advance – whether
60 days, 90 days or 190 days in advance – China had no objection.  But China had no obligationunder paragraph 18 to provide answers within a specific timeframe.  Because of the diverse views on
the understanding on this issue and paragraph 18, China did not think that there should be any
decisions concerning this matter.  China reiterated its willingness to continue informal consultations
with interested Members and hoped that an agreement could be reached through such consultations.
169. The Committee decided to continue the process of informal consultations with interested
Members.
170. The delegate of the United States requested that all Members be apprised of all developments
as they occur in the informal consultations.G/SG/M/19
Page 26
2. Special and differential treatment
171. The Chairman informed the Committee that on 10 December 2001, Mr. Inumba, then
Chairman of the Committee on Trade and Development, sent the Chairpersons of WTO bodies a letter
inquiring about the activities of those bodies in respect of the special and differential treatment
provisions of the relevant Agreements.  The Chairman noted that he had informed the Chairman of theCommittee on Trade and Development that the Committee was not engaged in any activities in
respect of the special and differential treatment provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards.
3. Technical assistance and capacity building
172. The Chairman recalled that paragraph 41 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration instructs the
Director-General to report to the Fifth Ministerial Conference on the adequacy and implementation of
technical assistance and/or capacity building commitments contained therein, with an interim report to
be provided to the General Council in December 2002.  In this connection, a suggestion was made atthe last meeting of the Committee on Trade and Development, which was supported by a large
number of delegations, that in order to avoid an end-of-year rush to compile the aforementioned
report, WTO bodies with technical assistance activities could put technical assistance as a standing
item in the agendas for their meetings throughout the year.  An understanding emerged on this
suggestion at the last meeting of the Committee on Trade and Development.  The Chairman broughtthis suggestion to the Committee's attention and sought the views of the Committee on this
suggestion.  He also noted that the mandate of the Committee did not expressly include technical
assistance activities, so it did not appear necessary to include this issue as a standing agenda item.
173. There were no comments from delegations on this item.  The Chairman took the absence of
comments from Members to mean that the issue would not be inserted as a standing point in theAgenda of the Committee.
4. Notification process
174. The Chairman reminded Members that their notifications to the Committee should be
communicated to the Chairman of the Committee via th e Secretariat.  This was to reduce the risk of
notifications being "lost" in the system.
5. Turkey – Safeguards investigations on steel
175. The delegate of Turkey expressed serious concerns about the safeguard measures taken by
various WTO Members regarding steel products.  Turkey was of the view that these measures had not
been adopted pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement.  Appropriate means in which the interested
parties could present evidence and their views were not allowed.  Also, injury caused by the structural
problems in the sector and by other factors was attributed to imports.  Turkey noted that, in some
cases, two or more trade policy measures were imposed on the same steel product.  Turkey was of theview that with these safeguard measures these countries grant relief beyond the extent necessary to
prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. It seemed to Turkey that these measures
had not been taken to eliminate the serious injury or threat of serious injury due to the increased
imports, but with a concern to protect domestic industry or to retaliate to another Member country’s
action.
176. Turkey also noted that although these measures would have adverse effects on the markets of
developing countries, on their development effort s, and on their foreign trade, determination of
developing country status with regard to Articl e 9.1 was neither uniform nor consistent with the
present WTO status of these countries.G/SG/M/19
Page 27
177. Turkey acknowledged the right of Members to take appropriate measures to protect their
domestic industries.  However, in the view of Turkey, safeguard measures imposed by Members to
protect their steel industries may cause, or were already starting to cause, a chain effect by leading
other Members to take counter measures.  As a result, these measures would restrict world steel trade,
create an unfair competition environment, harm th e multilateral trading system and create deadlock in
the intergovernmental discussions carried out in othe r international fora on the real problems of the
global steel market.
6. United States – Investigation by Ecuador on matches
178. The delegate of the United States questioned Ecuador regarding the status of a provisional
measure on matches, of which the last notificat ion was in late November 2000, G/SG/N/7/ECU/1.
The United States asked whether the measure was still in force, whether it had been terminated and
whether any findings had been made as to injury.
179. The representative of Ecuador stated that it would relay the US questions to capital and hoped
to have an official response to this subject as quickly as possible.
7. United States – Egypt's definitive safeguard measures on fluorescent lamps
180. The delegate of the United States  recalled that there was a notification in February 2001,
G/SG/N/8/EGY/3, indicating that Egypt's safeguard measure on fluorescent lamps was being
extended for one year. The United States questioned whether the measure had been terminated.
181. The delegate of Egypt informed the Committee that the measure had expired as of
27 February 2002.
182. The Committee took note of the statements made.
G. DATE OF NEXT REGULAR MEETING
183. The Chairman recalled that regular meetings would normally be held in the last week of April
and the last week of October, in conjunction with the regular meetings of the Committees on Anti-
Dumping Practices and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The Committee on Anti-Dumping
Practices and subsidiary bodies would meet for the whole week commencing Wednesday,
21 October 2002, and the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures would meet from30 October to Friday, 1 November 2002, with a meeting of the Working Party on Subsidies
Notifications scheduled for Tuesday, 29 October.  Accordingly, he suggested that the Safeguards
Committee meet on Monday, 28 October 2002.
184. The Committee so agreed.
H. ELECTION OF OFFICERS
The Committee elected Mr. Gustavo Lunazzi of Argentina as Chairman.
The Committee elected Ms. Ellen Kluijtmans of the Netherlands as Vice Chair.
__________