WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONWT/WGTI/3
22 October 1999
(99-4592)
REPORT (1999) OF THE WORKING GR OUP ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TRADE AND INVESTMENT TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
A. INTRODUCTION 1
B. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ON THE GROUP'S 2 - 4
ACTIVITIES
(a) Sources and materials used in the Group's work 2
(b) Meetings held in 1999 3
(c) Cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations 4
C. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE  IN THE GROUP IN 1999 5 - 107
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 7 - 33
TRADE AND INVESTMNET FOR DEVELOPMENT AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
II. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE 34 - 49
AND INVESTMENT
III. EXISTING INTERNATOINAL INSTRUMENTS AND 50 - 69
ACTIVITIES REGARDING TRADE AND INVESTMENT
(a) WTO provisions on matters related to investment 51 - 60
(b) Bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements 61 - 69
and initiatives;  implications for trade and investment flows
of existing international instruments
IV. ITEM IV OF THE CHECKLIST OF ISSUES SUGGESTED 70 - 107
FOR STUDY
ANNEX 1: TEXT OF THE SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL
DECLARATION, PARAGRAPH 20
ANNEX 2: CHECKLIST OF ISSUES SUGGESTED  FOR STUDYANNEX 3: TABULAR SUMMARY OF WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS
PROVIDED TO THE WORKING GROUP ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
IN 1999WT/WGTI/3
Page 2
A. INTRODUCTION
1. At its meeting held on 9-11 and 18 December 1998, the General Council had before it in
document WT/WGTI/2 the Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Relationship between Tradeand Investment and took the following decision with respect to the continuation of the work of this
Working Group:
"The General Council decides that the Working Group on the Relationship between
Trade and Investment shall continue the educational work that it has been
undertaking on the basis of the mandate contained in paragraph 20 of the Singapore
Ministerial Declaration. The work of the Working Group, which shall be reviewed by
the General Council, shall continue to be based on issues raised by Members withrespect to the subjects identified in the Checklist of Issues Suggested for Study.  It is
understood that this decision is without prejudice to any future decision that might be
taken by the General Council, including in the context of its existing work
programme."
1
This report provides an overview of the work done by the Working Group in 1999 pursuant to the
General Council's decision.
B. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ON THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES
(a) Sources and materials used in the Group's work
2. As was the case in 1997 and 1998, the work of the Working Group in 1999 has been based on
written contributions by Members and on oral statements, questions and answers by Members in theGroup. This material has been supplemented by information received from observer
intergovernmental organizations and notes prepared by the Secretariat.  A tabular summary of written
contributions provided to the Group in 1999 is attached as Annex 3.
(b) Meetings held in 1999
3. The Working Group has held three formal meetings in 1999, on 22-23 March, 3 June and
24 September.  The dates of these meetings were determined in the light of the instruction in
paragraph 22 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration that careful attention be given to coordinating
meetings of the Working Groups established under paragraphs 20 and 21 with those of relevant
UNCTAD bodies.  At both meetings, consideration was given to all Items of the Checklist of Issues
Suggested for Study. Reports on these meetings have been circulated in documents WT/WGTI/M/8, 9
and 10.
(c) Cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations
4. The Singapore Ministerial Declaration (paragraph 20) encouraged the Working Group to
undertake its work in cooperation with UNCTAD and other appropriate intergovernmental fora in
order to make the best use of available resources and to ensure that the development dimension is
taken fully into account.  In this regard, the IMF and the World Bank attended the Working Group's
meetings in an observer capacity, pursuant to the cooperation agreements concluded between theWTO and these organizations.  UNCTAD, OECD and UNIDO also attended the meetings as
observers, on the basis of an invitation from the Working Group.  In the course of the Group's
                                                     
1 WT/GC/M/32, p. 52.  The text of paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration is reproduced
in Annex 1. The Checklist of Issues Suggested for Study is reproduced in Annex 2.WT/WGTI/3
Page 3
meetings, these organizations have kept the Group updated on their relevant activities and contributed
to the debate.  The Working Group is highly appreciative of the valuable contributions to its work
made by the observers.
C. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DONE  IN THE GROUP IN 1999
5. This part of the report provides an overview  of the substantive work done in the Working
Group, pursuant to the mandate given in paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration and to
the General Council's decision adopted in December 1998.  By its very nature, such an overview
cannot reflect everything that was said and capture all nuances, such as can be found in the detailed
records of the two meetings of the Working Group (WT/WGTI/M/8 and 9) and in the written
contributions of Members (see Annex 3).
6. As provided for in the General Council's decision, the work undertaken in 1999 was
structured on the basis of the Checklist of Issues Suggested for Study which the Group took note of at
its meeting on 2 and 3 June 1997.  This summary uses the same structure.
I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOIMIC GROWTH
7. Written contributions on this Item of the Checklist were provided by Korea (W/69)2 and India
(W/73).  Oral statements were made by Korea, Australia, the European Communities, India, Japan,the United States, Canada, Pakistan, Venezuela, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Switzerland, Mexico, the
Philippines on behalf of ASEAN WTO Members, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and the observer for the
World Bank.
8. With reference to the experience of one Member regarding the role of foreign direct
investment ("FDI") in the context of the Asian financ ial crisis, attention was drawn to recent empirical
studies which had found a positive correlation between a low level of net FDI and the occurrence of a
currency crisis. This was due, inter alia,  to the fact that FDI flows were more stable than portfolio
investment flows. The point was also made that FDI had played a stabilizing role in the current
financial crisis, as evidenced by the significant increases of FDI inflows experienced by this Member
in recent years. Information was provided on recent  changes in this Member's policy towards inward
FDI which were part of a more general process of structural policy reforms adopted after the onset of
the Asian financial crisis.
3
9. Comments made on this Member's experience highlighted the positive, stabilizing role played
by FDI in the context of the Asian financial crisis and the relationship between, on the one hand, the
weakness of a country's financial infrastructure and its vulnerability to financial instability in
international markets and, on the other, a low level of FDI. Interest was expressed in the experiences
of other Members with respect to the role of FDI in the context of the Asian financial crisis.4
10. With respect to the observations made by this Member on the difference between FDI and
portfolio investment, the question was raised how as an operational matter a distinction could be made
between FDI and portfolio investment.5  Related to this, the observation was made that, while FDI
was more stable than portfolio investment because it involved assets which were not easily transferred
abroad, it was not easy to attract one type of investor while discouraging the other, and that FDI and
                                                     
2 Documents issued in the series WT/WGTI/W/- are referred to in this report as "W/-".  Documents
issued in the series WT/WGTI/M/- are referred to  as "M/-".
3 M/8, para. 4.
4 M/8, para. 8;  M/9, paras. 2-3.
5 M/8, para. 8.WT/WGTI/3
Page 4
portfolio investment tended to take place together. It was stated, in this regard, that portfolio
investment made an important economic contribution to host economies by adding to national
savings, by broadening the array of lending terms available to domestic businesses and by stabilizing
the local economy by spreading credit risk.6 It was also stated that the distinction between long- and
short-term investment was more relevant than th e distinction between FDI and portfolio investment,
and that portfolio investment was not by definition short-term and speculative.7
11. In response to the comment on the difficulty of distinguishing between FDI and portfolio
investment, it was said that many countries made this distinction in practice.8 It was also argued that
important differences existed not only between FDI and portfolio investment, but also between
various kinds of FDI.  In particular, FDI in the fo rm of acquisitions of existing domestic enterprises
was clearly less beneficial in terms of its impact on development than FDI in the form of greenfield
investment.9 This view was questioned on the grounds that  FDI in the form of acquisitions entailed
benefits deriving from greater access to capital, managerial skills, technology, and international
markets.10
12. The negative effects of volatile capital movements were mentioned as an issue which required
further study in the Working Group.11
13. As an example of the stabilising role of FDI in the Asian financial crisis,  mention was made
of data on the overseas activities of firms of one Member which showed that, while the sales of the
subsidiaries of these firms in four Asian countries had declined, the level of employment at these
subsidiaries had remained stable.12
14. A number of issues raised at the WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and Development
which had taken place in March 1999 were identified as relevant to the work of the Working Group.
15. With reference to the point made at that Symposium that trade liberalization could not take
place in a vacuum, it was observed that  an increase in FDI did not automatically lead to economic
growth, and that the Working Group needed to consider a range of factors impacting on the
contribution of FDI to economic growth.13 In response to this comment, it was stated that the work in
this Working Group was valuable precisely because it had allowed for a consideration of therelationship between investment and development from a wider perspective.
14
16. It was noted that, while in the debate at the Symposium on the relationship between
development and trade openness views had differed on the desirable pace of trade liberalization, no
support had been expressed for closed markets, and that investment had often been included in
references to the value of openness for development. The importance of capacity building, which had
been stressed at the Symposium, should also be looked at from the perspective of investment.  With
reference to the argument advanced at the Symposium that bound, duty-free treatment of imports fromleast-developed countries was important inter alia   because uncertainty regarding the tariff treatment
of their exports hampered FDI in these countries, it  was stated that the conditions for FDI in these
countries obviously could be even more directly affected by a lack of predictability of the regulatory
                                                     
6 M/9, para. 2.
7 M/8, para. 8.
8 M/8, para. 8.
9 M/8, para. 8.
10 M/8, para. 8.
11 M/8, para. 9.
12 M/10, para. 5.
13 M/8, para. 9.
14 M/8, para. 10.WT/WGTI/3
Page 5
framework for foreign investment.15 Enhancing the transparency of the regulatory framework was
important not only to attract foreign investment but also to foster domestic investment.16
17. It was noted that a number of speakers at the Symposium had pointed to the need for
government intervention.  Bearing in mind that th e contribution of FDI to development differed,
depending on the kind of economic activity concerned, the need for an active government roleappeared to be incompatible with the notion of a multilateral framework on investment which would
inevitably reduce the policy discretion of governments.
17  In response to this comment, it was stated
that the appropriate extent of government intervention was for each individual country to decide, but
that this issue had little bearing on the shape of the investment regime for all investors, whether they
were government-owned or privately-owned, and thus did not detract from the importance of a
transparent and non-discriminatory investment regime.18 Reference was made to the experiences of
several Members with negative effects of excessive government intervention19 and to academic
studies which indicated that over time countries were departing from government intervention. Thus,
empirical studies showed a trend toward the reduction of the use of performance requirements,
reflecting the experience of countries that these requirements, once seen as essential, in the end had
proved detrimental.20 However, another view expressed was that, in light of the present financial
crisis, there was a growing opinion among scholars and practitioners in favour of governmentintervention, and that performance requirements and incentives were used extensively by many
developing countries and were useful given their present stage of development.
21 Finally, the
observation was made that the discussions at the Symposium had shown that in recent years there had
been an important evolution in the debate on the role of governments in the process of economic
development in that it was now increasingly recognized that an active government role to pursuespecific development objectives was not incompatible with strategies based on openness to
international integration and adherence to a framework of international, market-oriented rules.
22
18. Reference was made to the view expressed at the Symposium by some academic experts that
the linkages between trade and investment did not me rit a consideration of rules on investment in the
WTO.23
19. The relationship of FDI to technology development of host economies was another prominent
theme of debate under this Item of the Checklist. In this respect, the Working Group had before it a
Note by the Secretariat on "The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Development:  Technology
and other Know-How Transfers and Spillovers" (WT/WGTI/W/65).
20. Support was expressed for the analysis contained in this Note of the contribution of FDI to
economic development which resulted from the diff usion of technology and other know-how arising
from various kinds of spillover effects.24 Reference was made in this connection to empirical studies
which provided evidence of the contribution of FDI to technological development of one Member
through the transfer of technology from parent companies to their foreign affiliates, the diffusion of
                                                     
15 M/8, para. 10.
16 M/8, para. 11.
17 M/8, para. 9.
18 M/8, para. 10.
19 M/8, paras. 10 and 13.
20 M/8, para. 15.
21 M/8, para. 16.
22 M/8, para. 14.
23 M/8, para. 12.
24 M/8, paras. 17-18, 21-22.WT/WGTI/3
Page 6
technology arising from linkages between foreign affili ates and local firms, and through research and
development projects initiated by foreign affiliates.25
21. The point in the Secretariat Note that the most significant channels for the dissemination of
modern, advanced technology were the spillover effect s of FDI, rather than formal technology transfer
agreements, was endorsed26, but it was also stated that on this issue the Note did not adequately take
into consideration other views.27
22. The importance was emphasized of the conclusions drawn in the Secretariat Note that the
positive effects of FDI through technology and other know-how spillovers depended upon the
characteristics and policies of host economies, and that the existence of a competitive environment
and local technological capabilities were especially important in this regard.  It was argued that
optimal policies  to enhance the contribution of FDI to technological development of host countries
should aim at improving local technology capabilities, education and infrastructure and at ensuring anadequate regulatory framework in areas such as competition policy and the protection of intellectual
property. By contrast, policies involving government intervention in investors' decisions, such as
performance requirements and transfer of technology requirements had been demonstrated to be often
counterproductive. The point was also made that, in order for FDI liberalization to produce the
expected outcome, including technological advance, strong economic fundamentals and soundmanagement of macro-economic policies were essential.
28
23. The view was also expressed that, while the main message of the Secretariat Note seemed to
be that technology transfer might occur automatically as a result of FDI, and that where this was not
the case a range of policy measures were available to host countries to stimulate and secure such
transfers and spillovers,  the Note did not adequately analyze the need and scope for specific policiesto enhance the contribution of FDI to technologica l development of host countries.  Thus, the Note
failed to give due attention to the role of performance requirements, except that paragraph 71 pointed
to the costs of such requirements.  The observations made in paragraph 72 clearly had important
implications regarding the need for a certain role of  governments, but the Note failed to discuss these
implications. A more general point made in this connection was that the discussion so far in theWorking Group on FDI and technology transfers and spillovers was somewhat inconclusive and
unsatisfactory because it was not informed by a su fficiently detailed analysis of the nature and
effectiveness of specific policies used by governments to promote the transfer of technology.  In this
regard, it was suggested that the Secretariat undertake an analysis of the relationship of performance
requirements and investment incentives to the transfer of technology.29
24. The point was made that in discussions on the transfer of technology there was a tendency to
view technology flows through the prism of competitive markets, while in reality internationalinvestment and technology flows were determined by decisions of multinational enterprises taken in a
context of oligopolistic equilibrium in which such enterprises sustained their strategic market
dominance through the systematic application of various policies, such as localization of individual
stages of production, the use of internal transfer prices and technological innovation.  These strategies
could not be adequately understood within a model of perfectly competitive markets in which anyactive development policy was seen as per se  distorting investment, trade and technology flows.  The
strategic considerations underlying the investment decisions of multinational enterprises explained the
fact that such firms preferred to buy from their affiliates to protect their dominant market positions
even where efficient local suppliers existed.  This strategically-motivated conduct necessitated  policy
                                                     
25 M/8, para. 21.
26 M/8, paras. 17-18.
27 M/8, para. 20.
28 M/8, paras. 17-19, 21-22 , 26-27;  M/9, para. 5.
29 M/8, paras. 20-21.WT/WGTI/3
Page 7
responses on the part of host countries, for example through measures to encourage multinational
enterprises to conduct research and developmen t in host countries with a view to enhancing
productive capabilities of local suppliers. 30
25. It was stated that the conclusions drawn in the Secretariat Note were perhaps valid for some
countries in some circumstances, but that there were also other views. Since multinational enterprisesaccounted for almost two-thirds of world trade and had a virtual monopoly on the transfer of
technology, there was a basic asymmetry between the buyers and the sellers of technology, which was
a fundamental factor in regard to the type of technology available to host countries.  A number of
studies had shown that there were indirect costs associated with the transfer of technology, such as
confidentiality requirements and export restrictions.  In addition, the transfer of technology was not
facilitated by the fact that international agreements, such as the TRIPS Agreement, reflected the view
that technology was of a proprietary nature.  In view of these considerations, it was naïve to believethat FDI would automatically lead to the transfer of technology.
31
26. In response to this observation, it was stated that,  in  the context of investment, the issue was
not the relations between buyers and sellers of technology but the inflow of technology into an
economy through investment.  Mention was made in this connection of the experience of one Member
regarding the tangible benefits from technology flow s associated with FDI. This Member had made a
commitment in a number of investment agreements not to impose transfer of technology requirements
as a condition for an investment because it believed that the imposition of such requirements had
negative consequences, in particular in the context of intense international competition for investment
and technology.32
27. With regard to observations made in contributions by one Member regarding the importance
of policy intervention to enhance the contribution of  FDI to the transfer of technology and intangible
assets, mention was made of studies which had found examples of negative effects of such policy
intervention. While these studies did not necessarily indicate that policy intervention always resulted
in negative effects on the transfer of technology, they provided some empirical evidence that
technology transfer through non-market mechanisms could cause unexpected negative effects, andthat local conditions in host countries, such as a high level of technical skills, infrastructure and a
competitive environment, were more important determinants of technology transfer and spillovers.
33
With respect to the same contributions, it was stated  that they seemed to suggest that  governments
should step in and force technology transfer and it was argued that, given that the WTO rules placed
restraints on governmental intervention, this su ggestion was contrary to the disciplines and
motivations underlying the WTO.34
28. In response to these comments, it was stated that, while in some circumstances policy
intervention with respect to the transfer of technology might have adverse consequences, the
fundamental point made in these contributions was that it was for each country to decide what were
the appropriate policies to adopt in light of its ow n circumstances.  The contributions  did not suggest
that governments should intervene to ensure that transfer of technology took place at any cost.
Rather, the point was that, if one left it completely to market forces, transfer of technology might nothappen at all. A number of African countries had completely liberal investment regimes but had not
experienced any technology transfer.  Thus, to say that a liberal FDI regime would automatically give
rise to FDI and associated transfer of technology seemed a very simplistic approach.  Equally
simplistic would be to draw the conclusion from these contributions that there was only a role for
                                                     
30 M/8, para. 23.
31 M/8, para. 24.
32 M/8, para. 25.
33 M/9, para. 4.
34 M/9, para. 6.WT/WGTI/3
Page 8
governmental intervention.  While attracting FDI was important, the space for policy intervention
should not be severely restricted. In light of the existence of provisions on the transfer of technology
in several WTO agreements, for example in the TRI PS Agreement, it could not be said that the WTO
had nothing to do with the subject of technolo gy transfer. These existing WTO provisions on
technology transfer needed to be strengthened to encourage the transfer of technology on reasonableterms.
35
29. In response to the point that an open investment regime did not automatically lead to transfer
of technology, it was stated that one should distinguish between the issue of the factors which
determined a country's capacity to attract FDI, on the one hand, and the issue of appropriate policies
regarding the transfer of technology, on the other.  The capacity of a country to attract FDI depended
in the first place upon the existence of profitable investment opportunities.  While the existence of an
open investment regime did not mean that a coun try would automatically be able to attract FDI,
instability and lack of transparency of the investment regime could increase the perceived risk of the
investment and thus deter investment decisions.  Policies involving the compulsory transfer of
technology which did not give sufficient guarantees to the investor that it would reap a legitimate
profit from using that technology could deter investment decisions.36 However, the view was also
expressed that, while it could be argued that, if a country forced a company to transfer technology,
this would diminish a country's attractiveness for FDI, what was involved was a bilateral contract
between an enterprise and a government.  Sinc e a company would not engage in transfer of
technology if it felt that the conditions imposed were too strict, host-country governments knew
exactly the risk of applying such conditions.  The point was also made that a distinction should be
made between  the use of a particular technology in a country and the transfer of that technology.Especially in regard to high technology, transfer of technology often did not occur even though the
technology was actually being used in the country by a particular company.
37
30. Reference was made to the experience of some Members which had benefitted substantially
from the transfer of technology associated with FDI, notwithstanding the absence of legislative
provisions requiring transfer of technology.  The positive impact of such transfer of technology wasevident in the growth and diversification of e xports and the improvement in the quality of the
domestic infrastructure.  Thus, the benefits of FDI that arose from its contribution to the transfer of
technology could be achieved through the operation of market forces.
38 It was also argued that the
process of globalization augmented the contribution of  FDI to the transfer of technology in that the
competitive pressures facing multinational enterprises in international markets compelled such
enterprises to enhance the efficiency of their operations.  An important example of this phenomenon
was the transfer of technology in the context of sub-contracting arrangements with local suppliers ofparts and components.
39
31. The view was expressed that the concept of government intervention with regard to the
transfer of technology was not necessarily incompatible with WTO rules and principles.40 It was
stated that while active policies to promote the transfer of technology were justified because of the
fact that markets for technology were not perfectly competitive, experience also demonstrated thatpolicies involving the compulsory transfer of technology did not achieve the intended results because
the technology transferred was often limited to process technology instead of core technology.  It was
therefore necessary for governments to be able to implement active policies which were not
compulsory but which tended to promote the transf er of technology on reasonable commercial terms,
                                                     
35 M/9, para. 7.
36 M/9, para. 9.
37 M/9, para. 12.
38 M/9, para. 10.
39 M/9, para. 11.
40 M/9, paras. 12-13.WT/WGTI/3
Page 9
including promotion of research and development activities and the formation of productive clusters.
Mention was made of one Member's positive experience with this kind of policy in the petroleum
sector.  Rather than focusing on the question of whether or not countries should oblige multinational
enterprises to transfer technology, the Working Group should concentrate its study on the
identification of market-friendly and WTO-consistent policy instruments to promote the transfer oftechnology.
41
32. It was stated that there appeared to be two grounds on which there was opposition to
government policies aimed at encouraging the transfer of technology.  The first was that such policies
were not effective;  the second was that such policies might deter FDI.  Whether such policies were
effective was essentially an empirical question on which evidence appeared to be mixed and for which
further study was required.  There was no conclusive evidence to justify a sweeping assertion that
technology transfer measures taken by governments had in all cases been counterproductive.  As tothe argument that technology transfer policies would deter FDI, this was essentially a matter for
governments to consider in light of their experience.  The experience of some developing countries
was that in certain cases it might be useful to institute policies which might encourage transfer of
technology.  If a country found that this had a negative impact on FDI inflows, it would obviously
reconsider its policies and seek to restore the balance between attracting investment and regulatinginvestment to promote development.
42
33. The Working Group was informed of studies prepared by the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service, a joint service of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, on criteria and
procedures for the screening of FDI and on backwa rd linkages between multinational enterprises and
suppliers in host countries.43
II. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
34. A written contribution was provided by India (W /72). Oral statements were made by Costa
Rica, the European Communities, Switzerland, Korea, Mexico, the United States, the Dominican
Republic, Singapore, India, Canada, Venezuela, E gypt, Argentina, Malaysia on behalf of ASEAN
WTO Members, Brazil and Hong Kong, China.
35. The discussions under this Item of the Checklist centred on the issue of investment incentives.
36. The view was expressed that fiscal incentives to attract investment were a second-best
solution, and that a more efficient approach was to directly address the causes of market failures.  The
costs of fiscal incentives often exceeded their benefits, especially in the case of competition between
countries or regions to attract investment through the granting of incentives.  The effects of such
incentives were mainly negative as they reduced global welfare, distorted investment flows and
related trade flows and delayed the necessary structural reform.  Moreover, most decisions ofinvestors appeared not to be affected by incentives.  While the legitimate concerns of countries which
needed to provide incentives to attract investment  should be recognized, the first-best policy for
countries wishing to attract FDI was to commit to  long-term reform of the regulatory and economic
environment.
 44
37. It was stated that  there appeared to be a view that, since investment incentives were second-
best solutions, they should either be eliminated or be disciplined.  However, the granting of incentives
did not mean that there was no recognition of the need to address underlying distortions through the
                                                     
41 M/9, para. 13.
42 M/9, para. 14.
43 M/10, paras. 3-4.
44 M/8, para. 30.WT/WGTI/3
Page 10
adoption of other policies.  Rather, incentives were an important additional tool, together with other
polices aimed at addressing distortions, and  they played an essential role in economic development.45
38. The point was made that the divergent views of Members on investment incentives illustrated
why Members were not yet ready to initiate negotiations on multilateral investment rules in the WTO.
If investment incentives were as distortive as had been argued by some Members, it was difficult tounderstand that their use was widespread among de veloped countries. Mention was made of the
positive experience of one Member with the use of investment incentives, for example to promote
export diversification.
46
39. In response to this observation, it was stated that the widespread use of investment incentives,
including by developed countries, did not mean that there was no need to consider possible
disciplines.  A key argument which had motivated the creation of multilateral rules on subsidies in the
area of trade in goods was that developed countries with deep pockets had a greater capacity to grantsubsidies than developing countries.  The same argument was valid with respect to investment
incentives.
47 It was also stated that the granting of investment incentives amounted to a transfer of
money from the domestic tax payers to a foreign investor, which was especially unfair from the
perspective of developing countries in which the tax base was often quite limited.  It was likely that in
many cases decisions were made to invest in developed countries because investors received moregenerous incentives than in developing countries.  It was suggested that the Secretariat attempt to
make a comparison between OECD and non-OECD countries with respect to their aggregate
expenditures on incentives.
48
40. The view was expressed that,  instead of focusing on whether incentives were good or bad,
the first question to be asked was why both developing and developed countries granted investmentincentives.  While it was understandable that developing countries sometimes needed to use
investment incentives, it was more difficult to understand why developed countries used incentives, in
particular in light of the fact that these countries generally took the view that market forces should
determine the allocation of resources.
49
41. The need for further work aimed at distinguishing between various kinds of investment
incentives was emphasized.  A specific proposal was made that the Secretariat undertake a study
which would differentiate between various kinds of investment incentives, their effects, and the
possible disciplines that could apply to specific kinds of incentives.50 It was suggested that a possible
classification of investment incentives might contain four categories:  (1) financial incentives;  (2)
fiscal incentives;  (3) subsidized services;  and (4) market privileges.51  The need to take into account
incentives granted at different levels of government was also mentioned.52
42. Regarding the proposal for a study of different types of investment incentives, the comment
was made that the Working Group also needed to pay more attention to the distorting impact of
various kinds of trade policy measures on investment flows, such as rules of origin in regional trade
agreements. The question of investment incentives should be considered within a broader conceptual
framework which encompassed a range of factors affecting locational decisions. In this respect,
                                                     
45 M/8, para. 36.
46 M/8, para. 34.
47 M/8, para. 35.
48 M/8, para. 39.
49 M/9, para. 25.
50 M/8, para. 32.
51 M/9, para. 28.
52 M/9, para. 28.WT/WGTI/3
Page 11
reference was made to the concept of "investment-related trade measures," which was the subject of a
recent UNCTAD publication.53
43. The view was expressed that there was a need to explore the possibility of multilateral
disciplines with respect to investment incentives. Such disciplines should not provide for a prohibition
of incentives but strike a balance between the recognition of important policy objectives served byincentives and the need to minimize their distorting effects on investment flows. In this respect, the
proposal was made that the Working Group explore the possibility of classifying incentives into
allowable and prohibited incentives. In regard to the notion that different disciplines for different
kinds of incentives might be warranted, depending upon their distorting effects, the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was mentioned as an example.   It was also argued that
consideration of possible multilateral disciplines on incentives should be inspired by the fundamental
WTO principles of non-discrimination and transparency.
54
44. The suggestion that the Working Group attemp t to distinguish between allowable and
prohibited incentives was opposed on the grounds that it would create difficulties in regard to the
distinction already contained in the SCM Agreement between allowable and prohibited subsidies, that
it was incompatible with the educational nature of the mandate of the Working Group, and that it was
inappropriate in light of the sensitivity of the subject. A further observation made in this connectionwas that, while the developed countries provided very substantial up-front grants to firms, developing
countries, which did not have the financial resources to provide such grants, usually granted
performance-based incentives.  A comprehensive consideration of this subject should therefore
include the grants offered by developed countries.
55
45. In reaction to these objections, it was stated that the proposal to attempt to distinguish
between allowable and prohibited incentives was not limited in scope to certain kinds of incentives
but was intended to address all forms of incentiv es comprehensively. The point was made that the
term incentives should be understood to cover any actions by governments which provided a financial
advantage to a recipient.  In this sense, the conc ept of incentives was similar to the notion of subsidy
as defined in the SCM Agreement.  If the term in centives was interpreted in this manner, it was self-
evident that grants were included and that there was no basis for distinguishing between fiscal
incentives and other kinds of incentives. It was also observed that an attempt to distinguish at a
conceptual level between desirable and undesirable incentives could further the Group's understanding
of this subject and was therefore not incompatible with the educational character of the Group's
work.56
46. The point was made that the Working Group should adopt a more differentiated approach not
only with respect to incentives but also with respect to performance requirements.57
47. With respect to the indent of this Item of the Checklist concerning the degree of correlation
between trade and investment flows, attention wa s drawn to a recent OECD study on the relationship
between trade and investment which had found, on the basis of an examination of data on 14 OECD
member countries, overwhelming evidence that FDI tended to be complementary to trade.  Intra-firm
trade was a central element of this complementary relationship.  For host countries, the immediateresult of FDI was an increase in imports but in the medium-term their export capacity increased due to
the inflow of capital and productive assets and the positive spillovers with respect to technology and
                                                     
53 M/8, paras. 34 and 66.
54 M/8, paras. 30-31 and 38;  M/9, paras. 17-19.
55 M/9, paras. 21-23 and 25.
56 M/9, paras. 24 and 26.
57 M/8, paras. 40-41.WT/WGTI/3
Page 12
management.  The study therefore found that countries which were both substantial outward and
inward investors stood to gain in trade terms from both outward and inward FDI.58
48. The comment was made that the findings in this OECD study appeared to differ somewhat
from the conclusions drawn in the Note by the Se cretariat on the relationship between trade and FDI
(W/7), which had found that in some instances there was substitution between trade and investment.59
49. Regarding the indent of this Item of the Ch ecklist concerning the relationship between
investment and competition policy, the view was expressed that a competition-oriented reform of
WTO rules with a view to increasing the synergies between trade, competition and investment
policies was essential to ensure that WTO rules remained valid and credible in a technology-driven
globalized economy. In this connection it was proposed that , in order to ensure that trade policy and
investment policy were mutually reinforcing, these policies should be reviewed in light of the
competition policy concept of market contestability. Examples of measures which required attentionfrom this perspective were performance requirements, investment incentives, the abuse of anti-duping
practices and the use of restrictive rules of origin.
60
III. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND ACTIVITIES REGARDINGTRADE AND INVESTMENT
50. A written contribution was provided by India (W /71).  Oral statements were made by India,
the European Communities, the United States, Egypt, Japan, Pakistan, Korea, Venezuela, Brazil,
Hong Kong, China, and the observers for UNCTAD and the OECD.
(a) WTO provisions on matters related to investment
51. The view was expressed that existing WTO provis ions relevant to investment, as contained in
the TRIMs Agreement, the GATS and the SCM Agreement, were limited in scope and lackedcoherence.
61 The different treatment of investment in services and in manufacturing was highlighted
in this respect.  It was suggested that, in co nsidering possible future WTO rules on investment,
account should be taken of approaches reflected in existing WTO rules, such as the "positive list"
approach and the concept of a progressive development of rules under the GATS.62
52. Specific suggestions were made regarding themes meriting consideration in the Working
Group with respect to the TRIMs Agreement and the GATS.
53. With regard to the TRIMs Agreement, it was proposed that the Working Group study whether
and how the review of this Agreement provided for in Article 9 thereof  might contribute to achieving
investment liberalization in a multilateral context.  In this connection, it was proposed that the
Working Group consider proposals which had been made to prohibit certain performance
requirements, such as joint venture, local ownership and technology transfer requirements, and that
the Working Group examine possible improvements  to the TRIMs Agreement with respect to
investment incentives. The point was made that, while it was unrealistic to call for the prohibition of
all investment incentives in the WTO at this stag e, there was merit in exploring ways to discourage
Members from engaging in unhealthy competition for investment and to minimize the distortive
effects of investment incentives.63
                                                     
58 M/para. 42.
59 M/8, para. 43.
60 M/9, para. 29.
61 M/8, para. 52;  M/9, para. 32.
62 M/9, para. 33.
63 M/8, para. 52.WT/WGTI/3
Page 13
54. With regard to the GATS, it was proposed that the Working Group consider the feasibility of
expanding the scope of the GATS to encompass provisions on investment protection and to cover all
forms of FDI.  Reference was made in this regard to the negotiations foreseen in Article XIX of the
GATS.64
55. With respect to the suggestion that the Working Group consider proposals to proscribe certain
performance requirements, including transfer of technology requirements,  the observation was made
that there was an inconsistency between the view that an investment agreement should be promoted
on the grounds that FDI brought in technology to th e host country, and the view that host countries
should be denied the ability to require investors to transfer technology.65 While FDI might entail a
transfer of technology from a parent to its foreign affiliate, this did not necessarily lead to diffusion of
such technology to the host economy more generally.66
56. A different view was that there was no inco nsistency between the view that FDI brought
technology to a host country and the view that foreign investors should not be forced to transfer
technology.  Rather, the real inconsistency was between the claim that forced technology transfer
helped the development process and the evidence which showed that, when forced to bring in a
particular type of technology, investors would either not enter a market at all or bring in less advanced
technology.67
57. However, the view that firms would react to  transfer of technology requirements by not
entering the market at all or by bringing in a lowe r level of technology was said to be contradicted by
one Member's experience which showed that firms used a certain level of technology in their global
operations and found it costly to use an inferior type of technology for the purpose of investing in a
particular country. The concept of a "forced" transfer of technology was questioned on the groundsthat in practice host countries encouraged the transfer of technology through a variety of incentives
rather than through compulsory measures.
68
58. It was stated that,  if the effect of performance requirements was that investors would bring in
less advanced technology, this would be a compelling argument against the use of such requirements.
However, if, as had been argued, firms would br ing in the most advanced technology anyway, the
question arose as to why performance requirements were necessary.69 The  observation was also made
that the effect of a technology transfer requirement on the level of technology used by a foreign
investor depended on many circumstances, including the nature of the industry.70
59. The suggestion that the Working Group study the issue of the review of the TRIMs
Agreement under Article 9 attracted some support,71  but it was also observed that, though the
Working Group could discuss substantive issues which might also be raised in the context of the
review under Article 9, the formal competence to co nduct this review rested with the Council for
Trade in Goods.72 The point was made that the express reference made to the review of the TRIMs
Agreement in the decision establishing this Working Group served to highlight the interface between
                                                     
64 M/8, para. 52.
65 M/8, para. 53.
66 M/8, para. 55.
67 M/8, para. 54.
68 M/8, para. 56.
69 M/8, para. 57.
70 M/8, para. 58.
71 M/8, paras. 59-60.
72 M/8, paras. 61-62.WT/WGTI/3
Page 14
the work of the Working Group and the review of the TRIMs Agreement and underlined the need for
consistency in this regard.73
60. Scepticism was expressed as to the possibility of extending the GATS to all forms of FDI in
view of the fact that the structure and obligations of the GATS specifically related to services.74
(b) Bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives;  implications for
trade and investment flows of existing international instruments
61. In a statement on one Member's experience with bilateral investment treaties the main
features of such treaties were described, including provisions on the definition of investment, the
scope of the agreements, Most-Favoured-Nation treatment and national treatment, expropriation,
compensation and repatriation, dispute settlement and the duration and termination of the agreements.
The point was made that bilateral investment treaties had found favour with developing countries
because they did not restrict the ability of host countries to follow their own FDI policies in light oftheir unique needs and circumstances.  Under these treaties, developing countries had the freedom to
grant national treatment only in the post-establishmen t phase, subject to such qualifications as they
deemed necessary.
75
62. In respect of the latter observation, the question was raised as to what kind of qualifications to
national treatment this Member considered useful, and what was the relationship between thisMember's bilateral investment treaties and the Most-Favoured-Nation principle.
76  In response, it was
stated that the Member in question had consistently taken the position that it was not possible for
developing countries to accord a right of establishment or national treatment in the pre-establishment
phase and that the entry of foreign investment needed  to be regulated. The bilateral investment treaties
concluded by this Member accorded national treatment and MFN treatment once investments hadbeen admitted in accordance with the applicable policy framework.  Bilateral investment treaties
provided protection of foreign investment and did not deal with market access issues.  By contrast, the
current discussion in this Working Group centred on the need and desirability of a possible
multilateral framework, the main focus of which was market access.  Because of this qualitative
difference between bilateral investment treaties and the proposed multilateral rules on investment, theargument that multilateral rules were more efficient because they would obviate the need for
concluding a large number of bilateral treaties was without merit.
77
63. In a comment on these observations, it was stated that market access was only one of a
number of issues that had been discussed in the Working Group, along with investment protection and
development.78
64. It was noted that in the description of this Member's bilateral investment treaties it was stated
that foreign investments were accorded the same treatment as domestic investments in the post-establishment phase, but that such national treatm ent was not accorded to foreign investors.  An
explanation was requested of the rationale for this distinction between foreign investments  and foreign
investors  and of how this distinction operated in practice.  The question was also raised as to whether
the provisions in these bilateral investment treaties on repatriation facilities also covered payments,
                                                     
73 M/8, para. 63.
74 M/8, para. 61.
75 M/8, para. 47.
76 M/8, para. 48.
77 M/8, para. 49.
78 M/8, para. 50.WT/WGTI/3
Page 15
such as interest payments and payments for goods, and whether these treaties contained a structure for
exceptions.79
65. The view was expressed that not enough attention had been paid so far to the concrete
implications of principles such as national treatment and MFN treatment.80
66. The Working Group was informed of relevant recent activities of UNCTAD and the OECD.
67. With respect to UNCTAD, information was pr ovided on meetings organized by UNCTAD
with representatives of civil society which  were aimed at providing a forum for public-private sector
dialogue on issues related to international investment agreements;  a seminar organized at the request
of the Group of 15 at which a number of bilateral investment treaties had been concluded between G-
15 countries;  regional symposia in Egypt, Argentina and the People's Republic of China  on key
concepts and issues relevant to international investment agreements;  a joint WTO-UNCTAD seminar
on trade, investment and development for Geneva-based delegates; an Expert Meeting on the questionof how international investment agreements could provide for flexibility in the interest of promoting
growth and development; and the publication of a new series of Issues Papers on concepts and issues
relevant to international investment agreements.
81
68. With respect to the OECD, the Working Group was informed that negotiations on a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI") were no longer taking place and that further work in
the OECD on investment rules would be of an analytical nature. To this end, the OECD Committee on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises had recently adopted a new work programme
on international investment which envisaged analytical work on five specific issues:  (1) analysis of
OECD member countries' investment rules, including the definition of investment in relation to issues
raised by financial crises;  (2) non-discrimination and social policies;  (3) non-discrimination andenvironmental policies;  (4) non-discrimination, investment protection and national sovereignty;  and
(5) investment incentives and investment promotion.  The aim was to complete this work programme
by Spring 2000. OECD member countries were also undertaking the first review of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises since 1991 as  part of the normal follow-up process to ensure
that the Guidelines were effective and that necessa ry changes were made to ensure their continued
relevance.  The current review would address both  the implementation procedures and the substantive
provisions of the Guidelines.  The main issues in the review were the territorial scope of the
Guidelines, i.e. the question as to whether the Guidelines should apply to the global operations of
OECD-based multinational enterprises or only to th eir operations in OECD countries;  the possible
need to update the Guidelines in certain areas, notably labour and the environment;  and ways and
means to strengthen the procedures for implementation of the Guidelines, especially with regard to the
role of national contact points. A special working group had been established for the purpose ofconsidering the suggestions that had been made concerning possible changes to the scope of
application, substantive provisions and implementation procedures of the Guidelines.  In connection
with this review, there had also been a meeting with representatives of civil society.
82
69. It was observed that the fact that the further work envisaged in the OECD on international
investment rules was of an exploratory and analytical nature underlined the need to proceed withcaution in this area.  It was proposed that, in order that the Working Group might benefit from the
experience gained by OECD member countries in the MAI negotiations, the Secretariat prepare a
                                                     
79 M/9, para. 36.
80 M/8, para. 48.
81 M/8, paras. 64;  M/9, para. 38.
82 M/8, para. 65;  M/9, para. 39.WT/WGTI/3
Page 16
factual account of the difficulties that had been encountered in these negotiations and of the positions
that had been taken on these issues.83
IV. ITEM IV OF THE CHECKLIST OF ISSUES SUGGESTED FOR STUDY
70. Written contributions were provided by India (W/74), Japan (W/75), Korea (W/70 and 79),
Australia (W/80), and the European Community and member States (W/81).  Oral statements were
made by India, Japan, Korea, Costa Rica, the European Communities, Egypt, Argentina, Canada,
Chile, the Philippines on behalf of ASEAN WTO Members, the United States, Brazil, Venezuela,
Malaysia, India, Mexico, Singapore, Australia, Hong Kong, China, and the observer for UNCTAD.
A note was submitted by the Secretariat on issues raised and views expressed in the discussions in the
Working Group on the definition of the term investment in international investment agreements
(W/76).  Written contributions were provided by UNCTAD on the issue of how international
investment agreements can provide for flexibil ity in the interest of promoting growth and
development (W/77 and 78).
71. Referring to a contribution made by a Member, a statement was made which identified certain
themes which needed to be taken into account by the Working Group in its consideration of this Item.
First, the fundamental factors explaining decisions of multinational enterprises to invest in developing
countries were availability of natural resources, market size, and the existence of a suitable platformfor exports.  The strength of local institutions, the quality of local infrastructure and of the work force
and the degree of macro-economic stability also played a role.  Second, certain possible negative
effects of FDI needed to be addressed, including restrictions on the transfer of technology, the
negative impact of FDI on the balance of payments and exchange rates, and the crowding out of
domestic entrepreneurial activity. A number of studies had pointed out that countries at low levels ofdevelopment were likely to be able to induce FDI only to low technology activities.  Third, the
situation of developing countries as net importers of capital and technology and the competitive gap
which existed between their enterprises and multinational enterprises should be acknowledged. The
experience of developing countries showed that the building-up of domestic entrepreneurial, industrial
and technological capabilities was essential not only to cope with, but also to realize the full benefitsfrom FDI and foreign technology.  Fourth, capital and labour were complementary factors of
production which needed to be studied together. Fifth, the issue of obligations of foreign investors
should be dealt with, in which connection acc ount should be taken of relevant OECD and UN
instruments.  Finally, the development dimension should be placed at the centre of the work of the
Group.
84
72. In regard to a contribution on the role of intern ational investment rules in ensuring stability
and transparency of the legal systems and policies of host countries,  the point was made that  lack ofsuch stability and transparency reduced the abilit y of foreign investors to develop their business
operations based on long-term plans, increased the costs of their investments, and distorted the
conditions of competition in favour of domestic firms.  Enhancing stability and transparency would
not only remove these problems faced by foreign investors, but would also benefit local firms and
would contribute overall to the development of host countries.  Based on existing internationalagreements, certain provisions which were essential to enhancing transparency and stability of
investment laws and regulations could be identified, including rules on the publication of laws and
regulations and on the availability of enquiry points, due process requirements with regard to
authorization and licensing procedures, non-discrimination requirements, standstill requirements, and
dispute settlement procedures. Since rules designed to enhance transparency and stability could entail
administrative costs for host countries and might deprive them of some of their policy tools which
                                                     
83 M/8, para. 66.
84 M/8, para. 70.WT/WGTI/3
Page 17
provided necessary protection to their domestic industries,  developing countries needed to be given
sufficient time for the implementation of such rules.85
73. The view was expressed that it was doubtful that the alleged problems of lack of stability and
transparency described in the above-mentioned contribution warranted the creation of multilateral
rules on investment. In this respect, it was argued that in an era of globalization it was in each
country's self interest to improve its domestic regulatory framework in order to compete successfully
for FDI. The point was also made that the contribution did not offer a sufficiently detailed  description
of these problems to make it possible to determine how prevalent they were in practice.  It was
possible that these problems were due to practices of the enterprises concerned, and that they might be
addressed more effectively through appropriate representation with individual governments of host
countries, including in the context of bilateral investment treaties. A further observation made in this
connection was that multilateral rules might compound problems arising in connection with FDI byoverly emphasizing the protection of foreign investment, and that such rules, if necessary,  should
address in a balanced manner the diverse and evolving interests of all countries.  Any consideration of
benefits of multilateral investment rules could not be confined to the benefits of such rules for home
countries and foreign investors, but should also address the question of whether multilateral rules
would translate into more investment flows and cons equent net benefits for host countries.  Related to
this, it was stated that the multilateral rules on investment advocated in this contribution lacked a
development dimension. This development dimension should find concrete expression in specific
substantive aspects of investment rules, notably with respect to the discretion of host-country
governments with regard to the establishment of  foreign investment, their ability to use policy
instruments to pursue legitimate sectoral, locational and development objectives, and provisions onthe transfer of technology.  Consequently, an approach to the development dimension which only
centred on extended timeframes for implementation was inadequate.
86
74. With respect to another contribution on the role multilateral rules on investment in enhancing
transparency and stability of the legal environment for FDI, the point was made that, unlike bilateral
investment treaties, which had not been effective in addressing the issue of transparency, multilateralrules could establish a set of common standards regarding the transparency of foreign investment
regimes. The very process of participating in the negotiation of such rules could improve the
transparency of a country's regulatory framework for foreign investment in that it necessitated a
comprehensive review of a country's laws and regulations affecting foreign investment. Multilateral
investment rules should provide for technical assistance to aid developing countries to establish a
comprehensive, yet focused list of all regula tions and rules governing foreign investment.
Transparency provisions as a core component of a multilateral investment treaty would serve as avaluable reference for countries desiring to enhance the overall level of transparency of their
investment regime.
87
75. With respect to concerns which had been raised on previous occasions about the possible
negative effects of FDI, the implications of  multilateral rules on investment for policy autonomy and
the uncertainty as to whether such rules on investment would actually lead to increased investmentflows which would benefit host countries,  the view was expressed that these concerns were
legitimate, but that they did not provide a compelli ng argument against the benefits of multilateral
rules on investment. It was stated in this connection  that no convincing arguments had been presented
so far regarding any real costs of a multilateral framework on investment and that it was important to
make a distinction between the issue of possible negative effects of FDI, on the one hand, and theissue of possible costs of multilateral rules on investment, on the other.  However, the issues raised in
the Working Group regarding the need to view the implications of fore ign investment in light of the
                                                     
85 M/8, para. 71.
86 M/9, paras. 68-69.
87 M/8, para. 72.WT/WGTI/3
Page 18
particular development needs and polices of individual countries merited further consideration. A
basic consideration regarding the desirability of multilateral rules on investment was that, by
enhancing transparency and predictability, such rules would contribute to creating increased
opportunities for foreign investment and thus contribute to economic growth and development. In
order to strike a balance between the interests of capital exporting and capital importing countries,multilateral investment rules should be investor-friendly, provide a sufficient degree of freedom and
flexibility for host countries, and should address the issue of obligations of investors.
88
76. In other comments on the advantages of multilateral rules on investment, it was stated that, in
comparison with existing international arrangements on investment, multilateral rules would be more
efficient, stable and predictable and easier to comply with for investors; they would ensure greater
consistency between trade and investment disciplines and would enshrine the principle of non-
discrimination in international investment relations. The point was also made that multilateral rules oninvestment negotiated among countries at different levels of development would necessarily take into
account developmental aspects, and that such rules would entail a limitation of regulatory sovereignty
of countries only to the extent that this was acceptable to all participants in such a negotiation. It was
observed that, while multilateral rules on investment were necessary to address certain deficiencies in
the existing framework of bilateral and regional investment arrangements, multilateral rules would notsupplant bilateral and regional arrangements but would be complementary to such arrangements.
89
77.  The view was also expressed that the arguments advanced in favour of multilateral rules on
investment did not contribute anything new to the debate and were too general in nature to be
convincing. A more concrete identification of costs and benefits of such rules was necessary by
focusing upon the precise contents of such rules. In this respect, it was argued that, in view of the
nature of the rules being proposed the benefits seemed to be outweighed by the costs.  A first category
of costs pertained to the loss of policy autonomy of developing countries to pursue their development
policies as a result of, for example, obligations with respect to incentives and performance
requirements.  A second category pertained to the possibility that such rules would unduly favour
multinational enterprises in their relationship with host countries.90
78. In respect of the point made regarding the general character of arguments in favour of
multilateral investment rules, it was suggested th at it would be useful for the Working Group to
examine how existing investment agreements addressed certain matters.91
79. Views were expressed on the implications of the failure of the MAI negotiations for the
consideration of the possible creation of multilateral rules on investment in the WTO.  It was argued
that the Working Group should devote more time to a concrete examination of advantages and
disadvantages of multilateral rules on investment in the WTO, and that a useful starting point in thisrespect might be to ask the question of what lessons could be learnt from the failure of the MAI
negotiations.
92  It was also observed, however, that investment negotiations in the WTO should be
guided by the WTO's own principles, philosophy and practice, and there was therefore no need to
seek guidance from the experience of OECD member countries with the MAI negotiations.93 The
view was expressed that, in light of the recent experience with the MAI negotiations, work in the
WTO should take a more incremental approach. In this regard, certain issues were identified which
merited further attention, namely, whether the core obligations of a multilateral framework on
investment would include only MFN and national treatment or whether it should also include
                                                     
88 M/8, para. 82.
89 M/8, paras. 84 and  87-88.
90 M/8, paras. 85-86.
91 M/8, para. 88.
92 M/8, para. 85.
93 M/8, para. 88.WT/WGTI/3
Page 19
standards for the protection of investment; whether provisions should be included on incentives and
performance requirements; whether the existing dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO could
apply to disputes arising under a multilateral invest ment framework; whether private investors should
have standing under the dispute settlement procedures in a multilateral framework; and how
exceptions should be treated, in particular whether a "positive list" or "negative list" approach shouldbe followed.
94 In connection with a proposal regarding key elements of a multilateral framework of
rules on investment in the WTO, the point was made that,  since the overall balance of interests
among Members was at the heart of all negotiations in the WTO, the feasibility of a multilateral
framework on investment in the WTO would largely depend on whether and how the different
realities faced by each Member could be reflected in an overall balance of concessions.  A multilateral
framework on investment in the WTO should therefore be different from the MAI, the standards of
which were unrealistically high and had failed to secure broad-based participation.95
80. It was observed that, while the possibility of multilateral negotiations on investment should be
considered, there were other possible avenues to promote investment liberalization and protection in a
multilateral setting, for example in the context of the TRIMs Agreement and the GATS.96
81. In regard to a contribution which contained a proposal on the main elements of a possible
multilateral framework on investment in the WTO, the point was made that the differing viewsexpressed in the Working Group on the desirability of multilateral rules on investment could be seen
as representing two different schools of thought on FDI:  a "globalization" school and an
"internalisation", school and that in order to reach agreement on multilateral rules on investment in the
WTO, the objectives of these different schools of thought needed to be reconciled.  This meant that an
equilibrium had to be reached between, on the one hand, the objective of enhancing global welfarethrough freer flows of investment and, on the othe r, the need to respect the right of sovereign
countries to formulate their own policies, in particular with respect to economic development. In
relation to investment protection, the level of protection in a multilateral framework should be set at
the medium rather than the highest level and should be aimed at achieving an optimal standard of
protection that was reasonably high, based on a consensus among all participants.  With respect toinvestment liberalization, the "bottom-up" approach adopted by the GATS, as opposed to the "top-
down" approach envisaged in the MAI negotiations , should be favoured.  While these two basic
concepts might need to be developed further, they could offer ways to devise a multilateral framework
on investment which reconciled the need for policy flexibility with the need to enhance transparency
and predictability.
97
82. The discussion of this proposal can be briefly summarized by the following key points. First,
the comment was made that the proposal was an important contribution which helped focus the workof the Working Group by offering concrete suggestions with regard to specific elements of a possible
multilateral framework of rules on investment in the WTO.
98 However, it was also argued that the
proposal did not address the key question of why multilateral  rules on investment were necessary and
why the WTO was seen as the forum for the negotiation of such rules.99 Second, it was argued that the
categorization of countries with differing positions on the desirability of multilateral investment rulesinto a globalization school and an internalisation school was too simplistic, and that the pursuit of
policies aimed at benefiting from closer integration into the global economy was not incompatible
with a belief in the need for government intervention and with a sceptical attitude toward the need for
                                                     
94 M/8, para. 84.
95 M/9, para. 41.
96 M/8, para. 84.
97 M/9, para. 41.
98 M/9, paras. 47, 52-53 and 55.
99 M/9, paras. 43 and 54.WT/WGTI/3
Page 20
multilateral investment rules.100  With respect to this point, it was also stated that, since most countries
were somewhere in between the extremes of the globalization school and the internalisation school, it
was possible to envisage a reconciliation of these different perspectives through a cautious approach
to the negotiation of multilateral rules on investment.101 Third, differing views were expressed on the
merits of the proposed method of achieving investment liberalization in a progressive manner througha "positive list" approach.
102  Fourth, it was pointed out that greater precision was necessary with
respect to the meaning of certain concepts used in this proposal, for example the concept of "a
reasonably high standard of protection."103 Fifth, the point was made that further consideration was
necessary of developmental aspects and of investment promotion.104  Finally,  concern was expressed
regarding the suggestion made in this proposal that account should be taken of industries with special
characteristics.105
83. In connection with the discussion on this proposal, the point was also made that, if some
countries belonged to a special multilateral agreement on investment and others did not, countries
which were parties to that particular agreement were in a better position to attract FDI.  However, if
all countries were parties to a multilateral agreement on investment, it was difficult to see how
adherence to such rules ensured that individual countries had a better chance of attracting FDI.106
84. In response to this observation, it was argued that multilateral rules on investment would
contribute to an efficient allocation of resources by enhancing transparency and predictability for FDI;
that such rules would prevent a country's ability  to attract FDI from being negated by distorting
practices of other countries, such as incentives and performance requirements; and that the alternative
to a common set of multilateral rules was the current patchwork of separate arrangements which
created confusion and lack of transparency.  The point was made that there could be no guarantee thatcommon investment rules would by themselves resu lt in increased investment flows, but that the
experience with the multilateral trading system suggested that by improving investment opportunities
such rules would impact positively on the level of international investment. It was also observed that
the existence of a set of common, multilateral rules would not necessarily mean that countries would
behave identically as there would be ample room for individual countries to enhance theirattractiveness to FDI, for example by improving the quality of their infrastructure and human
resources.
107
85. However, scepticism was voiced with regard to these arguments in favour of multilateral
investment rules. It was argued that the need to address distorting practices, such as performance
requirements and incentives, did not constitute a convincing reason for the negotiation of multilateral
investment rules.  Thus, it was stated that one Member's experience demonstrated that its difficulties
in attracting FDI were due to internal factors rather than to distorting practices of other countries andcould be resolved only through domestic policy measures. Likewise, the idea that the existence of a
multitude of investment agreement resulted in confusion and lack of transparency and thus warranted
the establishment of a multilateral framework of rules on investment was contested.  Attention was
also drawn to the limited relevance of investment agreements as a determinant of investment
decisions.  Finally, it was argued that in reality the main objective of proposals for the creation ofmultilateral investment rules was to secure market  access for foreign investment, and that in this
                                                     
100 M/9, paras. 43, 48 and 56.
101 M/9, para. 51.
102 M/9, paras. 44, 49-50 and 52.
103 M/9, para. 48.
104 M/9, paras. 48 and 52.
105 M/9, paras. 46 and 55.
106 M/9, para. 56.
107 M/9, paras. 57-60 and 62-63.WT/WGTI/3
Page 21
regard such rules would entail significant costs for host countries in terms of reduced policy
flexibility.108
86. A proposal was made on the use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in a possible
multilateral framework on investment in the WTO. The point was made that, since the essential
function of dispute settlement was to eliminate or modify measures found to be inconsistent with anagreed set of rules, the WTO dispute settlement system could be applied to investment disputes
without the need to make major adjustments. An important question was whether the WTO provisions
on compensation and suspension of concessions should be applied to investment disputes.  In this
regard, it was notable that these provisions were already applicable to investment-related disputes that
might arise under the GATS and the TRIMs Agreement.  Another question requiring attention was the
relationship between the application of WTO dispute settlement procedures to investment and the
application of dispute settlement provisions contained in the numerous existing bilateral and regionalinvestment agreements.  Since the WTO mechanism was more efficient, it appeared preferable to use
the WTO procedures, but this should not preclude recourse to provisions of bilateral or regional
investment agreements if the parties to a dispute so  decided.  In any case, the coexistence of various
dispute settlement procedures was not unique to investment but also occurred in the field of trade.
For example, regional trade agreements often contained their own dispute settlement procedures.  Theavailability of various dispute settlement mechanisms in the area of trade did not appear to have
caused serious problems.  Indeed, the coexistence of dispute settlement procedures in different
agreements could enhance the complementarity of such procedures.  However, it might be necessary
to design specific rules to avoid inefficiency and duplication.
109
87. The Working Group continued its discussion on the definition of the term "investment" in
international investment agreements. In this connection, differing views continued to be expressed on
the merits of a definition confined to foreign direct investment as compared with a broader, asset-
based definition.
88. One view was  that the Working Group should limit its work to FDI and  should use the IMF's
definition of FDI, as described in document W/61. Mention was made of the possible negativeconsequences of the volatility of portfolio investment. It was suggested in this regard that the precise
coverage of different components of the IMF definition needed to be better understood, and that the
benefits of FDI in relation to each of these components required further study.
110
89. The desirability and feasibility of limiting the definition of investment to FDI was questioned.
First, a definition of investment only in terms of direct investment would be incompatible with the
basic objective of international investment rules to provide protection of investment.  In this regard, it
was stated that an investment usually consisted of a complex of different properties that were difficultto separate;  that bilateral investment treaties for the protection of foreign investment typically
adopted broad definitions of investment; that, in view of the economic benefits deriving from both
direct and indirect investment, a distinction in  the treatment of foreign investors depending upon
whether their shareholdings constituted direct or indirect investment was difficult to justify;  that, as a
practical matter, any attempt to draw a clear line between direct and indirect investment would raisevery complex issues because of the difficulty of defining when a particular investor held a controlling
interest in an enterprise;  and that the distinction between investment and speculative capital
movements was more pertinent than the distinction between FDI and portfolio investment.  Second, it
was argued that concerns regarding the implicatio ns of including non-FDI forms of investment and
speculative capital movements should be dealt with through appropriate qualifications to substantiveobligations rather than through limitations of the definition of investment.  Specifically, the definition
                                                     
108 M/9, paras.  61, 66-67.
109 M/9, para. 42.
110 M/8, para. 75.WT/WGTI/3
Page 22
of investment should be considered in conjunction with provisions on the movement of capital.
Reference was made in this respect to provisions in  most investment agreements on transfers of funds,
which could be formulated to allow for a certain policy flexibility by permitting certain restrictions on
transfers, for example for macro-economic reasons or for the stability of the financial system.111
90. The need to view the definition of investment in relation to the scope and objectives of an
agreement was stressed by some of the Members.  In  this connection, interest was expressed in
exploring the possibility of applying  different definitions for purposes of different obligations.  In
particular, it was suggested that  a distinction might be warranted between a broad, asset-based
definition for purposes of obligations relating to the treatment of investment in the post-establishment
phase and a narrow definition, limited to FDI,  for purposes of the treatment of investment in the pre-
establishment phase.112
91. The point was made that a broad definition of investment raised several questions that
required careful consideration:  first, whether it was feasible and practical to apply the same set of
international investment rules to different categories of investment, for example, direct investment,
portfolio investment and intangible assets;  second, whether the use of a broad definition might have
unintended consequences in terms of the scope of application of substantive rules;  third, whether it
was fair and desirable to give the same level of protection to short-term and long-term investors;  and,fourth, whether a broad definition could adequate ly take care of the development needs of all
Members.
113
92. It was suggested that the Working Group study the implications of electronic commerce for
the treatment of commercial presence in the context of investment agreements.114
93. The Working Group considered the development dimension of international investment
agreements. It had before it communications from UNCTAD on the question of how international
investment agreements could provide for flexibil ity in the interest of promoting growth and
development.
94. The point was made by the observer for UNCTAD that the ultimate objective of international
investment agreements was to promote growth and development, and that a stable, transparent andpredictable framework for investment could help attr act foreign investment by providing security for
such investment. A basic challenge in the design of international investment agreements was how to
find a proper balance between the need to provide security for foreign investment and the need to
provide for the flexibility necessary for developing  countries to pursue development policies in light
of their specific circumstances.   This flexibility should not be used as a justification for unnecessarily
restrictive policies. Recent work in UNCTAD was aimed at identifying the means by which
international investment agreements could provide for such flexibility. A background Note by theUNCTAD Secretariat, which had been made available to the Working Group, contained a detailed
analysis of how flexibility for development purposes was reflected in the objectives, substantive
provisions, implementation and structure of exis ting international investment agreements.  The
Agreed Conclusions adopted at the UNCTAD Expert Meeting at which this Note had been discussed
provided that UNCTAD would continue its work on this matter.
115
95.  The view was expressed that by providing for security for foreign investment, international
investment promoted investment and thus contribut ed to economic growth and development, but that
                                                     
111 M/8, paras. 73-74 and  79.
112 M/8, paras. 74 and 77-78;  M/9, para. 75.
113 M/8, para. 76.
114 M/8, paras. 75 and 80.
115 M/9, paras. 77-79.WT/WGTI/3
Page 23
such agreements should also contain flexibility to reflect the differing levels of development of
countries.116 The need for a proper balance between such flexibility for development purposes and the
role of investment agreements in securing stability and predictability of the conditions for foreign
investment was emphasized.117 The point was made that the development dimension should be taken
into account as an integral part of the design and structure of investment agreements, in whichconnection the example was mentioned of the structure of the GATS which allowed Members to
make commitments commensurate with their levels of development.
118
96. It was stated that, while countries wished to retain a large degree of flexibility with respect to
the issue of the entry of foreign investment, at the post-establishment stage bilateral investment
treaties usually provided for national treatment for foreign investment.  This suggested that most
countries did not consider that discriminatory treatment of foreign investment in the post-
establishment stage was necessary for development purposes.119 In this connection, the point was
made that existing international investment agreements showed that there were various possible
approaches to provide a degree of flexibility in relation to obligations with respect to the entry of
foreign investment.120 Attention was also drawn to other aspects of the development dimension which
needed to be addressed in investment agreements, such as the problem of lack of human resources
necessary to implement an agreement.121
97. It was argued that the issue of flexibility for development purposes should not only be
considered in relation to the objectives, substantive provisions, implementation and structure of an
agreement, but also in respect of the particular institutional framework in which an agreement was
concluded.  In this respect, the  question was raised whether, in view of the nature of obligations
undertaken in the WTO, an optimal balance between flexibility for development purposes andpredictability for investment could be achieved in a negotiation of investment rules in the WTO.
122
98. The point was made that a careful definition of the notion of flexibility was necessary not
only to avoid the risk that this concept would undermine the fundamental objective of an investment
agreement but also to ensure that it would not be used to justify policies which were inefficient and
which, in a context of competition between countries to attract foreign investment, could have adverseconsequences for other countries. The example of fiscal incentives was mentioned in this respect.
123
99. It was stated by some Members that  it would appear that a common assumption in recent
UNCTAD papers was that government intervention in investment would assist or enhance the
development process.  They pointed out that this  assumption was in contradiction with empirical
evidence which showed that development was sometimes better promoted by deregulation than by
regulation.124
100. The Working Group received a contribution by one Member on the issue of investors'
responsibilities. This contribution contained an overview of relevant international instruments
containing norms for the conduct of foreign investors and of corporate codes of conduct.  It identified
certain questions for further consideration regarding the impact of these international instruments and
corporate codes, the relative merits of guidelines adopted in the framework of international
organizations, as compared with corporate codes of conduct, the role of governments in the further
                                                     
116 M/9, paras. 80-81.
117 M/9, paras. 80-81, 83-88.
118 M/9, paras. 80 and 86.
119 M/9, para. 80.
120 M/9, paras. 81 and 86.
121 M/9, para. 81.
122 M/9, para. 84.
123 M/9, para. 85.
124 M/9, para. 82WT/WGTI/3
Page 24
development of norms for corporate conduct, and the relationship between instruments dealing with
corporate responsibility and existing or future ru les on investment. In the latter regard, it was
emphasized that this contribution was not intended to suggest that the issue of investors'
responsibilities should necessarily be dealt with in the WTO. 125  Related to this, the point was made
that foreign investment was a complex, multifaceted matter which needed to be addressed in differentfora and through different instruments.
126
101. It was stated that the need to strike a balance between rights and responsibilities of foreign
investors had been recognized in the OECD Guide lines for Multinational Enterprises, the negotiations
on a draft United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations and in the linkage
established in the TRIMs Agreement between investment policy and competition policy as subjects
for future consideration in the WTO.127 Recent investment negotiations had given rise to renewed
interest in this matter among OECD member countries.128 In this regard,  the point was made that the
Working Group could benefit from the work under way in the OECD in the co ntext of the review of
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.129
102. The view was expressed that, while in the context of investment the obligations of foreign
investors were commonly understood to relate to issues such as restrictive business practices, transfer
pricing and the transfer of technology,  the international instruments and corporate codes of conductdiscussed in this contribution also dealt with social and human rights issues that were not within the
mandate of the Working Group and were not relevant to the WTO.
130   In response to this observation,
it was stated that the aim of this contribution was to provide factual information on the wide range of
aspects of corporate behaviour covered by existing instruments without implying that these matters
should be taken up in the WTO. It was also observed that the instruments described in thecontribution contained norms for the conduct of enterprises, not governments.
131
103. The point was made that international agreements should strike a balance rights and
obligations of foreign investors and that the statem ent made in this contribution that international
agreements cannot impose direct obligations on citizens or companies was too sweeping.132 In
response to these comments, it was stated that the contribution focused on the balance between the
rights of investors and the right of host countries to regulate economic activities in their territories
because the responsibilities of investors were primarily, if not exclusively a mater for domestic law
and the role of international instruments and guidelines on corporate responsibility was to facilitate
the implementation of domestic laws. In addition, it was difficult to see how the concept of a balance
between rights and obligations of foreign investors could in practice be translated into international
rules. Thus, the approach that had evolved over the years was to rely on instruments of a voluntary
nature which were complementary to the basic obligation of firms to respect the rules and regulationsof host countries.
133
104. The question was raised whether the voluntary character of the international instruments and
guidelines discussed in this contribution had affected their implementation.134   It was stated that a key
question was whether existing instruments and guidel ines had actually resulted in changes in the
behaviour of multinational enterprises in areas of interest to developing countries, such as competition
                                                     
125 M/10, paras. 9 and 25.
126 M/10, paras. 9, 19 and 22.
127 M/10, para. 10.
128 M/10, paras. 10 and 23.
129 M/10, para. 24.
130M/10, paras. 11 and 22.
131 M/10, paras. 12, 17 and 25.
132 M/10, paras. 13 and 14.
133 M/10, para. 25.
134 M/10, paras. 14 and 15.WT/WGTI/3
Page 25
and the transfer of technology.135 The point was also made that there did not appear to be an effective
mechanism for the monitoring of the implemen tation of these instruments and guidelines.136  It was
observed that because of the lack of objective and verifiable data and of effective monitoring
mechanisms it was difficult to determine whether or  not the behaviour of multinational enterprises
had improved as a result of guidelines for corporate conduct.137
105. It was argued that the issue of investors' responsibilities was an important theme for
consideration with respect to a possible multilateral framework on investment, particularly as regards
the development dimension of such a framework. Pr ovisions contained in the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises on competition and on the role of foreign investors in the technological
development of host countries were particularly relevant in this regard.138
106. Interest was expressed in more detailed information and further discussion on certain
instruments and initiatives mentioned in the contribution.139   In particular, it was proposed that there
be a discussion of the reasons of the failure of certain attempts to establish international norms for
corporate conduct, notably the draft United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational
Corporations.140
107. The view was expressed that the existing approach to corporate responsibility based on
voluntary commitments by investors had worked well and that there was therefore no need for adifferent approach.
141 It was argued that the further development  of corporate codes of conduct
should be left to the private sector but that there might be a role for governments in developing
guidelines and recommendations.142 Doubts were voiced as to whether this should be done in the
WTO.143
                                                     
135 M/10, para. 13.
136 M/10, para. 13.
137 M/10, para. 15.
138 M/10, paras. 12 and 20.
139 M/10, paras. 14 and 22.
140 M/10, para. 13.
141 M/10, para. 19.
142 M/10, paras. 15 and 23.
143 M/10, para. 23.WT/WGTI/3
Page 26
ANNEX 1
TEXT OF THE SINGAPORE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, PARAGRAPH 20
"20. Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to investment and
competition policy and the built-in agenda in these areas, including under the TRIMs Agreement, and
on the understanding that the work undertaken shall not prejudge whether negotiations will be
initiated in the future, we also agree to:
- establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade and investment;
and
- establish a working group to study issues raised by Members relating to the
interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive
practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit further consideration in the
WTO framework.
These groups shall draw upon each other's work if necessary and also draw upon and be without
prejudice to the work in UNCTAD and other appropriate intergovernmental fora.  As regards
UNCTAD, we welcome the work under way as provided for in the Midrand Declaration and the
contribution it can make to the understanding of issues.  In the conduct of the work of the working
groups, we encourage cooperation with the above organizations to make the best use of availableresources and to ensure that the development dimension is taken fully into account.  The General
Council will keep the work of each body under revi ew, and will determine after two years how the
work of each body should proceed.  It is clearly understood that future negotiations, if any, regarding
multilateral disciplines in these areas, will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken
among WTO Members regarding such negotiations."WT/WGTI/3
Page 27
ANNEX 2
CHECKLIST OF ISSUES SUGGESTED FOR STUDY
Non-Paper by the Chair
Revision
It was widely recognized that the Working Group's work programme should be open, non-
prejudicial and capable of evolution as the work pr oceeds.  It was also emphasized that all elements,
not only category I, should be permeated by the de velopment dimension.  Particular attention should
be paid to the situation of least-developed countries.  In pursuing the items of its work programme, theWorking Group should avoid unnecessary duplication of work done in UNCTAD and other
organizations.
_______________
I. Implications of the relationship between trade and investment for development and economic
growth, including:
- economic parameters relating to macroeconomic stability, such as domestic savings,
fiscal position and the balance of payments;
- industrialization, privatization, employment, income and wealth distribution,
competitiveness, transfer of technology and managerial skills;
- domestic conditions of competition and market structures.
In this work, the Working Group should seek to benefit from the experience of Members at
different stages of development and take account of recent trends in foreign investment flows
and of the relationship between different kinds of foreign investment.
II. The economic relationship between trade and investment:
- the degree of correlation between trade and investment flows;- the determinants of the relationship between trade and investment;- the impact of business strategies, practices and decision-making on trade and
investment, including through case studies;
- the relationship between the mobility of capital and the mobility of labour;- the impact of trade policies and measures on investment flows, including the effect of
the growing number of bilateral and regional arrangements;
- the impact of investment policies and measures on trade;- country experiences regarding national investment policies, including investment
incentives and disincentives;WT/WGTI/3
Page 28
- the relationship between foreign investment and competition policy.
III. Stocktaking and analysis of existing international instruments and activities regarding trade 
and investment:
- existing WTO provisions;- bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives;- implications for trade and investment flows of existing international instruments.
IV. On the basis of the work above:
144
- identification of common features and differences, including overlaps and possible
conflicts, as well as possible gaps in existing international instruments;
- advantages and disadvantages of entering into bilateral, regional and multilateral rules
on investment, including from a development perspective;
- the rights and obligations of home and host countries and of investors and host
countries;
- the relationship between existing and possible future international cooperation on
investment policy and existing and possible future international cooperation oncompetition policy.
                                                     
144 The question of the timing of work under section IV was the subject of a decision taken by the
Working Group at its meeting of 2-3 June 1997.WT/WGTI/3
Page 29
ANNEX 3
Summary of contributions received in the Working Group
on the Relationship between Trade and Investment in 1999
Symbol
(WT/WGTI/W/-)Member / Other
sourceWhere introduced
(Reference in Minutes)Topic
W/69 Korea M/8, Para. 4 FDI Flows and the Asian Financial
Crisis:  Korea's experience
W/70 Korea M/8, Para. 72 A Benefit of Multilateral
Investment Rules:  EnhancedTransparency
W/71 India M/8, Para. 47 Stocktaking of India Bilateral
Agreements for the Promotion andProtection of Investments
W/72 India Relationship between Trade,
Investment and Development
W/73 India M/8, Para. 5 Investment, Development and
Technology Transfers
W/74 India M/8, Para. 70 Development dimension of the
international investmentagreement
W/75 Japan M/8, Para. 71 Ensuring Transparency Stability
W/76 M/9, Para. 74 Issues raised and points made on
the definition of investment – Noteby the Secretariat
W/77 UNCTAD M/9, Paras. 76-79 Note on International Investment
Agreements:  Concepts allowing
for a certain flexibility in theinterest of promoting growth anddevelopment
W/78 UNCTAD M/9, Paras. 76-79 Report on the UNCTAD Expert
Meeting on International
Investment Agreements:  Concepts
allowing for a certain flexibility inthe interest of promoting growthand development,24-26  March  1999
W/79 Korea M/9, Para. 41 Multilateral Framework on
Investment:  A Realistic Approach
W/80 Australia M/9, Para. 75 Definition of Investment
W/81 European
Community and
member StatesM/10, Para. 9 Responsibilities of investors
__________