RESTRICTED
WORLD TRADE WT/WGTCP/W/48
24November 1997
ORGANIZATION(97-5158)
Original: English Working Group ontheInteraction
between Trade andCompetition Policy
SUBMISSION FROM THE UNITED STATES
Thefollowing communication, dated 21November 1997, hasbeenreceived fromthePermanent
Mission oftheUnited States withtherequest thatitbecirculated toMembers.
_______________
USExperience withAntitrust Cooperation Agreements
Inthiseraofincreased globalization, cooperation between governments inantitrust law
enforcement ismore andmore necessary, andmore andmore common. TheUnited States iscurrently
apartytofiveantitrust cooperation agreements withothergovernments; amultilateral Recommendation
oftheOrganization forEconomic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) andfourbilateral cooperation
agreements.1Thispaper describes thesubstance andthecontext ofthese agreements.
TheOECD Recommendation2,which wasmostrecently amended in1995, isthelastinaseries
ofsuchOECD Recommendations, theearliest ofwhich wassigned in1967. TheRecommendation
provides forOECD member countries tonotify othermember countries when undertaking anyantitrust
enforcement activity which mayaffect suchother member countries 'important interests, andfor
consultation, upon request, withregard tosuchactivity. (The United States made over70such
notifications during fiscal 1997.) TheRecommendation further exhorts member countries totakeinto
account, intheirenforcement activities, thesignificant national interests ofother member countries
thatmaybeaffected. Itcallsupon member countries tocooperate withoneanother inenforcement.
Italsocallsupon members toconsider taking action against anti-competitive practices thatadversely
impact uponanother member country, when requested todosobythelatter. (This lastprinciple, which
hascome tobeknown as"positive comity", wasadopted andexpanded upon inthe1991 agreement
between theUnited States andtheCommission oftheEuropean Communities ("EC").)
TheOECD Recommendation alsoprovides amechanism forconciliation ofdisputes between
member countries, ifrequested andagreed byallthemember countries involved. The1995revisions
totheRecommendation urgemember countries tocooperate more extensively intheenforcement of
theirantitrust laws-including, where appropriate andconsistent withnational law,through theexchange
ofconfidential investigative information andtheobtaining ofinformation ononeanother 'sbehalf.
1There arenumerous legal instruments, suchasMutual Legal Assistance Treaties andletters rogatory, that
areusedgenerallybygovernmentstoobtaincooperationandassistancefromothergovernmentsinlawenforcemen t
investigations, including antitrust investigations.
2Revised Recommendation oftheOECD Council Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on
AnticompetitivePracticesAffectingInternationalTrade,OECDDocumentNo.C(95)130/Final(21September1995).WT/WGTCP/W/48
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TheUnited States isalsoaparty tofourformal bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements, the
earliest ofwhich wassigned withtheFederal Republic ofGermany in1976. Later agreements involved
Australia (1982), Canada (1984, superseded byanewagreement in1995), andtheEuropean
Communities (EC)(1991).3AswiththeOECD Recommendation, eachofthese bilateral agreements
includesnotificationprovisions,whichcontemplatethateachpartywillprovidetheotherwithinformation
about planned actions which mayaffect theothers 'important interests. While thespecifics varyamong
thefouragreements, eachalsocontains aprovision forconsultations toresolve mutual orunilateral
concerns, whether based onnotified activities, orotherwise. Eachagreement alsoarticulates, insome
form, theintention ofbothparties tocooperate inmatters ofantitrust enforcement, where such
cooperation isfeasible inbothpractical andlegalterms. Boththe1991US-EC andthe1995US-Canada
agreements alsoinclude "positive comity" provisions calling foreachparty toweigh theimpact of
anti-competitive conduct ontheother party asanadditional reason infavour ofchallenging conduct
thatalsoviolates theenforcing party'santitrust laws. None ofthese agreements, however, permits
thesharing ofconfidential information without theprovider 'sconsent andallspecifically allow the
requested party totakeitsownnational interests intoaccount indetermining whether andtowhatextent
toprovide requested cooperation.4
Each ofthefourbilateral agreements reflects twothemes -enforcement cooperation, onthe
onehand, andtheavoidance ormanagement ofdisputes, ontheother. Theextent towhich oneor
theother ofthese themes haspredominated inaparticular agreement hasdepended onthespecific
bilateral concerns andhistory from which theagreement emerged.
TheGerman agreement isfocused predominantly onlawenforcement cooperation, reflecting
thestrongpost-WorldWarIIGermanantitrustenforcementtradition.Astheearliestoftheseagreements,
itistheleastdetailed. Despite itsbrevity, however, itclearly reflects theintention ofbothparties
toenhance theirantitrust enforcement activities through increased cooperation. TheGerman agreement
hasbeenthecornerstone ofaclose andcordial relationship between USandGerman antitrust agencies
thathascontinued tothepresent day.
Bycontrast, theAustralian and1984Canadian agreements centred more onconflict avoidance.
Eachofthose agreements grewoutofdifferences between theUnited States andtheother government
overtheuranium antitrust litigation ofthelate1970s andearly 1980s inUScourts, andinthecase
ofAustralia, overaUSantitrust investigation intheearly 1980s involving ocean shipping inthe
US-Australia/New Zealand trade. Needless tosay,theUnited States shared withAustralia andCanada
3SeeAgreement Between theGovernment oftheUnited States ofAmerica andtheGovernment oftheFederal
Republic ofGermany Relating toMutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 23June 1976,
US-Federal Republic ofGermany, 27U.S.T. 1956, T.I.S. No.8291, reprinted in4Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
¶13,501; Agreement Between theGovernment oftheUnited States ofAmerica andtheGovernment ofAustralia
Relating toCooperation onAntitrust Matters, 29June 1982, US-Australia, T.I.A.S. No.10365, reprinted in
4Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,502; Memorandum ofUnderstanding Between theGovernment oftheUnited
States ofAmerica andtheGovernment ofCanada astoNotification, Consultation, andCooperation withRespect
totheApplication ofNational Antitrust Laws, 9March 1984, US-Canada, reprinted in4Trade Reg.Rep.(CCH)
¶13,503A; Agreement Between theGovernment oftheUnited States ofAmerica andtheGovernment ofCanada
RegardingtheApplicationoftheirCompetitionandDeceptiveMarketingPracticesLaws,3August1995,reprinted
in4Trade Reg.Rep.(CCH) ¶13,503; andAgreement Between theGovernment oftheUnited States ofAmerica
andtheCommission oftheEuropean Communities Regarding theApplication ofTheir Competition Laws,
23September 1991, 30I.L.M. 1491 (Nov. 1991), reprinted in4Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,504; andOJ
L95/45 (27April 1995), corrected atOJL131/38 (15June 1995).
4Each oftheexisting agreements isan"executive agreement" forpurposes ofUSlaw. That is,theyare
formal, binding international agreements, buttheyhave notbeen ratified bytheUSSenate astreaties andthus
donotoverride anyprovisions ofUSlawwithwhich theymaybeinconsistent.WT/WGTCP/W/48
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aninterest inavoiding orminimizing conflicts overantitrust enforcement. Innegotiating these
agreements, theUnited States wasconcerned topreserve itsability toapply itsantitrust lawstoharmful
anti-competitive conduct affecting UScommerce, including conduct involving itstrade withtheother
party totheagreement. Australia andCanada wereconcerned toensure thatwhen theirinterests were
affected, theywould haveadvance notice andanopportunity forconsultation, andthattheirinterest
would beconsidered inanyenforcement action theUnited States might take.
These twoagreements havebeenhighly successful. Bycreating conflict avoidance mechanisms
inwhich theparties hadconfidence, theyfreed theparties tofocus intheirday-to-day relationships
oncooperation. Cooperation rather thandispute resolution hasbeentheprincipal basisonwhich both
countries haveinteracted inantitrust matters withtheUnited States since theagreements weresigned.
Infact,nosignificant differences overantitrust enforcement havearisen between theUnited States
andAustralia since 1982. Forobvious reasons, Canada andtheUnited States dealmore often with
eachother onantitrust matters; fromtimetotime, the1984agreement wasusedtoeliminate potential
misunderstandings ortoseektoaccommodate differences. Butthese occasions were farsurpassed
infrequency andsignificance bytheextraordinary ongoing enforcement cooperation thathasdeveloped
between theCanadian andUSantitrust authorities. Accordingly, by1995, thetwocountries were
ready toconclude anewcooperation agreement thatplaced averystrong emphasis onlawenforcement
cooperation. Thenewagreement builtonthesuccesses thattheUSDepartment ofJustice (DOJ) and
theCanadian antitrust authorities have hadinjoint criminal price-fixing investigations, which
investigations haveresulted inconvictions ofnumerous firms andindividuals onbothsidesoftheborder.
Inthecontext ofcooperation, theparties agree toexchange antitrust-related information, consistent
withexistingconfidentialityconstraints.Asnotedabove,thisagreementalsoincludesa"positivecomity"
provision.
Bycontrastwiththecooperation-orientedGermanagreementandtheconflictavoidance-oriented
Australian and1984Canadian agreements, theUnited States '1991agreement withtheECwasaimed
equally atbothconcerns. Moreover, theUS-EC agreement didnotarisefrom ahistory ofbilateral
antitrust cooperation orconflict between thetwojurisdictions. Rather, itreflected arecognition on
bothsides thatenforcement cooperation between them, andamechanism foravoiding orminimizing
potential differences, would beenormously important inthechanging world economy.
Although theimportance ofUS-EC antitrust cooperation isself-evident, three developments
inEurope might besaidtohavemade theneedforanagreement seem especially compelling atthe
timenegotiations began in1990. First, theEuropean Court ofJustice intheWood Pulpcase5had
recently confirmed theapplication ofCommunity antitrust lawtooffshore conduct. Bybringing the
USandECapproaches tojurisdiction closely intoline,thedecision broadened opportunities for
enforcement cooperation andlessened thechance ofdisputes overjurisdictional principles. Atthe
same time, theWood Pulpdecision served asareminder oftheneedforamicable ways todealwith
anydifferences thatmight arisefrom overlapping jurisdiction.
Second, thisperiod wasoneofintense andvisible expansion ofCommunity-level regulation
under the"1992" programme, aimed atthecompletion oftheinternal market. From aUSperspective,
the"1992" campaign spotlighted theimportance intheeconomic landscape ofECantitrust enforcement,
eventhough itdidnotinvolve extension oftheEuropean Commission 'santitrust powers.
5SeeCases 89/85, etc.,A.Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v.Commission ,1988 E.C.R. 5193, [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ¶14,491(1988).WT/WGTCP/W/48
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Third, theEuropean Council hadjustadopted thenewMerger Control Regulation. The
Commission andtheUSantitrust authorities expected theywould regularly beexamining thesame
mergers under theirrespective lawsandbelieved theywould need, attheleast, aregular channel of
communication forthose cases.
Theimmediate impact oftheUS-EC agreement hasbeenamarked increase incommunication
betweentheUSantitrustauthoritiesandtheEuropeanCommission.Thesecommunicationshaveincluded
formal notifications, regular consultations, informal contacts among theheads oftheagencies, and
aregular flowofphone callsandfaxes between agency staffs. Infact,allofthese things could legally
haveoccurred before theagreement, andtosomeextent theydid.Buttheagreement spurred theagencies
toseekopportunities forcooperation inamore structured andproactive waythathadnotoccurred
before.
Before discussing examples ofthekindofcooperation which hasbeenachieved under these
agreements, itisworth noting thatantitrust cooperation agreements continue toevolve, withnew
agreements currently intheprocess ofratification anddiscussion. LastApril, theUnited States and
Australia announced aproposed agreement which, iffinalized, would allow thetwocountries 'antitrust
agencies toexchange evidence onareciprocal basis foruseinantitrust enforcement, andassist each
other inobtaining evidence located intheother'scountry, while assuring thattheconfidentiality of
theinformation would beprotected.6TheUSandAustralia areintheprocess ofpursuing theirrespective
procedures forfinalizing theagreement.
Inaddition, theUShasrecently negotiated anewpositive comity agreement withtheEC.
Thisproposed newagreement seeks toclarify thesituations thatwould presumptively callforreferrals
andtofleshoutthereport-back andconsultation mechanisms thatwould come intoplayonceareferral
hasbeenmade. BoththeUSandtheECaretaking necessary steps tofinalize thisagreement.
Finally, theUSandother OECD members havealsobeenworking overthepastyearinthe
OECD tounderline theimportance ofenforcing national competition lawsagainst hard-core cartels.
TheUSisstrongly supporting aproposed Recommendation thatmember countries havecompetition
laws thateffectively prohibit anddeter hard-core cartels, with effective sanctions, enforcement
procedures, andinstitutions. Theproposed Recommendation alsostates thatOECD countries have
acommon interest inpreventing hard-core cartels andshould cooperate witheachother inenforcing
theirlawsagainst suchcartels, totheextent consistent withtheirownlaws, regulations andimportant
interests. More specifically, theproposed Recommendation would encourage member countries to
enterintomutual assistance agreements thatwould permit thesharing ofevidence withforeign antitrust
authorities, totheextent permitted bynational laws, andwould encourage members totakeanother
lookatprovisions intheirlawsthatstand inthewayofthesecooperative efforts. ThisRecommendation
iscurrently thesubject ofdiscussion within theOECD, andwehope itwillbeadopted inthenear
future.
6Thisagreemen t,iffinalized,wouldbethefirstonecompletedbytheUSpursuanttotheInternationalAntitrust
Enforcement Assistance Actof1994 ("IAEAA"), 15U.S.C. 6201-6212.WT/WGTCP/W/48
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Specific examples ofcooperation
Thespirit ofcooperation engendered bytheexistence oftheseagreements hasmanifested itself
incooperation innumerous specific investigations overthepastfewyears.7In1994, theDepartment
ofJustice andtheEuropean Commission 'sDG-IV conducted ajointinvestigation ofanti-competitive
practices byMicrosoft thatresulted inasingle coordinated remedy, implemented byavirtually identical
court decree intheUSandanundertaking inEurope. Thisdegree ofcooperation waspossible because
Microsoft agreed towaive confidentiality restrictions, andthestaffs onbothsides oftheAtlantic
consequently wereabletocoordinate theirinvestigations toadegree thatcould nothavebeenachieved
otherwise. While thisdegree ofcooperation would havebeenpossible intheabsence oftheUS-EC
cooperation agreement, asstated above, thespirit ofcooperation which theagreement fostered certainly
helped tofacilitate theresult achieved inthiscase.
In1996, theDOJconducted aninvestigation ofACNielsen, aUSfirmthatprovides services
tracking retailsales, todetermine whether Nielsen offered customers morefavourable terms incountries
where Nielsen hadmarket power ifthose customers alsousedNielsen incountries where itfaced
significantcompetition.TheEuropeanCommissionalsoinvestigated,sincemostoftheconductoccurred
inEurope andhadadirect impact onconsumers there. There wasclose contact between thestaffs
ofbothagencies anditbecame apparent thattheCommission would takeaction toremedy thesituation.
Consequently, theDOJdetermined thatitclearly made sense toallow DG-IV totakethelead, and
closed itsinvestigation when Nielsen signed itsundertaking withtheCommission. Again, the
communications thattookplace between theinvestigating staffs ofthetwoagencies inthismatter could
haveoccurred intheabsence ofacooperation agreement, buttheexistence oftheagreement certainly
helped tofoster thekindofatmosphere ofmutual trustthatmade suchcommunication andsucharesult
possible.
Similarly, theUSFederal Trade Commission (FTC) closed aninvestigation lastyearinview
ofanenforcement action bytheItalian Competition Authority. Aproduction quota maintained by
Parma hamproducers adversely affected consumers bothinItalyandinexport markets, including the
United States. Attheoutset ofitsinvestigation, theFTCconsulted theItalian Competition Authority.
TheItalians hadaninvestigation under waythatwould result inadecision byadatecertain. TheFTC
accordingly decided tostayitshand. TheItalian authority 'sdecision8andremedy addressed theFTC's
concerns, and,consequently, theFTCclosed itsinvestigation.
InApril 1997, theDOJannounced itsfirstpositive comity request totheECunder the1991
agreement. Theagency asked theCommission 'sDG-IV toinvestigate possible anti-competitive conduct
bycertain European airlines thatmaybepreventing US-based computer reservation systems from
competing effectively incertain European countries. Since thealleged conduct tookplace inEurope
andEuropean consumers would suffer ifcompetition hadbeendiminished, itbecame clear thatthe
ECwasinthebestposition toinvestigate. DG-IV hasannounced thatitisactively pursuing thematter.
7TheEuropean Commission hasissued twoinformative reports oncooperation under the1991 US-EC
Agreement, thefirston8October 1996 (COM(96)479 final) andthesecond on4July1997 (COM(97)346 final),
bothofwhich areavailable ontheWorld Wide Web Homepage oftheEC'santitrust authority, DG-IV. These
reports contain statistics onthenumber ofnotifications andadiscussion ofthenature andmechanics ofthe
cooperation thathastaken place between theECandUSauthorities.
8ConsorziodelProsciuttodiSanDaniele-ConsorziodelProsciuttodiParma(Rif.I138)Deliberadel19.06.96
-Boll. N.25/1996 (available ontheHomepage oftheItalian Competition Authority).WT/WGTCP/W/48
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Inaddition tothisformal referral, other matters havebeenreferred byonesidetotheother
informally. Complainants sometimes needtomaintain anonymity andalsosometimes donotknow
where toturnwhen theyfeelharmed byconduct occurring ontheother sideoftheAtlantic.
Through theircontacts withothercompetition authorities, USenforcement authorities areoften
abletofindasympathetic andauthoritative earintheplace where theanti-competitive conduct is
occurring. So,despite theinfrequency offormal positive comity referrals, informal referrals have
taken place andhavebeenpursued bythereceiving authority.
Asnoted above, theDOJhasengaged inseveral instances ofclose cooperation withCanada
onindividual investigations. Prominent among theseinstances ofcooperation wasthejointly conducted
criminal investigation intoprice-fixing ofthermal facsimile paper byUS,Canadian, andJapanese firms.
WorkingcloselytogetherinthecontextoftheUS-CanadaTreatyonMutualLegalAssistanceinCriminal
Matters, theCanadian andUSinvestigative staffs dealt withissues suchas:sharing ofdocuments
obtained bysubpoena andsearch warrant; sharing ofdocuments obtained from foreign defendants
pursuant topleaagreements; jointly interviewing witnesses; jointdocument analysis; andconducting
parallel andcoordinated pleanegotiations. Theresults wereimpressive onbothsides oftheborder.
IntheUnited States, three UScorporations, fourJapanese corporations, andaJapanese national thus
farhavepledguilty toantitrust violations. Thecorporations andoneindividual paidcriminal fines
totalling morethanUS$10 million, although oneUScorporation andoneofitsexecutives wereacquitted
attrialearlier thisyear. InCanada, fivecorporations -three US,oneCanadian, andoneJapanese
firm-havepledguilty andhavepaidfinesofroughly US$3 million.
Significantcooperationhastakenplaceinmanymultinationalmergercases,despitethedifferences
intheprocedural andsubstantive rules ofthereviewing authorities. TheShell/Montedison9caseis
agood example ofthepotential scope andbenefits ofcooperation insuchmerger cases. During the
initial phase oftheFTCandECinvestigations, inaddition totheroutine discussion ofreview process
andtiming, questions concerning intellectual property andcontract law(particularly astojointventure
contracts) intheUSandEuropean countries wereraised andexplanations exchanged. ECandFTC
staffalsoshared theirrespective views ontheappropriate definition oftheproduct andgeographic
markets, likely competitive effects andpotential remedies. Allsuchconversations were conducted
withcarethatinformation obtained subject toconfidentiality restrictions wasnotdisclosed. Inthis
case,boththeECandtheFTCcame tothesame conclusions astotherelevant product andgeographic
markets.
Finally, cooperative discussions were particularly useful ontheissue ofremedy. Both the
ECandFTCstaffagreed thatthemosteffective remedy would beadivestiture ofShell'sinterest in
its50-50 jointventure withUnion Carbide. Union Carbide 'sopposition tosuchadivesture resulted
intheECaccepting asettlement involving Montedison assets. Ultimately, theFTCreached aconsent
agreement withtheparties thatrequired divesture oftheUnion Carbide jointventure. But,before
reaching thatsettlement, theFTCcontinued toconsult withtheECinorder toobtain asettlement that
would notonlysatisfy theFTC'scompetitive concerns butalsothatwould notconflict withprovisions
oftheEC'sdecision.
Thisexperience hasbeenrepeated many times inother merger cases. Even incases where
themarket structures inEurope andAmerica differed, consultations havebeenuseful inconfirming
respective analyses andavoiding conflicts inremedies where action taken byoneauthority might have
theunintended consequence oflimiting therange ofremedies available toanother reviewing authority.
9Shell/Montecatini, Commission Decision 94/811/EC of8June 1994, Case IV/M.0269, OJL332/48
(22November 1994)(hereinafter "ECDecision"); Montedison/Shell, FTCDocket No.C-3580 (25May 1995).WT/WGTCP/W/48
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Cooperation between enforcement agencies andcommunication between investigating staffs
donotalways, however, result inbothagencies arriving atcoordinated orevensimilar outcomes.
Perhaps thebest-known example ofparallel antitrust investigations during thepastyearwasthe
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger case,inwhich theFTCandDG-IV reached different enforcement
decisions. While ultimate resolution ofthismatter presented difficult issues forbothUSandECantitrust
enforcers, thediscussions leading toitsresolution would havebeenfarmore difficult hadbothagencies
notalready established astrong basis ofcommunication arising from common antitrust enforcement
interests andrelationships.
Differing results havealsobeenreached inparallel investigations thatarenotaswell-known
asBoeing/McDonnell Douglas. TheDOJandCanadian enforcement authorities conducted parallel
investigations intoanti-competitive behaviour intheductile pipeindustry. While theUSauthorities
concluded thatthere wasinsufficient evidence toprosecute under USlaw,theCanadian authorities
assembled adifferent body ofevidence thatwassufficient toobtain aguilty pleaandrecord criminal
finefrom aCanadian subsidiary ofaUSfirm.
BoththeFTCandtheECalsoexaminedUpjohn'smergerwithPharmaciaofSweden.Following
itsexamination of14product overlaps invarious European Economic Area nations aswellasfour
compounds intheR&D stage, theECcleared themerger lastyear. TheFTCsubsequently issued
aconsent order thatrequired themerged company todivest Pharmacia 'sUSassets relating toR&D
for"9-AC", acolorectal cancer drugthatPharmacia isdeveloping under alicense fromtheUSNational
Cancer Institute. Upjohn produced "CPT-11", acompeting compound which wascloser than9-AC
toreceiving approval bytheUSFood andDrug Administration. TheFTC'scomplaint andorder were
based onthedesire tokeepbothcompounds intherunning tothemarket-place.
USandECantitrust authorities heldquite similar views onwhatmarkets would beaffected
bylastyear'sUS$3 billion merger between theSwiss pharmaceutical firms Ciba-Geigy andSandoz.
Forexample, boththeFTCanditsEuropean counterpart focused onthemerger 'sexpected impact
onaworld market forcertain types ofgenetherapy research anddevelopment. Nevertheless, theFTC
andtheECreached different ultimate conclusions about competitive effects. Citing anumber offactors,
theEuropean authorities concluded thatpotential anti-competitive effects inthismarket were too
speculative towarrant antitrust relief. TheFTC, ontheother hand, determined thatthemerging firms
were theleading commercial developers inahighly concentrated genetherapy market andthatnew
entry wasnotexpected todeter orcounteract themerger 'santi-competitive effects. AnFTCconsent
order required themerged firmtolicense certain genetherapy patent rights andother technology to
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.
TheCiba-Geigy/Sandozcaseillustrateswhycooperationisbeneficialevenifreviewingauthorities
differ atthe"bottom line". Thedifferent conclusions inthiscasedonotmean thattheFTC'stheory
ofinnovation competition isnecessarily "right" ormore "aggressive", while theEC'sapproach inthis
areaismore"cautious". Rather, objective, important differences between USandEuropean intellectual
property rights contributed todifferent conclusions astothepotential foreclosure effect ofpending
patent applications. What isimportant isthat,while ourconclusions differed, ourroutes tothese
conclusionswerethesame.And,hadtheEuropeanCommissionconcludedthatreliefinthegenetherapy
market wasnecessary, cooperation inthefashioning ofremedies would havebeenvitalfortheenforcers
andtheparties alike.
Conclusion
Astheforegoing discussion demonstrates, antitrust cooperation agreements serve animportant
function, andcontinue toevolve tomeetthechanging needs ofantitrust enforcement. Thespirit of
cooperation which these agreements have helped tofoster isresulting inmore effective antitrust
enforcement inthecountries thatareparty tosuchagreements, tothebenefit ofconsumers inthose
countries.