RESTRICTEDWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATIONG/SCM/M/33
25 April 2002
(02-2379)
Committee on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures
MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL MEETING
HELD ON 25 OCTOBER 2001
Chairman:  Mr. Remo Moretta (Australia)
1. The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures held a special meeting
on 25 October 2001.
2. The purpose of the meeting, as set forth in WTO/AIR/1655, was to continue discussion of the
implementation-related issues referred to the Committee in the 15 December 2000 decision of the
General Council, and the 31 July and 15 October 2001 requests from the Chairman of the General
Council.
Proposed methodology for calculations in constant 1990 US dollars
3. The Chairman recalled that the Chairman of the General Council had sent him a letter on 15
October 2001, recalling the following draft decision of the General Council found in Annex I to the
Draft Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns  (JOB(01)/139):
The General Council agrees that Annex VII( b) to the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures includes the Member s that are listed th erein until their GNP
per capita reaches US$ 1,000 in constant 1990 dollars for three consecutive years.
The Chairman of the General Council had requested that the Committee take up one particular
technical issue relating to this draft decision, that is, the question of precisely how and by whom the
calculation of 1990 dollars could be performed.  He had further requested that the Committee
Chairman report to him on this matter on 26 October 2001.
4. In response to the General Council Chairman's request, the Committee Chairman had
developed, in coordination with the Secretariat, a methodology for calculating the GNP per capita of
Members listed in Annex VII(b) in constant 1990 US dollars.  A paper reflecting this proposed
methodology was available in the room.  The Chairm an noted that this proposed methodology was
based closely on an approach that had been developed prior to Seattle and thus would be familiar to
many Members.  In considering a possible methodology, the Chairman had taken into account thatany calculation methodology needed to be clear and tr ansparent, thus the approach he proposed was
based entirely on readily accessible data, published by the World Bank, which could simply be
plugged into the methodology set forth in the paper.  His intention was to avoid subsequent arguments
about which data to use or precisely how to perform the calculations each year.
5. It had to be noted that the foregoing methodology could in some cases result in a figure for
GNP per capita in constant 1990 dollars in excess of GNP per capita in current dollars.  The
Committee Chairman understood that the Chairman of the General Council had been alerted to this
issue and was considering how it could be addressed in any decision.  At earlier informal
consultations the discussion had been inconclusive .  One Member had expressed concern over using
the 1990 World Bank figures from the 1992 World Bank Atlas, the data on the basis of whichG/SCM/M/33
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Annex VII(b) was originally compiled, as the starting-point.  The Member had pointed to subsequent
revisions to the 1990 data as the reason for concern.  In response, one Member had questioned
whether it would be appropriate for Members to revise their decisions every time the World Bank
might revise data, even years after the fact.  A few other Members had raised points of clarification.
As the Chairman had mentioned, the discussion had been inconclusive as to whether the methodologycould be accepted by the Committee.  The Chairman therefore enquired as to whether any Member
objected to the methodology that he had proposed.
6. The delegation of Thailand could accept the essence of the methodology, but suggested some
revisions, purely for the purpose of clarification in particular Step 4 in the last sentence of the
methodology, which was important in Thailand's view, because it dealt with the future.  Thailand
wished to propose that the last sentence in Step 4 be revised to ensure that this methodology would
reflect the evolution in the development and income level of Members in real terms.  Thailandsuggested that: (i) in the last sentence in Step 4, the word "should" be replaced by the words "as and
when" and (ii) the word "modify" be replaced by the word "modifies", (iii) in the second-last line, the
words "shall be updated accordingly and" be inserted after the words "step 2", and, (iv) in the last line,
the word "would" be replaced by the word "shall".  For Thailand, these revisions would go toward
resolving the question of principle before the General Council regarding Annex VII(b).
7. The Chairman clarified that Thailand was, therefore, proposing that the sentence read:
As and when the World Bank modifies its statistics such as that the values in step 1
are based upon constant dollars for a year different than 1995, the indices in step 2
shall be updated accordingly and, for years subsequent to the modification, shall be
constructed on the basis of the modified statistics.
8. The delegate of the United States indicated that, before addressing the proposal before the
Committee with respect to the methodology calculation, the United States wished to request a
clarification from the Chairman with respect to th e last paragraph of the communication that he had
sent based upon the letter that he had received from the Chairman of the General Council on
15 October 2001.  In the Committee Chairman's communication to the Committee, the final paragraphread as follows:
It should be noted that the foregoing methodology could in some cases result in a
figure where GNP per capita in 1990 constant dollars was in excess of GNP per
capita in current dollars.
The delegate of the United States understood that the Chairman of the General Council had been
alerted to this issue and was considering how it co uld be addressed in any decision.  In reviewing this
sentence the United States questioned, firstly, why it was there, and not some of the other elementsthat had been considered by the Chairman of the General Council, and, secondly, whether the
possibility of applying both constant 1990 dollar GNP and current-year dollar GNP was envisioned in
the methodology that the Chairman was proposing.
9. The Chairman indicated that the methodology before the Committee did not envisage an
alternative; it proposed that 1990 constant US dolla rs be used, and that was the basis upon which the
difference had been communicated to the Chairman of the General Council.  That was what was
before the Committee at this meeting.
10. The delegate of the United States did not wish to express an opinion on the merits of the
issue, as it was being discussed in another forum.  Where the Secretariat methodology was concerned,
the United States could accept it, although it remained concerned that the calculations were not basedon the most recently available World Bank data.  The United States was satisfied with the
methodology applied by the Secretariat, except to the extent of the 1990 base year.  It was, therefore,G/SCM/M/33
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prepared to go along with the proposal mentioned by  the Chairman, but would want to have reflected
in the methodology that the data would reflect the most recently available World Bank data rather
than data as published in 1992.
11. The Chairman recalled that he had advised Members that the reason for choosing the
1990 constant dollars as originally published was because these were the figures used at the time that
the WTO Agreement and Annex VII(b) were negotiated, and it took on board the concerns expressed
by other Members as to whether a new decision would be required every time the figures were
revised.  That was the basis upon which he had made this particular proposal.  He was willing to
accept all comments from all Members, and the Committee had just heard a proposal from the United
States to reflect in the methodology that updated figures be used.  The Chairman requested the views
of other Members, especially in relation to this last proposal.
12. The delegate of Egypt could accept the calculation and methodology as at present, and
reserved his right to comment on any revised methodology in the future.
13. The delegate of Sri Lanka indicated that her delegation also supported the methodology as
outlined in the Chairman's proposal.
14. The Chairman stated that, given that there appeared to be no consensus in respect of the
methodology that he had proposed, he would reflect in his report to the General Council the
methodology that he had proposed as well as th e comments and suggestions made by Members
thereon at this meeting.
15. The delegate of the United States proposed that the words "upon most recently available
World Bank data" be inserted in brackets along with the words "upon the World Bank Atlas 1992" in
Step 3, and the words "because they represented the information available at the time Membersnegotiated Annex VII(b)" be deleted.
16. The Chairman indicated that he would forward his proposal, as well as reflect the comments
and suggestions made today, in his report to the General Council.
17. The delegate of Bolivia indicated that he would be grateful if the US delegation would
explain the reason for wishing to amend this paragraph which Bolivia supported.  He wished to have
an argument upon which to base his explanation to his authorities.
18. The Chairman explained that his proposal was not based on updated or revised figures which
were more current and up to date; that was the proposal put forward by the United States.  Perhaps the
United States could give further justification for its proposal?
19. The delegate of the United States agreed with the Chairman in that the United States'
fundamental point was that the 1990 data had been subsequently revised, and more accurate
information was available.  Secondly, the United States noted that, depending on the methodologychosen, some Members would benefit and others would be disadvantaged, and the United States
wished to bring that to the attention of the Committee as well.
20. The Chairman enquired as to whether the United States would envisage separate decisions
being taken as and when data were revised.
21. The delegate of the United States considered that this was a question to be examined, and the
United States would see if it could come up with an overall approach to the process.  The delegate
noted the Chairman's point that the situation would change depending on new facts coming out, but it
did not have a response to the question at this meeting.  It could also impact on the graduation issue.
For instance, if numbers came out in 1990, and a particular Member had graduated in 1999, but inG/SCM/M/33
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2000 new numbers came out, that Member could be back in.  This was a fundamental problem that
needed to be addressed.
22. The Chairman concluded that the issue of methodology for calculations in constant 1990
dollars was still unresolved, and he would report and reflect Members' views, comments, and
suggestions in his report to the General Council.
Countervailing duty investigation procedures
23. The Chairman turned to the Committee's last issue for discussion at this meeting,
countervailing duty investigation procedures.  He recalled that India had circulated a draft decision in
respect of one of the issues that it had raised, i.e., that only the excess amount of duty drawback was
countervailable.  This proposal had been discussed at earlier informal consultations, and several
Members had raised questions and concerns about the drafting and the possible implications of the
proposal.  Some of those raising questions had indicated that they were prepared to work with Indiaon resolution of the issue of a revised text.  The Chairman enquired of India as to whether it had any
developments to report in this regard or any statement it wished to make in respect of its proposal and
how it saw it being taken forward.
24. The delegate of India indicated that he wished to press for a decision as proposed.  The
proposal had been made on an invitation to prioritise the issues raised in India's paper under Tiret 80.
The delegate encouraged Members to indicate any alternative text, and was looking forward to the
statement to be made by the European Communities on this matter.  India had nothing else to add
other than that it looked forward to taking a decision before the Ministerial Conference in Doha.
25. The delegate of the European Communities indicated that the European Communities was
willing to work on other possibilities to address this point, although for the time being the European
Communities maintained its reservation with regard to the wisdom of reiterating the obligations under
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement").  While he considered
that there was a common understanding that th e Committee was not considering modifying any
obligations, the text before it would not serve the purpose stated by India as it was an incomplete
reflection of the obligations in the Agreement.
26. The delegate of Canada indicated that Canada had similar concerns with the text as put on the
table by India.  Canada still had those concerns, and therefore could not go along with the proposal as
suggested by India.  Canada was, however, prepar e d  t o  w o r k  w i t h  I n d i a  i f  i t  w i s h e d  t o  p r o p o s e
alternative text.
27. The delegate of the United States noted that the United States shared many of the concerns
expressed by the European Communities and Canada.
28. The Chairman suggested that interested Members continue working assiduously towards a
possible resolution.  Turning to the rest of the countervail proposals of Brazil and India, he recalled
that Brazil had suggested that they would be best pursued through a renewal of the Committee's
mandate.  Other Members had made the counter-suggestion that these issues could be pursued in a
group, which could be established by the Committee, along the lines of the Anti-Dumping Ad Hoc
Group on Implementation.  India and Brazil, as well as some other Members, had been uncomfortable
with the suggestion to create such a group, howev er, as in their view this would prejudice any
decisions the General Council might take in respect of unresolved implementation issues.
29. The delegate of Brazil considered that the Chairman had made a faithful assessment of
Brazil's position.  Brazil continued to be uncomfortable with the idea of taking any decision about the
format of any future discussion of this item before the General Council had expressed itself.  BrazilG/SCM/M/33
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wished the Committee simply to recommend that th e examination be extended until a precise date in
the future.
30. The delegate of India seconded the view expressed by Brazil.
31. The Chairman noted the suggestion that the Committee recommend that its mandate be
extended.  If there were no objections to this proposal, his report to the General Council would reflect
the fact that the Committee recommended an extension.  Of course the Committee would need to be
mindful of any decision taken by the General Council on this matter.  The Chairman enquired as to
whether this was acceptable to Members.
32. The delegate of Brazil enquired as to whether the Chairman would make a precise
recommendation of a date in his report.
33. The Chairman indicated that he would do so if Members suggested a precise date.
34. The delegate of Brazil proposed 31 July 2002.
35. The Chairman indicated that, if there were no objections to this specific proposal for a date,
he would reflect it in his report.
36. The delegate of the European Communities wondered whether this was something the
Committee should leave to the General Council, sin ce the latter might refer a number of issues to
subsidiary bodies, including the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Committees, and might have a commondate in mind for completion of work on all such issues.  It might, therefore, be wiser to leave the date
open and leave it to the wisdom of the General Counc il to forward a date, an approach which did not
exclude at all that the Committee eventually have 31 July 2002 as the date for completion of its work
on the issue.
37. The delegate of Switzerland supported the view of the European Communities.
38. The delegate of the United States also considered that this was a decision for the General
Council.
39. The delegate of Chile was of the view that the Committee must of course not question the
wisdom of the General Council, nor prejudge what mi ght be decided by it, but that it would be very
useful and helpful for the General Council if the Committee, through the Chairman and his report,were to recommend a date.  It would simply provide guidance for the General Council.  Chile,
therefore, supported Brazil on the understanding that this was a recommendation which might be
modified in the decision to be taken by the General Council.
40. The Chairman suggested that his report refl ect that the Committee agreed that it could
continue its consideration of this issue, and that he as Chairman recommend a date of his own accord.
He enquired if that was acceptable to Members.
41. The delegate of the European Communities enquired as to the reason for such action on the
part of the Chairman.
42. The Chairman explained that it was to give comfort to those who considered that suggesting a
date would be appropriate.
43. The delegate of the European Communities was of the opinion that the best thing for the
Chairman to do was to report that there were suggestions to forward a date as well as suggestions
expressly not to forward a date.G/SCM/M/33
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44. The Chairman indicated that he would reflect in his report that a consensus had been reached
on a recommendation to the General Council to continue examination on this issue, but that it had not
been possible to reach a consensus on an end date.  He would report to the General Council in those
terms.
Export competitiveness
45. Concerning export competitiveness, the Chairman recalled that the Committee had been
discussing two different elements in the proposal, the determination of export competitiveness and the
possibility to resume export subsidization following loss of export competitiveness.  The most recent
basis for discussion was the proposal to determine export competitiveness on the basis of multi-year
moving averages for the two consecutive years referred to in Article 27.5, and the European
Communities' stop-the-clock proposal for resumption of export subsidisation following loss of export
competitiveness.  While there seemed to be growing convergence of views around the moving
average approach for determination of export compet itiveness, views in respect of the resumption of
export competitiveness after loss of competitiveness remained a considerable distance apart.
46. In particular, the proponents had identified a number of elements that had been raised in the
discussions of the stop-the-clock proposal that they  could not accept, while, on the other hand, it was
clear that these were elements of considerable importance to a number of other Members.  In addition,the proponents had made it clear that they considered the two elements of the proposal to be a
package and could not accept a solution only in respect of the first element.  Given this situation, the
Chairman had asked the proponents to consult internally to try and identify any way that they might
see for moving forward out of the impasse that had developed, and had indicated that he was prepared
to work with them to pursue any new ideas.  Acco rdingly, the Chairman enquired with the proponents
as to whether they wished to make a statement on this issue or report on any progress in their internal
consultations.
47. The delegate of the Dominican Republic agreed with the Chairman's summary of the
proponents' views.  The proposal remained the same, and the proponents were of the opinion that the
course of action proposed by the Chairman was appropriate.  They would continue with theirconsultations, and hoped to settle this matter as soon as possible.
48. The Chairman proposed that he report to the General Council that consultations on this issue
were continuing amongst Members, and it was hoped that a solution would be found upon the
conclusion of such consultations.
Developing country Members with a small share of world trade
49. On the issue of developing country Members with a small share of world trade the Chairman
first wished to introduce the documents before the Committee and outline how he saw the current
situation.  As of the meeting, the Committee was officially out of time for consideration of the
implementation-related issues.  The Chairman had been consulting intensively since he had sent out
his proposal on developing country Members with a sm all share of world trade the previous day.  He
was required to report officially on the outcome the following morning.  While there had been some
strong reactions, he remained hopeful that the Committee might be able to find a creative way forwardto try and bridge at least some of the principal gaps.
50. As Members were aware, the Chairman had sent all Members a revised version of his
proposal the previous day.  At this meeting, he also had made available a revised version of the
communication that would go to certain Members,  seeking information on their subsidy programmes
as well as containing a list of Members that met the two proposed criteria on percentage share ofworld export trade and total 2000 GNI as published by the World Bank.  As indicated at the top of
that list, the Chairman had made no attempt to screen out from this list any Members who were notG/SCM/M/33
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developing countries or any developing country Members who were not otherwise eligible to request
an extension pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement.  Thus, it was a comprehensive list of
WTO Members other than LDCs that met the two proposed numerical criteria, and not a list of WTO
Members that would meet all of the criteria referred to in paragraph 2(b) of the new draft.
51. The Chairman indicated that he had made some  relatively significant changes to the draft
proposal on the basis of the discussion at an earlie r meeting, but the basic structure and operation had
remained the same as originally put forward.  That is, the proposal envisaged the creation of an annex
of programmes of specific Members which would form an integral part of the package to be decided
and would represent the maximum universe of programmes of Members in respect of which the
procedures could be invoked.  This idea of crea ting an annex of programmes of Members was
intended to respond to those Members who had insist ed throughout the discussions that they would
not be able to agree to any solution on this issue unless they knew, at the time of the decision, inrespect of what programmes of which Members the procedures might be potentially invoked.
52. In this regard, the Chairman emphasized that he had tried to make it very clear in the revised
proposal that invoking the procedures was not the same thing as being granted an extension.  That is,
if Ministers agreed to this proposed package, which included an annex of programmes of Members,
they would not be agreeing to grant extensions in respect of all of those programmes.  Rather,extensions would only be granted by the Committee upon verification that all of the criteria set forth
in paragraph 2(b) had been met.  Thus, the annex would simply be a starting point.  If a Member that
was not a developing country had included programmes in the annex or if a developing country
Member had commitments under a protocol of accession that precluded it from seeking an Article
27.4 extension, the fact that it had included programmes in the annex would not guarantee that itwould receive the extension when the Committee considered it in 2002.
53. This raised the question of how the annex would be created.  As in the Chairman's original
proposal, it would be created on the basis of information provided by Members in response to a letter
that the Chairman would send to a list of Members the following day.  The Chairman considered that
the only way to proceed on his proposed letter as outlined in the first full paragraph of the secondpage of the draft was to send it to all Members meeting the two numerical criteria, that is, trade share
and total GNI.  If some Members on that list did not meet the other two criteria, namely, being a
developing country and being otherwise eligible to request an extension pursuant to Article 27.4, but
chose nonetheless to submit information for inclusion in the annex, they would not be screened out at
the stage when the annex was created.  Rather, they would be screened out during the Committee's
consideration of the detailed requests and notifications that might eventually be made by those
Members after the decision was adopted.
54. The Chairman realized that there were a number of Members that wished to have agreement
on a closed list of Members which would be recognized as the only ones eligible to submit
programmes for inclusion in the annex.  It was clear from the discussion, however, that such
agreement was not possible at this stage.  While this did not necessarily mean, in the Chairman's view,
that agreement on criteria was impossible, agreed criteria alone would be insufficient if Membersneeded to have the potentially eligible programmes identified.  This was because the agreed criteria
would have to be applied so as to derive a closed list of eligible Members which could then submit the
information for the annex, which brought the Committee back to the question of a closed list.
55. Therefore, while the Chairman believed that it would be extremely useful, if at all possible, to
come to a firm decision at this meeting as to the criteria, he remained of the view that, whether or notthat was possible, if Members continued to require information about programmes before they took a
decision, the only way forward that could keep this proposal alive for possible decision at Doha was
for the Committee to authorize the Chairman at the meeting to send a letter to the entire list of
Members concerned.  The Members on that list would, in the first instance, have to consider whether
they were developing countries and, if so, whether they were otherwise prevented from seeking anG/SCM/M/33
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Article 27.4 extension because of commitments in their accession protocol or other reasons.  To this
relatively limited extent, the annex would be self-selecting but only among those Members that met
the numerical criteria.  Furthermore, agreeing to the Chairman's sending the letter would be without
prejudice to any Member's final position in respect of the proposed package.  In practical terms, it was
the only way to keep options open for the future, given the requirements repeatedly expressed by anumber of Members for information about the programmes.
56. The Chairman had made available to Members both a clean and marked text of the revised
proposal so that it would be easy to track the changes.  A first significant change to point out was that
the Chairman had attempted to remove all references to Member eligibility as such, and instead to
focus on programme eligibility which, in turn, includ ed the requirements that the Member seeking the
extension must be a developing country and must otherwise be eligible to request an extension under
Article 27.4.  This change was meant to address the concern expressed by the delegation of Ecuador atan earlier meeting while preserving the underlying limitation that there might be situations, such as
protocols of accession, that would preclude cert ain developing country Members from requesting an
extension.  This significant drafting change caused consequential changes to paragraphs 1(a), 1(c),
and 2(b).  Along the same lines, the Chairman had deleted paragraph 6(a) as superfluous, given that
the Agreement made it clear that when listed Members graduated from Annex VII(b), they becamesubject to the provisions of Article 27.2(b), which in turn made it clear that the 2002 deadline for the
elimination of export subsidies applied to them as did the possibility for an extension of that deadline
under Article 27.4.  The remaining provisions of paragraph 6 had also been recast away from referring
to eligibility criteria and towards the operational aspects while making clear that the listed
Annex VII(b) Members that had not graduated could, nevertheless, include programmes in the annexand eventually invoke the procedures in respect of those programmes.  Footnote 1 further clarified
this point.  In the chapeau of the paper as well as in paragraphs 1(f) and 1(g), the Chairman had
introduced certain changes to clarify that this was a procedure that could be used to obtain extensions
under Article 27.4, that is, it was not a framework out side of Article 27.4.  Thus, extensions granted
under it would be under Article 27.4.
57. Concerning reviews, the Chairman had introduc ed changes in paragraph 1(e) to clarify how
annual reviews would function, as suggested by some delegations at a previous meeting.  Concerning
the standstill requirement, the Chairman had introduced footnote 2 to clarify the basis on which
standstill would be verified, along the lines suggested by one delegation at a previous meeting.  In
particular, this footnote aimed to make it clear that the favourableness of a programme – its scope,
coverage, and intensity – would be determined on th e basis of the underlying legal instruments, i.e.,
not on the basis of an absolute level of subsidisation.
58. The Chairman turned to the date that he had suggested in paragraph 1(e).  He had been
consulting with many Members and had heard a wide  range of views, many expressed in quite strong
terms.  He wished to lay out his rationale for the proposed date, and then indicate some of the
reactions he had received to that date.  He reported that views had been extremely divided on this
issue of the length of the extension.  While most Members had been more or less comfortable with an
X + 2 formula, there had been widely differing views on the value of X.  In addition, some Members
had taken the view that not only did X have to be a small number, but that that period plus the final
two years had to be the only extension possible under the procedures.  In other words, they wished to
foreclose the possibility that a Member receiving an extension of X years under the procedures might
come to the Committee at the end of that period and seek a prolongation of the extension pursuant tothe regular procedures under Article 27.4 and be subject to the final two years provided for in
Article 27.4 only at the end of any further extensions.
59. In brief, while the proponents had suggested, inter alia , 15-20 years + 2, and one Member had
suggested 8 or 10 years, some other Members had em phasised that they could go along with only an
extremely short extension under the quasi-automatic structure proposed by the Chairman.  Most often
mentioned, although with some Members indicating that they considered even this too long, had beenG/SCM/M/33
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2 + 2 years.  Thus, it was the Chairman's judgement that the market could not bear anything very
much longer than 2 + 2.  In addition, he recalled that, in the export competitiveness proposal, the
original rationale for the proposed change from 2 to 5 years for the determination of export
competitiveness had been that 5 years was a typical transition period for developing country Members
in WTO agreements.  Up to this point, the number of years had been left blank in the proposal, as theCommittee had concentrated its efforts on the technical aspects of the proposal.  Nevertheless, he had
been under growing pressure from Members to propose a number, as for many, as he had indicated,
their flexibility in respect of the technical aspects was directly related to the length of the extension.
As it was, he had left it to the eve of the last wo rking day of the Committee on this issue.  This was,
therefore, the thought process that had led the Chairman to the figure proposed.
60. The Chairman indicated that the reaction to this proposal had been immediate and vociferous.
As he had mentioned, the proponents had stated that, in their view, it would be better to leave theblank in the text for now or, if that was not possible , to have two sets of square bracketed dates, one
reflecting 2 + 2 and the other 15 + 2, thus capturing more or less the spectrum of views expressed, but
making no final proposal in that regard.  Some Me mbers had indicated that two bracketed dates would
be preferable to a complete blank.  The Chairman opened the floor for comments and requested, in
particular, the Committee's guidance on the procedural question of his letter, enquiring as to whetherhe had the Committee's authorisation to send the letter to the list of countries that he had provided.  If
not, he enquired how the Committee would resolve the problem of obtaining programme information,
assuming that a number of Members continued to consider such information indispensable to any
possibility of a decision at Doha.
61. The delegate of Bolivia noted that Bolivia was reflected in the Chairman's list as if it was not
in Annex VII(b).
62. The Chairman referred Bolivia to footnote 2 of the text.
63. The delegate of Mauritius indicated that she was awaiting instructions from capital and
needed additional time.
64. The Chairman stated that he could only report to the General Council that there was no
consensus in the Committee on this issue.
65. The delegate of the United States indicated that he was very pleased with the overall
framework, and that his concerns were largely procedural: (i) as there was limited time, the
Committee could not consider a full list of programmes and Members; (ii) the Chairman's letter did
not constitute a sufficiently clean and authoritative document regarding the eligibility of programmes
and Members; and (iii) the Members which had not been part of the discussion process would not
have sufficient time to react to the Chairman's le tter.  One alternative was for the Committee to agree
on the criteria, which could then be referenced in the decision.  The Chairman's letter could be sent,
preferably to eligible Members.  The information gathered by the Secretariat should not, however, be
annexed to the decision in Doha.  Further, 2 + 2 amounted to a 50 per cent increase in the length of
the transition period, and no more was possible.  Finally, the United States wished to have paragraph
1(f) of the Chairman's text in square brackets.
66. The delegate of Chile indicated that Chile did not necessarily agree on eligibility criteria,
because it all depended on the length of the extension.  To discuss the former without deciding the
latter was incoherent and illogical.  Chile could not sign a blank cheque, as it were; it needed to have
the information relating to the length of the extension first.
67. The delegate of the European Communities joined  the delegate of the United States in his
comments.  He considered, however, that the Committee was close to a solution.  The European
Communities were of the view that converting the responses to the Chairman's letter into an annexG/SCM/M/33
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which would not be subject to any examination and which would be part of the Ministerial Decision
would give the responses a legal character which could result in difficult discussions in the future.  He
agreed with Chile.  The Committee needed to ensure as much clarity as possible and in advance of the
decision.  Either the Committee could list all the elig ibility criteria in the text or agree on all such
criteria at a Committee meeting before Doha, so that even if the decision and the criteria werecontained in two different texts, they would be clear and agreed upon.  The delegate of the European
Communities considered that it was more appropriate to collect the programme information and leave
it as was, not make it part of the Ministerial Decision.  2 + 2 was reasonable, and no more was
possible.  References to paragraph 2(b) and the Chairman's letter were to be deleted.  He was of the
opinion that it was not in the Committee's interests to have precise identification of the programmes,
but would take into account other Members' views.  The European Communities could accept having
a rough idea of the beneficiary programmes by the end of 2001.  Regardless, all eligibility criteria hadto be fixed, wherever they might be located.
68. The delegate of Mexico agreed with Chile, that the duration of the extension was
fundamental.  Mexico considered 2 + 2 to be a reasonable time-period.
69. The delegate of Honduras considered it a wise suggestion for the Committee to agree on the
question of time-period first.
70. The delegate of Jamaica submitted that the dismantling of Jamaica's export incentives was
only viable if there was to be a long transition period.  The text could contain different transition
periods in square brackets.  Responses to the Chairman's letter could be due by 2 November 2001.
71. The delegate of Colombia considered that the proposed criteria did not meet the needs of all
developing countries, and the proposed solution was unfair.  Colombia could not accept the imbalance
created by this proposal.  Its concerns had to be reflected in any proposed framework.  Colombia
opposed sending the Chairman's letter and opposed the reflection of different time-periods in square
brackets.
72. The delegate of Canada was satisfied with the criteria proposed by the Chairman in his paper
of 24 October 2001.  To decide on a closed list would take considerable time, and the United States'
proposal had some merit.  Canada did not believe that the Committee should give any legitimacy to
the responses to the Chairman's letter.  2 + 2 was a reasonable time-period, and no more was possible.
73. The delegate of Panama expressed a need for additional time.  He supported the statements
made by Honduras and Jamaica.  He also supporte d the suggestion of reflecting various dates in
square brackets.
74. The delegate of Sri Lanka indicated that any Committee decision needed to take into account
the burden on small Members, in terms of the time needed to provide the required information.  She
sought clarification from the delegates of the European Communities and the United States on the
reference to Annex VII(b) Members.
75. The delegate of the United States explained that, as paragraph 1(e) was to be placed in square
brackets, it called into question paragraph 1(f).  Hence the suggestion that the latter be placed in
square brackets as well.
76. The delegate of Switzerland explained that the idea of self-selection by any Member which
had received the Chairman's letter, and that the Member could respond to the letter on that basis, was
of concern to Switzerland.  The Committee had to perhaps drop the idea of programme identification
in its decision, and opt for notification by the end of 2001 instead.  Eligibility criteria had to be agreed
upon before.G/SCM/M/33
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77. The delegate of Venezuela considered that no particular developing country would be helped
by such a framework.
78. The delegate of Ecuador stated that the two elements of the greatest concern to Ecuador were
the lack of time-period for the application of the mechanism and the lack of clarity in the list of
programmes and Members to be appended to the decision.
79. The delegate of Mexico believed that two time-periods should be suggested for consideration,
but that meant there were two different proposals.  Mexico was considering the 2 + 2 proposal, and
other elements depended on that.  If the agreed time-period was not to be 2 + 2, nothing else was
agreed upon and the entire proposal could be placed in square brackets.
80. The delegate of El Salvador regretted the lack of consensus on the issue of the length of the
extension.  The proposal could be forwarded to th e General Council with two time-periods in square
brackets, as suggested by the Chairman.  This would be a political solution.  El Salvador could alsoaccept placing paragraph 1(f) in square brackets.
81. The delegate of Costa Rica indicated that clear information on beneficiary programmes and
Members needed to be appended to the decision to be taken in Doha.  Members interested in availing
of this framework were in a position to provide this information beforehand.  The situation could be
reviewed by the Committee after Doha, and verification was an important condition of any extension.2 + 2 was a reasonable time-period.  The notion of a phase out could be placed in square brackets.
Costa Rica agreed with the United States on the link between paragraphs 1(e) and (f).
82. The delegate of Brazil stated that the proposal deepened categorisation amongst developing
countries.  If the Committee was to make this choice, Brazil preferred explicit language indicating that
this was an ad hoc solution and did not set a precedent.  Brazil considered that most technical issueshad been resolved, except for the status of the annexed list.  The political discussion that remained
would take place in the General Council.  The length of the extension was a crucial element.  In
Brazil's view, 2 + 2 was a reasonable time-period.
83. The delegate of Bolivia noted that Annex VII c ould not be modified.  Certain procedures had
to be followed in order to remove a Member from Annex VII.  Bolivia's position was that it was in
Annex VII.  Bolivia was of the view that Members granting agricultural subsidies in large numbers
were being the strictest on the question of the length of the extension, and Bolivia's position on
agricultural subsidies would take that into account.
84. The delegate of Chile agreed with Colombia that the threshold was arbitrary.  Chile also
considered that there was a direct correlation between the question of the length of the extension and
that of the eligibility criteria.  The process could continue after Doha.
85. The delegate of Cuba expressed concern over the absence of a time-period.  It considered that
dates had to be indicated in the text, albeit in square brackets.  Further, Members could submit their
own official data.  In the case of Cuba, the Committee could not consider World Bank data, as there
were none.
86. The delegate of the Dominican Republic could accept the Chairman's proposal as long as
extension periods were placed in square brackets, and there would then be a political discussion.  The
Dominican Republic could also accept deletion of paragraph 1(f).
87. The delegate of Guatemala supported two time-periods in square brackets in the text.G/SCM/M/33
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88. The delegate of India considered that the draft decision should not contain the twin criteria of
trade share and GNI.  Further, the text had to indicate that the eligibility criteria had been developed
only for purposes of this framework.
89. The delegate of St. Lucia indicated that, as a demandeur , St. Lucia was flexible on the
procedure.  She urged Members to take into account the particular situation of St. Lucia.
90. The delegate of Japan could accept the procedure as outlined in the Chairman's paper.  It also
considered 2 + 2 to be a reasonable time-period.  Japan stated that the implementation exercise did not
mean abandoning the fundamental disciplines of the SCM Agreement, and that was Japan's basic
position.
91. The delegate of Norway did not support including the list in the annex to the decision.
Norway was flexible on the question of the length of the extension, and suggested that 4 + 2 was a
possible time-period.
92. The delegate of Australia indicated that the Committee should recommend that Ministers
direct the Committee to vet the subsidy programmes in question.
93. The delegate of Bolivia stated that it was a question of regional markets, and he remained
concerned about the impact of the framework on beneficiary Members' neighbours.
94. The delegate of Malaysia agreed with India.  Malaysia also agreed with the comments of
Brazil on increased segmentation amongst developing countries.
95. The delegate of Nicaragua considered that there had to be a longer extension than that being
contemplated in the Committee.
96. The delegate of Argentina recalled that the General Council had referred the implementation-
related issues to the Committee.  The Chairman's pr oposal could, therefore, only be considered in that
context and had no legal character in any other context.
97. The Chairman indicated that he would reflect the comments and suggestions made by
Members in his report to the General Council.
98. The delegate of Chile considered that the entire proposal should be placed in square brackets,
particularly the eligibility criteria.  Square brackets around the time-periods alone did not mean that
the rest of the proposal enjoyed a consensus.
99. The delegate of Uruguay emphasised that no precedent was set by this framework.
100. The delegate of Colombia agreed with Chile.  Colombia considered that its concerned were
not reflected in the proposal.  Colombia was also unclear on the status of the Chairman's proposal,
which could bias future discussion of the issue, in the view of Colombia.
101. The delegate of Mexico supported placing the entire proposal in square brackets, and agreed
with Chile and Uruguay.
102. The delegate of the European Communities wished to confirm that the Chairman would not
be sending the letter.
103. The Chairman confirmed that he would not be sending the letter.  He indicated that he would
report to the General Council that there was no consensus on the issue, also reflecting the variousG/SCM/M/33
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views expressed by Members.  He thanked Members for their contributions both at this meeting and
during the lengthy process of consideration of the implementation-related issues.
104. The Committee took note of the statements made, and the meeting was adjourned .
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