Media freedom in Russia

Media freedom in Russia concerns both the ability of directors of mass-media outlets to carry out independent policies and the ability of journalists to access sources of information and to work without outside pressure. Media of Russia include television and radio channels, periodicals, and Internet media, which according to the laws of the Russian Federation may be either state or private property.

 Russia ranked 148th out of 179 countries in the Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders. In the 2015 Freedom House Freedom of the Press report Russia scored 83 (100 being the worst), mostly because of new laws introduced in 2014 that further extended the state control over mass media. Freedom House characterised the situation as even worse in Crimea where, after the 2014 annexation by Russia, both Russian jurisdiction and extrajudicial means are (according to Freedom House) routinely applied to limit freedom of expression.

Multiple international organizations criticize various aspects of the contemporary press-freedom situation in Russia. While much attention is paid to political influences, media expert William Dunkerley, a senior fellow at American University in Moscow, argues that the genesis of Russia's press-freedom woes lies in sectoral economic dysfunction.

History

Legislative framework
The Russian constitution provides for freedom of speech and press; however, government application of law, bureaucratic regulation, and politically motivated criminal investigations have forced the press to exercise self-censorship constraining its coverage of certain controversial issues, resulting in infringements of these rights. According to Human Rights Watch, the Russian government exerts control over civil society through selective implementation of the law, restriction and censure.

Commissioner for Human Rights (ombudsman)
Russia's ombudsman, named officially the Commissioner for Human Rights, is appointed for a certain term by the Parliament. The ombudsman cannot be dismissed before the end of his term, and is not subordinate to any body of power, including the president or the government. Russia's 83 administrative regions have the right to elect a local ombudsman whose authority is limited to that region. Less than half have done so.

Russian Ombudsman Vladimir Lukin reported in 2006, that suggesting that freedom of speech is non-existent in Russia would be an exaggeration, the constitutional right for speech freedom is basically observed, as well as that there was no institutionalised censorship. He also said that the US was a "Nazi state" and that Russia would destroy it. Apparently for these very reasons journalists and publishers seldom appeal to the commissioner protesting restrictions of their right of seeking, receiving, transferring, publishing or distributing information. Yet disguised restrictions exist to a considerable degree, they are often put through the economic pressure on mass media by the authorities and loyal business. The so-called "self-censorship" which induces journalists to refrain from disseminating information which, in their opinion, may not please the authorities, is also widespread. So in many places the right to praise the authorities is ensured, while the opposite right is just formally declared.

In 2008 annual report, Vladimir Lukin wrote that it is important to have the comprehensive legal interpretation of the terms that may limit the freedom of thought and word. He spoke against the election legislation amendment that is "a practical prohibition" of contesting candidates' criticism, calling it obviously excessive. And Lukin was critical about the Law on combating extremist activities, noting that extremism and dissent must be strictly legally divided.

Attacks and threats against journalists

The dangers to journalists in Russia have been well known since the early 1990s but concern at the number of unsolved killings soared after Anna Politkovskaya's murder in Moscow on 7 October 2006. While international monitors spoke of several dozen deaths, some sources within Russia talked of over two hundred fatalities.

Remembrance Day of Journalists Killed in the Line of Duty in Russia is observed on 15 December every year.

Assaults on journalists
Since the early 1990s, a number of Russian reporters who have covered the situation in Chechnya, contentious stories on organized crime, state and administrative officials, and large businesses have been killed. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, since 1992, 50 journalists have been murdered for their professional activity in Russia (which made it the third deadliest country for journalists in the 1992–2006 period): 30 journalists from 1993 to 2000, and 20 journalists since 2000.

According to Glasnost Defence Foundation, there were 9 cases of suspicious deaths of journalists in 2006, as well as 59 assaults on journalists, and 12 attacks on editorial offices. In 2005, the list of all cases included 7 deaths, 63 assaults, 12 attacks on editorial offices, 23 incidents of censorship, 42 criminal prosecutions, 11 illegal layoffs, 47 cases of detention by militsiya, 382 lawsuits, 233 cases of obstruction, 23 closings of editorial offices, 10 evictions, 28 confiscations of printed production, 23 cases of stopping broadcasting, 38 refusals to distribute or print production, 25 acts of intimidation, and 344 other violations of Russian journalist rights.

On 7 October 2006, Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, known for her criticisms of Russia's actions in Chechnya and the pro-Russia Chechen government, was shot in the lobby of her apartment building. The death of Politkovskaya triggered an outcry of criticism of Russia in the Western media, with accusations that, at best, Vladimir Putin has failed to protect the country's new independent media.

International Press Institute reports selective use of regulations, politically motivated criminal investigations, journalist imprisonments, outlet shutdowns and aggressive harassments by security services. According to the organization, Russia remains the most dangerous European country for journalists, with four killed in 2009.

The Amnesty International reported in 2009, that "Human rights defenders, journalists and lawyers who spoke openly about human rights abuses faced threats and intimidation. The police appeared to be reluctant to investigate such threats and a climate of impunity for attacks on civil society activists prevailed." Amnesty International reported also a "climate of growing intolerance towards independent views". According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Russia is a more dangerous place now than it was during the Cold War. Only Iraq and Algeria outrank it on the list of most life-threatening countries for the press.

In October 2016, a group of Chechen journalists published an anonymous, dramatic appeal in The Guardian describing the intimidation and physical attacks they are experiencing under the Ramzan Kadyrov government and complete control the officials are enforcing over the media organisations in the republic.

The Human Rights Committee of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is concerned about the contemporary situation in Russia.at the alarming incidence of threats, violent assaults and murders of journalists and human rights defenders, which has created a climate of fear and a chilling effect on the media, including for those working in the North Caucasus, and regrets the lack of effective measures taken to protect the right to life and security of these persons.

 In August 2014 the Pskov-based publisher Lev Shlosberg, member of the opposition Yabloko party, suffered a serious attack that left him unconscious. He claims the attack was related to his paper's investigations on the deployment of Russian soldiers from Pskov to Ukraine.
 In August 2014 the investigative reporter Aleksandr Krutov was attacked and beaten in Saratov - the fourth time in his 20-years career in covering crime for a local publication.
 In September 2014 a TV crew reporting on fraud was attacked in Novosibirsk. Their equipment was destroyed and the videographer was injured.
 In December 2014 in Novosibirsk the editor in chief of taiga.info was beaten by two men in the website premises.

On July 30, 2018, Orkhan Dzhemal (son of Geydar Dzhemal), was killed along with film director Alexander Rastorguev and cameraman Kirill Radchenko in the Central African Republic while filming a documentary about the activities of illegal Russian military formations in the CAR.

In June 2019, investigative journalist Ivan Golunov was arrested and allegedly beaten in custody

Denial of entry and deportation of foreign journalists
 In February 2011, Guardian journalist Luke Harding, from Britain, was refused entry into Russia, contrary to OCSE regulations. He became the first foreign journalist to be expelled from Russia since the end of the Cold War. Some linked his expulsion with unflattering coverage of Russia, including speculation about Vladimir Putin's wealth. On 9 February Russia reversed the decision.
 In July 2014, the Ukrainian journalist Yevgeniy Agarkov (1+1 TV) was arrested in Voronezh while reporting on the trial of a Ukrainian prisoner of war. He was charged with missing proper accreditation, and was convicted, deported and banned for five years.
 In September 2014, a BBC team was attacked in Astrakhan while investigating the deaths of Russian soldiers in Ukraine - at the time still denied by the Kremlin. They had their equipment destroyed.
 In 2015, an Australian journalist, Helen Womack, who spent over 30 years reporting from Russia was denied accreditation after listing on a nationalist-operated "list of enemies of Russia" website and forced to leave the country.
 Also in 2015, following the documentary on Russian soldiers serving in war in Donbass, Simon Ostrovsky was denied accreditation to Russia.
 Wacław Radziwinowicz was expelled in December 2015.

Censorship and self-censorship
Article 29(5) of the Constitution of Russia states, "The freedom of the mass media shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited." The World Report 2009 by Human Rights Watch said that the Russian government controlled over civil society through selective implementation of the law, media restrictions and harassment of activists and human rights defenders.

The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe in 2005 interview to Russian radio Ekho Moskvy said there was pressure on media from authorities in Russia's regions, and situation with the central media caused concerns, as many central TV media looked to lose former independence; his conclusion was that the most important task in Russia was to protect the victories of the 1991 law on mass media, and to let journalists work fully independently; yet he said that with all the difficulties the Russian media were free as a whole, and that he was interviewed in a direct broadcast without censorship spoke also about press freedom.

According to 2005 research conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM), the number of Russians who approve of censorship on TV has grown in a year from 63% to 82%; sociologists believe that Russians are not voting in favour of press freedom suppression, but rather for expulsion of ethically doubtful material such as scenes of violence and sex (57% for restricting of violence and sex depiction on TV, 30% for ban of fraudulent businesses ads; and 24% for products for sex ads, and 'criminal way of life propaganda' films).

According to journalist Maxim Kononenko, "People invent censorship for themselves, and what happens on some TV channels, some newspapers, happens not because Putin dials them and says: 'No, this mustn't go.' But because their bosses are fools." However, political scientist Yevgenia Albats in interview with Eduard Steiner has disputed this assertion: "Today the directors of the television channels and the newspapers are invited every Thursday into the Kremlin office of the deputy head of administration, Vladislav Surkov to learn what news should be presented, and where. Journalists are bought with enormous salaries. In discussions they tell us then how horrible it is to work in the state television service."

Since 2012, at the beginning of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term, numerous laws have been passed to make censorship and extensive surveillance easier. Such measures also led to self-censorship. A 2016 report by PEN America shows that limitations of freedom of expression in today's Russia do not affect only journalism and media, but the overall cultural space. According to the report, a confluence of laws aimed at contrasting terrorism and religious hatred and protecting children have led to an environment in which is increasingly hard to distribute fiction, broadcast independent television and promote independent theatre and music productions. In addition, the selectivity and, at times, arbitrariness of Roskomnadzor, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media, create uncertainty for writers, authors, publishers and other media producers, which often results in self-censorship as a way to avoid uncertain rules and arbitrary enforcement.

Also, according to the 2016 Freedom House's report on freedom of the press, government officials frequently use the country's politicized and corrupt court system to harass journalists and bloggers who expose abuses by authorities. In the Russian legal system the definition of extremism is broad and this make possible for officials to invoke it to silence critical voices. Enforcement of such legal provisions has encouraged self-censorship in the country.

Prosecution of "extremist" content
In summer 2012, the Russian State Duma considered Bill 89417-6 which would create a blacklist of Internet sites including child pornography, drug-related material, and extremist material; as well as making providers of telecom services liable for such breaches. The bill was criticized as not being aimed at combating the causes of illegal content and its distribution through the internet, nor contribute to the effectiveness of law enforcement and prosecution of criminals, and its subjective criteria could allow Russian authorities to mass block internet resources with legal content. In December 2013, a law criminalizing "calls for separatism" was proposed. Under the law, violators face a fine of up to 306,700 rubles ($9,500) or jail terms of up to five years for making public calls for action aimed against the country's territorial integrity.

Since 2009, the practice of the law enforcement agencies (most notably FSB) was to abuse newly introduced anti-extremism laws to suppress freedom of speech, including corruption investigations. Publications and activities classified as "extremist" included protests against the court rulings in Bolotnaya Square case ("calling for illegal action") and criticism of overspending of local governor ("insult of the authorities") or publishing a poem in support of Ukraine ("inciting hatred") In 2015, the fines for "extremist" content were raised to a maximum of 1 million rubles ($16,069).
 In June 2015, Alexandr Byvshev, the poet whose works were banned as "extremist" earlier, was also listed on the official "list of terrorists and extremists" maintained by the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring (Росфинмониторинг, Rosfinmonitoring) and a "spontaneous collective condemnation" campaign was started in his village described as Soviet-esque by independent media.
 Litvinenko's book "Blowing Up Russia" was also listed as an "extremist publication" and banned in 2015.
 In November 2015, just before the Holodomor anniversary in Ukraine, the articles of Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide and used it to describe the Holodomor, were also added to the federal index of extremist materials in Russia.
 In February 2016, police in Saint Petersburg confiscated a whole print run of a book by a Polish war-time author Jan Nowak-Jeziorański because of an allegedly "extremist content" (mentions of Nazi-Soviet collaboration during World War II).
In October 2018 customs office in Saint Petersburg stopped a single copy of book "Future is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia" by Masha Gessen, ordered on Amazon by a lawyer Sergey Golubok. DHL requested a declaration from Golubok that "the book does not contain extremist content" prior to delivery, and a few days later customs office requested him to certify that the book "does not spread specific views". The book  is not sold in Russia, but it's also not in the "register of extremist materials".
Coordinated measures are being applied to movies that do not follow Russia's currently preferred official version of historical events, including fiction and documentary movies. Preemptive "inspections" by the prosecutor general office, Ministry of Culture and other official organs, as well as not issuing a required "screening license" was used to harass directors and block widespread shows of films such as The Death of Stalin, "Holiday" (rus. Праздник) by Andrey Krassovski, Child 44, Ordered to forget.

Criticism of annexation of Crimea
After Russia took control of Crimea, the Russian parliament passed a law making it a criminal offense to question Russia's territorial integrity within what the government considers its borders. A man named Andrei Bubayev was jailed for two years for reposting a picture of a toothpaste tube with the words "squeeze Russia out of yourself" and an article under the headline "Crimea is Ukraine" by a controversial blogger, who is in jail now, calling for military aggression against Russia.

Russian edition of a popular bestseller 21 Lessons for the 21st Century by Yuval Noah Harari published in 2019 had all references to annexation of Crimea and Russian fake news factories removed or replaced by references to Donald Trump fakes.

Disputing USSR role in World War 2
A number of people were fined after 2014 law which criminalizes publication or speech that "spread intentionally false information about the Soviet Union". In actual prosecution the law was applied to statements that were factually correct (like Soviet invasion on Poland) but incompatible with the new policy towards interpretation of USSR involvement in World War 2 introduced in Russia after 2014. The law also resulted in chilling effect on scientific research in Russia, with director of Russian State Archive getting fired after publicly admitting the story of Panfilov's Twenty-Eight Guardsmen was largely fabricated.

Internet censorship and surveillance

Russia was found to engage in selective Internet filtering in the political and social areas; no evidence of filtering was found in the conflict/security and Internet tools areas by the OpenNet Initiative in December 2010. Russia was on Reporters Without Borders list of countries under surveillance from 2010 to 2013 and was moved to the Internet Enemies list in 2014. On 31 March 2013, The New York Times reported that Russia was beginning 'Selectively Blocking [the] Internet'.
 Russia's System of Operational-Investigatory Measures (SORM) requires telecommunications operators to install hardware provided by the Federal Security Service (FSB). It allow the agency to unilaterally monitor users' communications metadata and content, including phone calls, email traffic and web browsing activity. Metadata can be obtained without a warrant. In 2014, the system was expanded to include social media platforms, and the Ministry of Communications ordered companies to install new equipment with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) capability. In 2015, the European Court for Human Rights found Russia's SORM surveillance legislation and practice in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Zakharov v. Russia).
 The Russian internet blacklist law (2012) faced criticism by major websites and NGOs on it launch. At the time of introduction the list was described as a means for the protection of children from harmful content; particularly content which glorifies drug usage, advocates suicide or describes suicide methods, or contain child pornography. In 2013 the blacklist law was amended with a clause to block content "suspected in extremism". It was expanded to include actions such as "calling for illegal meetings", "inciting hatred" and any other actions "violating the established order". During the 2014 Crimea Crisis, Roskomnadzor blocked a number of websites criticising Russian policy in Ukraine, including pages of Alexei Navalny, Garri Kasparov and Grani.ru. In July 2014, the online extremism law was used to prevent a march for Siberian autonomy. In subsequent years, it has been used to block caricatures of Vladimir Putin and LGBTQ content.
 The "Bloggers law" (2014), an amendment to existing anti-terrorism legislation, requires all web services to store the user data of Russian citizens on servers within the country. Sites which do not comply with this requirement may be added to the blacklist. Since August 2014, the law requires operators of free Wi-Fi hotspots (e.g. in restaurants, libraries, cafes etc.) to collect personal details of all users and identify them using passports.
 The "Yarovaya law" (2016) requires telecom operators to store recordings of phone conversations, text messages and users' internet traffic for up to 6 months, as well as metadata for up to 3 years. This data as well as "all other information necessary" is available to authorities on request and without a court order.
Social media platforms came under increased pressure in 2014. In April the founder of Vkontakte, Pavel Durov, announced he'd resign and leave the country due to FSB intimidation, after he refused to hand over the account data of Ukrainian activists. In September 2014 Vkontakte was taken over by mail.ru, owned by Kremlin-friendly businessman Alisher Usmanov.

 In 2004, Russia pressured Lithuania and in 2006 Sweden into shutting down the Kavkaz Center website, a site that supports creation of a Sharia state in North Caucasus and hosts videos on terrorist attacks on Russian forces in North Caucasus.
 Magomed Yevloyev, editor of Ingushetia.org, a vocal critic of the region's administration, was murdered in August 2008.
 At the background of December 2008 demonstrations in Vladivostok, it was reported by Kontury news website that FSB officers addressed moderators of the ru_auto Internet community with a request to remove stories about the Vladivostok protests. The major reason, as reported by a moderator of the resource, was that a number of repeating posts with the information about protests worsened some sort of statistics on people's attitudes. The moderator in question requested bloggers to publish only unique posts about protest actions.
 In December 2009, Internet provider Yota with over 100,000 subscribers has blocked access to some Russian opposition Internet resources for its Moscow-based subscribers for a few days. The block occurred after the chief prosecutor of St. Petersburg recommended the company to block access to extremist resources. At the time, the only Internet resource listed as extremist by the Ministry of Justice of Russia was the site of Caucasian separatists Kavkaz Center. Since the evening of 6 December 2009, Yota opened access to all previously blocked resources, save for Kavkaz Center.
 On 5 April 2013, it was confirmed by a spokesperson for the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media that Wikipedia had been blacklisted over the article 'Cannabis Smoking' on Russian Wikipedia.
 On 7 August 2013, the Central District Court of the city of Tver, located 100 miles (roughly 160 km) northwest of Moscow, ruled that the official website of Jehovah's Witnesses should be banned throughout the Russian Federation. On 22 January 2014 the Regional Court of Tver ruled in favor of Jehovah's Witnesses and reversed the earlier ruling by the lower court. The Regional Court conducted a new trial, which concluded that the decision of the Central District Court was unjustified, since there was no legal reason to ban the site.

Banned images
The Ministry of Justice maintains a list of "extremest materials" which are illegal to share.

In 2017 an image of Putin as a "gay clown" was added as item 4071, as a result of a 2016 legal case against social media activist A. V. Tsvetkov.

Judicial prosecution of journalists and media outlets
Prosecutors in Russia have the custom of charging individuals – including journalists, bloggers, and whistle-blowers – with trumped-up criminal offenses including defamation, extremism, and other common criminal charges, as part of an effort to deter and limit their activities.

 In a three-year court case beginning in 2008, Chernovik, Dagestan's largest independent newspaper, saw its editor-in-chief Nadira Isayeva and several reporters prosecuted on charges of "inciting hatred toward law enforcement officials" following criticism of the Federal Security Service's counterinsurgency tactics. Reporters Without Borders, Committee to Protect Journalists, and ARTICLE 19 all protested the charges, and Isayeva was ultimately acquitted. She described the case as "a test for the institution of press freedom" in Dagestan.

 In November 2013 Rostov-na-Donu investigative journalist and blogger Sergey Reznik (often reporting on corruption and abuses by politicians) was sentenced to 1.5 years in jail on various charges, including insult to a governmental official. The jail term was upheld in appeal in April 2014. A new defamation case was open against him in July 2014.
 In January 2014 Aksana Panova, former chief editor of the Ura.ru website in Yekaterinburg, was given a two-year suspended sentence - including a ban on journalist activities - after being tried for extortion. She rejected all charges, claiming to be targeted in retribution for critical coverage of local officials.
In September 2015 the Siberian journalist and blogger Dmitriy Shipilov was arrested after he had interviewed the organisers of a march for Siberian autonomy. The official reason included failure to serve a three-month sentence for "insulting a public official". Shipilov claims the detention is politically motivated.
 In October 2014 Rostov-na-Donu journalist Aleksandr Tolmachev was convicted to 9 years of hard labor on extortion charges, after having already spent three years in pre-trial detention.

Judicial harassment of the blogger and politician Aleksey Navalny continued in 2014. Navalny was fined $8,400 in April for defaming a Moscow city councillor on Twitter. In December he was sentenced to three and a half years (with suspended sentence) together with his brother Oleg Navalny upon fraud charges. Roskomnadzor warned four media that reported on the sentence and relied a video of Navalny calling for demonstration, accusing them of inciting extremism.

Government ownership and control of media outlets
The government has been using direct ownership, or ownership by large private companies with government links, to control or influence major national media and regional media outlets, especially television. There were reports of self-censorship in the television and print media, particularly on issues critical of the government.

As to a 2016 Mediastandart Foundation survey, most of the Russian journalists feel that they are not free and independent, and believe that media owners undermine the independence of journalists. According to Alexey Kudrin, Russia's former Minister of Finance and current head of the Civil Initiative Committee, "in the regions, the number of independent media is progressively declining. The same happens on the federal level—major corporations and state institutions exercise influence on the media."

In the 15 years after 1990 most of the Russian print media underwent a change of ownership. Many of them disappeared, others changed owners repeatedly. After the new Law on Mass Media was adopted in 1991, the first stage of privatization of the media market followed.  The term "oligarchs", including "media oligarchs", started to be used specifically in Russia indicating powerful businessmen close to political power. The latter, made them the "chosen ones" in the redistribution of the country's wealth after the Soviet Union's dissolution. Since the election of Vladimir Putin in 1999, only oligarchs loyal to the government are able to maintain their control on strategic sectors of Russian economy and politic such as the information one.

Over 5 years between 2011 and 2016 the government forced changes of ownership over 12 significant newsrooms with all-country reach, all of them previously associated with honest and independent reporting. RBC, Forbes, Russian Media Group, TV2, Russkaya Planeta, REN TV, Grani.ru, Lenta.ru, Rain TV, RIA Novosti, Gazeta.ru and Kommersant were suppressed or taken over using different techniques - some of the, with government owned shares were completely disbanded and their resources passed to newly created bodies under control of state-approved managers (e.g. RIA Novosti), while Rain TV was forcibly removed from TV channels and only allowed to continue business as an Internet-only station.

All but one national TV channel are fully or partially owned by the state. The last channel – NTV – is owned by Gazprom, in which the state has a controlling stake. The situation in the radio market is similar. Major information channels are somehow controlled by the state.

As of 2009, the Russian government owns 60% of newspapers, and in whole or in part, all national television stations.

In 2008, the BBC has stated in recent years, that companies with close links to the Government, state-owned Gazprom among them, have bought several of the most influential papers.

As to the IREX association Media Sustainability Index, in smaller cities, private independent media are often the only sources of local news, because local municipal newspapers publish only official information.

Russian antimonopoly regulation is still evolving, with many uncertainties and compliance challenges remaining. Many of the key provisions of the Competition Law are unclear and open to interpretation. For this reason, they require further interpretation by Russian courts.

Moreover, governmental control over media is in addition exercised through the distribution of state subsidies and advertising revenues.

Government control over the broadcast media
Observers have noted the loss of the independence of national television stations. As stated by the BBC, two out of the three main federal channels Channel One and Russia TV are controlled by the government, since they are completely or partially owned by the Rosimuschestvo (the Federal Agency for State Property Management). Instead, state-controlled energy giant Gazprom owns NTV.

Russia TV (Rossiya) covers 98.5% of the country's territory and is state- owned. Channel One (Pervyj Kanal) covers 98.8% of Russia's territory and has a shared state and private ownership (51% state- 49% private). However, most of the private shareholders include National Media Group (controlled by the structures of Yuri Kovalchuk, Chairman of the Board of Rossiya Bank, one of the largest banks in Russia, and Vladimir Putin’s personal friend; and Roman Abramovich, owner of Chelsea football club and Putin’s ally).  NTV covers 84% of the national territory.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, "All three major television networks are now in the hands of Kremlin loyalists." Indeed, while Rossiya TV (Channel Russia) was state-owned since its foundation in 1991, major shareholders of ORT and NTV (Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, respectively) sold their stocks to the government and Gazprom in 2000-2001. Moreover, TV6, a media outlet owned by Berezovsky, was closed in 2002 using a legal loophole. In 2003 TVS channel which was formed mainly of former NTV and TV6 was closed due to financial problems.

Along with that, plenty of media outlets actively develop now while state participation in them is minimal. There are private Russian TV networks with the broadcast cover reaching the majority of the Russia's population: REN TV (known for the daily analytical talk show with Tigran Keosayan, analytical news program "Week" with Marianna Maksimovskaya), TV Center ( known for "Postscriptum" with Aleksey Pushkov, "Moment of Truth" with Andrey Karaulov), Petersburg - Channel 5.

Liberal opposition TV-Channel RTVi owned by Vladimir Gusinsky is not broadcast in Russia, but available in that country through networks of cable and satellite television, MMDS and IPTV networks. A former editor of a program on that channel, Vladimir Kara-Murza, believes it is the merit of the RTVi that the possibility of a third presidential term of Vladimir Putin was prevented, and that the "backdoor political technologists" were made to "abide to the Constitution, albeit with the Successor operation".

On 29 January 2014, the largest Russian TV providers, after key politicians expressed their discontent, disconnected Dozhd channel in response to a survey on its website and in live "Dilettants" discussing program. The survey asked if Leningrad should have been surrendered to the invading Nazi army in order to save hundreds of thousands of lives.

Top state television channels frequently apply self-censorship, avoiding any controversial topics that might impact the public image of the authorities. For example, massive truck drivers protests across the country were never even mentioned in the First Channel in spite of wide coverage in local and independent media and requests of the viewers.

The situation in the radio market is similar. Major information channels are in one way or another controlled by the state. Only three Russian radios broadcast political talk shows: Mayak, Radio Rossiya, and Ekho Moskvy. Mayak and Radio Rossiya are state-owned (Rosimushchestvo), while Ekho Moskvy is owned by the state-controlled Gazprom Media. A complete list of the audiovisual services in Russia can be found in the MAVISE Database, made by the European Audiovisual Observatory. Such list includes the ownership of TV channels and on-demand services.

Government control over print media
Kommersant-Vlast, Expert, and the New Times are weeklies that provide serious analysis of the current political issues . However, they are owned by oligarchs who openly support the government. Kommersant-Vlast is produced by Kommersant Publishing House that is owned by Alisher Usmanov. Expert is a part of Expert Media Holding that is owned by Oleg Deripaska’s Basic Element and a Russian state corporation—Vnesheconombank.

Government control over web-sites
Most popular websites, if they are not internationally owned such as Google and Facebook, are state-owned or owned by a couple of influential businessmen such as Alexander Mamut and Alisher Usmanov.

Foreign media owners
A law signed in 2014 provided to limit foreign ownership stakes in any Russian media assets to 20% by early 2017. As a consequence, in 2015, the German Springer Publishing House sold the Russian edition of Forbes, and Finland’s Sanoma sold its stakes in the business newspaper Vedomosti and the English-language publication, The Moscow Times. Russian media executives bought the stakes in both transactions. The Moscow Times subsequently switched from daily to weekly publication, and its chief editor resigned due to conflicts with the new owner. The new publisher of Forbes said that the magazine would carry fewer stories on politics and focus on business and economics.

"Black lists" controversy
As reported by Clifford J. Levy in a 2008 New York Times article, all Vladimir Putin's opponents are being made to vanish from Russian television. They are blacklisted and not allowed to appear in television shows. In one example, a presentation critical of Putin's policies has been digitally erased. This is the case of Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, two powerful Russian oligarchs in the 1990s. Berezovsky had invested in the former public broadcaster ORT’s first channel while Gusinsky, created Russia’s first independent TV station, NTV. After Putin’s power takeover, the media owned by Berezovsky and Gusinsky were the first victims of this "purge." Tax controls, raids by armed men, searches and arrests forced their bosses to flee the country and to sell their media outlets.

As reported by Russian scientist Sergey L. Lopatnikov, information about "black lists" is nonsense; an argument was made that not less than 35-40% of participants of NTV-aired talk show "At a barrier" hosted by Vladimir Solovyov during the last two years represented the liberal opposition (including Novodvorskaya, Ivanenko, Nemtsov, Hakamada); from January to May 2008, overt adversaries of Vladimir Putin participated in 9 of 16 (more than 50%) issues of the talk show.

REN-TV and Channel 5 news ban controversy
On 16 October 2009, Kommersant newspaper reported that the owner of private television channels REN TV and Channel 5 had made changes to the managing structures of the channels. Referring to an anonymous source, Kommersant stated that as the result these channels would cease to broadcast independent news; instead, since 2010 they would receive the news from the state channel RT (known as Russia Today until 2009). As Kommersant wrote, "the Channel 5 and REN-TV are the only Russian TV channels today whose editorial policy is different than state news. Only through these channeles opposition politicians are aired, as well as other events adversed by authorities are reported." However, the head of a REN-TV analytical news program Week Marianna Maksimovskaya was quoted by Kommersant as saying she held optimistic about the new executive director of REN-TV and sure that its editorial policy would not be altered.

On 19 October 2009, press secretary of REN-TV channel Nazarov asserted that REN-TV and Channel 5 will receive from the RT network "exclusively technological support", and the state channel will impose no influence on the informational part of the news.

On 22 October 2009, Alexander Orjonikize, a former head of REN-TV, and now CEO of National Media Group that owns TV channels in question, said that while the possibility of partnership in order to produce more saturated and interesting news is discussed, "it's important to note that whatever business strategy would be chosen in that direction, editorial policy regarding news and its informational contents will not be altered."

Channel 5 employs 1,700 people in Saint Petersburg. Its sales in 2009 accounted for US$20 million, while the expenditures exceeded 100 million. On 19 October 2009, employees of the TV channel published an open letter to the top Russian politicians, concerned over a possibility of mass dismissals. On 23 October 2009, CEO of NMG-TV Vladimir Khanumyan in an interview promised no mass dismissals will take place; he also commented that "Information about Russia Today is generally some misunderstanding. I don't even understand how could it be used in our project. It's the TV channel which makes programs for the abroad audience in English and Arab languages. How does that relate to Channel 5?"

RBC
In 2016 leadership and top journalists of RBC media holding left the company following an investigation launched by the authorities into an alleged "fraud", which was widely associated with the non-mainstream coverage of political affairs and the government, including the latest Panama Papers publications on the wealth of Vladimir Putin. One journalist described the situation as "having a strong resemblance to the takeover of NTV in the early 2000s".

Official stance towards the issues of state dominance
In 2000, prior to the presidential election, Kommersant published a long document titled "The Reform of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation",  allegedly leaked from the election committee of Vladimir Putin. The programme proposed a number of changes to government information policy, including strict centralization of mass media and suppression of criticism from both media as well as from opposition in Duma."The Directorate, setting a goal for itself, needs to act more effectively and actively than the opposition, must be harsher in its work and claims than the opposition, it must use sharper and more crushing facts. There should be no weakness or liberalism, there is no time left for this. For every claim directed against the Leadership of the country or its policy, the Presidential Press Center of the Administration must immediately answer. Operational information about the intentions of opposition forces to conduct political events comes to the Directorate. The Directorate implements all preemptive actions before the action to be conducted by the opposition, but in a beneficial “light” for the Presidential side".The document also offered a number of case studies and examples on how journalists or members of Duma exposing cases of corruption or suspicious purchases (e.g. foreign property) by members of the administration should be silenced with "preventive political actions", involving release of compromising personal details about the whistleblowers, journalists and protesters or organizing "spontaneous" counter-pickets in support of the administration. These methods were also applied to foreign journalists reporting from Russia and included ostensible surveillance, tapping of apartments and threats to relatives.

In 2006, President of Russia Vladimir Putin commented that in the period of 1990s freedom of press in Russia "was indeed under threat, not from the former state ideology that once held a monopoly on expression, but from the dictates of oligarchic capital". When asked about media freedom in 2006 interview with NBC TV channel, Putin replied: "We have more than 3,500 television and radio companies here in Russia and state participation in them is decreasing with every passing year. As for print media, there are more than 40,000 publications and we could not control them all even if we wanted to."

In May 2008, the International Federation of Journalists welcomed signs of a "fresh start" in relations between the authorities and independent media in Russia.

In November 2008, state of the nation address President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged problems with the Russian media:"[A]s was the case 20 years ago, the bureaucracy still does not trust free citizens and free activity. This logic pushes it into dangerous conclusions and acts. The bureaucracy from time to time casts fear over the business world, pressuring it to keep in line and not to take what they consider wrong action, takes control of this or that media outlet, trying to stop it from saying what they consider the wrong thing, meddles in the electoral process, preventing the election of what they consider the wrong person, and puts pressure on the courts, stopping them from handing down what they consider the wrong verdict."The policies adopted in that address answered that criticism the following way:"Ninth, parliamentary parties should have clear guarantees that their work will be covered by the state media.Tenth, freedom of speech should be backed up by technological innovation. Experience shows that it is practically of no use to persuade the bureaucrats to "leave the media in peace". Instead of persuading, we should work more actively to expand the free internet and digital television space. No bureaucrat can obstruct discussion on the internet or censor thousands of channels at once." In May 2009, a Federal Law "On Guarantees of Equality of Parliamentary Parties in Covering their Activities by the National State-Owned TV and Radio Channels" was adopted.

In his 2009 State of the Nation Address Dmitry Medvedev recommended all regions of the Russian Federation to pass laws on guarantees of equal media coverage of activity of parties represented in regional parliaments.

In 2007, a report by professor of politics Nicolai N. Petro asserted that foreign companies owned shares in over half of all Russian broadcasting companies and not the state. According to him, the Russian state's share in the newspaper and journal market is estimated to be less than 10%, while its share in electronic media is even smaller.

Russian head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs Konstantin Kosachev said in a 2005 interview that there were no differences between freedom of speech in Russia and Western countries in regards to the printed media: "there is an enormous amount of newspapers which write any sort of stuff." Speaking of electronic media, he acknowledged that they were mainly under the control of the authorities, but added that that's not a specifically Russian phenomenon.

According to the BBC, the Russian newspaper market offers its consumers a more diverse range of views than those same consumers can sample on the country's leading television channels.

According to Vedomosti newspaper, in 2009 Rupert Murdoch's corporation failed to sell its three popular Russian radio stations because it didn't manage to find buyers for them.

War propaganda

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea, in 2014, led to a reinforcement of propaganda and disinformation from state-owned media outlets, including by altered or misidentified images, stories that were distorted or invented from scratch. Russian authorities also kept using paid commentators to influence online contents and comments related to the conflict. According to war reporter and veteran of the First Chechen War Arkadiy Babchenko, Russian mass media played a significant role in actually starting the war in Donbass stating that "this is the first war in history started exclusively by Goebbels-like propaganda".

Independent coverage of war-related issues led to official pressures on media outlets. Lenta.ru was warned by Roskomnadzor in March 2014 after publishing an interview with a member of Right Sector; the following day the owner replaced the editor with a pro-governmental one, and 40 employees resigned in protest. In October 2014, Ekho Moskvy was warned by Roskomnadzor after airing first-hand testimonies of the fighting in eastern Ukraine, allegedly "justifying war crimes".

In March 2016 Sergey Shoygu when speaking on a Russian media prize ceremony described their work as "yet another weapon, yet another unit of the Armed Forces".

Political pressure on independent media
According to the World Press Freedom Review 2008 by International Press Institute, the pressure on Russian independent media outlets and their employees increased considerably in 2007.  The government use variety of methods to control of broadcasters, to sideline critical journalists, and to intimidate them into self-censorship.

According to International Press Institute, even bolder publications have to curtail their coverage to avoid problems with the authorities.Selective use of bureaucratic regulations were employed to inhibit media outlets, vague laws were passed to restrict independent activities, politically motivated criminal investigations against critics were used, independent journalists were imprisoned on trumped-up charges and their media outlets were closed, controlling interests in independent news outlets were purchased, aggressive harassment of journalists by security services took place and the failure to bring justice in the murders of journalists and in other violent attacks against the press prevailed.In 2016, the PEN association concluded that using a combination of methods including taking control over large media companies and TV channels and selective and flexible usage of newly introduced laws, the government has acquired practical control over what is published in mass-media in Russia:Although the press has not given in without a struggle and some key independent outlets, reporters, and editors continue to speak and publish, state television and a limited selection of other “loyal” outlets dominate today’s Russian media landscape. With the mainstream press increasingly toeing the Kremlin line, government restrictions have expanded to encroach upon other cultural spaces and modes of expression, including social activism, literature, art, and theater.While there are  provisions in the Russian Constitution that guarantee freedom of speech and specifically forbid censorship, the practical execution of numerous legal acts and dependence of courts results in practically unlimited control of the government over what is published and where. The laws in question are the anti-extremism laws, law on protection of children from harmful information, law on insult to religious believers, foreign agents law and undesirable organisations law. An important role in the censorship system is played by Roskomnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications), an institution that- according to PEN-  "has reawakened people’s internal editors — the voice in your head that consciously or unconsciously makes you question what you are writing or publishing: does this cross the line? Will this get me in trouble?"

According to an expert, the expulsion of competitive political actors from media ownership has gradually led to the depoliticisation of media content. Depoliticization of media content, however, led to its patriotisation as well.

On 25 November 2017, Putin signed into law new measures allowing authorities to list foreign media outlets as "foreign agents", comparing it to the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act requirement that forces Russia Today to register as a Russian foreign agent in the U.S. The law allows Moscow to force foreign media to brand their own news provided to Russians as the work of "foreign agents".

Selective use of regulations and criminal investigations
As stated by IPI, the Russian Government use selectively politicized regulations and bureaucratic harassment to inhibit media outlets. Main legal tools used here are anti-extremism laws (described above) and foreign agents law.

In 2008, Amnesty International criticized the run-up to parliamentary and presidential elections as "a clampdown on the freedoms of assembly and expression", stating that "the authorities have violently dispersed some opposition demonstrations, while pro-government events have gone ahead without interference."

In 2015, PolitPress initiated a database of various forms of repression applied to journalists and activists in Russia, counting overall 302 of those subject to various forms of repression, including 17 journalists. Memorial has published a list of political prisoners in Russia, that also includes journalists.

Access to information and open data
Russia's Law on Providing Access to Information on the Activities of State Bodies and Bodies of Local Self-Government, was enacted by the lower house of the legislature (State Duma) on 21 January 2009. The law positively guarantees the rights of Russian citizens to request and receive information, outlines a procedure for such requests, and determines government responsibility for providing such information. Such adoption was welcomed by the Human Rights Committee of United Nations in 2009.

However, even if the right to information is also legally guaranteed in Russia by the first Article of the Russian Law on Mass Media (27 December 1991) and by Article 29 of the 1993 Constitution, the realm of information is characterized by secrecy rather than openness. The Law on Mass Media assigns a direct right to receive information only to mass media, while Russian citizens have the right to receive reliable information on the state activities and representants via the mass media (Art. 38.1). State officials, in turn, are obliged to inform the media about their activities: on demand, but also actively.

According to the Global Right to Information Rating (GRIR), the Russian legal framework (including jurisprudence) does not recognise a fundamental right of access to information.  The GRIR appointed score 1 to Russia, where 6 is the maximum possible score with regard to the right to access information. However, when considered together with the scope and the requesting procedures provided by the Russian Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the GRIR assigned Russia a total score of 98, out of the maximum score of 150. The Penal Code (Art. 144) fixes high penalties for unlawful refusal of information and for hindering the professional activity of journalists. The right to access public information is particularly undermined by the legal exception valid for refusing the information's disclosure, namely the category of "confidential information" (commercial, state, or military secrets) is open to wide interpretations. The Law "on state secrets" was adopted on 21 July 1993 (amended in October 1997). In addition to a list of categories of information that could be classified as state secrets, the President of Russia can elaborate and approve such list through the publication of a public decree.

Svetlana Mironyuk commented to Vasily Gatov that Russian media since the early 2000s is divided into three groups: outsiders, our guys, and in-betweeners.
"Outsiders." Vedomosti, Kommersant, Forbes, Novaya Gazeta, Lenta.ru (until March 2014), Dozhd, The Moscow Times, and others. These have a more Western media approach to covering events. These media sources are outside the official Kremlin viewpoint.
"Our guys." Komsomolskaya Pravda, Russia-24, VGTRK, and the Aram Gabrelyanov media family — Zhizn, Lifenews.ru and Izvestia. This group can access exclusive interviews of Kremlin officials but the Kremlin expects certain "services" in return. To keep this group inline, it is up to several central figures such as Alexei Gromov and Mikhail Lesin, who began the task, and later they were joined by first Vladislav Surkov, and then his replacement Vyacheslav Volodin. To replace the Kremlin handlers, special yellow telephones, which are "media hotlines" to the Kremlin, have been installed on the "Our guys" editors desks since the mid-2000s.
"In-betweeners." the commercial radio station Ekho Moskvy (majority owned by Gazprom-Media) and the Interfax news agency may not always have access to Kremlin authorities, but occasionally can have a story.

In 2015, the FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation), the principal security agency of Russia, proposed a new regulation that will restrict access to public property registers, that were previously frequently used by whistle-blowers to expose multimillion-dollar mansions belonging to public officials who could not afford them from their official salary. The regulation was proposed shortly after the media exposed an undeclared mansion belonging to FSB vice-director Sergey Smirnov using the public registers. In the same year, a group of deputies proposed a new law that would  penalize "anti-Russian" or "anti-patriotic" statements. The law was criticized as unconstitutional and vague due to lack of definition of what these terms would really mean.

Another regulation enacted in 2015 is based on the European right to be forgotten concept, but without any of the safeguards for the public interest and freedom of speech. According to some experts, the regulation's scope is to silence publications about specific corrupted politicians, even if the accusations were true and confirmed in courts. Public land registers were also anonymized to hide names of property owners after they were frequently used by watchdogs to question unexplainable wealth of public officers.

In 2015, the non-profit association RosOtvet, launched  an online service to facilitate requests for information to authorities.

Open data and proactive disclosure

Beyond the duty to disclose public information upon request, public authorities in Russia have an affirmative obligation to publish information (i.e. proactive disclosure). Such information consists in:
 Full and brief official names of the government body, postal address, email for requests/messages from citizens, reference phone numbers - usually published and actualized information on powers and competence;
 Information on head officials (full names, other information - upon agreement);
 Official symbols;
 Approved forms (templates) for applications and other documents acceptable for review by the government body;
 Information on services provided by the government body in the field of licensing works performed abroad and using information containing state secret;
 Procedure for entering state service in the government body;
 Procedure for submission and review of applications from individuals and organizations Procedure, address, and schedule for reception of individuals and organizations;
 Name of the government body's structure department in charge of reception, contact data (email, reference phones).
Proactive disclosure of information by public bodies is provided by a series of laws, many of them aimed at contrasting corruption. One of them is the Russian Federation Federal Law "On providing access to information on the activities of state bodies and local governments", adopted by the State Duma on 21 January 2009.

The Russian legislation provides several ways for government bodies to publish their open data: it can be done through the federal Open Data Portal (data.gov.ru),  dedicating a  section on a government body's own official website or on a special open data portal, regional or municipal.

In 2016, the association Infometer has audited open data of 166 websites belonging to administrations of the largest Russian cities, those populated over 100,000. This study revealed that most cities' administrations do not publish open data:
 most of those publishing open data do it at their own resources that is not always the best solution;
 quite few city administrations approve normative acts regarding open data;
 the very few city administrations  work with the community of open data software developers.
73 out of the 166 cities under survey do publish open data. They observe the requirements on open data publication for 47.9%.

Infometer, from July to October 2014, made an audit of compliance of various level courts' official websites with the Federal Law "On Providing Access to Information on the Activities of Courts in the Russian Federation" No. 262-FZ from 22 Dec 2008. The experts focused on the openness of information on Russian general jurisdiction courts' activities, focusing on online publication of templates for documents used for filing applications to courts. The results showed that, with regard to the Supreme Court of Russia, information is available at 24.1%. Referring to Regional Court, out of the 85 examined their openness level appears to be 42.4%. Finally, with regard to First Instance courts, their openness was 31%.

With regard to open data, as to 2015 the Infometer association calculated that 69 Russian regions publish open data and for 36.6% at average regions observe requirements for open data publication. Most of these open data are published in the governmental field.

See also
 Human rights in Russia
 List of journalists killed in Russia

 Media of Russia
 Political repression of cyber-dissidents § Russia
 Russian Internet blacklist
 Telecommunications in Russia

References

External links

 Harassment Chronicles, an English-language resource run by the oppositional Other Russia (a coalition including Kasparov's United Civil Front)
Freedom House 2010 Press Survey: Russia
A guide to the troubled world of independent Russian media, The Calvert Journal, April 2014

Russia
Russia
Russia
Category:Human rights in Russia
Category:Media in Russia
Category:Censorship in Russia


Huileries du Congo Belge

Huileries du Congo Belge was a subsidiary of Lever Brothers created by William Hesketh Lever that operated in the Congo, established in 1911 when the soap manufacturer received a concession for  of forest in Belgian Congo, mostly south of Bandundu, where it operated through this subsidiary. By 1923 a Lever soap factory was built there and by 1924 SAVCO (Savonneries Congolaises) was established, it was the nucleus of the United Africa Company, a principal supplier to the United Kingdom of several key commodities. From 1951 it was producing Lux soap. The company produced palm oil for Lever Brothers and later Unilever, is was notorious for its use of forced labour. The companies former planations today operates under the control of Feronia Inc, employing approximately 4,000 people.

Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB) was at one time known as :fr:Plantations Lever au Congo with Plantations Lever au Zaire, and ultimately :fr:Plantations et huileries du Congo

Company history

The decision of W.H Lever to expand into the Congo was in a period after there had been an international campaign against the Congo Free State from 1890 under the leadership of the British activist E. D. Morel, by 1908 under international pressure Belgian had annexed the Congo Free State, removing direct personal rule by Leopold II and created the Belgian Congo ending some of his systems responsible for the worse atrocities, forced labour continued.

The joint-stock company to exploit the oil mills of the Belgian Congo was founded on April 14, 1911, following  an agreement  by the Minister Jules Renkin and the firm's new President of the Board of directors.

The firm greatly expanded the palm oil business during the Great War. New rail and steamship lines opened to handle the expanded export traffic. The state took over so-called "vacant lands" (land not directly used by local tribes) and redistributed the territory to European companies, to individual white landowners (colons), or to the missions. In this way, an extensive plantation economy developed. The company was allocated 5 state-owned lands for the plantation of Elaeis palms, near five localities: Bumba, (plantation of Alberta) and Barumbu, (plantation of Elisabetha) on the Congo river, Lusanga, (plantations of Leverville) on Kwilu, Basongo on Kasai, Brabanta plantation (Mapangu) and near Ingende, (Flandria plantation) on Ruki. Palm-oil production in the Congo increased from 2,500 tons in 1914 to 9,000 tons in 1921.

As World War II approached, it created the large Elaeis plantation (13,500 hectares) northeast of Bumba on the Aketi road (Yaligimba plantation: 4,000 workers) and two other mixed plantations. Cocoa trees and Heveas in Mokaria (on Yandombo-Basoko road) and Gwaka (on Mongala south of Gemena). Shortly before independence, it will create a tea plantation in Mweso, Kivu.

A research station employing a dozen academics had been established in Yaligimba at the end of the war. Important technological research on machining had been undertaken with other companies in the Mongana pilot plant. DFC also trained, in self-financed schools, their technicians and accountants (in Leverville), their assistant agronomists in Yaeseke, and nurses in Alberta. Major hospitals, managed by doctors, had been established in each plantation. To feed their workers, the DFC had created two large cattle farms, one in the south near Leverville and one in Ubangi in Lombo. The PLCs had a port and storage tanks in Kinshasa, as well as their own boats and their own railcars. They also had a large oil storage capacity in Matadi.

In 1958 the head office was transferred from Brussels to Leopoldville.

In 1957, the company employed 14,780 cutters in Kwilu. Palm Oil production reached 230,000 tons in 1957.

The operations through the subsidiary ceased at Lusanga on Mobutu coming to power in 1965 and the site has fallen to ruin.

Forced labour

In the Congo, Lever Brothers, through their subsidiary Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB), utilized forced labour. Palm cutters failing to meet requirements regarding compulsory cultivation of crops were liable to prison sentences, where the chicotte, a type of whip, was used.

A decree issued 16 March 1922 by the Belgian government in the Congo, which remained in force for the remainder of the colonial period, albeit with a few modifications, made provision for prison sentences of two to three months for "dishonesty" (reneging upon their legal obligations to work), and prison sentences of a fortnight for violations of work discipline. Francois Beissel was dissatisfied with  a number of the measures laid down in the decree, and left record of this in a letter dated 22 November 1922, which he wrote to Doctor Albert Duren, Inspector of Industrial Hygiene. Regarding absenteeism, Beissel wrote, "As the man hired could not renege more seriously upon his obligations than by abstaining from work without a plausible excuse, I would venture to hope that the prison sentences recommended would be applied with all due rigor in the case of unjustified, repeated absences. I would be glad to receive some reassurance in this regard."

Reports by Rene Mouchet and Victor Daco show that some limited improvements were made to the condition of the HCB's workers by 1928 and 1929. However, the HCB was still using forced labor. Daco recommended that local workers should be fed just as imported workers were. Accommodations at many camps had been improved, and there were houses made of baked brick or adobe. However some camps, such as the villages of the Yanzi, were still in a deplorable state. Overcrowding continued to be an issue, as houses were too few in number, in Daco's opinion.  Daco believed the existing hospitals were in good state, but that there were too few of them, and that the number of beds should be quadrupled.

A report signed on 29 January 1931 by Pierre Ryckmans and two others appointed by the minister discusses the quota system in use by the HCB at the time. Ryckmans' report quoted some directives issued by company headquarters at Leverville for Kwenge sector, dated 23 March 1930. One of the directives stated that, "It is your responsibility to organise the cutters' deliveries so as to obtain on a regular bases an average production of 40 crates per month." Ryckmans recommended that the quotas should vary throughout the year to correlate to the rate at which clusters ripened. The Ryckmans report also stated, "We reckon that the employment of state messengers ought generally to be condemned. They understand just one thing, namely, that they are responsible for getting people to work, and they are ready to use any means possible to carry out this mission." In short, as Jules Marchal summarized the report, "the exploitation of palm groves in Lusanga circle was a system of forced labour pure and simple."

Further reading

References

Category:Unilever companies
Category:Manufacturing companies disestablished in 1960
Category:Palm oil production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo


Kumkum (actress)

Kumkum, born Zaibunnissa, is an Indian film actress from Hussainabad in Sheikhpura, Bihar. Her father was Nabab of Hussainabad and belonged to a highly reputed family. She acted in almost 115 films in her career. She is best known for her roles in Mr. X in Bombay (1964), Mother India (1957), Son Of India (1962), Kohinoor (1960), Ujala, Naya Daur, Shreeman Funtoosh, Ek Sapera Ek Lutera, Ganga Ki Laharen, Raja Aur Runk, Aankhen (1968), Lalkaar, Geet and Ek Kuwara Ek Kuwari. She paired with many film heroes of her era and was popular in roles alongside Kishore Kumar.

Kumkum also acted in Bhojpuri films, starting with Ganga Maiyya Tohe Piyari Chadhaibo (1963), which was also the first ever Bhojpuri film.

Career
Kumkum  was discovered by Guru Dutt. Guru Dutt was to picturise the song "Kabhi Aar Kabhi Paar Laaga Teere Nazar" for his movie Aar Paar  (1954) on his friend Jagdeep (father of Javed Jaffery, Naved Jaffery), but later decided to picturise this song on a female actor. But at that time, no one agreed to do a small song. Then Guru Dutt finally picturised this song on Kumkum. Later, Kumkum was seen in a small role in Pyaasa (1957). The famous song "Yeh Hai Bombay Meri Jaan" from C.I.D (1956), sung by Geeta Dutt was picturised on her. She was also paired alongside Shammi Kapoor in a side role in Mem Saheb (1956) and also in lead opposite Shammi Kapoor in Char Dil Char Raahein (1959).

She was trained in Kathak by the famous Pandit Shambhu Maharaj. She showed her dancing talents in the film Kohinoor (1960) with Dilip Kumar. "Madhuban Mein Radhika Nache Re" and "Haye Jaadugar Qaatil, Haazir Hai Mera Dil", sung by Asha Bhosle for Naushad were picturised on Kumkum. She was paired opposite Kishore Kumar in films like Ganga Ki Laharen, Shreeman Funtoosh, Haaye Mera Dil and Mr. X in Bombay. The songs like "Khoobsurat Haseena" from Mr. X in Bombay, "Ijazat Ho Toh" from Haaye Mera Dil, "Sultana Sultana" from Shreeman Funtoosh and "Machalti Hui" from Ganga Ki Lahren, which were picturised on the pair Kishore-Kumkum remain popular since their release till date. She has been a favourite choice for writer director Ramanand Sagar. Ramanand Sagar decided to cast Kumkum as Dharmendra's sister in Ankhen, a super hit film of 1968. In 1970, for Geet, Kumkum was Ramanand Sagar's choice for a small role. But in Lalkar (1972), she was paired with Dharmendra, while Rajendra Kumar was paired with Mala Sinha. Kumkum was paired with Kiran Kumar in Jalte Badan (1973), produced, directed and written by Ramanand Sagar. She was paired opposite Vinod Khanna in Dhamkee in 1973 and the duet song "Chand Kya Hai Roop Ka Darpan" became hugely popular. She was paired opposite Pran in the comedy film Ek Kuwara Ek Kuwari, directed by Prakash Mehra, which was a blockbuster.

After her marriage, she left the industry.

Filmography
 Aar Paar (1954) as dancer in song "Kabhi Aar Kabhi Paar" (uncredited role)
 Mirza Ghalib (1954)
 Mr. & Mrs. '55 (1955)
 House No. 44 (1955)
 Kundan (1955)
 Funtoosh (1956)
 C.I.D. (1956)
 Basant Bahar (1956)
 Naya Daur (1957)
 Mother India (1957)
 Pyaasa (1957)
 Char Dil Char Rahen (1959)
 Shararat (1959)
 Kali Topi Lal Rumal (1959)
 Ujala (1959)
 Kohinoor (1960)
 Dil Bhi Tera Hum Bhi Tere (1960)
 Son Of India (1962)
 King Kong (1962)
 Sher Khan (1962)
 Ganga Maiyya Tohe Piyari Chadhaibo (1963, Bhojpuri)
 Laagi Nahi Chhute Ram (1963, Bhojpuri)
 Mr. X in Bombay (1964)
 Ganga Ki Lahren (1964)
 Raja Aur Runk (1968)
 Aankhen (1968)
 Gunah Aur Kanoon (1970)
 Geet (1970)
 Aan Baan (1972)
 Lalkaar (1972)
 Dhamkee
 Jalte Badan (1973)
 Ek Kunwari Ek Kunwara (1973)
  Mr. Fantoosh (1965)

Note: Films in Hindi, unless otherwise mentioned.

References

External links

Category:Living people
Category:Indian film actresses
Category:Actresses in Hindi cinema
Category:Actresses in Bhojpuri cinema
Category:20th-century Indian actresses
Category:Actresses from Bihar
Category:1935 births


Shadow on the Land

Shadow on the Land, also known as United States: It Can't Happen Here, is a 1968 television film which aired on ABC. It was adapted from the Sinclair Lewis novel It Can't Happen Here by Nedrick Young, and directed by Richard C. Sarafian. The plot involves a President creating a fascist, totalitarian regime in the United States, and a resistance movement forming against it.

References

External links

Category:1968 television films
Category:American television films
Category:American films
Category:Dystopian films
Category:Films based on works by Sinclair Lewis
Category:Films based on American novels
Category:Films based on science fiction novels
Category:Screen Gems films
Category:Television pilots not picked up as a series
Category:Films scored by Sol Kaplan


London Dreams (soundtrack)

London Dreams is the soundtrack to the 2009 Bollywood film London Dreams directed by Vipul Amrutlal Shah starring Salman Khan, Ajay Devgan and Asin. The music is composed by Shankar-Ehsaan-Loy, while the lyrics are penned by Prasoon Joshi.

The album was released on 17 September 2009 by T-Series.

The song style is generally rock inspired to match the motifs in the movie. "Khanabadosh", "Shola Shola", "Barso Yaaron", "Khwab" and "Man Ko Ati Bhavey Saiyaan" were very popular songs; "Man Ko Ati Bhavey" and "Khanabadosh" being the most popular ones.

Development
Initially, A.R. Rahman was approached for composing the music for the film, but he opted out due to other commitments. Vipul then roped in the critically acclaimed trio Shankar-Ehsaan-Loy, who scored music for Rock On!!, the first rock musical in Bollywood.

The soundtrack consists of eight original songs and three remix versions. "Barso Yaaron" by Vishal and Roop Kumar Rathod is a rock number that ends with "Hanuman Chalisa". "Manko Ati Bhavey Saiyaan" is a romantic song picturized on Asin and Salman at the Eiffel Tower. Then follows the folksy "Tapkey Masti" by Feroz Khan and bhangra beat number with aesthetics of qawaali - "Yaari Bina" by Roop Kumar Rathod. "Khanabadosh" is crooned by Mohan, accompanied with rich and layered instrumentations. Abhijeet Ghoshal's "Jashn Hai Jeet Ka", a soft mellow song is then followed by Rahat-Shankar duo's "Khwab Jo". Finally, there is Zubin Garg's "Shola Shola", rock track with a techno twist to it.

All the songs in the soundtrack are rendered by male singers, which is a rarity in Bollywood.

Track listing

Reception

The music was met with positive critical response upon release. Joginder Tuteja of Bollywood Hungama said, "Once you are into the  album the fifth time over, you realize that London Dreams does carry some good stuff to make heads turn. The songs are bound to find much better acceptance if the film succeeds at the box office."

Glamsham, in its review, remarked, "London Dreams sizzles out with rock-music genre of soundtracks and accompanies all other varied genres ('bhangra', 'qawalli') in its packaging with promising results. Overall, it's a satisfying listening experience from trio and 'must-grab' musical package for all rock music lovers."

Chandrima Pal of Rediff, in her three and a half star review, described the album as, "tight, meticulously planned and power-packed, with hardly any weak link" and called it "one of the most engaging albums to have emerged this season."

Planet Bollywoods review was along the similar lines too, which read, "London Dreams deserves high praise for its lyrics and vocals, where the music also becomes experimental in nature in the case of this particular album where the trio really go wild with their music. A  must-buy for SEL and Prasoon Joshi enthusiasts and music lovers alike, as this album has come to impress all the way."

Vibhuti Patel of BBC UK gave the album a thumbs up, calling the album "a class above the usual bollywood fare."

Controversy
The song "Barso Yaaron" ran into controversy as the song had a part where Salman Khan chants the Hanuman Chalisa in a rock concert. The censor board felt this might hurt some religious sentiments and asked director Vipul Shah to change the visuals. So Vipul went to Delhi and approached the tribunal, which accepted his point of view and passed the promos.

Composer Ehsaan Noorani of the trio, later commented, "First there was a bit of worry because you know how in this country everything is sensitive. When it came through, it is a very innocent depiction of Hanuman Chalisa. It is very valid. Whenever we start our concert, we start with a Ganesh shloka."

References

Category:Shankar–Ehsaan–Loy soundtracks
Category:2009 soundtracks


James Goold Cutler

James Goold Cutler (April 24, 1848 – April 21, 1927) was a prominent Rochester, New York architect and businessman, and served as the Mayor of Rochester from 1904 to 1907. He was born in Albany, New York, the son of John N. Cutler and Mary E. (Goold) Cutler. On September 27, 1871, he married Anna Catherine Abbey, and in 1872 he and his brother J. W. Cutler moved with their families to the Rochester, New York area. Here he was a practicing architect from 1872 to 1884 in partnership with Andrew Jackson Warner (1833–1910) from 1875 to 1877. He was a republican presidential elector for New York State in 1896 and was the mayor of Rochester, N.Y. from 1904 to 1907. He was the inventor of the Cutler mail chute, a mail delivery system for tall buildings, and was associated with his brother, J. W. Cutler, in management of the Cutler Manufacturing company, controlling and operating the Cutler mail chute patents. He died on April 21, 1927 in Rochester and was eulogized by his many friends including former U.S. president William Howard Taft, former governor of New York Charles Evans Hughes and former presidential candidate John W. Davis.

References

External links

Cutler Building (Note: the actual Cutler building is to the left and separate from the M. Dolores Denman Courthouse.)
The Elwood Memorial Building
William S. Kimball Tobacco Factory
Alexander Lindsay Residence
Residence of H. C. Brewster
Residence of I. A. Baum, Esq

Category:1848 births
Category:Architects from New York (state)
Category:Mayors of Rochester, New York
Category:Politicians from Albany, New York
Category:University of Rochester people
Category:1927 deaths
Category:New York (state) Republicans
Category:Artists from Albany, New York


O'Sheehan

O'Sheehan, a Gaelic-Irish surname.

Overview

The O'Sheehan (or, as is the more common anglicization, Sheehan) family is an Irish clan traditionally of County Clare. Part of the Dalcassian branch of families, the O'Sheehans themselves played only a small role in Irish politics, as vassals to the more famed O'Briens, who commonly became kings of Thomond and included the Irish legend Brian Boru.

The original form of Sheehan is síocháin, meaning peace or peaceful. This in combination with the prefix O', meaning 'descendant of,' could be taken to mean something like 'descendant of peace,' or 'descendant of the peaceful one,' though who this could be referring to remains unclear.

Today, many Sheehans still live in County Clare, though others have since migrated to the United States and other countries, mainly as part of the mass exodus that followed the Potato Famine.

Category:Surnames
Category:Irish families
Category:Irish Brehon families
Category:Surnames of Irish origin
Category:Anglicised Irish-language surnames
Category:Families of Irish ancestry
Category:Roman Catholic families


Cochylidia oblonga

Cochylidia oblonga is a species of moth of the family Tortricidae. It is found in China (Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Tianjin).

The wingspan is  for males and  for females. The ground colour of the forewings is yellowish white, the costal margin with a narrow brownish black stripe running from the base to the median fascia. The hindwings are pale grey.

References

External links

Category:Moths described in 2012
Category:Endemic fauna of China
Category:Cochylini


Lanterns (A Very Loud Death album)

Lanterns is the debut, full-length album of American rock band A Very Loud Death, released independently by the group on September 19, 2017. Recorded between April 1, 2017 and August 21, 2017 at The Ministry of Sound in Atlanta, Georgia, the album was engineered by Luke Campolieta and produced by both Luke and the band.

Background and recording
Following the release of their EP, The Castration of the Idiot, A Very Loud Death took a 7-month break to develop chemistry with their new drummer, Cole O'Neil Robertson. At that time, Chris Edge and Bryan Peel already had half of the album written as well as about 20 other songs, with the tracks for Lanterns selected because they were "darker and heavier and more fitting of the art direction at the time".

According to Edge, it wasn't until the track, "The Wild", had been written with Cole that the band found a direction and concept for the album and were able to finish writing the second half of the album. They approached Luke Campolieta at one of their concerts in November 2016 about doing a possible full length. Two months later they finalized a date and began pre-production.

While all of the tracks went through pre-production, with Edge writing the lyrics and the band formulating the arrangements and overall direction, any songs with lead melodies, harmonies, backing vocals, effects, noise, and any post-production were written in the studio, often on the fly utilizing free jazz, noise rock, jam band, industrial, narrative, and experimental techniques.

Critical reception
The album has received generally favorable reviews from independent music critics. On October 16, 2017 Adam Harmless of GAD! Zine said of Lanterns "This recording is a mystery...You're gonna think you've heard this before, but it's richer and more interesting. Subtlety is power."

On October 23, 2017, James Orez of Lone Frequencies called Lanterns a "Glorious album". With Jacob of Lone Frequencies saying of Lanterns "...it's very layered/textured. Not over the top, just moody music...there is a bit of beauty in the darkness of A Very Loud Death."

Pat "Riot" Whitaker, of RiffRelevant.com, gave a positive review, saying about Lanterns, "…what they are is rather cool, emotionally riveting post-metal/progressive rock…the trio provide some powerfully illuminating music…it is as haunting as it is beautiful…”

Brian Lush of RockWired Radio and Magazine, gave a favorable review stating of Lanterns, "The album is a dark, moody listen that combines  primal punk energy with a more nuanced, progressive rock aesthetic. It's a sound that is sure to take the band beyond their stomping grounds and into that cherished glow of indie rock recognition, and dare we say 'fame'."

One of the more interesting reviews came from Kayla Hutton of imperfectFifth.com, who said of Lanterns "The best way to describe A Very Loud Death’s latest offering is that there is enough dramatic loudness to wake up empathy in a stone-cold psychopath."

On July 10, 2018 Andrew Duncan of Selective Memory Mag said "...The bottom line is that Lanterns is a great album. So, how do you top that?"

Track listing

References

Category:2017 debut albums
Category:A Very Loud Death albums


Auvray

Auvray is a French surname. Notable people with the surname include:

Félix Auvray (1800–1833), French painter
Jean-Claude Auvray, French opera director
Louis Auvray (1810–1890), French sculptor and art critic
Lydie Auvray (born 1956), French accordionist, composer and singer
Stéphane Auvray (born 1981), Guadeloupean footballer

Category:French-language surnames


2010 Beach Handball World Championships

The 2010 Beach Handball World Championships was a twelve-team tournament in both men's and women's beach handball, held at Antalya in Turkey from 23 June 2010 to 27 June 2010. It was the fourth edition of the event. Matches were played in sets, the team that wins two sets was the winner of a match. When teams are equal in points the head-to-head result was decisive.

Format
The twelve teams were split into two groups of six teams. After playing a round-robin, the three top-ranked teams advanced to the main round. Every team kept the points from preliminary round matches against teams who also advanced. In the main round every team had three games against the opponents they did not face in the preliminary round. The top four teams advanced to the semifinals. The three bottom-ranked teams from each preliminary round group were packed into one group. The points won against the teams who were also in this group would be valid. Every team had three games and after those rounds there were placement matches from 7th to 12th.

Men

Participating nations

Preliminary round

Group A

June 23, 2010

June 24, 2010

June 25, 2010

Group B

June 23, 2010

June 24, 2010

June 25, 2010

Main round (Group C)

June 25, 2010

June 26, 2010

Consolation Round (Group D)

June 25, 2010

June 26, 2010

Placement matches
11th/12th position
June 27, 2010

9th/10th position
June 27, 2010

7th/8th position
June 27, 2010

5th/6th position
June 27, 2010

Finals

Semifinals
June 27, 2010

3rd/4th Place
June 27, 2010

Final
June 27, 2010

Women

Participating nations

Preliminary round

Group A

June 23, 2010

June 24, 2010

June 25, 2010

Group B

June 23, 2010

June 24, 2010

June 25, 2010

Main Round (Group C)

June 25, 2010

June 26, 2010

Consolation Round (Group D)

June 25, 2010

June 26, 2010

Placement matches
11th/12th position
June 27, 2010

9th/10th position
June 27, 2010

7th/8th position
June 27, 2010

5th/6th position
June 27, 2010

Finals

Semifinals
June 27, 2010

3rd/4th Place
June 27, 2010

Final
June 27, 2010

References
Format & Rules

External links
Official Site
IHF Page

Beach World Championships
Category:Beach Handball World Championships
Beach handball
Beach Handball World Championships
Category:Sport in Antalya
Category:21st century in Antalya


Jean-Pierre de Peretti Della Rocca

Jean-Pierre de Peretti Della Rocca (26 June 1930; Switzerland – 8 October 2001, Tours, France) was a Swiss-born French Union for French Democracy politician. He served as Mayor of Aix-en-Provence from 1983 to 1989, and as a member of the National Assembly of France for the 14th district encompassing the Bouches-du-Rhône from 1986 to 1993.

Biography

Early life
He was born on 26 June 1930 in Lausanne, Switzerland. He worked as a general practitioner and wrote a book about the French parliament.

Political career
He served as Mayor of Aix-en-Provence from 1986 to 1993. During city council meetings, he sang the Copa Santa, the official anthem of Provence. He was initially an ally of Alain Joissains, who served as Mayor from 1978 to 1983, but he did not support his wife, who currently serves as Mayor.

Subsequently, he served as member of the French Assembly for the 14th district from 1986 to 1993.

Death
He died in Tours in 2001.

Bibliography
L'Antigénothérapie spécifique par voie intradermique dans le traitement des staphyloccies rebelles et récidivantes (1956)

References

Category:1930 births
Category:2001 deaths
Category:People from Lausanne
Category:Union for French Democracy politicians
Category:Deputies of the 8th National Assembly of the French Fifth Republic
Category:Deputies of the 9th National Assembly of the French Fifth Republic
Category:Mayors of Aix-en-Provence


Acacoyagua Municipality

Acacoyagua Municipality one of the 122 municipalities of Chiapas, which in turn is one of the states of Mexico. As of 2010, the municipality had a total population of 16,814, up from 14,189 as of 2005.

History
The area is notable for being the place where the first organized Japanese immigrants settled in Mexico. In 1897, thirty five initial colonists led by Enomoto Takeaki arrived to work on coffee farms. Making Mexico the first Latin American country to receive Japanese immigrants. Although the coffee endeavor failed, the colonists began farming vegetables and flowers. Over the following 30 years, six more "waves" of migrants followed. As most of the migrants were men, marriage with local women and conversion to Roman Catholicism was common.

Nikkei have become Municipal President, the first being Juvencio Nishizama Cruz in 1954 and the latest being José Martín Nomura Hernandez in 2005. The main garden in town has Japanese influences and there is a monument commemorating the Japanese migrants.

In May 1997, Prince Akishino, Ambassador Teresuke Terada and members of the Japanese Navy visited the town to mark the hundred year anniversary of the arrival of the first colonists.

Demographics
As of 2010, the town of Acacoyagua had a population of 7,515. Other than the town of Acacoyagua, the municipality had 152 localities, the largest of which (with 2010 populations in parentheses) was: Hidalgo (1,209), classified as rural.

References

External links
 http://www.acacoyagua.gob.mx

Category:Municipalities of Chiapas


Te Paea Cherrington

Te Paea Cherrington (c.1878–30 September 1937) was a New Zealand tribal leader. Of Māori descent, she identified with the Nga Puhi iwi. She was born in Otiria, Northland, New Zealand on c.1878.

References

Category:1878 births
Category:1937 deaths
Category:Ngāpuhi
Category:People from the Northland Region


Alexander Stafford

Alexander Paul Thomas Stafford (born 19 July 1987) is a British Conservative Party politician. He has been the Member of Parliament (MP) for Rother Valley since the 2019 general election. He is the first Conservative to ever be elected for the seat.

Background
Stafford's maternal grandparents were refugees who fled communist regimes. His Polish Ukrainian grandfather was imprisoned in a gulag in Siberia during World War 2, until he was allowed to leave to fight with the British Army after the Soviet Union joined the allies. After the war he came to Britain and met Stafford's grandmother, a Polish East German who was also a refugee.

Stafford grew up in Ealing Broadway and was privately educated at St Benedict's School, Ealing, where he was Deputy Head Boy. He studied at Oxford University where he served as President of the  Newman Society and President of the Oxford University Conservative Association (in Michaelmas Term of 2007). Before becoming an MP worked for Shell, the World Wildlife Fund and two MPs.

Political career
Stafford's political career began when he was elected to Ealing Council in West London, where he has represented the ward of Ealing Broadway since 2014. In November 2019, he was selected as the prospective parliamentary candidate for Rother Valley. He was elected in the 2019 general election, becoming the first non-Labour MP to represent Rother Valley in the 101 year history of the constituency.

Stafford campaigned to leave the European Union during the 2016 referendum.

Personal life
Stafford lives with his wife Natalie, with whom he is expecting his first child in 2020.

References

Category:1987 births
Category:Living people
Category:Conservative Party (UK) MPs for English constituencies
Category:UK MPs 2019–
Category:People educated at St Benedict's School
Category:Alumni of the University of Oxford
Category:Presidents of the Oxford University Conservative Association
Category:Conservative Party (UK) councillors
Category:Councillors in the London Borough of Ealing
Category:21st-century British politicians
Category:English people of Polish descent
Category:English people of Ukrainian descent
Category:English people of German descent


Canton of Valensole

The canton of Valensole is an administrative division in southeastern France. At the French canton reorganisation which came into effect in March 2015, the canton was expanded from 4 to 10 communes:
Allemagne-en-Provence
Brunet
Esparron-de-Verdon
Gréoux-les-Bains
Montagnac-Montpezat
Quinson
Sainte-Croix-du-Verdon
Saint-Laurent-du-Verdon
Saint-Martin-de-Brômes
Valensole

Demographics

See also
Cantons of the Alpes-de-Haute-Provence department
Communes of France

References

Category:Cantons of Alpes-de-Haute-Provence