Daily Papers

The rapid proliferation of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) is often framed as enabling unified multimodal knowledge discovery but rests on an under-examined assumption: that current VLMs faithfully synthesise multimodal data. We argue they often do not, and this gap reflects a trustworthiness problem in the dominant Vision Encoder-Projector-LLM paradigm. Rather than extracting grounded knowledge from visual inputs, state-of-the-art models frequently exhibit functional blindness, i.e., exploiting strong language priors to bypass severe visual representation bottlenecks. In this work, we challenge the conventional methodology of multimodal evaluation, which relies on data ablation or new dataset creation and therefore conflates dataset biases with architectural incapacity. We propose an information-theoretic departure: the Modality Translation Protocol, designed to quantify what we call the Expense of Seeing. By translating semantic payloads rather than ablating them, we formulate three novel metrics -- the Toll (ToS), Curse (CoS), and Fallacy (FoS) of Seeing -- culminating in the Semantic Sufficiency Criterion (SSC). Furthermore, we hypothesise a Divergence Law of Multimodal Scaling: as the underlying language engines scale to unprecedented reasoning capabilities, the penalty of the visual knowledge bottleneck may increase rather than diminish. We argue the community should move beyond "multimodal gain" as a primary evaluation target. By elevating the SSC from a passive diagnostic constraint to an active architectural blueprint, we provide a foundation for guiding the next generation of AI systems toward genuine multimodal reasoning.

Despite the remarkable performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in natural language processing tasks, they still struggle with generating logically sound arguments, resulting in potential risks such as spreading misinformation. To address this issue, we introduce FIPO, a fallacy-informed framework that leverages preference optimization methods to steer LLMs toward logically sound arguments. FIPO includes a classification loss, to capture the fine-grained information on fallacy types. Our results on argumentation datasets show that our method reduces the fallacy errors by up to 17.5%. Furthermore, our human evaluation results indicate that the quality of the generated arguments by our method significantly outperforms the fine-tuned baselines, as well as other preference optimization methods, such as DPO. These findings highlight the importance of ensuring models are aware of logical fallacies for effective argument generation. Our code is available at github.com/lucamouchel/Logical-Fallacies.

Reasoning is central to human intelligence. However, fallacious arguments are common, and some exacerbate problems such as spreading misinformation about climate change. In this paper, we propose the task of logical fallacy detection, and provide a new dataset (Logic) of logical fallacies generally found in text, together with an additional challenge set for detecting logical fallacies in climate change claims (LogicClimate). Detecting logical fallacies is a hard problem as the model must understand the underlying logical structure of the argument. We find that existing pretrained large language models perform poorly on this task. In contrast, we show that a simple structure-aware classifier outperforms the best language model by 5.46% on Logic and 4.51% on LogicClimate. We encourage future work to explore this task as (a) it can serve as a new reasoning challenge for language models, and (b) it can have potential applications in tackling the spread of misinformation. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/logical-fallacy

An important skill in critical thinking and argumentation is the ability to spot and recognize fallacies. Fallacious arguments, omnipresent in argumentative discourse, can be deceptive, manipulative, or simply leading to `wrong moves' in a discussion. Despite their importance, argumentation scholars and NLP researchers with focus on argumentation quality have not yet investigated fallacies empirically. The nonexistence of resources dealing with fallacious argumentation calls for scalable approaches to data acquisition and annotation, for which the serious games methodology offers an appealing, yet unexplored, alternative. We present Argotario, a serious game that deals with fallacies in everyday argumentation. Argotario is a multilingual, open-source, platform-independent application with strong educational aspects, accessible at www.argotario.net.

Logical fallacies are common in public communication and can mislead audiences; fallacious arguments may still appear convincing despite lacking soundness, because convincingness is inherently subjective. We present the first computational study of how emotional framing interacts with fallacies and convincingness, using large language models (LLMs) to systematically change emotional appeals in fallacious arguments. We benchmark eight LLMs on injecting emotional appeal into fallacious arguments while preserving their logical structures, then use the best models to generate stimuli for a human study. Our results show that LLM-driven emotional framing reduces human fallacy detection in F1 by 14.5% on average. Humans perform better in fallacy detection when perceiving enjoyment than fear or sadness, and these three emotions also correlate with significantly higher convincingness compared to neutral or other emotion states. Our work has implications for AI-driven emotional manipulation in the context of fallacious argumentation.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

In this paper, we present our submission to the MM-ArgFallacy2025 shared task, which aims to advance research in multimodal argument mining, focusing on logical fallacies in political debates. Our approach uses pretrained Transformer-based models and proposes several ways to leverage context. In the fallacy classification subtask, our models achieved macro F1-scores of 0.4444 (text), 0.3559 (audio), and 0.4403 (multimodal). Our multimodal model showed performance comparable to the text-only model, suggesting potential for improvements.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has greatly improved our ability to process complex language. However, accurately detecting logical fallacies remains a significant challenge. This study presents a novel and effective prompt formulation approach for logical fallacy detection, applicable in both supervised (fine-tuned) and unsupervised (zero-shot) settings. Our method enriches input text incorporating implicit contextual information -- counterarguments, explanations, and goals -- which we query for validity within the context of the argument. We then rank these queries based on confidence scores to inform classification. We evaluate our approach across multiple datasets from 5 domains, covering 29 distinct fallacy types, using models from the GPT and LLaMA series. The results show substantial improvements over state-of-the-art models, with F1 score increases of up to 0.60 in zero-shot settings and up to 0.45 in fine-tuned models. Extensive analyses further illustrate why and how our method excels.

We introduce MAFALDA, a benchmark for fallacy classification that merges and unites previous fallacy datasets. It comes with a taxonomy that aligns, refines, and unifies existing classifications of fallacies. We further provide a manual annotation of a part of the dataset together with manual explanations for each annotation. We propose a new annotation scheme tailored for subjective NLP tasks, and a new evaluation method designed to handle subjectivity. We then evaluate several language models under a zero-shot learning setting and human performances on MAFALDA to assess their capability to detect and classify fallacies.

Priorities in multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) convey the relevance preference of one criterion over another, which is usually reflected by imposing the non-negativity and unit-sum constraints. The processing of such priorities is different than other unconstrained data, but this point is often neglected by researchers, which results in fallacious statistical analysis. This article studies three prevalent fallacies in group MCDM along with solutions based on compositional data analysis to avoid misusing statistical operations. First, we use a compositional approach to aggregate the priorities of a group of DMs and show that the outcome of the compositional analysis is identical to the normalized geometric mean, meaning that the arithmetic mean should be avoided. Furthermore, a new aggregation method is developed, which is a robust surrogate for the geometric mean. We also discuss the errors in computing measures of dispersion, including standard deviation and distance functions. Discussing the fallacies in computing the standard deviation, we provide a probabilistic criteria ranking by developing proper Bayesian tests, where we calculate the extent to which a criterion is more important than another. Finally, we explain the errors in computing the distance between priorities, and a clustering algorithm is specially tailored based on proper distance metrics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved significant progress in language understanding and reasoning. Evaluating and analyzing their logical reasoning abilities has therefore become essential. However, existing datasets and benchmarks are often limited to overly simplistic, unnatural, or contextually constrained examples. In response to the growing demand, we introduce SmartyPat-Bench, a challenging, naturally expressed, and systematically labeled benchmark derived from real-world high-quality Reddit posts containing subtle logical fallacies. Unlike existing datasets and benchmarks, it provides more detailed annotations of logical fallacies and features more diverse data. To further scale up the study and address the limitations of manual data collection and labeling - such as fallacy-type imbalance and labor-intensive annotation - we introduce SmartyPat, an automated framework powered by logic programming-based oracles. SmartyPat utilizes Prolog rules to systematically generate logically fallacious statements, which are then refined into fluent natural-language sentences by LLMs, ensuring precise fallacy representation. Extensive evaluation demonstrates that SmartyPat produces fallacies comparable in subtlety and quality to human-generated content and significantly outperforms baseline methods. Finally, experiments reveal nuanced insights into LLM capabilities, highlighting that while excessive reasoning steps hinder fallacy detection accuracy, structured reasoning enhances fallacy categorization performance.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced in reasoning tasks through reinforcement learning (RL) optimization, achieving impressive capabilities across various challenging benchmarks. However, our empirical analysis reveals a critical drawback: reasoning-oriented RL fine-tuning significantly increases the prevalence of hallucinations. We theoretically analyze the RL training dynamics, identifying high-variance gradient, entropy-induced randomness, and susceptibility to spurious local optima as key factors leading to hallucinations. To address this drawback, we propose Factuality-aware Step-wise Policy Optimization (FSPO), an innovative RL fine-tuning algorithm incorporating explicit factuality verification at each reasoning step. FSPO leverages automated verification against given evidence to dynamically adjust token-level advantage values, incentivizing factual correctness throughout the reasoning process. Experiments across mathematical reasoning and hallucination benchmarks using Qwen2.5 and Llama models demonstrate that FSPO effectively reduces hallucinations while enhancing reasoning accuracy, substantially improving both reliability and performance.

Preference alignment methods such as RLHF and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) improve instruction following, but they can also reinforce hallucinations when preference judgments reward fluency and confidence over factual correctness. We introduce F-DPO (Factuality-aware Direct Preference Optimization), a simple extension of DPO that uses only binary factuality labels. F-DPO (i) applies a label-flipping transformation that corrects misordered preference pairs so the chosen response is never less factual than the rejected one, and (ii) adds a factuality-aware margin that emphasizes pairs with clear correctness differences, while reducing to standard DPO when both responses share the same factuality. We construct factuality-aware preference data by augmenting DPO pairs with binary factuality indicators and synthetic hallucinated variants. Across seven open-weight LLMs (1B-14B), F-DPO consistently improves factuality and reduces hallucination rates relative to both base models and standard DPO. On Qwen3-8B, F-DPO reduces hallucination rates by five times (from 0.424 to 0.084) while improving factuality scores by 50 percent (from 5.26 to 7.90). F-DPO also generalizes to out-of-distribution benchmarks: on TruthfulQA, Qwen2.5-14B achieves plus 17 percent MC1 accuracy (0.500 to 0.585) and plus 49 percent MC2 accuracy (0.357 to 0.531). F-DPO requires no auxiliary reward model, token-level annotations, or multi-stage training.

We present VAPO, Value-based Augmented Proximal Policy Optimization framework for reasoning models., a novel framework tailored for reasoning models within the value-based paradigm. Benchmarked the AIME 2024 dataset, VAPO, built on the Qwen 32B pre-trained model, attains a state-of-the-art score of 60.4. In direct comparison under identical experimental settings, VAPO outperforms the previously reported results of DeepSeek-R1-Zero-Qwen-32B and DAPO by more than 10 points. The training process of VAPO stands out for its stability and efficiency. It reaches state-of-the-art performance within a mere 5,000 steps. Moreover, across multiple independent runs, no training crashes occur, underscoring its reliability. This research delves into long chain-of-thought (long-CoT) reasoning using a value-based reinforcement learning framework. We pinpoint three key challenges that plague value-based methods: value model bias, the presence of heterogeneous sequence lengths, and the sparsity of reward signals. Through systematic design, VAPO offers an integrated solution that effectively alleviates these challenges, enabling enhanced performance in long-CoT reasoning tasks.

Early warning signals have been proposed to forecast the possibility of a critical transition, such as the eutrophication of a lake, the collapse of a coral reef, or the end of a glacial period. Because such transitions often unfold on temporal and spatial scales that can be difficult to approach by experimental manipulation, research has often relied on historical observations as a source of natural experiments. Here we examine a critical difference between selecting systems for study based on the fact that we have observed a critical transition and those systems for which we wish to forecast the approach of a transition. This difference arises by conditionally selecting systems known to experience a transition of some sort and failing to account for the bias this introduces -- a statistical error often known as the Prosecutor's Fallacy. By analysing simulated systems that have experienced transitions purely by chance, we reveal an elevated rate of false positives in common warning signal statistics. We further demonstrate a model-based approach that is less subject to this bias than these more commonly used summary statistics. We note that experimental studies with replicates avoid this pitfall entirely.

Detecting logical fallacies in texts can help users spot argument flaws, but automating this detection is not easy. Manually annotating fallacies in large-scale, real-world text data to create datasets for developing and validating detection models is costly. This paper introduces CoCoLoFa, the largest known logical fallacy dataset, containing 7,706 comments for 648 news articles, with each comment labeled for fallacy presence and type. We recruited 143 crowd workers to write comments embodying specific fallacy types (e.g., slippery slope) in response to news articles. Recognizing the complexity of this writing task, we built an LLM-powered assistant into the workers' interface to aid in drafting and refining their comments. Experts rated the writing quality and labeling validity of CoCoLoFa as high and reliable. BERT-based models fine-tuned using CoCoLoFa achieved the highest fallacy detection (F1=0.86) and classification (F1=0.87) performance on its test set, outperforming the state-of-the-art LLMs. Our work shows that combining crowdsourcing and LLMs enables us to more effectively construct datasets for complex linguistic phenomena that crowd workers find challenging to produce on their own.

Health-related misinformation is very prevalent and potentially harmful. It is difficult to identify, especially when claims distort or misinterpret scientific findings. We investigate the impact of synthetic data generation and lightweight fine-tuning techniques on the ability of large language models (LLMs) to recognize fallacious arguments using the MISSCI dataset and framework. In this work, we propose MisSynth, a pipeline that applies retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to produce synthetic fallacy samples, which are then used to fine-tune an LLM model. Our results show substantial accuracy gains with fine-tuned models compared to vanilla baselines. For instance, the LLaMA 3.1 8B fine-tuned model achieved an over 35% F1-score absolute improvement on the MISSCI test split over its vanilla baseline. We demonstrate that introducing synthetic fallacy data to augment limited annotated resources can significantly enhance zero-shot LLM classification performance on real-world scientific misinformation tasks, even with limited computational resources. The code and synthetic dataset are available on https://github.com/mxpoliakov/MisSynth.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Large language models (LLMs) continue to struggle with mathematical reasoning, and common post-training pipelines often reduce each generated solution to a binary outcome: correct or incorrect. This perspective is limiting in practice, as failures in chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning are frequently structured; solutions may appear convincing while containing subtle logical, algebraic, or numerical flaws. Meanwhile, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) variants that rely on large reward models or LLM-as-a-judge signals are often expensive, difficult to scale, and unstable to iterate. We propose a lightweight and pragmatic post-training pipeline that targets such structured errors under realistic compute budgets. Starting from supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on MetaMathQA-style CoT data, we introduce a compact MathVerifier that decomposes a candidate solution into a six-dimensional error profile and aggregates it into interpretable wrongness and absurdity scores. These verifier signals serve two roles: (i) mining hard negatives that are near-correct yet structurally flawed, and (ii) defining per-sample importance weights that emphasize the most informative preference pairs. We integrate both into an offline Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) objective via a verifier-guided weighted formulation. Experiments on a 1.5B-parameter Qwen2.5 model show that verifier-guided, weighted DPO yields more targeted improvements than vanilla SFT and unweighted DPO, particularly on problems where solutions are numerically close to correct but logically inconsistent, while avoiding the overhead of training large reward models or relying on external judges.

How do multi-turn reasoning systems fail? The expected answer is logical contradiction, in which the system's maintained state becomes unsatisfiable. We show that the dominant mode is instead satisfiable drift, where the internal state stays consistent while the returned answer silently violates prior commitments. We build DRIFT-Bench (Decomposing Reasoning Into Failure Types), a solver-instrumented benchmark of 816 test problems across three constraint domains, and evaluate four methods on it across four open-weight models (8B-120B parameters). MUS-Repair, which feeds minimal unsatisfiable subsets back to the generator, is strongest in every setting (+1.8 to +15.0 pp over the best non-MUS baseline). But the central finding is what repair leaves behind. After structured feedback, models rarely contradict themselves. They forget. Residual errors are 98-100% satisfiable drift across all settings, while contradiction drops to near zero. Reliable multi-turn systems must separately validate that the returned answer respects the maintained state. Code is available at https://github.com/kaons-research/drift-bench.

We present FOLIO, a human-annotated, open-domain, and logically complex and diverse dataset for reasoning in natural language (NL), equipped with first order logic (FOL) annotations. FOLIO consists of 1,435 examples (unique conclusions), each paired with one of 487 sets of premises which serve as rules to be used to deductively reason for the validity of each conclusion. The logical correctness of premises and conclusions is ensured by their parallel FOL annotations, which are automatically verified by our FOL inference engine. In addition to the main NL reasoning task, NL-FOL pairs in FOLIO automatically constitute a new NL-FOL translation dataset using FOL as the logical form. Our experiments on FOLIO systematically evaluate the FOL reasoning ability of supervised fine-tuning on medium-sized language models (BERT, RoBERTa) and few-shot prompting on large language models (GPT-NeoX, OPT, GPT-3, Codex). For NL-FOL translation, we experiment with GPT-3 and Codex. Our results show that one of the most capable Large Language Model (LLM) publicly available, GPT-3 davinci, achieves only slightly better than random results with few-shot prompting on a subset of FOLIO, and the model is especially bad at predicting the correct truth values for False and Unknown conclusions. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Yale-LILY/FOLIO.

LLMs can perform multi-step reasoning through Chain-of-Thought (CoT), but they cannot reliably verify their own logic. Even when they reach correct answers, the underlying reasoning may be flawed, undermining trust in high-stakes scenarios. To mitigate this issue, we introduce VeriCoT, a neuro-symbolic method that extracts and verifies formal logical arguments from CoT reasoning. VeriCoT formalizes each CoT reasoning step into first-order logic and identifies premises that ground the argument in source context, commonsense knowledge, or prior reasoning steps. The symbolic representation enables automated solvers to verify logical validity while the NL premises allow humans and systems to identify ungrounded or fallacious reasoning steps. Experiments on the ProofWriter, LegalBench, and BioASQ datasets show VeriCoT effectively identifies flawed reasoning, and serves as a strong predictor of final answer correctness. We also leverage VeriCoT's verification signal for (1) inference-time self-reflection, (2) supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on VeriCoT-distilled datasets and (3) preference fine-tuning (PFT) with direct preference optimization (DPO) using verification-based pairwise rewards, further improving reasoning validity and accuracy.

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental task in natural language processing that presents significant challenges to Large Language Models (LLMs). The inherent characteristics of logical reasoning makes it well-suited for symbolic representations such as first-order logic (FOL). Research in symbolic logical reasoning explored FOL generation using state-of-the-art LLMs (i.e., GPT-4) to produce FOL translations of natural language (NL) statements, but errors in translation are usually not the focus. We address this by categorizing the translation errors in FOL statements generated by LLMs. To make progress towards improving the quality of FOL translations for smaller language models such as LLaMA-2 13B and Mistral 7B, we create ProofFOL, a high-quality FOL-annotated subset of ProofWriter dataset using GPT-4o. The models fine-tuned on this silver standard data achieve a significant gain in performance when compared to larger language models such as LLaMA-2 70B. In addition to improving the model using large data, we also tackle the issue of data scarcity and introduce an incremental framework encompassing of data augmentation and verification steps. In the augmentation process, a single pair of (premises, conclusion) is split into multiple new instances based on the predicates and FOLs. This data is used for fine-tuning, and the inference on this model generates FOLs with fewer errors over the model trained on the original data. Our investigation on the translation errors leads to generation of a perturbation dataset, which is used to train a verifier that corrects potential syntactic and semantic FOL translation errors. We demonstrate an efficient method for making the most of a limited existing human-annotated dataset. Our results show state-of-the-art performance for ProofWriter and ProntoQA datasets using ProofFOL on LLaMA-2 and Mistral models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Hierarchical reasoning model (HRM) achieves extraordinary performance on various reasoning tasks, significantly outperforming large language model-based reasoners. To understand the strengths and potential failure modes of HRM, we conduct a mechanistic study on its reasoning patterns and find three surprising facts: (a) Failure of extremely simple puzzles, e.g., HRM can fail on a puzzle with only one unknown cell. We attribute this failure to the violation of the fixed point property, a fundamental assumption of HRM. (b) "Grokking" dynamics in reasoning steps, i.e., the answer is not improved uniformly, but instead there is a critical reasoning step that suddenly makes the answer correct; (c) Existence of multiple fixed points. HRM "guesses" the first fixed point, which could be incorrect, and gets trapped there for a while or forever. All facts imply that HRM appears to be "guessing" instead of "reasoning". Leveraging this "guessing" picture, we propose three strategies to scale HRM's guesses: data augmentation (scaling the quality of guesses), input perturbation (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging inference randomness), and model bootstrapping (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging training randomness). On the practical side, by combining all methods, we develop Augmented HRM, boosting accuracy on Sudoku-Extreme from 54.5% to 96.9%. On the scientific side, our analysis provides new insights into how reasoning models "reason".

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings where reasoning, such as multi-step problem solving and chain-of-thought, is essential. Yet, current evaluation practices overwhelmingly report single-run accuracy while ignoring the intrinsic uncertainty that naturally arises from stochastic decoding. This omission creates a blind spot because practitioners cannot reliably assess whether a method's reported performance is stable, reproducible, or cost-consistent. We introduce ReasonBENCH, the first benchmark designed to quantify the underlying instability in LLM reasoning. ReasonBENCH provides (i) a modular evaluation library that standardizes reasoning frameworks, models, and tasks, (ii) a multi-run protocol that reports statistically reliable metrics for both quality and cost, and (iii) a public leaderboard to encourage variance-aware reporting. Across tasks from different domains, we find that the vast majority of reasoning strategies and models exhibit high instability. Notably, even strategies with similar average performance can display confidence intervals up to four times wider, and the top-performing methods often incur higher and less stable costs. Such instability compromises reproducibility across runs and, consequently, the reliability of reported performance. To better understand these dynamics, we further analyze the impact of prompts, model families, and scale on the trade-off between solve rate and stability. Our results highlight reproducibility as a critical dimension for reliable LLM reasoning and provide a foundation for future reasoning methods and uncertainty quantification techniques. ReasonBENCH is publicly available at https://github.com/au-clan/ReasonBench .

A rule-based logic solver resolves every instance in our benchmark in under 50 microseconds with 100% accuracy; the best frontier language model reaches 65% at best and drops to 23.5% under rendering-robust evaluation (worst case over four surface renderings). We introduce DeFAb (Defeasible Abduction Benchmark), a dataset and generation pipeline that converts four decades of publicly funded knowledge bases into formally grounded instances for defeasible abduction: constructing hypotheses that explain anomalies by overriding defaults while preserving unrelated expectations. Because every hypothesis must pass polynomial-time checks for valid derivation, conservativity, and minimality, DeFAb makes logical rigor the instrument for measuring creativity and theoretical reasoning, scoring the disciplined construction of theory revisions rather than fluent but theory-destroying prose. The pipeline pairs taxonomic hierarchies (OpenCyc, YAGO, Wikidata) with behavioral property graphs (ConceptNet, UMLS) to produce 372,648+ instances across 33.75M materialized rules from 18 sources, in three levels with polynomial-time verifiable gold standards. Four frontier models do not reliably internalize defeasible reasoning: rendering-robust Level 2 accuracy is 7.8-23.5%; chain-of-thought variance (~36 pp) exceeds any inter-model gap; and a matched contamination control isolates a +19.4 pp Level 3 gap. We further release DeFAb-Hard (a 235-instance Level 3 difficulty variant; best model 53.3% vs 100% symbolic) and CONJURE (a kernel-verified transformative-creativity variant of 560 Lean 4/Mathlib instances whose gold answers are definitions the proof kernel did not previously contain, judge-free verifier; a pilot finds zero novel concepts). The same verifier doubles as an exact reward for preference optimization (DPO, RLVR/GRPO). Released under MIT at https://huggingface.co/datasets/PatrickAllenCooper/DeFAb.

Logical reasoning is a critical benchmark for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as it reflects their ability to derive valid conclusions from given premises. While the combination of test-time scaling with dedicated outcome or process reward models has opened up new avenues to enhance LLMs performance in complex reasoning tasks, this space is under-explored in deductive logical reasoning. We present a set of Outcome Reward Models (ORMs) for deductive reasoning. To train the ORMs we mainly generate data using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) with single and multiple samples. Additionally, we propose a novel tactic to further expand the type of errors covered in the training dataset of the ORM. In particular, we propose an echo generation technique that leverages LLMs' tendency to reflect incorrect assumptions made in prompts to extract additional training data, covering previously unexplored error types. While a standard CoT chain may contain errors likely to be made by the reasoner, the echo strategy deliberately steers the model toward incorrect reasoning. We show that ORMs trained on CoT and echo-augmented data demonstrate improved performance on the FOLIO, JustLogic, and ProverQA datasets across four different LLMs.

Large reasoning models often reach correct answers through flawed intermediate steps, creating a gap between final accuracy and reasoning reliability. Existing alignment strategies address this with external verifiers or massive sampling, limiting scalability. In this work, we introduce CASPO (Confidence-Aware Step-wise Preference Optimization), a framework that aligns token-level confidence with step-wise logical correctness through iterative Direct Preference Optimization, without training a separate reward model. During inference, we propose Confidence-aware Thought (CaT), which leverages this calibrated confidence to dynamically prune uncertain reasoning branches with negligible O(V) latency. Experiments across ten benchmarks and multiple model families show that CASPO consistently improves reasoning reliability and inference efficiency. CASPO scales to Qwen3-8B-Base and surpasses tree-search baselines on AIME'24 and AIME'25 without using reward-model data. We also release a step-wise dataset with confidence annotations to support fine-grained analysis of reasoning reliability. Code is available at https://github.com/Thecommonirin/CASPO.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether a specific sample was used to train a predictive model. Knowing this may indeed lead to a privacy breach. Most MIAs, however, make use of the model's prediction scores - the probability of each output given some input - following the intuition that the trained model tends to behave differently on its training data. We argue that this is a fallacy for many modern deep network architectures. Consequently, MIAs will miserably fail since overconfidence leads to high false-positive rates not only on known domains but also on out-of-distribution data and implicitly acts as a defense against MIAs. Specifically, using generative adversarial networks, we are able to produce a potentially infinite number of samples falsely classified as part of the training data. In other words, the threat of MIAs is overestimated, and less information is leaked than previously assumed. Moreover, there is actually a trade-off between the overconfidence of models and their susceptibility to MIAs: the more classifiers know when they do not know, making low confidence predictions, the more they reveal the training data.

The reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have been a longstanding focus of research. Recent works have further enhanced these capabilities using reinforcement learning (RL), with many new methods claiming significant improvements with minimal or no external supervision. Surprisingly, some studies even suggest that random or incorrect reward signals can enhance reasoning performance. However, these breakthroughs are mostly reported on the Qwen2.5 model family and evaluated on well-known benchmarks such as MATH-500, AMC, and AIME, while failing to achieve similar gains on other models like Llama, which warrants further investigation. Our analysis shows that although Qwen2.5 achieves strong mathematical reasoning performance, its pretraining on large-scale web corpora makes it vulnerable to data contamination in popular benchmarks. As a result, results derived from these benchmarks may be unreliable. To address this, we introduce a generator that produces fully synthetic arithmetic problems of arbitrary length and difficulty, yielding a clean dataset we call RandomCalculation. Using these leakage-free datasets, we show that only accurate reward signals consistently improve performance, while noisy or incorrect signals do not. We advocate for evaluating RL methods on uncontaminated benchmarks and across diverse model families to ensure trustworthy conclusions.

Reasoning models are evaluated on single-turn benchmarks but deployed in multi-turn dialogue, where users push back on correct answers. Under sustained adversarial pressure we find a previously undocumented failure mode: the chain-of-thought stays factually correct from first turn to last while the emitted answer flips wrong. We call this unfaithful capitulation (UC) and isolate it with a 2times 2 latent-versus-behavioral framework that flip-rate metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes both miss. Across three datasets (MT-Consistency, MMLU-Pro, GSM8K), the latent-correct rate at the behavioral flip clusters near 50% in think mode and collapses to 11-15% under no_think -- paired, within-model causal evidence that reasoning creates the gap. Across models the effect tracks the reasoning channel (high in Qwen3-32B and GPT-OSS-20B, low in inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it). An independent GPT-4o judge corroborates 86% of UC labels; a token-level probe shows the answer-slot argmax is correct in 84% of UC cells; and a naive trace-anchored defense backfires. We release all trajectories, traces, and judge labels.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Users increasingly rely on Large Language Models (LLMs) for Deep Research, using them to synthesize diverse sources into structured reports that support understanding and action. In this context, the practical reliability of such reports hinges on logical quality: whether the report's claims and arguments are explicitly supported and can be trusted as a basis for downstream use, rather than merely appearing fluent or informative. However, current evaluation frameworks largely overlook this requirement. To bridge this gap, we introduce ReportLogic, a benchmark that quantifies report-level logical quality through a reader-centric lens of auditability. Specifically, ReportLogic adopts a hierarchical taxonomy that evaluates whether readers can (1) trace an on-topic report structure with a unified analytical arc (Macro-Logic), (2) understand the progression with necessary context (Expositional-Logic), and (3) verify conclusions via explicit claim--support (Structural-Logic). Based on this taxonomy, we construct a human-annotated rubric-guided dataset and train an open-source LogicJudge for scalable evaluation. We further evaluate judge robustness via adversarial attacks, showing that off-the-shelf LLM judges are frequently influenced by superficial cues (e.g., verbosity), and reasoning modes can mask broken support relations. Overall, our results provide actionable guidance for building more robust logic evaluators and improving the logical reliability of LLM-generated reports.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Recent work on chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness reports single aggregate numbers (e.g., DeepSeek-R1 acknowledges hints 39% of the time), implying that faithfulness is an objective, measurable property of a model. This paper demonstrates that it is not. Three classifiers (a regex-only detector, a two-stage regex-plus-LLM pipeline, and an independent Claude Sonnet 4 judge) are applied to 10,276 influenced reasoning traces from 12 open-weight models spanning 9 families and 7B to 1T parameters. On identical data, these classifiers produce overall faithfulness rates of 74.4%, 82.6%, and 69.7%, respectively, with non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals. Per-model gaps range from 2.6 to 30.6 percentage points; all are statistically significant (McNemar's test, p < 0.001). The disagreements are systematic, not random: inter-classifier agreement measured by Cohen's kappa ranges from 0.06 ("slight") for sycophancy hints to 0.42 ("moderate") for grader hints, and the asymmetry is pronounced: for sycophancy, 883 cases are classified as faithful by the pipeline but unfaithful by the Sonnet judge, while only 2 go the other direction. Classifier choice can also reverse model rankings: Qwen3.5-27B ranks 1st under the pipeline but 7th under the Sonnet judge; OLMo-3.1-32B moves in the opposite direction, from 9th to 3rd. The root cause is that different classifiers operationalize related faithfulness constructs at different levels of stringency (lexical mention versus epistemic dependence), and these constructs yield divergent measurements on the same behavior. These results demonstrate that published faithfulness numbers cannot be meaningfully compared across studies that use different classifiers, and that future evaluations should report sensitivity ranges across multiple classification methodologies rather than single point estimates.

We introduce an axiomatic evaluation framework for latent thought representations in LLMs, comprising metrics that are independent of downstream benchmark scores and reveal representational failures that benchmark accuracy masks. Existing evaluations conflate representation quality with model capacity. Therefore, failures cannot be attributed to the representation rather than to the model that processes it. We formalize four functional axioms (Causality, Minimality, Separability, and Stability) and define a quantitative measure for each, computed directly on the representation independently of downstream accuracy. We audit open-weight LLMs across 23 reasoning tasks (e.g., Spatial Reasoning, Factual QA). We find that no candidate satisfies all four axioms simultaneously, that the representations distinguish task type reliably but cannot distinguish between two questions within the same task, and that the representations encode little information beyond what is already present in the input embedding. The failure is consistent across dense, reasoning-distilled, and RL-trained model families, indicating that the gap is structural rather than a property of model size or training procedure.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

With the growing importance of detecting misinformation, many studies have focused on verifying factual claims by retrieving evidence. However, canonical fact verification tasks do not apply to catching subtle differences in factually consistent claims, which might still bias the readers, especially on contentious political or economic issues. Our underlying assumption is that among the trusted sources, one's argument is not necessarily more true than the other, requiring comparison rather than verification. In this study, we propose ClaimDiff, a novel dataset that primarily focuses on comparing the nuance between claim pairs. In ClaimDiff, we provide 2,941 annotated claim pairs from 268 news articles. We observe that while humans are capable of detecting the nuances between claims, strong baselines struggle to detect them, showing over a 19% absolute gap with the humans. We hope this initial study could help readers to gain an unbiased grasp of contentious issues through machine-aided comparison.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

On-policy distillation (OPD) improves LLM reasoning by training a student model on its own generated outputs, but standard OPD treats all student-generated outputs (SGOs) equally regardless of their informativeness. We observe a consistent asymmetry in controlled filtering experiments: in both OPD and on-policy self distillation (OPSD), training only on incorrect SGOs outperforms training only on correct ones. Our further analysis suggests that models trained on correct-only SGOs tend to generate shorter reasoning traces and show weaker reflection behavior, while incorrect SGOs better preserve exploratory reasoning near the model's capability boundary. To exploit this signal without requiring full answer-containing rollouts, we introduce ReNIO, which Reweights Negative trajectory Importance for LLM On-policy distillation. By using the student-to-teacher probability ratio, ReNIO identifies pivotal tokens leading to wrong reasoning traces and aggregates their information into a normalized sample weight, inherently assigning larger weights to likely negative trajectories without observing the correctness of final-answer. Since Re-NIO only uses prefix-conditioned token probabilities, it preserves OPD's prefix training advantage over full-rollout reinforcement learning. Across both mathematical reasoning and code generation tasks, ReNIO improves both OPD and OPSD, with representative relative gains of up to 8.90% for Qwen3-1.7B and 10.00% for R1-Distill-Qwen-7B on mathematical reasoning benchmarks. Code repo: https://github.com/BDML-lab/ReNIO.

Reasoning has become a central paradigm for large language models (LLMs), consistently boosting accuracy across diverse benchmarks. Yet its suitability for precision-sensitive tasks remains unclear. We present the first systematic study of reasoning for classification tasks under strict low false positive rate (FPR) regimes. Our analysis covers two tasks--safety detection and hallucination detection--evaluated in both fine-tuned and zero-shot settings, using standard LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). Our results reveal a clear trade-off: Think On (reasoning-augmented) generation improves overall accuracy, but underperforms at the low-FPR thresholds essential for practical use. In contrast, Think Off (no reasoning during inference) dominates in these precision-sensitive regimes, with Think On surpassing only when higher FPRs are acceptable. In addition, we find token-based scoring substantially outperforms self-verbalized confidence for precision-sensitive deployments. Finally, a simple ensemble of the two modes recovers the strengths of each. Taken together, our findings position reasoning as a double-edged tool: beneficial for average accuracy, but often ill-suited for applications requiring strict precision.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Current reasoning paradigms for LLMs include chain-of-thought, ReAct, and post-hoc self-critique. These paradigms rely on two assumptions that fail on long-horizon, multi-stage tasks. As a result, errors accumulate silently across reasoning steps, leaving an open question: can a reasoning system effectively detect and recover from its own failures? We present ReFlect, a harness system for LLM reasoning that creates standalone error detection and recovery logic as a deterministic wrapper around the model. Controlled experiments across 6 reasoning domains show that prompt-level self-critique produces formulaic templates that flag no issues in 90 of 100 audited reflection blocks, and the investigated LLMs wrongly accept a wrong answer in at least 76\% of cases. Our ReFlect harness achieves task success rates ranging from 41\% on gpt-4o-mini to 56\% on Claude Sonnet 4.5 across six models spanning small and frontier scale, with per-model gains over Direct CoT ranging from +7 pp on Qwen2.5-72B to +29 pp on Claude Sonnet 4.5, and additionally raises SWE-bench patch-structural quality from 0\% (Direct CoT) to between 82\% (Qwen2.5-72B) and 87\% (GPT-4o). Notably, the harness gain is inversely proportional to the model's Direct CoT task success rate (the fitted slope is -1.69 with r=-0.76): each pp lost in baseline success rate is mechanically recovered by 1.69 pp of harness gain. We spot that adding structured reasoning state and operators yields only 15.0--18.7\% pair-mean on Llama-3.3-70B and Qwen2.5-72B because models at this scale cannot reliably populate the state its operators require. ReFlect is model-agnostic, training-free, and operates entirely at inference time.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

What is reasoning? This question has driven centuries of philosophical inquiry, from Aristotle's syllogisms to modern computational complexity theory. In the age of large language models achieving superhuman performance on benchmarks like GSM8K (95\% accuracy) and HumanEval (90\% pass@1), we must ask: have these systems learned to reason, or have they learned to pattern-match over reasoning traces? This paper argues for a specific answer: reasoning is iterative operator application in state spaces, converging to fixed points. This definition is not merely philosophical -- it has concrete architectural implications that explain both the failures of current systems and the path to genuine reasoning capabilities. Our investigation begins with a puzzle (OpenXOR), progresses through theory (OpenOperator), and culminates in a working solution (OpenLM) that achieves 76\% accuracy where state-of-the-art LLMs achieve 0\%. This is not about criticizing existing systems, but about understanding what reasoning requires and building architectures that provide it.

We study a synthetic corpus based approach for language models (LMs) to acquire logical deductive reasoning ability. The previous studies generated deduction examples using specific sets of deduction rules. However, these rules were limited or otherwise arbitrary, limiting the generalizability of acquired reasoning ability. We rethink this and adopt a well-grounded set of deduction rules based on formal logic theory, which can derive any other deduction rules when combined in a multistep way. Then, using the proposed corpora, which we name FLD (Formal Logic Deduction), we first evaluate and analyze the logical reasoning ability of the latest LLMs. Even GPT-4 can solve only half of the problems, suggesting that pure logical reasoning isolated from knowledge is still challenging for the LLMs, and additional training specialized in logical reasoning is indeed essential. We next empirically verify that LMs trained on FLD corpora acquire more generalizable reasoning ability. Furthermore, we identify the aspects of reasoning ability on which deduction corpora can enhance LMs and those on which they cannot, and discuss future directions on each aspect. The released corpora serve both as learning resources and as challenging benchmarks.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently achieved significant progress in complex reasoning tasks, aided by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. However, LRMs often suffer from overthinking, expending excessive computation on simple problems and reducing efficiency. Existing efficient reasoning methods typically require accurate task assessment to preset token budgets or select reasoning modes, which limits their flexibility and reliability. In this work, we revisit the essence of overthinking and identify that encouraging effective steps while penalizing ineffective ones is key to its solution. To this end, we propose a novel rule-based verifiable stepwise reward mechanism (VSRM), which assigns rewards based on the performance of intermediate states in the reasoning trajectory. This approach is intuitive and naturally fits the step-by-step nature of reasoning tasks. We conduct extensive experiments on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including AIME24 and AIME25, by integrating VSRM with PPO and Reinforce++. Results show that our method achieves substantial output length reduction while maintaining original reasoning performance, striking an optimal balance between efficiency and accuracy. Further analysis of overthinking frequency and pass@k score before and after training demonstrates that our approach in deed effectively suppresses ineffective steps and encourages effective reasoning, fundamentally alleviating the overthinking problem. All code will be released upon acceptance.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

Recent years have witnessed meteoric progress in reasoning models: neural networks that generate intermediate reasoning traces (RTs) before producing a final output. Despite the rapid advancement, our understanding of how RTs support reasoning, and the limits of this paradigm, remain incomplete. To promote greater clarity, we introduce PITA: a novel large-scale dataset of over 23 million statements in propositional logic and their corresponding proofs. As a benchmark for robust reasoning, we focus on length generalization: if a model is trained to determine truth or falsity on statements with proofs up to fixed length, how well does it generalize to statements requiring longer proofs? We propose notions of (1) task depth and (2) task breadth, which measure respectively (1) the number of steps required to solve an example from a task and (2) the number of unique examples across a task. We vary these quantities across subsets of PITA, and find that RT models generalize well on broad and shallow subsets, while deteriorating on narrow and deep subsets relative to non-RT baselines. To determine whether our results are idiosyncratic to PITA or indicative of general phenomena, we compare our results to a simple synthetic task based on syllogisms. Our resulting theory suggests fundamental scalings that limit how well RT models perform on deep tasks, and highlights their generalization strengths on broad tasks. Our findings overall identify fundamental benefits and limitations inherent in using reasoning traces.

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

The recent successful paradigm of solving logical reasoning problems with tool-augmented large language models (LLMs) leverages translation of natural language (NL) statements into First-Order Logic~(FOL) and external theorem provers. However, the correctness of FOL statements, comprising operators and text, often go unverified due to the lack of a reliable evaluation metric for comparing generated and ground-truth FOLs. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on the sensitivity of existing NL-, FOL-, and graph-based metrics to capture differences between a sampled FOL and its corresponding ground-truth. We then measure the alignment between a metric-based ranking of FOL outputs and a strong LLM as-a-judge. To do this, we first apply operator and text-based perturbations to ground-truth FOL statements to assess metric sensitivity. We then evaluate metric robustness by comparing the metrics against LLMs judgment. Our empirical findings highlight a clear oversensitivity in the n-gram metric BLEU for text perturbations. The operator perturbation affects the semantic graph metric Smatch++ for structural changes, and the FOL metric for specific operator changes. We observe a closer alignment between BertScore and LLM judgement, proving the importance of semantic evaluation. Additionally, we show that combining metrics enhances both robustness and sensitivity compared to using individual metrics.

Modern analyst agents must reason over complex, high token inputs, including dozens of retrieved documents, tool outputs, and time sensitive data. While prior work has produced tool calling benchmarks and examined factuality in knowledge augmented systems, relatively little work studies their intersection: settings where LLMs must integrate large volumes of dynamic, structured and unstructured multi tool outputs. We investigate LLM failure modes in this regime using crypto as a representative high data density domain. We introduce (1) CryptoAnalystBench, an analyst aligned benchmark of 198 production crypto and DeFi queries spanning 11 categories; (2) an agentic harness equipped with relevant crypto and DeFi tools to generate responses across multiple frontier LLMs; and (3) an evaluation pipeline with citation verification and an LLM as a judge rubric spanning four user defined success dimensions: relevance, temporal relevance, depth, and data consistency. Using human annotation, we develop a taxonomy of seven higher order error types that are not reliably captured by factuality checks or LLM based quality scoring. We find that these failures persist even in state of the art systems and can compromise high stakes decisions. Based on this taxonomy, we refine the judge rubric to better capture these errors. While the judge does not align with human annotators on precise scoring across rubric iterations, it reliably identifies critical failure modes, enabling scalable feedback for developers and researchers studying analyst style agents. We release CryptoAnalystBench with annotated queries, the evaluation pipeline, judge rubrics, and the error taxonomy, and outline mitigation strategies and open challenges in evaluating long form, multi tool augmented systems.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have witnessed remarkable growth, showcasing formidable capabilities in handling intricate multimodal tasks with exceptional performance. Recent research has underscored the inclination of large language models to passively accept defective inputs, often resulting in futile reasoning on invalid prompts. However, the same critical question of whether LMMs can actively detect and scrutinize erroneous inputs still remains unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the Input Scrutiny Ability Evaluation Framework (ISEval), which encompasses seven categories of flawed premises and three evaluation metrics. Our extensive evaluation of ten advanced LMMs has identified key findings. Most models struggle to actively detect flawed textual premises without guidance, which reflects a strong reliance on explicit prompts for premise error identification. Error type affects performance: models excel at identifying logical fallacies but struggle with surface-level linguistic errors and certain conditional flaws. Modality trust varies-Gemini 2.5 pro and Claude Sonnet 4 balance visual and textual info, while aya-vision-8b over-rely on text in conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LMMs' proactive verification of input validity and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/LMM_ISEval.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.

Existing methods on understanding the capabilities of LLMs in logical reasoning rely on binary entailment classification or synthetically derived rationales, which are not sufficient for proper investigation of model's capabilities. We present P-FOLIO, a human-annotated dataset consisting of diverse and complex reasoning chains for a set of realistic logical reasoning stories also written by humans. P-FOLIO is collected with an annotation protocol that facilitates humans to annotate well-structured natural language proofs for first-order logic reasoning problems in a step-by-step manner. The number of reasoning steps in P-FOLIO span from 0 to 20. We further use P-FOLIO to evaluate and improve large-language-model (LLM) reasoning capabilities. We evaluate LLM reasoning capabilities at a fine granularity via single-step inference rule classification, with more diverse inference rules of more diverse and higher levels of complexities than previous works. Given that a single model-generated reasoning chain could take a completely different path than the human-annotated one, we sample multiple reasoning chains from a model and use pass@k metrics for evaluating the quality of model-generated reasoning chains. We show that human-written reasoning chains significantly boost the logical reasoning capabilities of LLMs via many-shot prompting and fine-tuning. Furthermore, fine-tuning Llama3-7B on P-FOLIO improves the model performance by 10% or more on three other out-of-domain logical reasoning datasets. We also conduct detailed analysis to show where most powerful LLMs fall short in reasoning. We will release the dataset and code publicly.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

This position paper argues that AI-assisted software engineering requires explicit mechanisms for tracking the epistemic status and temporal validity of architectural decisions. LLM coding assistants generate decisions faster than teams can validate them, yet no widely-adopted framework distinguishes conjecture from verified knowledge, prevents trust inflation through conservative aggregation, or detects when evidence expires. We propose three requirements for responsible AI-assisted engineering: (1) epistemic layers that separate unverified hypotheses from empirically validated claims, (2) conservative assurance aggregation grounded in the Gödel t-norm that prevents weak evidence from inflating confidence, and (3) automated evidence decay tracking that surfaces stale assumptions before they cause failures. We formalize these requirements as the First Principles Framework (FPF), ground its aggregation semantics in fuzzy logic, and define a quintet of invariants that any valid aggregation operator must satisfy. Our retrospective audit applying FPF criteria to two internal projects found that 20-25% of architectural decisions had stale evidence within two months, validating the need for temporal accountability. We outline research directions including learnable aggregation operators, federated evidence sharing, and SMT-based claim validation.

In this paper we introduce a new publicly available dataset for verification against textual sources, FEVER: Fact Extraction and VERification. It consists of 185,445 claims generated by altering sentences extracted from Wikipedia and subsequently verified without knowledge of the sentence they were derived from. The claims are classified as Supported, Refuted or NotEnoughInfo by annotators achieving 0.6841 in Fleiss kappa. For the first two classes, the annotators also recorded the sentence(s) forming the necessary evidence for their judgment. To characterize the challenge of the dataset presented, we develop a pipeline approach and compare it to suitably designed oracles. The best accuracy we achieve on labeling a claim accompanied by the correct evidence is 31.87%, while if we ignore the evidence we achieve 50.91%. Thus we believe that FEVER is a challenging testbed that will help stimulate progress on claim verification against textual sources.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning but are traditionally evaluated in static, "frozen world" settings: model responses are assumed to be instantaneous, and the context of a request is presumed to be immutable over the duration of the response. While generally true for short-term tasks, the "frozen world" assumption breaks down in modern reasoning tasks such as assistive programming, where models may take hours to think through problems and code may change dramatically from the time the model starts thinking to the model's final output. In this work, we challenge the frozen world assumption and evaluate LRM robustness under two realistic dynamic scenarios: interruptions, which test the quality of the model's partial outputs on a limited budget, and dynamic context, which tests model adaptation to in-flight changes. Across mathematics and programming benchmarks that require long-form reasoning, static evaluations consistently overestimate robustness: even state-of-the-art LRMs, which achieve high accuracy in static settings, can fail unpredictably when interrupted or exposed to changing context, with performance dropping by up to 60% when updates are introduced late in the reasoning process. Our analysis further reveals several novel failure modes, including reasoning leakage, where models fold the reasoning into their final answer when interrupted; panic, where under time pressure models abandon reasoning entirely and return incorrect answers; and self-doubt, where performance degrades while incorporating updated information.

Retrieval-enhanced methods have become a primary approach in fact verification (FV); it requires reasoning over multiple retrieved pieces of evidence to verify the integrity of a claim. To retrieve evidence, existing work often employs off-the-shelf retrieval models whose design is based on the probability ranking principle. We argue that, rather than relevance, for FV we need to focus on the utility that a claim verifier derives from the retrieved evidence. We introduce the feedback-based evidence retriever(FER) that optimizes the evidence retrieval process by incorporating feedback from the claim verifier. As a feedback signal we use the divergence in utility between how effectively the verifier utilizes the retrieved evidence and the ground-truth evidence to produce the final claim label. Empirical studies demonstrate the superiority of FER over prevailing baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful candidates for complex decision-making, leveraging vast encoded knowledge and remarkable zero-shot abilities. However, their adoption in high-stakes environments is hindered by their opacity; their outputs lack faithful explanations and cannot be effectively contested to correct errors, undermining trustworthiness. In this paper, we propose ART (Adaptive Reasoning Trees), a hierarchical method for claim verification. The process begins with a root claim, which branches into supporting and attacking child arguments. An argument's strength is determined bottom-up via a pairwise tournament of its children, adjudicated by a judge LLM, allowing a final, transparent and contestable verdict to be systematically derived which is missing in methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT). We empirically validate ART on multiple datasets, analyzing different argument generators and comparison strategies. Our findings show that ART's structured reasoning outperforms strong baselines, establishing a new benchmark for explainable claim verification which is more reliable and ensures clarity in the overall decision making step.

Root cause analysis (RCA) is essential for diagnosing failures within complex software systems to ensure system reliability. The highly distributed and interdependent nature of modern cloud-based systems often complicates RCA efforts, particularly for multi-hop fault propagation, where symptoms appear far from their true causes. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) present new opportunities to enhance automated RCA. However, their practical value for RCA depends on the fidelity of reasoning and decision-making. Existing work relies on historical incident corpora, operates directly on high-volume telemetry beyond current LLM capacity, or embeds reasoning inside complex multi-agent pipelines -- conditions that obscure whether failures arise from reasoning itself or from peripheral design choices. We present a focused empirical evaluation that isolates an LLM's reasoning behavior. We design a controlled experimental framework that foregrounds the LLM by using a simplified experimental setting. We evaluate six LLMs under two agentic workflows (ReAct and Plan-and-Execute) and a non-agentic baseline on two real-world case studies (GAIA and OpenRCA). In total, we executed 48,000 simulated failure scenarios, totaling 228 days of execution time. We measure both root-cause accuracy and the quality of intermediate reasoning traces. We produce a labeled taxonomy of 16 common RCA reasoning failures and use an LLM-as-a-Judge for annotation. Our results clarify where current open-source LLMs succeed and fail in multi-hop RCA, quantify sensitivity to input data modalities, and identify reasoning failures that predict final correctness. Together, these contributions provide transparent and reproducible empirical results and a failure taxonomy to guide future work on reasoning-driven system diagnosis.

Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with maintaining accuracy across a sequence of intermediate reasoning steps in mathematical reasoning, leading to error propagation that undermines the final result. The current methodology to mitigate this issue primarily involves using a verifier model to assess the correctness of generated solution candidates, focusing either on the overall reasoning path or on an incomplete reasoning path. By rethinking this approach, we argue that assessing potentials of incomplete reasoning paths could be more advantageous as it guides towards correct final answers, transforming the task into a planning problem. Our proposed verifier, the Outcome-supervision Value Model (OVM), employs outcome supervision for training, offering an efficient and intuitive method for planning by prioritizing steps that lead to accurate conclusions over mere per-step correctness. Furthermore, the OVM eschews the need for labor-intensive annotations on step-level correctness, enhancing its scalability. Our experiments on two multi-step mathematical reasoning datasets, GSM8K and Game of 24, demonstrate the superior performance of the OVM model. Notably, in GSM8K, our OVM-7B model achieves state-of-the-art results among LLMs up to 13B parameters; especially it does not utilize GPT-4 or code execution. These findings offer a novel perspective on the role of outcome supervision in training verifiers for multi-step reasoning tasks and provide theoretical justification for its advantage in value estimation for planning.

First-order logic (FOL) reasoning, which involves sequential deduction, is pivotal for intelligent systems and serves as a valuable task for evaluating reasoning capabilities, particularly in chain-of-thought (CoT) contexts. Existing benchmarks often rely on extensive human annotation or handcrafted templates, making it difficult to achieve the necessary complexity, scalability, and diversity for robust evaluation. To address these limitations, we propose a novel framework called ProverGen that synergizes the generative strengths of Large Language Models (LLMs) with the rigor and precision of symbolic provers, enabling the creation of a scalable, diverse, and high-quality FOL reasoning dataset, ProverQA. ProverQA is also distinguished by its inclusion of accessible and logically coherent intermediate reasoning steps for each problem. Our evaluation shows that state-of-the-art LLMs struggle to solve ProverQA problems, even with CoT prompting, highlighting the dataset's challenging nature. We also finetune Llama3.1-8B-Instruct on a separate training set generated by our framework. The finetuned model demonstrates consistent improvements on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution test sets, suggesting the value of our proposed data generation framework. Code available at: https://github.com/opendatalab/ProverGen

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Logic reasoning in natural language has been recognized as an important measure of human intelligence for Large Language Models (LLMs). Popular benchmarks may entangle multiple reasoning skills and thus provide unfaithful evaluations on the logic reasoning skill. Meanwhile, existing logic reasoning benchmarks are limited in language diversity and their distributions are deviated from the distribution of an ideal logic reasoning benchmark, which may lead to biased evaluation results. This paper thereby proposes a new classical logic benchmark DivLogicEval, consisting of natural sentences composed of diverse statements in a counterintuitive way. To ensure a more reliable evaluation, we also introduce a new evaluation metric that mitigates the influence of bias and randomness inherent in LLMs. Through experiments, we demonstrate the extent to which logical reasoning is required to answer the questions in DivLogicEval and compare the performance of different popular LLMs in conducting logical reasoning.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

Fact verification is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM applications. In this study, we evaluate 12 pre-trained LLMs and one specialized fact-verifier, including frontier LLMs and open-weight reasoning LLMs, using a collection of examples from 14 fact-checking benchmarks. We share three findings intended to guide future development of more robust fact verifiers. First, we highlight the importance of addressing annotation errors and ambiguity in datasets, demonstrating that approximately 16\% of ambiguous or incorrectly labeled data substantially influences model rankings. Neglecting this issue may result in misleading conclusions during comparative evaluations, and we suggest using a systematic pipeline utilizing LLM-as-a-judge to help identify these issues at scale. Second, we discover that frontier LLMs with few-shot in-context examples, often overlooked in previous works, achieve top-tier performance. We therefore recommend future studies include comparisons with these simple yet highly effective baselines. Lastly, despite their effectiveness, frontier LLMs incur substantial costs, motivating the development of small, fine-tuned fact verifiers. We show that these small models still have room for improvement, particularly on instances that require complex reasoning. Encouragingly, we demonstrate that augmenting training with synthetic multi-hop reasoning data significantly enhances their capabilities in such instances. We release our code, model, and dataset at https://github.com/just1nseo/verifying-the-verifiers

Deductive reasoning is the process of deriving conclusions strictly from the given premises, without relying on external knowledge. We define honesty in this setting as a model's ability to respond only when the conclusion is logically entailed by the premises, and to abstain otherwise. However, current language models often fail to reason honestly, producing unwarranted answers when the input is insufficient. To study this challenge, we formulate honest deductive reasoning as multi-step tasks where models must either derive the correct conclusion or abstain. We curate two datasets from graph structures, one for linear algebra and one for logical inference, and introduce unanswerable cases by randomly perturbing an edge in half of the instances. We find that prompting and existing training methods, including GRPO with or without supervised fine-tuning initialization, struggle on these tasks. In particular, GRPO optimize only for final task outcomes, leaving models vulnerable to collapse when negative rewards dominate early training. To address this, we propose ACNCHOR, a reinforcement learning method that injects ground truth trajectories into rollouts, preventing early training collapse. Our results demonstrate that this method stabilizes learning and significantly improves the overall reasoning performance, underscoring the importance of training dynamics for enabling honest deductive reasoning in language models.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in proving formal theorems using proof assistants such as Lean. However, existing methods are difficult to reproduce or build on, due to private code, data, and large compute requirements. This has created substantial barriers to research on machine learning methods for theorem proving. This paper removes these barriers by introducing LeanDojo: an open-source Lean playground consisting of toolkits, data, models, and benchmarks. LeanDojo extracts data from Lean and enables interaction with the proof environment programmatically. It contains fine-grained annotations of premises in proofs, providing valuable data for premise selection: a key bottleneck in theorem proving. Using this data, we develop ReProver (Retrieval-Augmented Prover): the first LLM-based prover that is augmented with retrieval for selecting premises from a vast math library. It is inexpensive and needs only one GPU week of training. Our retriever leverages LeanDojo's program analysis capability to identify accessible premises and hard negative examples, which makes retrieval much more effective. Furthermore, we construct a new benchmark consisting of 96,962 theorems and proofs extracted from Lean's math library. It features challenging data split requiring the prover to generalize to theorems relying on novel premises that are never used in training. We use this benchmark for training and evaluation, and experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of ReProver over non-retrieval baselines and GPT-4. We thus provide the first set of open-source LLM-based theorem provers without any proprietary datasets and release it under a permissive MIT license to facilitate further research.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform better when asked to reason step-by-step before answering a question. However, it is unclear to what degree the model's final answer is faithful to the stated reasoning steps. In this paper, we perform a causal mediation analysis on twelve LLMs to examine how intermediate reasoning steps generated by the LLM influence the final outcome and find that LLMs do not reliably use their intermediate reasoning steps when generating an answer. To address this issue, we introduce FRODO, a framework to tailor small-sized LMs to generate correct reasoning steps and robustly reason over these steps. FRODO consists of an inference module that learns to generate correct reasoning steps using an implicit causal reward function and a reasoning module that learns to faithfully reason over these intermediate inferences using a counterfactual and causal preference objective. Our experiments show that FRODO significantly outperforms four competitive baselines. Furthermore, FRODO improves the robustness and generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on out-of-distribution test sets. Finally, we find that FRODO's rationales are more faithful to its final answer predictions than standard supervised fine-tuning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently extended their powerful reasoning capabilities to safety checks-using chain-of-thought reasoning to decide whether a request should be answered. While this new approach offers a promising route for balancing model utility and safety, its robustness remains underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce Malicious-Educator, a benchmark that disguises extremely dangerous or malicious requests beneath seemingly legitimate educational prompts. Our experiments reveal severe security flaws in popular commercial-grade LRMs, including OpenAI o1/o3, DeepSeek-R1, and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking. For instance, although OpenAI's o1 model initially maintains a high refusal rate of about 98%, subsequent model updates significantly compromise its safety; and attackers can easily extract criminal strategies from DeepSeek-R1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking without any additional tricks. To further highlight these vulnerabilities, we propose Hijacking Chain-of-Thought (H-CoT), a universal and transferable attack method that leverages the model's own displayed intermediate reasoning to jailbreak its safety reasoning mechanism. Under H-CoT, refusal rates sharply decline-dropping from 98% to below 2%-and, in some instances, even transform initially cautious tones into ones that are willing to provide harmful content. We hope these findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety mechanisms to preserve the benefits of advanced reasoning capabilities without compromising ethical standards.

State-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs) are accredited with an increasing number of different capabilities, ranging from reading comprehension, over advanced mathematical and reasoning skills to possessing scientific knowledge. In this paper we focus on their multi-hop reasoning capability: the ability to identify and integrate information from multiple textual sources. Given the concerns with the presence of simplifying cues in existing multi-hop reasoning benchmarks, which allow models to circumvent the reasoning requirement, we set out to investigate, whether LLMs are prone to exploiting such simplifying cues. We find evidence that they indeed circumvent the requirement to perform multi-hop reasoning, but they do so in more subtle ways than what was reported about their fine-tuned pre-trained language model (PLM) predecessors. Motivated by this finding, we propose a challenging multi-hop reasoning benchmark, by generating seemingly plausible multi-hop reasoning chains, which ultimately lead to incorrect answers. We evaluate multiple open and proprietary state-of-the-art LLMs, and find that their performance to perform multi-hop reasoning is affected, as indicated by up to 45% relative decrease in F1 score when presented with such seemingly plausible alternatives. We conduct a deeper analysis and find evidence that while LLMs tend to ignore misleading lexical cues, misleading reasoning paths indeed present a significant challenge.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Tool-integrated reasoning (TIR) is difficult to scale to small language models due to instability in long-horizon tool interactions and limited model capacity. While reinforcement learning methods like group relative policy optimization provide only sparse outcome-level rewards. Recently, on-policy distillation (OPD) has gained popularity by supplying dense token-level supervision from a teacher on student-generated trajectories. However, our experiments indicate that applying OPD to TIR leads to a critical failure mode: erroneous tool calls tend to cascade across subsequent reasoning steps, progressively amplifying student-teacher divergence and rendering the teacher's token-level supervision increasingly unreliable. To address this, we propose SOD, a step-wise on-policy distillation framework for small language model agents, which adaptively reweights distillation strength at each step based on step-level divergence. Therefore, SOD can attenuate potentially misleading teacher signals in high-divergence regions while preserving dense guidance in well-aligned states. Experiments on challenging math, science, and code benchmarks show that SOD achieves up to 20.86% improvement over the second-best baseline. Notably, our 0.6B student achieves 26.13% on AIME 2025, demonstrating effective transfer of agentic reasoning to lightweight models. Our code is available at https://github.com/YoungZ365/SOD.

Reasoning-focused large language models (LLMs) have advanced in many NLP tasks, yet their evaluation remains challenging: final answers alone do not expose the intermediate reasoning steps, making it difficult to determine whether a model truly reasons correctly and where failures occur, while existing multi-hop QA benchmarks lack step-level annotations for diagnosing reasoning failures. To address this gap, we propose Omanic, an open-domain multi-hop QA resource that provides decomposed sub-questions and intermediate answers as structural annotations for analyzing reasoning processes. It contains 10,296 machine-generated training examples (OmanicSynth) and 967 expert-reviewed human-annotated evaluation examples (OmanicBench). Systematic evaluations show that state-of-the-art LLMs achieve only 73.11% multiple-choice accuracy on OmanicBench, confirming its high difficulty. Stepwise analysis reveals that CoT's performance hinges on factual completeness, with its gains diminishing under knowledge gaps and errors amplifying in later hops. Additionally, supervised fine-tuning on OmanicSynth brings substantial transfer gains (7.41 average points) across six reasoning and math benchmarks, validating the dataset's quality and further supporting the effectiveness of OmanicSynth as supervision for reasoning-capability transfer. We release the data at https://huggingface.co/datasets/li-lab/Omanic and the code at https://github.com/XiaojieGu/Omanic.

We present gpt-oss-120b and gpt-oss-20b, two open-weight reasoning models that push the frontier of accuracy and inference cost. The models use an efficient mixture-of-expert transformer architecture and are trained using large-scale distillation and reinforcement learning. We optimize the models to have strong agentic capabilities (deep research browsing, python tool use, and support for developer-provided functions), all while using a rendered chat format that enables clear instruction following and role delineation. Both models achieve strong results on benchmarks ranging from mathematics, coding, and safety. We release the model weights, inference implementations, tool environments, and tokenizers under an Apache 2.0 license to enable broad use and further research.

Three of the most popular methods for training language models to reason look like three different tricks. They are not. All three adjust a single number: standard deviation, reflecting how much a prompt's sampled answers disagree. When such a model is trained, it answers each problem many times, and an automatic checker marks every answer right or wrong. The standard deviation of those marks measures the disagreement: largest when the answers split evenly between right and wrong, and zero when they all agree. Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) divides by this number, GRPO Done Right (Dr. GRPO) drops the division, and Decoupled Clip and Dynamic Sampling Policy Optimization (DAPO) discards the groups where it is zero. Each is presented as its own fix, yet this paper proves they are three settings of one dial. That dial is not cosmetic: for right-or-wrong rewards, the disagreement is exactly the size of the training update, the group-standard-deviation identity. A split group teaches the most, while a unanimous group teaches nothing and falls silent. The same result says which problems deserve the most weight and how many tries each one needs. This paper confirms the intuition on a large real difficulty dataset (Big-Math) and in a controlled training run. What looks like a harmless normalization step is the dial that decides where learning happens and how strongly.

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

We set out to train behavioral dispositions (self-verification, uncertainty acknowledgment, feedback integration) into small language models (0.6B to 2.3B effective parameters) through a four-stage all-MIT distillation pipeline, with follow-on experiments on inference-time attention-head interventions and a frozen-base confidence-gated sidecar. An internal draft reported +33.9-point MCAS and +15.3-point HumanEval gains on a Qwen3-0.6B student; a second-pass sanity check falsified both numbers before publication. The HumanEval delta was a truncation artifact (n_predict=512) that inverted to -8.0 points at n_predict=1024; the MCAS gain disappeared under apples-to-apples scoring. That falsification triggered three subsequent arcs. Across (1) SFT/DPO LoRA on three model families and two domains, (2) inference-time attention-head tempering on o_proj, and (3) a training-free frozen-base sidecar reading the final-token hidden state h_last, we find no operator that moves judge-measured disposition without damaging content or collapsing into stylistic mimicry. The failure is consistent across five models (Qwen3-0.6B, Qwen3-1.7B, Qwen3.5-0.8B, Gemma 4 E2B, and SmolLM2-1.7B-Instruct). A within-distribution cross-validation pass (AUC=0.683) collapsed to chance on fresh prompts (AUC=0.516). We contribute a three-arc negative result with mechanism, a two-failure-mode taxonomy for linear h_last probes, and an honest falsification pipeline that converts the class of false positives we ourselves produced into publishable negatives. As an independent finding, Gemma 4 E2B exhibits near-complete confidence-correctness decoupling on the Chef domain (assertion asymmetry -0.009; the model asserts at 91% regardless of correctness).

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

This paper presents a case study of coding tasks by the latest reasoning models of OpenAI, i.e. o1-preview and o1-mini, in comparison with other frontier models. The o1 models deliver SOTA results for WebApp1K, a single-task benchmark. To this end, we introduce WebApp1K-Duo, a harder benchmark doubling number of tasks and test cases. The new benchmark causes the o1 model performances to decline significantly, falling behind Claude 3.5. Moreover, they consistently fail when confronted with atypical yet correct test cases, a trap non-reasoning models occasionally avoid. We hypothesize that the performance variability is due to instruction comprehension. Specifically, the reasoning mechanism boosts performance when all expectations are captured, meanwhile exacerbates errors when key expectations are missed, potentially impacted by input lengths. As such, we argue that the coding success of reasoning models hinges on the top-notch base model and SFT to ensure meticulous adherence to instructions.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising first-order logic (FOL) reasoning capabilities with applications in various areas. However, their effectiveness in complex mathematical reasoning involving multi-step FOL deductions is still under-researched. While LLMs perform competitively on established mathematical reasoning benchmarks, they struggle with multi-step FOL tasks, as demonstrated by Deepseek-Prover-V2-7B's low accuracy (4.2%) on our proposed theorem proving dataset. This issue arises from the limited exploration of diverse proof strategies and the potential for early reasoning mistakes to undermine entire proofs. To address these issues, we propose DREAM, a self-adaptive solution that enhances the Diversity and REAsonability of LLMs' generation strategies. DREAM incorporates an Axiom-Driven Strategy Diversification mechanism to promote varied strategic outcomes and a Sub-Proposition Error Feedback to help LLMs reflect on and correct their proofs. Our contributions include pioneering advancements in LLMs' mathematical reasoning through FOL theorem proving, introducing a novel inference stage solution that improves performance by 0.6% to 6.4%, and providing a curated dataset of 447 mathematical theorems in Lean 4 format for evaluation.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Counterfactual reasoning, a hallmark of intelligence, consists of three steps: inferring latent variables from observations (abduction), constructing alternatives (interventions), and predicting their outcomes (prediction). This skill is essential for advancing LLMs' causal understanding and expanding their applications in high-stakes domains such as scientific research. However, existing efforts in assessing LLM's counterfactual reasoning capabilities tend to skip the abduction step, effectively reducing to interventional reasoning and leading to overestimation of LLM performance. To address this, we introduce executable counterfactuals, a novel framework that operationalizes causal reasoning through code and math problems. Our framework explicitly requires all three steps of counterfactual reasoning and enables scalable synthetic data creation with varying difficulty, creating a frontier for evaluating and improving LLM's reasoning. Our results reveal substantial drop in accuracy (25-40%) from interventional to counterfactual reasoning for SOTA models like o4-mini and Claude-4-Sonnet. To address this gap, we construct a training set comprising counterfactual code problems having if-else condition and test on out-of-domain code structures (e.g. having while-loop); we also test whether a model trained on code would generalize to counterfactual math word problems. While supervised finetuning on stronger models' reasoning traces improves in-domain performance of Qwen models, it leads to a decrease in accuracy on OOD tasks such as counterfactual math problems. In contrast, reinforcement learning induces the core cognitive behaviors and generalizes to new domains, yielding gains over the base model on both code (improvement of 1.5x-2x) and math problems. Analysis of the reasoning traces reinforces these findings and highlights the promise of RL for improving LLMs' counterfactual reasoning.

Reasoning models think out loud, but much of what they say is noise. We introduce OPSDC (On-Policy Self-Distillation for Reasoning Compression), a method that teaches models to reason more concisely by distilling their own concise behavior back into themselves. The entire approach reduces to one idea: condition the same model on a "be concise" instruction to obtain teacher logits, and minimize per-token reverse KL on the student's own rollouts. No ground-truth answers, no token budgets, no difficulty estimators. Just self-distillation. Yet this simplicity belies surprising sophistication: OPSDC automatically compresses easy problems aggressively while preserving the deliberation needed for hard ones. On Qwen3-8B and Qwen3-14B, we achieve 57-59% token reduction on MATH-500 while improving accuracy by 9-16 points absolute. On AIME 2024, the 14B model gains 10 points with 41% compression. The secret? Much of what reasoning models produce is not just redundant-it is actively harmful, compounding errors with every unnecessary token.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Tool-augmented Language Models (TaLMs) can invoke external tools to solve problems beyond their parametric capacity. However, it remains unclear whether these tool-enabled gains reflect trustworthy reasoning. Focusing on the Code Interpreter tool, we show that even when tools are selected and executed correctly, TaLMs treat tool outputs as substitutes for reasoning, producing solutions that appear correct but lack coherent justification. We term this failure mode Tool-Induced Myopia (TIM), and study it using PYMATH, a benchmark of 1,679 competition-level mathematical problems for which Python code is helpful but not sufficient. We further develop a multi-dimensional evaluation suite to quantify reasoning degradation in TaLMs relative to their non-tool counterparts. Our findings reveal that while TaLMs achieve up to a 19.3 percentage point gain in final-answer accuracy, their reasoning behavior consistently deteriorates (e.g., non-tool LLMs win up to 41.5% more often in pairwise comparisons of the reasoning process). This degradation intensifies with tool use; the more frequently a model invokes tools, the less coherent its reasoning becomes. Moreover, tool use shifts errors from arithmetic mistakes toward global reasoning failures (logic, assumption, creativity); with TIM present in ~55% of high-risk cases. Finally, we propose a preference-optimization-based framework that realigns TaLMs to use tools as assistive evidence, improving both final-answer accuracy and reasoning depth under tool use. Codes and data are available at: https://github.com/megagonlabs/TIM.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely applied to downstream domains. However, current LLMs for high-stakes domain tasks, such as financial investment and legal QA, typically generate brief answers without reasoning processes and explanations. This limits users' confidence in making decisions based on their responses. While original CoT shows promise, it lacks self-correction mechanisms during reasoning. This work introduces Domaino1s, which enhances LLMs' reasoning capabilities on domain tasks through supervised fine-tuning and tree search. We construct CoT-stock-2k and CoT-legal-2k datasets for fine-tuning models that activate domain-specific reasoning steps based on their judgment. Additionally, we propose Selective Tree Exploration to spontaneously explore solution spaces and sample optimal reasoning paths to improve performance. We also introduce PROOF-Score, a new metric for evaluating domain models' explainability, complementing traditional accuracy metrics with richer assessment dimensions. Extensive experiments on stock investment recommendation and legal reasoning QA tasks demonstrate Domaino1s's leading performance and explainability. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Domaino1s-006F/.

Multimodal reasoning models (MRMs) trained with reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) show improved accuracy on visual reasoning benchmarks. However, we observe that accuracy gains often come at the cost of reasoning quality: generated Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces are frequently inconsistent with the final answer and poorly grounded in the visual evidence. We systematically study this phenomenon across seven challenging real-world spatial reasoning benchmarks and find that it affects contemporary MRMs such as ViGoRL-Spatial, TreeVGR as well as our own models trained with standard Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We characterize CoT reasoning quality along two complementary axes: "logical consistency" (does the CoT entail the final answer?) and "visual grounding" (does each reasoning step accurately describe objects, attributes, and spatial relationships in the image?). To address this, we propose Faithful GRPO (FGRPO), a variant of GRPO that enforces consistency and grounding as constraints via Lagrangian dual ascent. FGRPO incorporates batch-level consistency and grounding constraints into the advantage computation within a group, adaptively adjusting the relative importance of constraints during optimization. We evaluate FGRPO on Qwen2.5-VL-7B and 3B backbones across seven spatial datasets. Our results show that FGRPO substantially improves reasoning quality, reducing the inconsistency rate from 24.5% to 1.7% and improving visual grounding scores by +13%. It also improves final answer accuracy over simple GRPO, demonstrating that faithful reasoning enables better answers.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has been widely applied in the mathematical reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs). Recently, the introduction of derivative process supervision on CoT trajectories has sparked discussions on enhancing scaling capabilities during test time, thereby boosting the potential of these models. However, in multimodal mathematical reasoning, the scarcity of high-quality CoT training data has hindered existing models from achieving high-precision CoT reasoning and has limited the realization of reasoning potential during test time. In this work, we propose a three-module synthesis strategy that integrates CoT distillation, trajectory-format rewriting, and format unification. It results in a high-quality CoT reasoning instruction fine-tuning dataset in multimodal mathematics, MMathCoT-1M. We comprehensively validate the state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance of the trained URSA-7B model on multiple multimodal mathematical benchmarks. For test-time scaling, we introduce a data synthesis strategy that automatically generates process annotation datasets, known as DualMath-1.1M, focusing on both interpretation and logic. By further training URSA-7B on DualMath-1.1M, we transition from CoT reasoning capabilities to robust supervision abilities. The trained URSA-RM-7B acts as a verifier, effectively enhancing the performance of URSA-7B at test time. URSA-RM-7B also demonstrates excellent out-of-distribution (OOD) verifying capabilities, showcasing its generalization. Model weights, training data and code will be open-sourced.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant progress in solving complex reasoning tasks by Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). This advancement is also inseparable from the oversight automated by reliable verifiers. However, current outcome-based verifiers (OVs) are unable to inspect the unreliable intermediate steps in the long reasoning chains of thought (CoTs). Meanwhile, current process-based verifiers (PVs) have difficulties in reliably detecting errors in the complex long CoTs, limited by the scarcity of high-quality annotations due to the prohibitive costs of human annotations. Therefore, we propose the Outcome-based Process Verifier (OPV), which verifies the rationale process of summarized outcomes from long CoTs to achieve both accurate and efficient verification and enable large-scale annotation. To empower the proposed verifier, we adopt an iterative active learning framework with expert annotations to progressively improve the verification capability of OPV with fewer annotation costs. Specifically, in each iteration, the most uncertain cases of the current best OPV are annotated and then subsequently used to train a new OPV through Rejection Fine-Tuning (RFT) and RLVR for the next round. Extensive experiments demonstrate OPV's superior performance and broad applicability. It achieves new state-of-the-art results on our held-out OPV-Bench, outperforming much larger open-source models such as Qwen3-Max-Preview with an F1 score of 83.1 compared to 76.3. Furthermore, OPV effectively detects false positives within synthetic dataset, closely align with expert assessment. When collaborating with policy models, OPV consistently yields performance gains, e.g., raising the accuracy of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B from 55.2% to 73.3% on AIME2025 as the compute budget scales.

Despite substantial progress in fact-verification benchmarks, claims grounded in large-scale structured data remain underexplored. In this work, we introduce ClaimDB, the first fact-verification benchmark where the evidence for claims is derived from compositions of millions of records and multiple tables. ClaimDB consists of 80 unique real-life databases covering a wide range of domains, from governance and healthcare to media, education and the natural sciences. At this scale, verification approaches that rely on "reading" the evidence break down, forcing a timely shift toward reasoning in executable programs. We conduct extensive experiments with 30 state-of-the-art proprietary and open-source (below 70B) LLMs and find that none exceed 83% accuracy, with more than half below 55%. Our analysis also reveals that both closed- and open-source models struggle with abstention -- the ability to admit that there is no evidence to decide -- raising doubts about their reliability in high-stakes data analysis. We release the benchmark, code, and the LLM leaderboard at https://claimdb.github.io .

We conduct a systematic audit of three widely used reasoning benchmarks, SocialIQa, FauxPas-EAI, and ToMi, and uncover pervasive flaws in both benchmark items and evaluation methodology. Using five LLMs (GPT-{3, 3.5, 4, o1}, and LLaMA 3.1) as diagnostic tools, we identify structural, semantic, and pragmatic issues in benchmark design (e.g., duplicated items, ambiguous wording, and implausible answers), as well as scoring procedures that prioritize output form over reasoning process. Through systematic human annotation and re-evaluation on cleaned benchmark subsets, we find that model scores often improve not due to due to erratic surface wording variations and not to improved reasoning. Infact, further analyses show that model performance is highly sensitive to minor input variations such as context availability and phrasing, revealing that high scores may reflect alignment with format-specific cues rather than consistent inference based on the input. These findings challenge the validity of current benchmark-based claims about reasoning in LLMs, and highlight the need for evaluation protocols that assess reasoning as a process of drawing inference from available information, rather than as static output selection. We release audited data and evaluation tools to support more interpretable and diagnostic assessments of model reasoning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allocate substantial inference-time compute to Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, improving performance on mathematics, scientific QA, and tool usage. However, this introduces overthinking: LRMs often reach a correct intermediate solution, continue reasoning, and overwrite it with an incorrect answer. We first demonstrate that oracle stopping--where we inject </think> at every sentence boundary and select the best stopping point in hindsight--improves average accuracy by 8% while reducing thinking tokens by 72%, exposing substantial overthinking. Motivated by this finding, we propose ThinkBrake, which monitors the log-probability margin between the top continuation token and </think> at sentence boundaries, stopping reasoning when this margin narrows. ThinkBrake requires no training and achieves favorable accuracy-efficiency trade-offs across math, scientific QA, and tool usage benchmarks, reducing thinking token usage by up to 30%. Furthermore, we provide theoretical analysis showing that ThinkBrake is equivalent to test-time realignment with a reward bonus for the </think> token.

The growing popularity of neuro symbolic reasoning has led to the adoption of various forms of differentiable (i.e., fuzzy) first order logic. We introduce PyReason, a software framework based on generalized annotated logic that both captures the current cohort of differentiable logics and temporal extensions to support inference over finite periods of time with capabilities for open world reasoning. Further, PyReason is implemented to directly support reasoning over graphical structures (e.g., knowledge graphs, social networks, biological networks, etc.), produces fully explainable traces of inference, and includes various practical features such as type checking and a memory-efficient implementation. This paper reviews various extensions of generalized annotated logic integrated into our implementation, our modern, efficient Python-based implementation that conducts exact yet scalable deductive inference, and a suite of experiments. PyReason is available at: github.com/lab-v2/pyreason.

The scarcity of high-quality, logically sound data is a critical bottleneck for advancing the mathematical reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs). Our work confronts this challenge by turning decades of automated theorem proving research into a scalable data engine. Rather than relying on error-prone LLMs or complex proof-assistant syntax like Lean and Isabelle, our framework leverages E-prover's saturation capabilities on the vast TPTP axiom library to derive a massive, guaranteed-valid corpus of theorems. Our pipeline is principled and simple: saturate axioms, filter for "interesting" theorems, and generate tasks. With no LLMs in the loop, we eliminate factual errors by construction. This purely symbolic data is then transformed into three difficulty-controlled challenges: entailment verification, premise selection, and proof reconstruction. Our zero-shot experiments on frontier models reveal a clear weakness: performance collapses on tasks requiring deep, structural reasoning. Our framework provides both the diagnostic tool to measure this gap and a scalable source of symbolic training data to address it. We make the code and data publicly available. https://github.com/sileod/reasoning_core https://hf.co/datasets/reasoning-core/rc1

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is fundamental for human social intelligence and a critical capability for advanced Artificial Intelligence. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising performance on ToM benchmarks, raising the question: Do these benchmarks necessitate explicit human-like reasoning processes, or can models succeed through alternative strategies? We investigate this question empirically by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) to LLMs of varying scales (0.5B to 7B parameters) and evaluating them across multiple ToM datasets. Our results reveal a scale-dependent impact of RL: while RL significantly improves accuracy and fosters high-quality, interpretable, and transferable belief-tracking reasoning in larger models (7B), it leads to "reasoning collapse" in smaller models (leq3B), where high accuracy and generalization ability are achieved via drastically shortened, less meaningful responses. Surprisingly, further SFT achieves competitive and generalizable performance across these benchmarks, often matching or exceeding RL models in accuracy, despite not being explicitly trained to produce structured reasoning traces. These findings highlight a critical discrepancy between benchmark accuracy and the nature of learned reasoning. Our work suggests that current ToM benchmarks may be solvable without requiring the explicit, human-like simulation of mental states they were designed to probe. LLMs, particularly when scale is limited or training signals focus solely on output correctness, may leverage alternative rules effective for benchmark data structures.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.