Daily Papers

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has become essential for improving language model capabilities, but traditional approaches rely on the assumption that human preferences follow a transitive Bradley-Terry model. This assumption fails to capture the non-transitive nature of populational human preferences. Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF), targeting non-transitive preferences, is a problem of computing the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the two-player constant-sum game defined by the human preference. We introduce Extragradient preference optimization (EGPO), a novel algorithm for NLHF achieving last-iterate linear convergence to the NE of KL-regularized games and polynomial convergence to the NE of original games, while being robust to noise. Unlike previous approaches that rely on nested optimization, we derive an equivalent implementation using gradients of an online variant of the identity preference optimization (IPO) loss, enabling more faithful implementation for neural networks. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate EGPO's superior performance over baseline methods when training for the same number of epochs, as measured by pairwise win-rates using the ground truth preference. These results validate both the theoretical strengths and practical advantages of EGPO for language model alignment with non-transitive human preferences.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive capabilities but require careful alignment with human preferences. Traditional training-time methods finetune LLMs using human preference datasets but incur significant training costs and require repeated training to handle diverse user preferences. Test-time alignment methods address this by using reward models (RMs) to guide frozen LLMs without retraining. However, existing test-time approaches rely on trajectory-level RMs which are designed to evaluate complete responses, making them unsuitable for autoregressive text generation that requires computing next-token rewards from partial responses. To address this, we introduce GenARM, a test-time alignment approach that leverages the Autoregressive Reward Model--a novel reward parametrization designed to predict next-token rewards for efficient and effective autoregressive generation. Theoretically, we demonstrate that this parametrization can provably guide frozen LLMs toward any distribution achievable by traditional RMs within the KL-regularized reinforcement learning framework. Experimental results show that GenARM significantly outperforms prior test-time alignment baselines and matches the performance of training-time methods. Additionally, GenARM enables efficient weak-to-strong guidance, aligning larger LLMs with smaller RMs without the high costs of training larger models. Furthermore, GenARM supports multi-objective alignment, allowing real-time trade-offs between preference dimensions and catering to diverse user preferences without retraining.

Recent Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms making use of Kullback-Leibler (KL) regularization as a core component have shown outstanding performance. Yet, only little is understood theoretically about why KL regularization helps, so far. We study KL regularization within an approximate value iteration scheme and show that it implicitly averages q-values. Leveraging this insight, we provide a very strong performance bound, the very first to combine two desirable aspects: a linear dependency to the horizon (instead of quadratic) and an error propagation term involving an averaging effect of the estimation errors (instead of an accumulation effect). We also study the more general case of an additional entropy regularizer. The resulting abstract scheme encompasses many existing RL algorithms. Some of our assumptions do not hold with neural networks, so we complement this theoretical analysis with an extensive empirical study.

Self-play alignment algorithms have been developed as effective methods for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs), formulating preference optimization as a two-player game. However, the regularization with respect to the reference policy, which is crucial for mitigating over-optimization, has been insufficiently investigated in self-play alignment. In this paper, we show that our regularization method can improve the unregularized self-play significantly. To study the impact of different regularizations in self-play alignment, we propose Regularized Self-Play Policy Optimization (RSPO). This generalized framework regularizes the self-play by simply adding a chosen regularization term into the loss while maintaining provable last-iterate convergence to the Nash Equilibrium of the corresponding regularized game. Surprisingly, empirical evaluations using the Mistral-7B-Instruct base model reveal that forward KL divergence regularization reduces response length in RSPO, whereas reverse KL divergence markedly improves raw win rates. RSPO with a linear combination of forward and reverse KL divergence regularization substantially increases the length-controlled win rate in AlpacaEval-2, elevating the unregularized self-play alignment method (SPPO) from 28.53% to 35.44%. Finally, we show that RSPO also improves the response diversity.

Many policy optimization approaches in reinforcement learning incorporate a Kullback-Leilbler (KL) divergence to the previous policy, to prevent the policy from changing too quickly. This idea was initially proposed in a seminal paper on Conservative Policy Iteration, with approximations given by algorithms like TRPO and Munchausen Value Iteration (MVI). We continue this line of work by investigating a generalized KL divergence -- called the Tsallis KL divergence -- which use the q-logarithm in the definition. The approach is a strict generalization, as q = 1 corresponds to the standard KL divergence; q > 1 provides a range of new options. We characterize the types of policies learned under the Tsallis KL, and motivate when q >1 could be beneficial. To obtain a practical algorithm that incorporates Tsallis KL regularization, we extend MVI, which is one of the simplest approaches to incorporate KL regularization. We show that this generalized MVI(q) obtains significant improvements over the standard MVI(q = 1) across 35 Atari games.

Policy gradient algorithms have been successfully applied to enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Despite the widespread use of Kullback-Leibler (KL) regularization in policy gradient algorithms to stabilize training, the systematic exploration of how different KL divergence formulations can be estimated and integrated into surrogate loss functions for online reinforcement learning (RL) presents a nuanced and systematically explorable design space. In this paper, we propose regularized policy gradient (RPG), a systematic framework for deriving and analyzing KL-regularized policy gradient methods in the online RL setting. We derive policy gradients and corresponding surrogate loss functions for objectives regularized by both forward and reverse KL divergences, considering both normalized and unnormalized policy distributions. Furthermore, we present derivations for fully differentiable loss functions as well as REINFORCE-style gradient estimators, accommodating diverse algorithmic needs. We conduct extensive experiments on RL for LLM reasoning using these methods, showing improved or competitive results in terms of training stability and performance compared to strong baselines such as GRPO, REINFORCE++, and DAPO. The code is available at https://github.com/complex-reasoning/RPG.

Incorporating expert demonstrations has empirically helped to improve the sample efficiency of reinforcement learning (RL). This paper quantifies theoretically to what extent this extra information reduces RL's sample complexity. In particular, we study the demonstration-regularized reinforcement learning that leverages the expert demonstrations by KL-regularization for a policy learned by behavior cloning. Our findings reveal that using N^{E} expert demonstrations enables the identification of an optimal policy at a sample complexity of order mathcal{O}(Poly(S,A,H)/(varepsilon^2 N^{E})) in finite and mathcal{O}(Poly(d,H)/(varepsilon^2 N^{E})) in linear Markov decision processes, where varepsilon is the target precision, H the horizon, A the number of action, S the number of states in the finite case and d the dimension of the feature space in the linear case. As a by-product, we provide tight convergence guarantees for the behaviour cloning procedure under general assumptions on the policy classes. Additionally, we establish that demonstration-regularized methods are provably efficient for reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). In this respect, we provide theoretical evidence showing the benefits of KL-regularization for RLHF in tabular and linear MDPs. Interestingly, we avoid pessimism injection by employing computationally feasible regularization to handle reward estimation uncertainty, thus setting our approach apart from the prior works.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Quantization-aware training (QAT) combined with knowledge distillation (KD) is a promising strategy for compressing Artificial Intelligence (AI) models for deployment on resource-constrained hardware. However, existing QAT-KD methods often struggle to balance task-specific (TS) and distillation losses due to heterogeneous gradient magnitudes, especially under low-bit quantization. We propose Game of Regularizer (GoR), a novel learnable regularization method that adaptively balances TS and KD objectives using only two trainable parameters for dynamic loss weighting. GoR reduces conflict between supervision signals, improves convergence, and boosts the performance of small quantized models (SQMs). Experiments on image classification, object detection (OD), and large language model (LLM) compression show that GoR consistently outperforms state-of-the-art QAT-KD methods. On low-power edge devices, it delivers faster inference while maintaining full-precision accuracy. We also introduce QAT-EKD-GoR, an ensemble distillation framework that uses multiple heterogeneous teacher models. Under optimal conditions, the proposed EKD-GoR can outperform full-precision models, providing a robust solution for real-world deployment.

Reinforcement learning (RL) post-training is crucial for LLM alignment and reasoning, but existing policy-based methods, such as PPO and DPO, can fall short of fixing shortcuts inherited from pre-training. In this work, we introduce Qsharp, a value-based algorithm for KL-regularized RL that guides the reference policy using the optimal regularized Q function. We propose to learn the optimal Q function using distributional RL on an aggregated online dataset. Unlike prior value-based baselines that guide the model using unregularized Q-values, our method is theoretically principled and provably learns the optimal policy for the KL-regularized RL problem. Empirically, Qsharp outperforms prior baselines in math reasoning benchmarks while maintaining a smaller KL divergence to the reference policy. Theoretically, we establish a reduction from KL-regularized RL to no-regret online learning, providing the first bounds for deterministic MDPs under only realizability. Thanks to distributional RL, our bounds are also variance-dependent and converge faster when the reference policy has small variance. In sum, our results highlight Qsharp as an effective approach for post-training LLMs, offering both improved performance and theoretical guarantees. The code can be found at https://github.com/jinpz/q_sharp.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) has achieved great success in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Prevalent RLHF approaches are reward-based, following the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which may not fully capture the complexity of human preferences. In this paper, we explore RLHF under a general preference framework and approach it from a game-theoretic perspective. Specifically, we formulate the problem as a two-player game and propose a novel algorithm, iterative Nash policy optimization (INPO). The key idea is to let the policy play against itself via no-regret learning, thereby approximating the Nash policy. Unlike previous methods, INPO bypasses the need for estimating the expected win rate for individual responses, which typically incurs high computational or annotation costs. Instead, we introduce a new loss objective that is directly minimized over a preference dataset. We provide theoretical analysis for our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments on various representative benchmarks. With an LLaMA-3-8B-based SFT model, INPO achieves a 41.5% length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0 and a 38.3% win rate on Arena-Hard, showing substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art iterative algorithm [Dong et al., 2024] under the BT model assumption. Additionally, our ablation study highlights the benefits of incorporating KL regularization for response length control.

This paper explores the effects of various forms of regularization in the context of language model alignment via self-play. While both reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and direct preference optimization (DPO) require to collect costly human-annotated pairwise preferences, the self-play fine-tuning (SPIN) approach replaces the rejected answers by data generated from the previous iterate. However, the SPIN method presents a performance instability issue in the learning phase, which can be mitigated by playing against a mixture of the two previous iterates. In the same vein, we propose in this work to address this issue from two perspectives: first, by incorporating an additional Kullback-Leibler (KL) regularization to stay at the proximity of the reference policy; second, by using the idea of fictitious play which smoothens the opponent policy across all previous iterations. In particular, we show that the KL-based regularizer boils down to replacing the previous policy by its geometric mixture with the base policy inside of the SPIN loss function. We finally discuss empirical results on MT-Bench as well as on the Hugging Face Open LLM Leaderboard.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a powerful tool for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) to improve complex reasoning abilities. However, state-of-the-art policy optimization methods often suffer from high computational overhead and memory consumption, primarily due to the need for multiple generations per prompt and the reliance on critic networks or advantage estimates of the current policy. In this paper, we propose A*-PO, a novel two-stage policy optimization framework that directly approximates the optimal advantage function and enables efficient training of LLMs for reasoning tasks. In the first stage, we leverage offline sampling from a reference policy to estimate the optimal value function V*, eliminating the need for costly online value estimation. In the second stage, we perform on-policy updates using a simple least-squares regression loss with only a single generation per prompt. Theoretically, we establish performance guarantees and prove that the KL-regularized RL objective can be optimized without requiring complex exploration strategies. Empirically, A*-PO achieves competitive performance across a wide range of mathematical reasoning benchmarks, while reducing training time by up to 2times and peak memory usage by over 30% compared to PPO, GRPO, and REBEL. Implementation of A*-PO can be found at https://github.com/ZhaolinGao/A-PO.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), regularization has emerged as a popular tool both in theory and practice, typically based either on an entropy bonus or a Kullback-Leibler divergence that constrains successive policies. In practice, these approaches have been shown to improve exploration, robustness and stability, giving rise to popular Deep RL algorithms such as SAC and TRPO. Policy Mirror Descent (PMD) is a theoretical framework that solves this general regularized policy optimization problem, however the closed-form solution involves the sum of all past Q-functions, which is intractable in practice. We propose and analyze PMD-like algorithms that only keep the last M Q-functions in memory, and show that for finite and large enough M, a convergent algorithm can be derived, introducing no error in the policy update, unlike prior deep RL PMD implementations. StaQ, the resulting algorithm, enjoys strong theoretical guarantees and is competitive with deep RL baselines, while exhibiting less performance oscillation, paving the way for fully stable deep RL algorithms and providing a testbed for experimentation with Policy Mirror Descent.

This paper studies the theoretical framework of the alignment process of generative models with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). We consider a standard mathematical formulation, the reverse-KL regularized contextual bandit for RLHF. Despite its widespread practical application, a rigorous theoretical analysis of this formulation remains open. We investigate its behavior in three distinct settings -- offline, online, and hybrid -- and propose efficient algorithms with finite-sample theoretical guarantees. Moving towards practical applications, our framework, with a robust approximation of the information-theoretical policy improvement oracle, naturally gives rise to several novel RLHF algorithms. This includes an iterative version of the Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) algorithm for online settings, and a multi-step rejection sampling strategy for offline scenarios. Our empirical evaluations on real-world alignment experiment of large language model demonstrate that these proposed methods significantly surpass existing strong baselines, such as DPO and Rejection Sampling Optimization (RSO), showcasing the connections between solid theoretical foundations and their powerful practical implementations.

We study how to learn ε-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of episodes, denoted by T. Existing procedures suffer from high variance due to the use of importance sampling over sequences of actions (Steinberger et al., 2020; McAleer et al., 2022). To reduce this variance, we consider a fixed sampling approach, where players still update their policies over time, but with observations obtained through a given fixed sampling policy. Our approach is based on an adaptive Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm that applies OMD locally to each information set, using individually decreasing learning rates and a regularized loss. We show that this approach guarantees a convergence rate of mathcal{O}(T^{-1/2}) with high probability and has a near-optimal dependence on the game parameters when applied with the best theoretical choices of learning rates and sampling policies. To achieve these results, we generalize the notion of OMD stabilization, allowing for time-varying regularization with convex increments.

We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium. While the O(1{T}) rate is tight for a large class of algorithms including the well-studied extragradient algorithm and optimistic gradient algorithm, it is not optimal for all gradient-based algorithms. We propose the accelerated optimistic gradient (AOG) algorithm, the first doubly optimal no-regret learning algorithm for smooth monotone games. Namely, our algorithm achieves both (i) the optimal O(T) regret in the adversarial setting under smooth and convex loss functions and (ii) the optimal O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium in multi-player smooth monotone games. As a byproduct of the accelerated last-iterate convergence rate, we further show that each player suffers only an O(log T) individual worst-case dynamic regret, providing an exponential improvement over the previous state-of-the-art O(T) bound.

We consider learning in an adversarial Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the loss functions can change arbitrarily over K episodes and the state space can be arbitrarily large. We assume that the Q-function of any policy is linear in some known features, that is, a linear function approximation exists. The best existing regret upper bound for this setting (Luo et al., 2021) is of order mathcal O(K^{2/3}) (omitting all other dependencies), given access to a simulator. This paper provides two algorithms that improve the regret to mathcal O(sqrt K) in the same setting. Our first algorithm makes use of a refined analysis of the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm with the log-barrier regularizer. This analysis allows the loss estimators to be arbitrarily negative and might be of independent interest. Our second algorithm develops a magnitude-reduced loss estimator, further removing the polynomial dependency on the number of actions in the first algorithm and leading to the optimal regret bound (up to logarithmic terms and dependency on the horizon). Moreover, we also extend the first algorithm to simulator-free linear MDPs, which achieves mathcal O(K^{8/9}) regret and greatly improves over the best existing bound mathcal O(K^{14/15}). This algorithm relies on a better alternative to the Matrix Geometric Resampling procedure by Neu & Olkhovskaya (2020), which could again be of independent interest.

Traditional Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) often relies on reward models, frequently assuming preference structures like the Bradley-Terry model, which may not accurately capture the complexities of real human preferences (e.g., intransitivity). Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) offers a more direct alternative by framing the problem as finding a Nash equilibrium of a game defined by these preferences. In this work, we introduce Nash Mirror Prox (Nash-MP), an online NLHF algorithm that leverages the Mirror Prox optimization scheme to achieve fast and stable convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis establishes that Nash-MP exhibits last-iterate linear convergence towards the beta-regularized Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that the KL-divergence to the optimal policy decreases at a rate of order (1+2beta)^{-N/2}, where N is a number of preference queries. We further demonstrate last-iterate linear convergence for the exploitability gap and uniformly for the span semi-norm of log-probabilities, with all these rates being independent of the size of the action space. Furthermore, we propose and analyze an approximate version of Nash-MP where proximal steps are estimated using stochastic policy gradients, making the algorithm closer to applications. Finally, we detail a practical implementation strategy for fine-tuning large language models and present experiments that demonstrate its competitive performance and compatibility with existing methods.

For RL algorithms, appropriate entropy control is crucial to their effectiveness. To control the policy entropy, a commonly used method is entropy regularization, which is adopted in various popular RL algorithms including PPO, SAC and A3C. Although entropy regularization proves effective in robotic and games RL conventionally, studies found that it gives weak to no gains in LLM-RL training. In this work, we study the issues of entropy bonus in LLM-RL setting. Specifically, we first argue that the conventional entropy regularization suffers from the LLM's extremely large response space and the sparsity of the optimal outputs. As a remedy, we propose AEnt, an entropy control method that utilizes a new clamped entropy bonus with an automatically adjusted coefficient. The clamped entropy is evaluated with the re-normalized policy defined on certain smaller token space, which encourages exploration within a more compact response set. In addition, the algorithm automatically adjusts entropy coefficient according to the clamped entropy value, effectively controlling the entropy-induced bias while leveraging the entropy's benefits. AEnt is tested in math-reasoning tasks under different base models and datasets, and it is observed that AEnt outperforms the baselines consistently across multiple benchmarks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is frequently employed in fine-tuning large language models (LMs), such as GPT-3, to penalize them for undesirable features of generated sequences, such as offensiveness, social bias, harmfulness or falsehood. The RL formulation involves treating the LM as a policy and updating it to maximise the expected value of a reward function which captures human preferences, such as non-offensiveness. In this paper, we analyze challenges associated with treating a language model as an RL policy and show how avoiding those challenges requires moving beyond the RL paradigm. We start by observing that the standard RL approach is flawed as an objective for fine-tuning LMs because it leads to distribution collapse: turning the LM into a degenerate distribution. Then, we analyze KL-regularised RL, a widely used recipe for fine-tuning LMs, which additionally constrains the fine-tuned LM to stay close to its original distribution in terms of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. We show that KL-regularised RL is equivalent to variational inference: approximating a Bayesian posterior which specifies how to update a prior LM to conform with evidence provided by the reward function. We argue that this Bayesian inference view of KL-regularised RL is more insightful than the typically employed RL perspective. The Bayesian inference view explains how KL-regularised RL avoids the distribution collapse problem and offers a first-principles derivation for its objective. While this objective happens to be equivalent to RL (with a particular choice of parametric reward), there exist other objectives for fine-tuning LMs which are no longer equivalent to RL. That observation leads to a more general point: RL is not an adequate formal framework for problems such as fine-tuning language models. These problems are best viewed as Bayesian inference: approximating a pre-defined target distribution.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form double oracle (XDO), respectively. In this study, we further examine the theoretical convergence rate and sample complexity of such regret minimization-based double oracle methods, utilizing a unified framework called Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle. Based on this framework, we extend ODO to extensive-form games and determine its sample complexity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the sample complexity of XDO can be exponential in the number of information sets |S|, owing to the exponentially decaying stopping threshold of restricted games. To solve this problem, we propose the Periodic Double Oracle (PDO) method, which has the lowest sample complexity among all existing double oracle methods, being only polynomial in |S|. Empirical evaluations on multiple poker and board games show that PDO achieves significantly faster convergence than previous double oracle algorithms and reaches a competitive level with state-of-the-art regret minimization methods.

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We address the challenge of exploration in reinforcement learning (RL) when the agent operates in an unknown environment with sparse or no rewards. In this work, we study the maximum entropy exploration problem of two different types. The first type is visitation entropy maximization previously considered by Hazan et al.(2019) in the discounted setting. For this type of exploration, we propose a game-theoretic algorithm that has mathcal{O}(H^3S^2A/varepsilon^2) sample complexity thus improving the varepsilon-dependence upon existing results, where S is a number of states, A is a number of actions, H is an episode length, and varepsilon is a desired accuracy. The second type of entropy we study is the trajectory entropy. This objective function is closely related to the entropy-regularized MDPs, and we propose a simple algorithm that has a sample complexity of order mathcal{O}(poly(S,A,H)/varepsilon). Interestingly, it is the first theoretical result in RL literature that establishes the potential statistical advantage of regularized MDPs for exploration. Finally, we apply developed regularization techniques to reduce sample complexity of visitation entropy maximization to mathcal{O}(H^2SA/varepsilon^2), yielding a statistical separation between maximum entropy exploration and reward-free exploration.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) aligns large language models (LLMs) by encouraging their generations to have high rewards, using a reward model trained on human preferences. To prevent the forgetting of pre-trained knowledge, RLHF usually incorporates a KL regularization; this forces the policy to remain close to its supervised fine-tuned initialization, though it hinders the reward optimization. To tackle the trade-off between KL and reward, in this paper we introduce a novel alignment strategy named Weight Averaged Rewarded Policies (WARP). WARP merges policies in the weight space at three distinct stages. First, it uses the exponential moving average of the policy as a dynamic anchor in the KL regularization. Second, it applies spherical interpolation to merge independently fine-tuned policies into a new enhanced one. Third, it linearly interpolates between this merged model and the initialization, to recover features from pre-training. This procedure is then applied iteratively, with each iteration's final model used as an advanced initialization for the next, progressively refining the KL-reward Pareto front, achieving superior rewards at fixed KL. Experiments with GEMMA policies validate that WARP improves their quality and alignment, outperforming other open-source LLMs.

In this work, we consider and analyze the sample complexity of model-free reinforcement learning with a generative model. Particularly, we analyze mirror descent value iteration (MDVI) by Geist et al. (2019) and Vieillard et al. (2020a), which uses the Kullback-Leibler divergence and entropy regularization in its value and policy updates. Our analysis shows that it is nearly minimax-optimal for finding an varepsilon-optimal policy when varepsilon is sufficiently small. This is the first theoretical result that demonstrates that a simple model-free algorithm without variance-reduction can be nearly minimax-optimal under the considered setting.

We propose a game-based formulation for learning dimensionality-reducing representations of feature vectors, when only a prior knowledge on future prediction tasks is available. In this game, the first player chooses a representation, and then the second player adversarially chooses a prediction task from a given class, representing the prior knowledge. The first player aims is to minimize, and the second player to maximize, the regret: The minimal prediction loss using the representation, compared to the same loss using the original features. For the canonical setting in which the representation, the response to predict and the predictors are all linear functions, and under the mean squared error loss function, we derive the theoretically optimal representation in pure strategies, which shows the effectiveness of the prior knowledge, and the optimal regret in mixed strategies, which shows the usefulness of randomizing the representation. For general representations and loss functions, we propose an efficient algorithm to optimize a randomized representation. The algorithm only requires the gradients of the loss function, and is based on incrementally adding a representation rule to a mixture of such rules.

Learning from human feedback has been shown to improve text-to-image models. These techniques first learn a reward function that captures what humans care about in the task and then improve the models based on the learned reward function. Even though relatively simple approaches (e.g., rejection sampling based on reward scores) have been investigated, fine-tuning text-to-image models with the reward function remains challenging. In this work, we propose using online reinforcement learning (RL) to fine-tune text-to-image models. We focus on diffusion models, defining the fine-tuning task as an RL problem, and updating the pre-trained text-to-image diffusion models using policy gradient to maximize the feedback-trained reward. Our approach, coined DPOK, integrates policy optimization with KL regularization. We conduct an analysis of KL regularization for both RL fine-tuning and supervised fine-tuning. In our experiments, we show that DPOK is generally superior to supervised fine-tuning with respect to both image-text alignment and image quality.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Classical convergence guarantees for gradient-based learning in games require the pseudo-gradient to be (strongly) monotone in Euclidean geometry as shown by rosen(1965), a condition that often fails even in simple games with strong cross-player couplings. We introduce Small-Gain Nash (SGN), a block small-gain condition in a custom block-weighted geometry. SGN converts local curvature and cross-player Lipschitz coupling bounds into a tractable certificate of contraction. It constructs a weighted block metric in which the pseudo-gradient becomes strongly monotone on any region where these bounds hold, even when it is non-monotone in the Euclidean sense. The continuous flow is exponentially contracting in this designed geometry, and projected Euler and RK4 discretizations converge under explicit step-size bounds derived from the SGN margin and a local Lipschitz constant. Our analysis reveals a certified ``timescale band'', a non-asymptotic, metric-based certificate that plays a TTUR-like role: rather than forcing asymptotic timescale separation via vanishing, unequal step sizes, SGN identifies a finite band of relative metric weights for which a single-step-size dynamics is provably contractive. We validate the framework on quadratic games where Euclidean monotonicity analysis fails to predict convergence, but SGN successfully certifies it, and extend the construction to mirror/Fisher geometries for entropy-regularized policy gradient in Markov games. The result is an offline certification pipeline that estimates curvature, coupling, and Lipschitz parameters on compact regions, optimizes block weights to enlarge the SGN margin, and returns a structural, computable convergence certificate consisting of a metric, contraction rate, and safe step-sizes for non-monotone games.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in performing complex multi-step reasoning, yet they continue to struggle with mathematical reasoning, often making systematic errors. A promising solution is reinforcement learning (RL) guided by reward models, particularly those focusing on process rewards, which score each intermediate step rather than solely evaluating the final outcome. This approach is more effective at guiding policy models towards correct reasoning trajectories. In this work, we propose an entropy-regularized process reward model (ER-PRM) that integrates KL-regularized Markov Decision Processes (MDP) to balance policy optimization with the need to prevent the policy from shifting too far from its initial distribution. We derive a novel reward construction method based on the theoretical results. Our theoretical analysis shows that we could derive the optimal reward model from the initial policy sampling. Our empirical experiments on the MATH and GSM8K benchmarks demonstrate that ER-PRM consistently outperforms existing process reward models, achieving 1% improvement on GSM8K and 2-3% improvement on MATH under best-of-N evaluation, and more than 1% improvement under RLHF. These results highlight the efficacy of entropy-regularization in enhancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

We propose a new class of online learning algorithms, generalized implicit Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL), that expands the scope of FTRL framework. Generalized implicit FTRL can recover known algorithms, as FTRL with linearized losses and implicit FTRL, and it allows the design of new update rules, as extensions of aProx and Mirror-Prox to FTRL. Our theory is constructive in the sense that it provides a simple unifying framework to design updates that directly improve the worst-case upper bound on the regret. The key idea is substituting the linearization of the losses with a Fenchel-Young inequality. We show the flexibility of the framework by proving that some known algorithms, like the Mirror-Prox updates, are instantiations of the generalized implicit FTRL. Finally, the new framework allows us to recover the temporal variation bound of implicit OMD, with the same computational complexity.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

Policy optimization methods are popular reinforcement learning algorithms in practice. Recent works have built theoretical foundation for them by proving T regret bounds even when the losses are adversarial. Such bounds are tight in the worst case but often overly pessimistic. In this work, we show that in tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs), by properly designing the regularizer, the exploration bonus and the learning rates, one can achieve a more favorable polylog(T) regret when the losses are stochastic, without sacrificing the worst-case guarantee in the adversarial regime. To our knowledge, this is also the first time a gap-dependent polylog(T) regret bound is shown for policy optimization. Specifically, we achieve this by leveraging a Tsallis entropy or a Shannon entropy regularizer in the policy update. Then we show that under known transitions, we can further obtain a first-order regret bound in the adversarial regime by leveraging the log-barrier regularizer.

Because it is difficult to precisely specify complex objectives, reinforcement learning policies are often optimized using proxy reward functions that only approximate the true goal. However, optimizing proxy rewards frequently leads to reward hacking: the optimized reward function ceases to be a good proxy and the resulting policy performs poorly with respect to the unspecified true reward. Principled solutions to reward hacking have been impeded by the lack of a good definition for the problem. To address this gap, we introduce a definition of reward hacking based on the correlation between proxy and true rewards for states and actions seen by a "base policy" that breaks down under optimization. We show that this definition captures reward hacking behavior across several realistic settings, including in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Using our formulation, we show theoretically that regularization to the base policy can effectively prevent reward hacking. While the current practice in RLHF applies a KL penalty between action distributions for this purpose, our theory suggests regularizing the chi^2 divergence between the policies' occupancy measures can be more effective. We intuitively show the benefits of this type of regularization and demonstrate that it better mitigates reward hacking in practice across four realistic settings, including RLHF. Our code is available at https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/orpo.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only feedback is realizations of the game (bandit feedback). In particular, the dynamic of the IIG is not known -- we can only access it by sampling or interacting with a game simulator. For this learning setting, we provide the Implicit Exploration Online Mirror Descent (IXOMD) algorithm. It is a model-free algorithm with a high-probability bound on the convergence rate to the NE of order 1/T where T is the number of played games. Moreover, IXOMD is computationally efficient as it needs to perform the updates only along the sampled trajectory.

On-policy reinforcement learning (RL) has become a popular framework for solving sequential decision problems due to its computational efficiency and theoretical simplicity. Some on-policy methods guarantee every policy update is constrained to a trust region relative to the prior policy to ensure training stability. These methods often require computationally intensive non-linear optimization or require a particular form of action distribution. In this work, we show that applying KL penalization alone is nearly sufficient to enforce such trust regions. Then, we show that introducing a "fixup" phase is sufficient to guarantee a trust region is enforced on every policy update while adding fewer than 5% additional gradient steps in practice. The resulting algorithm, which we call FixPO, is able to train a variety of policy architectures and action spaces, is easy to implement, and produces results competitive with other trust region methods.

We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret performance compared to existing approaches. The first algorithm, although computationally inefficient, ensures a regret of mathcal{O}left(Kright), where K is the number of episodes. This is the first result with the optimal K dependence in the considered setting. The second algorithm, which is based on the policy optimization framework, guarantees a regret of mathcal{O}left(K^{3{4}} right) and is computationally efficient. Both our results significantly improve over the state-of-the-art: a computationally inefficient algorithm by Kong et al. [2023] with mathcal{O}left(K^{4{5}}+polyleft(1{lambda_{min}}right) right) regret, for some problem-dependent constant lambda_{min} that can be arbitrarily close to zero, and a computationally efficient algorithm by Sherman et al. [2023b] with mathcal{O}left(K^{6{7}} right) regret.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Exploration is essential in modern learning, from reinforcement learning environments with small neural policies to large language models (LLMs). Existing work, such as DPO, leverages full sequence log-likelihoods to capture an entire trajectory of the model's decisions, while methods like GRPO aggregate per-token ratios into a trajectory-level update. However, both often limit exploration on long-horizon tasks. We introduce History-Aggregated Exploratory Policy Optimization (HAEPO), a history-aware exploratory loss to combat these shortcomings. HAEPO compresses each trajectory into the sum of its logarithmic probabilities (a cumulative logarithmic likelihood), and applies a Plackett-Luce softmax across trajectories to obtain normalized weights proportional to their returns, thus encouraging broader exploration. We add entropy regularization to stabilize the aggressive updates to prevent premature collapse and a soft KL penalty relative to a frozen copy of the previous (reference) policy. Empirically, HAEPO converges fast, explores thoroughly, aligns closely with true rewards, and demonstrates robust learning behavior better or at par with PPO, GRPO, and DPO across diverse tasks. Thus, HAEPO provides a stable and interpretable framework by explicitly leveraging full-trajectory history while balancing exploration and stability.

Mixture of experts (MoE) has a well-principled finite mixture model construction for prediction, allowing the gating network (mixture weights) to learn from the predictors (explanatory variables) together with the experts' network (mixture component densities). We investigate the estimation properties of MoEs in a high-dimensional setting, where the number of predictors is much larger than the sample size, for which the literature lacks computational and especially theoretical results. We consider the class of finite MoE models with softmax gating functions and Gaussian regression experts, and focus on the theoretical properties of their l_1-regularized estimation via the Lasso. We provide a lower bound on the regularization parameter of the Lasso penalty that ensures an l_1-oracle inequality is satisfied by the Lasso estimator according to the Kullback--Leibler loss. We further state an l_1-ball oracle inequality for the l_1-penalized maximum likelihood estimator from the model selection.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has propelled Large Language Models in complex reasoning, yet its scalability is often hindered by a training bottleneck where performance plateaus as policy entropy collapses, signaling a loss of exploration. Previous methods typically address this by maintaining high policy entropy, yet the precise mechanisms that govern meaningful exploration have remained underexplored. Our analysis suggests that an unselective focus on entropy risks amplifying irrelevant tokens and destabilizing training. This paper investigates the exploration dynamics within RLVR and identifies a key issue: the gradual elimination of valuable low-probability exploratory tokens, which we term \textit{reasoning sparks}. We find that while abundant in pre-trained models, these sparks are systematically extinguished during RLVR due to over-penalization, leading to a degeneracy in exploration. To address this, we introduce Low-probability Regularization (Lp-Reg). Its core mechanism regularizes the policy towards a heuristic proxy distribution. This proxy is constructed by filtering out presumed noise tokens and re-normalizing the distribution over the remaining candidates. The result is a less-noisy proxy where the probability of reasoning sparks is amplified, which then serves as a soft regularization target to shield these valuable tokens from elimination via KL divergence. Experiments show that Lp-Reg enables stable on-policy training for around 1,000 steps, a regime where baseline entropy-control methods collapse. This sustained exploration leads to state-of-the-art performance, achieving a 60.17% average accuracy on five math benchmarks, an improvement of 2.66% over prior methods. Code is available at https://github.com/CarlanLark/Lp-Reg.

We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often requiring hundreds of years of experience to produce competitive agents. Our approach is based on model-based planning. We tackle the problem of partial observability by first building an (oracle) planner that has access to the full state of the environment and then distilling the knowledge of the oracle to a (follower) agent which is trained to play the imperfect-information game by imitating the oracle's choices. We experimentally show that planning with naive Monte Carlo tree search does not perform very well in large combinatorial action spaces. We therefore propose planning with a fixed-depth tree search and decoupled Thompson sampling for action selection. We show that the planner is able to discover efficient playing strategies in the games of Clash Royale and Pommerman and the follower policy successfully learns to implement them by training on a few hundred battles.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Large language models (LLMs) have been increasingly employed for (interactive) decision-making, via the development of LLM-based autonomous agents. Despite their emerging successes, the performance of LLM agents in decision-making has not been fully investigated through quantitative metrics, especially in the multi-agent setting when they interact with each other, a typical scenario in real-world LLM-agent applications. To better understand the limits of LLM agents in these interactive environments, we propose to study their interactions in benchmark decision-making settings in online learning and game theory, through the performance metric of regret. We first empirically study the {no-regret} behaviors of LLMs in canonical (non-stationary) online learning problems, as well as the emergence of equilibria when LLM agents interact through playing repeated games. We then provide some theoretical insights into the no-regret behaviors of LLM agents, under certain assumptions on the supervised pre-training and the rationality model of human decision-makers who generate the data. Notably, we also identify (simple) cases where advanced LLMs such as GPT-4 fail to be no-regret. To promote the no-regret behaviors, we propose a novel unsupervised training loss of regret-loss, which, in contrast to the supervised pre-training loss, does not require the labels of (optimal) actions. We then establish the statistical guarantee of generalization bound for regret-loss minimization, followed by the optimization guarantee that minimizing such a loss may automatically lead to known no-regret learning algorithms. Our further experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our regret-loss, especially in addressing the above ``regrettable'' cases.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

Modern neural models trained on textual data rely on pre-trained representations that emerge without direct supervision. As these representations are increasingly being used in real-world applications, the inability to control their content becomes an increasingly important problem. We formulate the problem of identifying and erasing a linear subspace that corresponds to a given concept, in order to prevent linear predictors from recovering the concept. We model this problem as a constrained, linear maximin game, and show that existing solutions are generally not optimal for this task. We derive a closed-form solution for certain objectives, and propose a convex relaxation, \method, that works well for others. When evaluated in the context of binary gender removal, the method recovers a low-dimensional subspace whose removal mitigates bias by intrinsic and extrinsic evaluation. We show that the method is highly expressive, effectively mitigating bias in deep nonlinear classifiers while maintaining tractability and interpretability.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

Recent advances in large language model (LLM) post-training have leveraged two distinct paradigms to enhance reasoning capabilities: reinforcement learning (RL) and knowledge distillation (KD). While RL enables the emergence of complex reasoning behaviors, it often suffers from low sample efficiency when the initial policy struggles to explore high-reward trajectories. Conversely, KD improves learning efficiency via mimicking the teacher model but tends to generalize poorly to out-of-domain scenarios. In this work, we present KDRL, a unified post-training framework that jointly optimizes a reasoning model through teacher supervision (KD) and self-exploration (RL). Specifically, KDRL leverages policy gradient optimization to simultaneously minimize the reverse Kullback-Leibler divergence (RKL) between the student and teacher distributions while maximizing the expected rule-based rewards. We first formulate a unified objective that integrates GRPO and KD, and systematically explore how different KL approximations, KL coefficients, and reward-guided KD strategies affect the overall post-training dynamics and performance. Empirical results on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that KDRL outperforms GRPO and various KD baselines while achieving a favorable balance between performance and reasoning token efficiency. These findings indicate that integrating KD and RL serves as an effective and efficient strategy to train reasoning LLMs.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has recently enhanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), particularly for mathematical problem solving. However, a fundamental limitation remains: as the sampling budget increases, the advantage of RLVR-trained models over their pretrained bases often diminishes or even vanishes, revealing a strong dependence on the base model's restricted search space. We attribute this phenomenon to the widespread use of the reverse Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence regularizer, whose mode-seeking behavior keeps the policy trapped inside the base model's support region and hampers wider exploration. To address this issue, we propose RAPO (Rewards-Aware Policy Optimization), an algorithm to promote broader yet focused exploration. Our method (i) utilizes the forward KL penalty to replace the reverse KL penalty for out-of-distribution exploration, and (ii) reweights the reference policy to facilitate adaptive in-distribution exploration. We train Qwen2.5-3B and 7B models with RAPO on the 8K SimpleRL-Zero dataset, without supervised fine-tuning, and evaluate them on AIME2024 and AIME2025. Results show that RAPO consistently improves problem-solving performance. Notably, RAPO enables models to surpass the base model's performance ceiling and solves previously intractable problems, advancing the frontier of RLVR for challenging reasoning tasks.

The controllable generation of diffusion models aims to steer the model to generate samples that optimize some given objective functions. It is desirable for a variety of applications including image generation, molecule generation, and DNA/sequence generation. Reinforcement Learning (RL) based fine-tuning of the base model is a popular approach but it can overfit the reward function while requiring significant resources. We frame controllable generation as a problem of finding a distribution that optimizes a KL-regularized objective function. We present SLCD -- Supervised Learning based Controllable Diffusion, which iteratively generates online data and trains a small classifier to guide the generation of the diffusion model. Similar to the standard classifier-guided diffusion, SLCD's key computation primitive is classification and does not involve any complex concepts from RL or control. Via a reduction to no-regret online learning analysis, we show that under KL divergence, the output from SLCD provably converges to the optimal solution of the KL-regularized objective. Further, we empirically demonstrate that SLCD can generate high quality samples with nearly the same inference time as the base model in both image generation with continuous diffusion and biological sequence generation with discrete diffusion. Our code is available at https://github.com/Owen-Oertell/slcd

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has delivered impressive gains in mathematical and multimodal reasoning and has become a standard post-training paradigm for contemporary language and vision-language models. However, the RLVR recipe introduces a significant risk of capability regression, where models forget foundational skills after prolonged training without employing regularization strategies. We empirically confirm this concern, observing that open-source reasoning models suffer performance degradation on core capabilities such as perception and faithfulness. While imposing regularization terms like KL divergence can help prevent deviation from the base model, these terms are calculated on the current task, thus they do not guarantee broader knowledge. Meanwhile, commonly used experience replay across heterogeneous domains makes it nontrivial to decide how much training focus each objective should receive. To address this, we propose RECAP-a replay strategy with dynamic objective reweighting for general knowledge preservation. Our reweighting mechanism adapts in an online manner using short-horizon signals of convergence and instability, shifting the post-training focus away from saturated objectives and toward underperforming or volatile ones. Our method is end-to-end and readily applicable to existing RLVR pipelines without training additional models or heavy tuning. Extensive experiments on benchmarks based on Qwen2.5-VL-3B and Qwen2.5-VL-7B demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, which not only preserves general capabilities but also improves reasoning by enabling more flexible trade-offs among in-task rewards.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

Recent advancements in reasoning-focused language models such as OpenAI's O1 and DeepSeek-R1 have shown that scaling test-time computation-through chain-of-thought reasoning and iterative exploration-can yield substantial improvements on complex tasks like mathematics and code generation. These breakthroughs have been driven by large-scale reinforcement learning (RL), particularly when combined with verifiable reward signals that provide objective and grounded supervision. In this report, we investigate the effects of prolonged reinforcement learning on a small language model across a diverse set of reasoning domains. Our work identifies several key ingredients for effective training, including the use of verifiable reward tasks, enhancements to Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), and practical techniques to improve training stability and generalization. We introduce controlled KL regularization, clipping ratio, and periodic reference policy resets as critical components for unlocking long-term performance gains. Our model achieves significant improvements over strong baselines, including +14.7% on math, +13.9% on coding, and +54.8% on logic puzzle tasks. To facilitate continued research, we release our model publicly.

Learning from human preference data has emerged as the dominant paradigm for fine-tuning large language models (LLMs). The two most common families of techniques -- online reinforcement learning (RL) such as Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and offline contrastive methods such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) -- were positioned as equivalent in prior work due to the fact that both have to start from the same offline preference dataset. To further expand our theoretical understanding of the similarities and differences between online and offline techniques for preference fine-tuning, we conduct a rigorous analysis through the lens of dataset coverage, a concept that captures how the training data covers the test distribution and is widely used in RL. We prove that a global coverage condition is both necessary and sufficient for offline contrastive methods to converge to the optimal policy, but a weaker partial coverage condition suffices for online RL methods. This separation provides one explanation of why online RL methods can perform better than offline methods, especially when the offline preference data is not diverse enough. Finally, motivated by our preceding theoretical observations, we derive a hybrid preference optimization (HyPO) algorithm that uses offline data for contrastive-based preference optimization and online data for KL regularization. Theoretically and empirically, we demonstrate that HyPO is more performant than its pure offline counterpart DPO, while still preserving its computation and memory efficiency.

We generalize gradient descent with momentum for optimization in differentiable games to have complex-valued momentum. We give theoretical motivation for our method by proving convergence on bilinear zero-sum games for simultaneous and alternating updates. Our method gives real-valued parameter updates, making it a drop-in replacement for standard optimizers. We empirically demonstrate that complex-valued momentum can improve convergence in realistic adversarial games - like generative adversarial networks - by showing we can find better solutions with an almost identical computational cost. We also show a practical generalization to a complex-valued Adam variant, which we use to train BigGAN to better inception scores on CIFAR-10.

Let p denote a generative language model. Let r denote a reward model that returns a scalar that captures the degree at which a draw from p is preferred. The goal of language model alignment is to alter p to a new distribution phi that results in a higher expected reward while keeping phi close to p. A popular alignment method is the KL-constrained reinforcement learning (RL), which chooses a distribution phi_Delta that maximizes E_{phi_{Delta}} r(y) subject to a relative entropy constraint KL(phi_Delta || p) leq Delta. Another simple alignment method is best-of-N, where N samples are drawn from p and one with highest reward is selected. In this paper, we offer a closed-form characterization of the optimal KL-constrained RL solution. We demonstrate that any alignment method that achieves a comparable trade-off between KL divergence and reward must approximate the optimal KL-constrained RL solution in terms of relative entropy. To further analyze the properties of alignment methods, we introduce two simplifying assumptions: we let the language model be memoryless, and the reward model be linear. Although these assumptions may not reflect complex real-world scenarios, they enable a precise characterization of the asymptotic behavior of both the best-of-N alignment, and the KL-constrained RL method, in terms of information-theoretic quantities. We prove that the reward of the optimal KL-constrained RL solution satisfies a large deviation principle, and we fully characterize its rate function. We also show that the rate of growth of the scaled cumulants of the reward is characterized by a proper Renyi cross entropy. Finally, we show that best-of-N is asymptotically equivalent to KL-constrained RL solution by proving that their expected rewards are asymptotically equal, and concluding that the two distributions must be close in KL divergence.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Training LLM agents in multi-turn environments with sparse rewards, where completing a single task requires 30+ turns of interaction within an episode, presents a fundamental challenge for reinforcement learning. We identify a critical failure mode unique to this setting: the exploration-exploitation cascade failure. This cascade begins with early-stage policy premature convergence, where sparse feedback causes agents to commit to flawed, low-entropy strategies. Subsequently, agents enter late-stage policy collapse, where conventional entropy regularization becomes counterproductive, promoting chaotic exploration that destabilizes training. We propose Entropy-regularized Policy Optimization (EPO), a general framework that breaks this failure cycle through three synergistic mechanisms: (1) adopting entropy regularization in multi-turn settings to enhance exploration, (2) an entropy smoothing regularizer that bounds policy entropy within historical averages to prevent abrupt fluctuations, and (3) adaptive phase-based weighting that balances exploration and exploitation across training. Our analysis justifies that EPO guarantees monotonically decreasing entropy variance while maintaining convergence. EPO achieves up to 152% performance improvement on ScienceWorld and up to 19.8% on ALFWorld. Our work demonstrates that multi-turn sparse-reward settings require fundamentally different entropy control than traditional RL, with broad implications for LLM agent training.

We show that Reinforcement Learning (RL) methods for solving Text-Based Games (TBGs) often fail to generalize on unseen games, especially in small data regimes. To address this issue, we propose Context Relevant Episodic State Truncation (CREST) for irrelevant token removal in observation text for improved generalization. Our method first trains a base model using Q-learning, which typically overfits the training games. The base model's action token distribution is used to perform observation pruning that removes irrelevant tokens. A second bootstrapped model is then retrained on the pruned observation text. Our bootstrapped agent shows improved generalization in solving unseen TextWorld games, using 10x-20x fewer training games compared to previous state-of-the-art methods despite requiring less number of training episodes.

In the misspecified kernel ridge regression problem, researchers usually assume the underground true function f_{rho}^{*} in [H]^{s}, a less-smooth interpolation space of a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) H for some sin (0,1). The existing minimax optimal results require |f_{rho}^{*}|_{L^{infty}}<infty which implicitly requires s > alpha_{0} where alpha_{0}in (0,1) is the embedding index, a constant depending on H. Whether the KRR is optimal for all sin (0,1) is an outstanding problem lasting for years. In this paper, we show that KRR is minimax optimal for any sin (0,1) when the H is a Sobolev RKHS.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

Real-world reinforcement learning (RL) is often severely limited since typical RL algorithms heavily rely on the reset mechanism to sample proper initial states. In practice, the reset mechanism is expensive to implement due to the need for human intervention or heavily engineered environments. To make learning more practical, we propose a generic no-regret reduction to systematically design reset-free RL algorithms. Our reduction turns reset-free RL into a two-player game. We show that achieving sublinear regret in this two-player game would imply learning a policy that has both sublinear performance regret and sublinear total number of resets in the original RL problem. This means that the agent eventually learns to perform optimally and avoid resets. By this reduction, we design an instantiation for linear Markov decision processes, which is the first provably correct reset-free RL algorithm to our knowledge.

We introduce a framework for translating game descriptions in natural language into extensive-form representations in game theory, leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and in-context learning. Given the varying levels of strategic complexity in games, such as perfect versus imperfect information, directly applying in-context learning would be insufficient. To address this, we introduce a two-stage framework with specialized modules to enhance in-context learning, enabling it to divide and conquer the problem effectively. In the first stage, we tackle the challenge of imperfect information by developing a module that identifies information sets along and the corresponding partial tree structure. With this information, the second stage leverages in-context learning alongside a self-debugging module to produce a complete extensive-form game tree represented using pygambit, the Python API of a recognized game-theoretic analysis tool called Gambit. Using this python representation enables the automation of tasks such as computing Nash equilibria directly from natural language descriptions. We evaluate the performance of the full framework, as well as its individual components, using various LLMs on games with different levels of strategic complexity. Our experimental results show that the framework significantly outperforms baseline models in generating accurate extensive-form games, with each module playing a critical role in its success.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

The kernel thinning (KT) algorithm of Dwivedi and Mackey (2021) compresses a probability distribution more effectively than independent sampling by targeting a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) and leveraging a less smooth square-root kernel. Here we provide four improvements. First, we show that KT applied directly to the target RKHS yields tighter, dimension-free guarantees for any kernel, any distribution, and any fixed function in the RKHS. Second, we show that, for analytic kernels like Gaussian, inverse multiquadric, and sinc, target KT admits maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) guarantees comparable to or better than those of square-root KT without making explicit use of a square-root kernel. Third, we prove that KT with a fractional power kernel yields better-than-Monte-Carlo MMD guarantees for non-smooth kernels, like Laplace and Mat\'ern, that do not have square-roots. Fourth, we establish that KT applied to a sum of the target and power kernels (a procedure we call KT+) simultaneously inherits the improved MMD guarantees of power KT and the tighter individual function guarantees of target KT. In our experiments with target KT and KT+, we witness significant improvements in integration error even in 100 dimensions and when compressing challenging differential equation posteriors.

Existing imitation learning methods mainly focus on making an agent effectively mimic a demonstrated behavior, but do not address the potential contradiction between the behavior style and the objective of a task. There is a general lack of efficient methods that allow an agent to partially imitate a demonstrated behavior to varying degrees, while completing the main objective of a task. In this paper we propose a method called Regularized Soft Actor-Critic which formulates the main task and the imitation task under the Constrained Markov Decision Process framework (CMDP). The main task is defined as the maximum entropy objective used in Soft Actor-Critic (SAC) and the imitation task is defined as a constraint. We evaluate our method on continuous control tasks relevant to video games applications.

Policy-based methods currently dominate reinforcement learning (RL) pipelines for large language model (LLM) reasoning, leaving value-based approaches largely unexplored. We revisit the classical paradigm of Bellman Residual Minimization and introduce Trajectory Bellman Residual Minimization (TBRM), an algorithm that naturally adapts this idea to LLMs, yielding a simple yet effective off-policy algorithm that optimizes a single trajectory-level Bellman objective using the model's own logits as Q-values. TBRM removes the need for critics, importance-sampling ratios, or clipping, and operates with only one rollout per prompt. We prove convergence to the near-optimal KL-regularized policy from arbitrary off-policy data via an improved change-of-trajectory-measure analysis. Experiments on standard mathematical-reasoning benchmarks show that TBRM consistently outperforms policy-based baselines, like PPO and GRPO, with comparable or lower computational and memory overhead. Our results indicate that value-based RL might be a principled and efficient alternative for enhancing reasoning capabilities in LLMs.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

This paper re-examines a continuous optimization framework dubbed NOTEARS for learning Bayesian networks. We first generalize existing algebraic characterizations of acyclicity to a class of matrix polynomials. Next, focusing on a one-parameter-per-edge setting, it is shown that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions for the NOTEARS formulation cannot be satisfied except in a trivial case, which explains a behavior of the associated algorithm. We then derive the KKT conditions for an equivalent reformulation, show that they are indeed necessary, and relate them to explicit constraints that certain edges be absent from the graph. If the score function is convex, these KKT conditions are also sufficient for local minimality despite the non-convexity of the constraint. Informed by the KKT conditions, a local search post-processing algorithm is proposed and shown to substantially and universally improve the structural Hamming distance of all tested algorithms, typically by a factor of 2 or more. Some combinations with local search are both more accurate and more efficient than the original NOTEARS.

Offline preference optimization allows fine-tuning large models directly from offline data, and has proved effective in recent alignment practices. We propose generalized preference optimization (GPO), a family of offline losses parameterized by a general class of convex functions. GPO enables a unified view over preference optimization, encompassing existing algorithms such as DPO, IPO and SLiC as special cases, while naturally introducing new variants. The GPO framework also sheds light on how offline algorithms enforce regularization, through the design of the convex function that defines the loss. Our analysis and experiments reveal the connections and subtle differences between the offline regularization and the KL divergence regularization intended by the canonical RLHF formulation. In a controlled setting akin to Gao et al 2023, we also show that different GPO variants achieve similar trade-offs between regularization and performance, though the optimal values of hyper-parameter might differ as predicted by theory. In all, our results present new algorithmic toolkits and empirical insights to alignment practitioners.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

A simple and effective method for the alignment of generative models is the best-of-n policy, where n samples are drawn from a base policy, and ranked based on a reward function, and the highest ranking one is selected. A commonly used analytical expression in the literature claims that the KL divergence between the best-of-n policy and the base policy is equal to log (n) - (n-1)/n. We disprove the validity of this claim, and show that it is an upper bound on the actual KL divergence. We also explore the tightness of this upper bound in different regimes. Finally, we propose a new estimator for the KL divergence and empirically show that it provides a tight approximation through a few examples.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) emerges as a promising paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs). However, a notable challenge in RLHF is overoptimization, where beyond a certain threshold, the pursuit of higher rewards leads to a decline in human preferences. In this paper, we observe the weakness of KL regularization which is commonly employed in existing RLHF methods to address overoptimization. To mitigate this limitation, we scrutinize the RLHF objective in the offline dataset and propose uncertainty-penalized RLHF (UP-RLHF), which incorporates uncertainty regularization during RL-finetuning. To enhance the uncertainty quantification abilities for reward models, we first propose a diverse low-rank adaptation (LoRA) ensemble by maximizing the nuclear norm of LoRA matrix concatenations. Then we optimize policy models utilizing penalized rewards, determined by both rewards and uncertainties provided by the diverse reward LoRA ensembles. Our experimental results, based on two real human preference datasets, showcase the effectiveness of diverse reward LoRA ensembles in quantifying reward uncertainty. Additionally, uncertainty regularization in UP-RLHF proves to be pivotal in mitigating overoptimization, thereby contributing to the overall performance.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

We consider the problem of conformal prediction under covariate shift. Given labeled data from a source domain and unlabeled data from a covariate shifted target domain, we seek to construct prediction sets with valid marginal coverage in the target domain. Most existing methods require estimating the unknown likelihood ratio function, which can be prohibitive for high-dimensional data such as images. To address this challenge, we introduce the likelihood ratio regularized quantile regression (LR-QR) algorithm, which combines the pinball loss with a novel choice of regularization in order to construct a threshold function without directly estimating the unknown likelihood ratio. We show that the LR-QR method has coverage at the desired level in the target domain, up to a small error term that we can control. Our proofs draw on a novel analysis of coverage via stability bounds from learning theory. Our experiments demonstrate that the LR-QR algorithm outperforms existing methods on high-dimensional prediction tasks, including a regression task for the Communities and Crime dataset, an image classification task from the WILDS repository, and an LLM question-answering task on the MMLU benchmark.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

We consider the exploration-exploitation dilemma in finite-horizon reinforcement learning problems whose state-action space is endowed with a metric. We introduce Kernel-UCBVI, a model-based optimistic algorithm that leverages the smoothness of the MDP and a non-parametric kernel estimator of the rewards and transitions to efficiently balance exploration and exploitation. For problems with K episodes and horizon H, we provide a regret bound of Oleft( H^3 K^{2d{2d+1}}right), where d is the covering dimension of the joint state-action space. This is the first regret bound for kernel-based RL using smoothing kernels, which requires very weak assumptions on the MDP and has been previously applied to a wide range of tasks. We empirically validate our approach in continuous MDPs with sparse rewards.

We provide a theoretical framework for Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Our analysis shows that when the true reward function is linear, the widely used maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) converges under both the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model and the Plackett-Luce (PL) model. However, we show that when training a policy based on the learned reward model, MLE fails while a pessimistic MLE provides policies with improved performance under certain coverage assumptions. Additionally, we demonstrate that under the PL model, the true MLE and an alternative MLE that splits the K-wise comparison into pairwise comparisons both converge. Moreover, the true MLE is asymptotically more efficient. Our results validate the empirical success of existing RLHF algorithms in InstructGPT and provide new insights for algorithm design. Furthermore, our results unify the problem of RLHF and max-entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL), and provide the first sample complexity bound for max-entropy IRL.

In the post-training of large language models (LLMs), Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is an effective approach to achieve generation aligned with human preferences. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) allows for policy training with a simple binary cross-entropy loss without a reward model. The objective of DPO is regularized by reverse KL divergence that encourages mode-seeking fitting to the reference policy. Nonetheless, we indicate that minimizing reverse KL divergence could fail to capture a mode of the reference distribution, which may hurt the policy's performance. Based on this observation, we propose a simple modification to DPO, H-DPO, which allows for control over the entropy of the resulting policy, enhancing the distribution's sharpness and thereby enabling mode-seeking fitting more effectively. In our experiments, we show that H-DPO outperformed DPO across various tasks, demonstrating superior results in pass@k evaluations for mathematical tasks. Moreover, H-DPO is simple to implement, requiring only minor modifications to the loss calculation of DPO, which makes it highly practical and promising for wide-ranging applications in the training of LLMs.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Neural network pruning is widely used to reduce model size and computational cost. Yet, most existing methods treat sparsity as an externally imposed constraint, enforced through heuristic importance scores or training-time regularization. In this work, we propose a fundamentally different perspective: pruning as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among model components. We model parameter groups such as weights, neurons, or filters as players in a continuous non-cooperative game, where each player selects its level of participation in the network to balance contribution against redundancy and competition. Within this formulation, sparsity emerges naturally when continued participation becomes a dominated strategy at equilibrium. We analyze the resulting game and show that dominated players collapse to zero participation under mild conditions, providing a principled explanation for pruning behavior. Building on this insight, we derive a simple equilibrium-driven pruning algorithm that jointly updates network parameters and participation variables without relying on explicit importance scores. This work focuses on establishing a principled formulation and empirical validation of pruning as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than exhaustive architectural or large-scale benchmarking. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves competitive sparsity-accuracy trade-offs while offering an interpretable, theory-grounded alternative to existing pruning methods.

Despite the great empirical success of deep reinforcement learning, its theoretical foundation is less well understood. In this work, we make the first attempt to theoretically understand the deep Q-network (DQN) algorithm (Mnih et al., 2015) from both algorithmic and statistical perspectives. In specific, we focus on a slight simplification of DQN that fully captures its key features. Under mild assumptions, we establish the algorithmic and statistical rates of convergence for the action-value functions of the iterative policy sequence obtained by DQN. In particular, the statistical error characterizes the bias and variance that arise from approximating the action-value function using deep neural network, while the algorithmic error converges to zero at a geometric rate. As a byproduct, our analysis provides justifications for the techniques of experience replay and target network, which are crucial to the empirical success of DQN. Furthermore, as a simple extension of DQN, we propose the Minimax-DQN algorithm for zero-sum Markov game with two players. Borrowing the analysis of DQN, we also quantify the difference between the policies obtained by Minimax-DQN and the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game in terms of both the algorithmic and statistical rates of convergence.

Recently, the study of linear misspecified bandits has generated intriguing implications of the hardness of learning in bandits and reinforcement learning (RL). In particular, Du et al. (2020) show that even if a learner is given linear features in R^d that approximate the rewards in a bandit or RL with a uniform error of varepsilon, searching for an O(varepsilon)-optimal action requires pulling at least Omega(exp(d)) queries. Furthermore, Lattimore et al. (2020) show that a degraded O(varepsilond)-optimal solution can be learned within poly(d/varepsilon) queries. Yet it is unknown whether a structural assumption on the ground-truth parameter, such as sparsity, could break the varepsilond barrier. In this paper, we address this question by showing that algorithms can obtain O(varepsilon)-optimal actions by querying O(varepsilon^{-s}d^s) actions, where s is the sparsity parameter, removing the exp(d)-dependence. We then establish information-theoretical lower bounds, i.e., Omega(exp(s)), to show that our upper bound on sample complexity is nearly tight if one demands an error O(s^{delta}varepsilon) for 0<delta<1. For deltageq 1, we further show that poly(s/varepsilon) queries are possible when the linear features are "good" and even in general settings. These results provide a nearly complete picture of how sparsity can help in misspecified bandit learning and provide a deeper understanding of when linear features are "useful" for bandit and reinforcement learning with misspecification.

Many important optimization problems, such as the minimum spanning tree and minimum-cost flow, can be solved optimally by a greedy method. In this work, we study a learning variant of these problems, where the model of the problem is unknown and has to be learned by interacting repeatedly with the environment in the bandit setting. We formalize our learning problem quite generally, as learning how to maximize an unknown modular function on a known polymatroid. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm for solving our problem and bound its expected cumulative regret. Our gap-dependent upper bound is tight up to a constant and our gap-free upper bound is tight up to polylogarithmic factors. Finally, we evaluate our method on three problems and demonstrate that it is practical.

Despite the widespread empirical success of ResNet, the generalization properties of deep ResNet are rarely explored beyond the lazy training regime. In this work, we investigate scaled ResNet in the limit of infinitely deep and wide neural networks, of which the gradient flow is described by a partial differential equation in the large-neural network limit, i.e., the mean-field regime. To derive the generalization bounds under this setting, our analysis necessitates a shift from the conventional time-invariant Gram matrix employed in the lazy training regime to a time-variant, distribution-dependent version. To this end, we provide a global lower bound on the minimum eigenvalue of the Gram matrix under the mean-field regime. Besides, for the traceability of the dynamic of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, we establish the linear convergence of the empirical error and estimate the upper bound of the KL divergence over parameters distribution. Finally, we build the uniform convergence for generalization bound via Rademacher complexity. Our results offer new insights into the generalization ability of deep ResNet beyond the lazy training regime and contribute to advancing the understanding of the fundamental properties of deep neural networks.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has shown great promise in enhancing the reasoning abilities of large reasoning models (LRMs). However, it suffers from a critical issue: entropy collapse and premature convergence. Naive entropy regularization, a common approach for encouraging exploration in the traditional RL literature, fails to address this problem in the context of LRM. Our analysis reveals that this failure stems from the vast action space and long trajectories in LRMs, which easily trigger a global entropy explosion as the model indiscriminately explores all possible actions and states. To address this, we propose SIREN (SelectIve entRopy rEgularizatioN), a method that confines exploration to a meaningful subset of actions and states. SIREN achieves this through a two-step entropy masking mechanism, consisting of a top-p mask and a peak-entropy mask. In addition, regularization is transformed into a self-anchored form to stabilize training. Across five mathematical benchmarks, SIREN attains superior average performance over previous entropy-related RLVR approaches, exemplified by a +6.6 maj@k improvement on AIME24/25 with Qwen2.5-Math-7B. Further analysis confirms that SIREN promotes greater response diversity and maintains entropy at an appropriate level, which helps to preserve the validation pass@k throughout training. This effectively mitigates the premature convergence problem common in RLVR for LRM.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their proficiency in complex reasoning tasks, their performance in dynamic, interactive, and competitive scenarios - such as business strategy and stock market analysis - remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we formally explore the dynamic reasoning capabilities of LLMs for decision-making in rapidly evolving environments. We introduce two game theory-based pilot challenges that mirror the complexities of real-world dynamic decision-making. These challenges are well-defined, enabling clear, controllable, and precise evaluation of LLMs' dynamic reasoning abilities. Through extensive experiments, we find that existing reasoning methods tend to falter in dynamic settings that require k-level thinking - a key concept not tackled by previous works. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning approach for LLMs, named "K-Level Reasoning". This approach adopts the perspective of rivals to recursively employ k-level thinking based on available historical information, which significantly improves the prediction accuracy of rivals' subsequent moves and informs more strategic decision-making. This research not only sets a robust quantitative benchmark for the assessment of dynamic reasoning but also markedly enhances the proficiency of LLMs in dynamic contexts.

The dominant line of work in domain adaptation has focused on learning invariant representations using domain-adversarial training. In this paper, we interpret this approach from a game theoretical perspective. Defining optimal solutions in domain-adversarial training as a local Nash equilibrium, we show that gradient descent in domain-adversarial training can violate the asymptotic convergence guarantees of the optimizer, oftentimes hindering the transfer performance. Our analysis leads us to replace gradient descent with high-order ODE solvers (i.e., Runge-Kutta), for which we derive asymptotic convergence guarantees. This family of optimizers is significantly more stable and allows more aggressive learning rates, leading to high performance gains when used as a drop-in replacement over standard optimizers. Our experiments show that in conjunction with state-of-the-art domain-adversarial methods, we achieve up to 3.5% improvement with less than of half training iterations. Our optimizers are easy to implement, free of additional parameters, and can be plugged into any domain-adversarial framework.

Test-time reasoning significantly enhances pre-trained AI agents' performance. However, it requires an explicit environment model, often unavailable or overly complex in real-world scenarios. While MuZero enables effective model learning for search in perfect information games, extending this paradigm to imperfect information games presents substantial challenges due to more nuanced look-ahead reasoning techniques and large number of states relevant for individual decisions. This paper introduces an algorithm LAMIR that learns an abstracted model of an imperfect information game directly from the agent-environment interaction. During test time, this trained model is used to perform look-ahead reasoning. The learned abstraction limits the size of each subgame to a manageable size, making theoretically principled look-ahead reasoning tractable even in games where previous methods could not scale. We empirically demonstrate that with sufficient capacity, LAMIR learns the exact underlying game structure, and with limited capacity, it still learns a valuable abstraction, which improves game playing performance of the pre-trained agents even in large games.

Interactive fiction games have emerged as an important application to improve the generalization capabilities of language-based reinforcement learning (RL) agents. Existing environments for interactive fiction games are domain-specific or time-consuming to generate and do not train the RL agents to master a specific set of skills. In this work, we introduce an interactive environment for self-supervised RL, STARLING, for text-based games that bootstraps the text-based RL agents with automatically generated games (based on the seed set of game ideas) to boost the performance and generalization capabilities to reach a goal of the target environment. These games let the agent hone their skills on a predefined set of tasks. We create and test an environment with 100 games, generated using this automated framework that uses large language models (GPT-3) and an interactive fiction game engine (based on Inform7) to provide the user with the ability to generate more games under minimal human supervision. Experimental results based on both the human participants and baseline text-based RL agents reveal that current state-of-the-art text-based RL agents cannot use previously learned skills in new situations at the level humans can. These results enforce STARLING's potential to serve as a sandbox environment for further research in self-supervised text-based RL.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

The vast majority of Reinforcement Learning methods is largely impacted by the computation effort and data requirements needed to obtain effective estimates of action-value functions, which in turn determine the quality of the overall performance and the sample-efficiency of the learning procedure. Typically, action-value functions are estimated through an iterative scheme that alternates the application of an empirical approximation of the Bellman operator and a subsequent projection step onto a considered function space. It has been observed that this scheme can be potentially generalized to carry out multiple iterations of the Bellman operator at once, benefiting the underlying learning algorithm. However, till now, it has been challenging to effectively implement this idea, especially in high-dimensional problems. In this paper, we introduce iterated Q-Network (i-QN), a novel principled approach that enables multiple consecutive Bellman updates by learning a tailored sequence of action-value functions where each serves as the target for the next. We show that i-QN is theoretically grounded and that it can be seamlessly used in value-based and actor-critic methods. We empirically demonstrate the advantages of i-QN in Atari 2600 games and MuJoCo continuous control problems.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

This paper studies defense mechanisms against model inversion (MI) attacks -- a type of privacy attacks aimed at inferring information about the training data distribution given the access to a target machine learning model. Existing defense mechanisms rely on model-specific heuristics or noise injection. While being able to mitigate attacks, existing methods significantly hinder model performance. There remains a question of how to design a defense mechanism that is applicable to a variety of models and achieves better utility-privacy tradeoff. In this paper, we propose the Mutual Information Regularization based Defense (MID) against MI attacks. The key idea is to limit the information about the model input contained in the prediction, thereby limiting the ability of an adversary to infer the private training attributes from the model prediction. Our defense principle is model-agnostic and we present tractable approximations to the regularizer for linear regression, decision trees, and neural networks, which have been successfully attacked by prior work if not attached with any defenses. We present a formal study of MI attacks by devising a rigorous game-based definition and quantifying the associated information leakage. Our theoretical analysis sheds light on the inefficacy of DP in defending against MI attacks, which has been empirically observed in several prior works. Our experiments demonstrate that MID leads to state-of-the-art performance for a variety of MI attacks, target models and datasets.

Kullback-Leiber divergence has been widely used in Knowledge Distillation (KD) to compress Large Language Models (LLMs). Contrary to prior assertions that reverse Kullback-Leibler (RKL) divergence is mode-seeking and thus preferable over the mean-seeking forward Kullback-Leibler (FKL) divergence, this study empirically and theoretically demonstrates that neither mode-seeking nor mean-seeking properties manifest in KD for LLMs. Instead, RKL and FKL are found to share the same optimization objective and both converge after a sufficient number of epochs. However, due to practical constraints, LLMs are seldom trained for such an extensive number of epochs. Meanwhile, we further find that RKL focuses on the tail part of the distributions, while FKL focuses on the head part at the beginning epochs. Consequently, we propose a simple yet effective Adaptive Kullback-Leiber (AKL) divergence method, which adaptively allocates weights to combine FKL and RKL. Metric-based and GPT-4-based evaluations demonstrate that the proposed AKL outperforms the baselines across various tasks and improves the diversity and quality of generated responses.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

In this study, we investigate the DIstribution Correction Estimation (DICE) methods, an important line of work in offline reinforcement learning (RL) and imitation learning (IL). DICE-based methods impose state-action-level behavior constraint, which is an ideal choice for offline learning. However, they typically perform much worse than current state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods that solely use action-level behavior constraint. After revisiting DICE-based methods, we find there exist two gradient terms when learning the value function using true-gradient update: forward gradient (taken on the current state) and backward gradient (taken on the next state). Using forward gradient bears a large similarity to many offline RL methods, and thus can be regarded as applying action-level constraint. However, directly adding the backward gradient may degenerate or cancel out its effect if these two gradients have conflicting directions. To resolve this issue, we propose a simple yet effective modification that projects the backward gradient onto the normal plane of the forward gradient, resulting in an orthogonal-gradient update, a new learning rule for DICE-based methods. We conduct thorough theoretical analyses and find that the projected backward gradient brings state-level behavior regularization, which reveals the mystery of DICE-based methods: the value learning objective does try to impose state-action-level constraint, but needs to be used in a corrected way. Through toy examples and extensive experiments on complex offline RL and IL tasks, we demonstrate that DICE-based methods using orthogonal-gradient updates (O-DICE) achieve SOTA performance and great robustness.

Mirror descent value iteration (MDVI), an abstraction of Kullback-Leibler (KL) and entropy-regularized reinforcement learning (RL), has served as the basis for recent high-performing practical RL algorithms. However, despite the use of function approximation in practice, the theoretical understanding of MDVI has been limited to tabular Markov decision processes (MDPs). We study MDVI with linear function approximation through its sample complexity required to identify an varepsilon-optimal policy with probability 1-delta under the settings of an infinite-horizon linear MDP, generative model, and G-optimal design. We demonstrate that least-squares regression weighted by the variance of an estimated optimal value function of the next state is crucial to achieving minimax optimality. Based on this observation, we present Variance-Weighted Least-Squares MDVI (VWLS-MDVI), the first theoretical algorithm that achieves nearly minimax optimal sample complexity for infinite-horizon linear MDPs. Furthermore, we propose a practical VWLS algorithm for value-based deep RL, Deep Variance Weighting (DVW). Our experiments demonstrate that DVW improves the performance of popular value-based deep RL algorithms on a set of MinAtar benchmarks.

Recent works have shown a reduction from contextual bandits to online regression under a realizability assumption [Foster and Rakhlin, 2020, Foster and Krishnamurthy, 2021]. In this work, we investigate the use of neural networks for such online regression and associated Neural Contextual Bandits (NeuCBs). Using existing results for wide networks, one can readily show a {O}(T) regret for online regression with square loss, which via the reduction implies a {O}(K T^{3/4}) regret for NeuCBs. Departing from this standard approach, we first show a O(log T) regret for online regression with almost convex losses that satisfy QG (Quadratic Growth) condition, a generalization of the PL (Polyak-\L ojasiewicz) condition, and that have a unique minima. Although not directly applicable to wide networks since they do not have unique minima, we show that adding a suitable small random perturbation to the network predictions surprisingly makes the loss satisfy QG with unique minima. Based on such a perturbed prediction, we show a {O}(log T) regret for online regression with both squared loss and KL loss, and subsequently convert these respectively to mathcal{O}(KT) and mathcal{O}(KL^* + K) regret for NeuCB, where L^* is the loss of the best policy. Separately, we also show that existing regret bounds for NeuCBs are Omega(T) or assume i.i.d. contexts, unlike this work. Finally, our experimental results on various datasets demonstrate that our algorithms, especially the one based on KL loss, persistently outperform existing algorithms.

Test-time alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) to human preferences offers a flexible way to generate responses aligned to diverse objectives without extensive retraining of LLMs. Existing methods achieve alignment to multiple objectives simultaneously (e.g., instruction-following, helpfulness, conciseness) by optimizing their corresponding reward functions. However, they often rely on predefined weights or optimize for averages, sacrificing one objective for another and leading to unbalanced outcomes. To address this, we introduce Robust Multi-Objective Decoding (RMOD), a novel inference-time algorithm that optimizes for improving worst-case rewards. RMOD formalizes the robust decoding problem as a maximin two-player game between reward weights and the sampling policy, solving for the Nash equilibrium. We show that the game reduces to a convex optimization problem to find the worst-case weights, while the best response policy can be computed analytically. We also introduce a practical RMOD variant designed for efficient decoding with contemporary LLMs, incurring minimal computational overhead compared to non-robust Multi-Objective Decoding (MOD) methods. Our experimental results showcase the effectiveness of RMOD in generating responses equitably aligned with diverse objectives, outperforming baselines up to 20%.