Daily Papers

We present an empirical evaluation of various outputs generated by nine of the most widely-available large language models (LLMs). Our analysis is done with off-the-shelf, readily-available tools. We find a correlation between percentage of memorized text, percentage of unique text, and overall output quality, when measured with respect to output pathologies such as counterfactual and logically-flawed statements, and general failures like not staying on topic. Overall, 80.0% of the outputs evaluated contained memorized data, but outputs containing the most memorized content were also more likely to be considered of high quality. We discuss and evaluate mitigation strategies, showing that, in the models evaluated, the rate of memorized text being output is reduced. We conclude with a discussion on potential implications around what it means to learn, to memorize, and to evaluate quality text.

Reasoning is central to human intelligence. However, fallacious arguments are common, and some exacerbate problems such as spreading misinformation about climate change. In this paper, we propose the task of logical fallacy detection, and provide a new dataset (Logic) of logical fallacies generally found in text, together with an additional challenge set for detecting logical fallacies in climate change claims (LogicClimate). Detecting logical fallacies is a hard problem as the model must understand the underlying logical structure of the argument. We find that existing pretrained large language models perform poorly on this task. In contrast, we show that a simple structure-aware classifier outperforms the best language model by 5.46% on Logic and 4.51% on LogicClimate. We encourage future work to explore this task as (a) it can serve as a new reasoning challenge for language models, and (b) it can have potential applications in tackling the spread of misinformation. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/logical-fallacy

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Anomaly Detection (AD) focuses on detecting samples that differ from the standard pattern, making it a vital tool in process control. Logical anomalies may appear visually normal yet violate predefined constraints on object presence, arrangement, or quantity, depending on reasoning and explainability. We introduce LogicQA, a framework that enhances AD by providing industrial operators with explanations for logical anomalies. LogicQA compiles automatically generated questions into a checklist and collects responses to identify violations of logical constraints. LogicQA is training-free, annotation-free, and operates in a few-shot setting. We achieve state-of-the-art (SOTA) Logical AD performance on public benchmarks, MVTec LOCO AD, with an AUROC of 87.6 percent and an F1-max of 87.0 percent along with the explanations of anomalies. Also, our approach has shown outstanding performance on semiconductor SEM corporate data, further validating its effectiveness in industrial applications.

While self-correction has shown promise in improving LLM outputs in terms of style and quality (e.g. Chen et al., 2023; Madaan et al., 2023), recent attempts to self-correct logical or reasoning errors often cause correct answers to become incorrect, resulting in worse performances overall (Huang et al., 2023). In this paper, we break down the self-correction process into two core components: mistake finding and output correction. For mistake finding, we release BIG-Bench Mistake, a dataset of logical mistakes in Chain-of-Thought reasoning traces. We provide benchmark numbers for several state-of-the-art LLMs, and demonstrate that LLMs generally struggle with finding logical mistakes. For output correction, we propose a backtracking method which provides large improvements when given information on mistake location. We construe backtracking as a lightweight alternative to reinforcement learning methods, and show that it remains effective with a reward model at 60-70% accuracy.

Knights and knaves problems represent a classic genre of logical puzzles where characters either tell the truth or lie. The objective is to logically deduce each character's identity based on their statements. The challenge arises from the truth-telling or lying behavior, which influences the logical implications of each statement. Solving these puzzles requires not only direct deductions from individual statements, but the ability to assess the truthfulness of statements by reasoning through various hypothetical scenarios. As such, knights and knaves puzzles serve as compelling examples of suppositional reasoning. In this paper, we introduce TruthQuest, a benchmark for suppositional reasoning based on the principles of knights and knaves puzzles. Our benchmark presents problems of varying complexity, considering both the number of characters and the types of logical statements involved. Evaluations on TruthQuest show that large language models like Llama 3 and Mixtral-8x7B exhibit significant difficulties solving these tasks. A detailed error analysis of the models' output reveals that lower-performing models exhibit a diverse range of reasoning errors, frequently failing to grasp the concept of truth and lies. In comparison, more proficient models primarily struggle with accurately inferring the logical implications of potentially false statements.

A prominent weakness of modern language models (LMs) is their tendency to generate factually incorrect text, which hinders their usability. A natural question is whether such factual errors can be detected automatically. Inspired by truth-seeking mechanisms in law, we propose a factuality evaluation framework for LMs that is based on cross-examination. Our key idea is that an incorrect claim is likely to result in inconsistency with other claims that the model generates. To discover such inconsistencies, we facilitate a multi-turn interaction between the LM that generated the claim and another LM (acting as an examiner) which introduces questions to discover inconsistencies. We empirically evaluate our method on factual claims made by multiple recent LMs on four benchmarks, finding that it outperforms existing methods and baselines, often by a large gap. Our results demonstrate the potential of using interacting LMs for capturing factual errors.

Large reasoning models (e.g., R1, o3) have demonstrated remarkable mathematical problem-solving abilities. However, the high reported accuracy of these advanced models on popular datasets, reliance on purely numerical evaluation and potential benchmark leakage, often masks their true reasoning shortcomings. To address this, we propose leveraging the inherent rigor and methodological complexity of mathematical proofs as a diagnostic tool to expose these hidden failures. Specifically, we introduce the RFMDataset (Reveal Failure Modes), a collection of 200 diverse mathematical proof problems, and thoroughly evaluate advanced models' performance on it. Our in-depth analysis of their failures uncovers 10 fine-grained error types, which shows fundamental limitations in current large reasoning models: 1) large reasoning models grapple profoundly with mathematical proofs, with some generating entirely correct proofs for less than 20% of problems and failing even on basic ones; 2) models exhibit a diverse spectrum of reasoning failures, prominently demonstrating the lack of guarantees for the correctness and rigor of single-step reasoning; and 3) models show hallucination and incompleteness during the reasoning process. Our findings reveal that models' self-reflection is insufficient to resolve the current logical dilemmas, necessitating formalized and fine-grained logical training.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

Ensuring logical consistency in predictions is a crucial yet overlooked aspect in multi-attribute classification. We explore the potential reasons for this oversight and introduce two pressing challenges to the field: 1) How can we ensure that a model, when trained with data checked for logical consistency, yields predictions that are logically consistent? 2) How can we achieve the same with data that hasn't undergone logical consistency checks? Minimizing manual effort is also essential for enhancing automation. To address these challenges, we introduce two datasets, FH41K and CelebA-logic, and propose LogicNet, an adversarial training framework that learns the logical relationships between attributes. Accuracy of LogicNet surpasses that of the next-best approach by 23.05%, 9.96%, and 1.71% on FH37K, FH41K, and CelebA-logic, respectively. In real-world case analysis, our approach can achieve a reduction of more than 50% in the average number of failed cases compared to other methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved significant progress in language understanding and reasoning. Evaluating and analyzing their logical reasoning abilities has therefore become essential. However, existing datasets and benchmarks are often limited to overly simplistic, unnatural, or contextually constrained examples. In response to the growing demand, we introduce SmartyPat-Bench, a challenging, naturally expressed, and systematically labeled benchmark derived from real-world high-quality Reddit posts containing subtle logical fallacies. Unlike existing datasets and benchmarks, it provides more detailed annotations of logical fallacies and features more diverse data. To further scale up the study and address the limitations of manual data collection and labeling - such as fallacy-type imbalance and labor-intensive annotation - we introduce SmartyPat, an automated framework powered by logic programming-based oracles. SmartyPat utilizes Prolog rules to systematically generate logically fallacious statements, which are then refined into fluent natural-language sentences by LLMs, ensuring precise fallacy representation. Extensive evaluation demonstrates that SmartyPat produces fallacies comparable in subtlety and quality to human-generated content and significantly outperforms baseline methods. Finally, experiments reveal nuanced insights into LLM capabilities, highlighting that while excessive reasoning steps hinder fallacy detection accuracy, structured reasoning enhances fallacy categorization performance.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Detecting logical fallacies in texts can help users spot argument flaws, but automating this detection is not easy. Manually annotating fallacies in large-scale, real-world text data to create datasets for developing and validating detection models is costly. This paper introduces CoCoLoFa, the largest known logical fallacy dataset, containing 7,706 comments for 648 news articles, with each comment labeled for fallacy presence and type. We recruited 143 crowd workers to write comments embodying specific fallacy types (e.g., slippery slope) in response to news articles. Recognizing the complexity of this writing task, we built an LLM-powered assistant into the workers' interface to aid in drafting and refining their comments. Experts rated the writing quality and labeling validity of CoCoLoFa as high and reliable. BERT-based models fine-tuned using CoCoLoFa achieved the highest fallacy detection (F1=0.86) and classification (F1=0.87) performance on its test set, outperforming the state-of-the-art LLMs. Our work shows that combining crowdsourcing and LLMs enables us to more effectively construct datasets for complex linguistic phenomena that crowd workers find challenging to produce on their own.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Logic reasoning in natural language has been recognized as an important measure of human intelligence for Large Language Models (LLMs). Popular benchmarks may entangle multiple reasoning skills and thus provide unfaithful evaluations on the logic reasoning skill. Meanwhile, existing logic reasoning benchmarks are limited in language diversity and their distributions are deviated from the distribution of an ideal logic reasoning benchmark, which may lead to biased evaluation results. This paper thereby proposes a new classical logic benchmark DivLogicEval, consisting of natural sentences composed of diverse statements in a counterintuitive way. To ensure a more reliable evaluation, we also introduce a new evaluation metric that mitigates the influence of bias and randomness inherent in LLMs. Through experiments, we demonstrate the extent to which logical reasoning is required to answer the questions in DivLogicEval and compare the performance of different popular LLMs in conducting logical reasoning.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

We present BIS Reasoning 1.0, the first large-scale Japanese dataset of syllogistic reasoning problems explicitly designed to evaluate belief-inconsistent reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Unlike prior datasets such as NeuBAROCO and JFLD, which focus on general or belief-aligned reasoning, BIS Reasoning 1.0 introduces logically valid yet belief-inconsistent syllogisms to uncover reasoning biases in LLMs trained on human-aligned corpora. We benchmark state-of-the-art models - including GPT models, Claude models, and leading Japanese LLMs - revealing significant variance in performance, with GPT-4o achieving 79.54% accuracy. Our analysis identifies critical weaknesses in current LLMs when handling logically valid but belief-conflicting inputs. These findings have important implications for deploying LLMs in high-stakes domains such as law, healthcare, and scientific literature, where truth must override intuitive belief to ensure integrity and safety.

LLMs can perform multi-step reasoning through Chain-of-Thought (CoT), but they cannot reliably verify their own logic. Even when they reach correct answers, the underlying reasoning may be flawed, undermining trust in high-stakes scenarios. To mitigate this issue, we introduce VeriCoT, a neuro-symbolic method that extracts and verifies formal logical arguments from CoT reasoning. VeriCoT formalizes each CoT reasoning step into first-order logic and identifies premises that ground the argument in source context, commonsense knowledge, or prior reasoning steps. The symbolic representation enables automated solvers to verify logical validity while the NL premises allow humans and systems to identify ungrounded or fallacious reasoning steps. Experiments on the ProofWriter, LegalBench, and BioASQ datasets show VeriCoT effectively identifies flawed reasoning, and serves as a strong predictor of final answer correctness. We also leverage VeriCoT's verification signal for (1) inference-time self-reflection, (2) supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on VeriCoT-distilled datasets and (3) preference fine-tuning (PFT) with direct preference optimization (DPO) using verification-based pairwise rewards, further improving reasoning validity and accuracy.

Deductive reasoning is the process of deriving conclusions strictly from the given premises, without relying on external knowledge. We define honesty in this setting as a model's ability to respond only when the conclusion is logically entailed by the premises, and to abstain otherwise. However, current language models often fail to reason honestly, producing unwarranted answers when the input is insufficient. To study this challenge, we formulate honest deductive reasoning as multi-step tasks where models must either derive the correct conclusion or abstain. We curate two datasets from graph structures, one for linear algebra and one for logical inference, and introduce unanswerable cases by randomly perturbing an edge in half of the instances. We find that prompting and existing training methods, including GRPO with or without supervised fine-tuning initialization, struggle on these tasks. In particular, GRPO optimize only for final task outcomes, leaving models vulnerable to collapse when negative rewards dominate early training. To address this, we propose ACNCHOR, a reinforcement learning method that injects ground truth trajectories into rollouts, preventing early training collapse. Our results demonstrate that this method stabilizes learning and significantly improves the overall reasoning performance, underscoring the importance of training dynamics for enabling honest deductive reasoning in language models.

Logical reasoning consistently plays a fundamental and significant role in the domains of knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a noteworthy innovation in natural language processing (NLP), exhibiting impressive achievements across various classic NLP tasks. However, the question of whether LLMs can effectively address the task of logical reasoning, which requires gradual cognitive inference similar to human intelligence, remains unanswered. To this end, we aim to bridge this gap and provide comprehensive evaluations in this paper. Firstly, to offer systematic evaluations, we select fifteen typical logical reasoning datasets and organize them into deductive, inductive, abductive and mixed-form reasoning settings. Considering the comprehensiveness of evaluations, we include three representative LLMs (i.e., text-davinci-003, ChatGPT and BARD) and evaluate them on all selected datasets under zero-shot, one-shot and three-shot settings. Secondly, different from previous evaluations relying only on simple metrics (e.g., accuracy), we propose fine-level evaluations from objective and subjective manners, covering both answers and explanations. Additionally, to uncover the logical flaws of LLMs, problematic cases will be attributed to five error types from two dimensions, i.e., evidence selection process and reasoning process. Thirdly, to avoid the influences of knowledge bias and purely focus on benchmarking the logical reasoning capability of LLMs, we propose a new dataset with neutral content. It contains 3,000 samples and covers deductive, inductive and abductive settings. Based on the in-depth evaluations, this paper finally forms a general evaluation scheme of logical reasoning capability from six dimensions. It reflects the pros and cons of LLMs and gives guiding directions for future works.

Recent developments in large language models (LLMs) have been impressive. However, these models sometimes show inconsistencies and problematic behavior, such as hallucinating facts, generating flawed code, or creating offensive and toxic content. Unlike these models, humans typically utilize external tools to cross-check and refine their initial content, like using a search engine for fact-checking, or a code interpreter for debugging. Inspired by this observation, we introduce a framework called CRITIC that allows LLMs, which are essentially "black boxes" to validate and progressively amend their own outputs in a manner similar to human interaction with tools. More specifically, starting with an initial output, CRITIC interacts with appropriate tools to evaluate certain aspects of the text, and then revises the output based on the feedback obtained during this validation process. Comprehensive evaluations involving free-form question answering, mathematical program synthesis, and toxicity reduction demonstrate that CRITIC consistently enhances the performance of LLMs. Meanwhile, our research highlights the crucial importance of external feedback in promoting the ongoing self-improvement of LLMs.

Research on causality extraction from text has so far almost entirely neglected counterclaims. Existing causality extraction datasets focus solely on "procausal" claims, i.e., statements that support a relationship. "Concausal" claims, i.e., statements that refute a relationship, are entirely ignored or even accidentally annotated as procausal. We address this shortcoming by developing a new dataset that integrates concausality. Based on an extensive literature review, we first show that concausality is an integral part of causal reasoning on incomplete knowledge. We operationalize this theory in the form of a rigorous guideline for annotation and then augment the Causal News Corpus with concausal statements, obtaining a substantial inter-annotator agreement of Cohen's κ=0.74. To demonstrate the importance of integrating concausal statements, we show that models trained without concausal relationships tend to misclassify these as procausal instead. Based on our new dataset, this mistake can be mitigated, enabling transformers to effectively distinguish pro- and concausality.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Logical reasoning is a critical benchmark for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as it reflects their ability to derive valid conclusions from given premises. While the combination of test-time scaling with dedicated outcome or process reward models has opened up new avenues to enhance LLMs performance in complex reasoning tasks, this space is under-explored in deductive logical reasoning. We present a set of Outcome Reward Models (ORMs) for deductive reasoning. To train the ORMs we mainly generate data using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) with single and multiple samples. Additionally, we propose a novel tactic to further expand the type of errors covered in the training dataset of the ORM. In particular, we propose an echo generation technique that leverages LLMs' tendency to reflect incorrect assumptions made in prompts to extract additional training data, covering previously unexplored error types. While a standard CoT chain may contain errors likely to be made by the reasoner, the echo strategy deliberately steers the model toward incorrect reasoning. We show that ORMs trained on CoT and echo-augmented data demonstrate improved performance on the FOLIO, JustLogic, and ProverQA datasets across four different LLMs.

The capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason is fundamental to their application in complex, knowledge-intensive domains. In real-world scenarios, LLMs are often augmented with external information that can be helpful, irrelevant, or even misleading. This paper investigates the causal impact of such auxiliary information on the reasoning process of LLMs with explicit step-by-step thinking capabilities. We introduce SciAux, a new dataset derived from ScienceQA, to systematically test the robustness of the model against these types of information. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability: the model's deliberative "thinking mode" is a double-edged sword. While helpful context improves accuracy, misleading information causes a catastrophic drop in performance, which is amplified by the thinking process. Instead of conferring robustness, thinking reinforces the degree of error when provided with misinformation. This highlights that the challenge is not merely to make models "think", but to endow them with the critical faculty to evaluate the information upon which their reasoning is based. The SciAux dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/billhdzhao/SciAux.

Recent work has demonstrated the viability of using crowdsourcing as a tool for evaluating the truthfulness of public statements. Under certain conditions such as: (1) having a balanced set of workers with different backgrounds and cognitive abilities; (2) using an adequate set of mechanisms to control the quality of the collected data; and (3) using a coarse grained assessment scale, the crowd can provide reliable identification of fake news. However, fake news are a subtle matter: statements can be just biased ("cherrypicked"), imprecise, wrong, etc. and the unidimensional truth scale used in existing work cannot account for such differences. In this paper we propose a multidimensional notion of truthfulness and we ask the crowd workers to assess seven different dimensions of truthfulness selected based on existing literature: Correctness, Neutrality, Comprehensibility, Precision, Completeness, Speaker's Trustworthiness, and Informativeness. We deploy a set of quality control mechanisms to ensure that the thousands of assessments collected on 180 publicly available fact-checked statements distributed over two datasets are of adequate quality, including a custom search engine used by the crowd workers to find web pages supporting their truthfulness assessments. A comprehensive analysis of crowdsourced judgments shows that: (1) the crowdsourced assessments are reliable when compared to an expert-provided gold standard; (2) the proposed dimensions of truthfulness capture independent pieces of information; (3) the crowdsourcing task can be easily learned by the workers; and (4) the resulting assessments provide a useful basis for a more complete estimation of statement truthfulness.

State-of-the-art fact-checking systems combat misinformation at scale by employing autonomous LLM-based agents to decompose complex claims into smaller sub-claims, verify each sub-claim individually, and aggregate the partial results to produce verdicts with justifications (explanatory rationales for the verdicts). The security of these systems is crucial, as compromised fact-checkers, which tend to be easily underexplored, can amplify misinformation. This work introduces Fact2Fiction, the first poisoning attack framework targeting such agentic fact-checking systems. Fact2Fiction mirrors the decomposition strategy and exploits system-generated justifications to craft tailored malicious evidences that compromise sub-claim verification. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Fact2Fiction achieves 8.9\%--21.2\% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art attacks across various poisoning budgets. Fact2Fiction exposes security weaknesses in current fact-checking systems and highlights the need for defensive countermeasures.

Making LLMs speak for different, especially minority groups of people, and generate statements supporting their diverse or even controversial perspectives is critical to creating an inclusive environment. However, existing LLMs lack sufficient controllability to the stance of their generated content, which often contains inconsistent, neutral, or biased statements. In this paper, we improve the controllability of LLMs in generating statements supporting an argument the user defined in the prompt. We find that multi-round debates between two LLMs with opposite stances generate higher-quality and more salient statements for each, which are important training data to improve the controllability of LLMs. Motivated by this, we develop a novel debate & tuning (DEBATUNE) pipeline finetuning LLMs to generate the statements obtained via debate. To examine DEBATUNE, we curate the largest dataset of debate topics so far, which covers 710 controversial topics and corresponding arguments for each topic. Evaluations by the GPT-4 judge with a novel controversy controllability metric show that LLMs' capability of generating diverse perspectives is significantly improved by DEBATUNE. Moreover, such controllability can be generalized to unseen topics, generating high-quality statements supporting controversial arguments.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Human cognition exhibits systematic compositionality, the algebraic ability to generate infinite novel combinations from finite learned components, which is the key to understanding and reasoning about complex logic. In this work, we investigate the compositionality of large language models (LLMs) in mathematical reasoning. Specifically, we construct a new dataset MathTrap by introducing carefully designed logical traps into the problem descriptions of MATH and GSM8K. Since problems with logical flaws are quite rare in the real world, these represent "unseen" cases to LLMs. Solving these requires the models to systematically compose (1) the mathematical knowledge involved in the original problems with (2) knowledge related to the introduced traps. Our experiments show that while LLMs possess both components of requisite knowledge, they do not spontaneously combine them to handle these novel cases. We explore several methods to mitigate this deficiency, such as natural language prompts, few-shot demonstrations, and fine-tuning. Additionally, we test the recently released OpenAI o1 model and find that human-like `slow thinking' helps improve the compositionality of LLMs. Overall, systematic compositionality remains an open challenge for large language models.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

The scarcity of high-quality, logically sound data is a critical bottleneck for advancing the mathematical reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs). Our work confronts this challenge by turning decades of automated theorem proving research into a scalable data engine. Rather than relying on error-prone LLMs or complex proof-assistant syntax like Lean and Isabelle, our framework leverages E-prover's saturation capabilities on the vast TPTP axiom library to derive a massive, guaranteed-valid corpus of theorems. Our pipeline is principled and simple: saturate axioms, filter for "interesting" theorems, and generate tasks. With no LLMs in the loop, we eliminate factual errors by construction. This purely symbolic data is then transformed into three difficulty-controlled challenges: entailment verification, premise selection, and proof reconstruction. Our zero-shot experiments on frontier models reveal a clear weakness: performance collapses on tasks requiring deep, structural reasoning. Our framework provides both the diagnostic tool to measure this gap and a scalable source of symbolic training data to address it. We make the code and data publicly available. https://github.com/sileod/reasoning_core https://hf.co/datasets/reasoning-core/rc1

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Peer review serves as a backbone of academic research, but in most AI conferences, the review quality is degrading as the number of submissions explodes. To reliably detect low-quality reviews, we define misinformed review points as either "weaknesses" in a review that contain incorrect premises, or "questions" in a review that can be already answered by the paper. We verify that 15.2% of weaknesses and 26.4% of questions are misinformed and introduce ReviewScore indicating if a review point is misinformed. To evaluate the factuality of each premise of weaknesses, we propose an automated engine that reconstructs every explicit and implicit premise from a weakness. We build a human expert-annotated ReviewScore dataset to check the ability of LLMs to automate ReviewScore evaluation. Then, we measure human-model agreements on ReviewScore using eight current state-of-the-art LLMs and verify moderate agreements. We also prove that evaluating premise-level factuality shows significantly higher agreements than evaluating weakness-level factuality. A thorough disagreement analysis further supports a potential of fully automated ReviewScore evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has greatly improved our ability to process complex language. However, accurately detecting logical fallacies remains a significant challenge. This study presents a novel and effective prompt formulation approach for logical fallacy detection, applicable in both supervised (fine-tuned) and unsupervised (zero-shot) settings. Our method enriches input text incorporating implicit contextual information -- counterarguments, explanations, and goals -- which we query for validity within the context of the argument. We then rank these queries based on confidence scores to inform classification. We evaluate our approach across multiple datasets from 5 domains, covering 29 distinct fallacy types, using models from the GPT and LLaMA series. The results show substantial improvements over state-of-the-art models, with F1 score increases of up to 0.60 in zero-shot settings and up to 0.45 in fine-tuned models. Extensive analyses further illustrate why and how our method excels.

Large Language Models have demonstrated strong performance on many established reasoning benchmarks. However, these benchmarks primarily evaluate structured skills like quantitative problem-solving, leaving a gap in assessing flexible, multifaceted reasoning abilities that are central to human intelligence. These abilities require integrating logical deduction with spatial awareness and constraint satisfaction, which current evaluations do not measure well. To address this, we introduce RiddleBench, a benchmark of 1,737 challenging puzzles in English designed to probe these core reasoning capabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art models on RiddleBench shows fundamental weaknesses. Even top proprietary models like Gemini 2.5 Pro, o3, and Claude 4 Sonnet achieve accuracy just above 60% (60.30%, 63.37%, and 63.16%). Analysis further reveals deep failures, including hallucination cascades (accepting flawed reasoning from other models) and poor self-correction due to a strong self-confirmation bias. Their reasoning is also fragile, with performance degrading significantly when constraints are reordered or irrelevant information is introduced. RiddleBench functions as a diagnostic tool for these issues and as a resource for guiding the development of more robust and reliable language models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

With the emergence of advanced reasoning models like OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities. However, their ability to perform rigorous logical reasoning remains an open question. This survey synthesizes recent advancements in logical reasoning within LLMs, a critical area of AI research. It outlines the scope of logical reasoning in LLMs, its theoretical foundations, and the benchmarks used to evaluate reasoning proficiency. We analyze existing capabilities across different reasoning paradigms - deductive, inductive, abductive, and analogical - and assess strategies to enhance reasoning performance, including data-centric tuning, reinforcement learning, decoding strategies, and neuro-symbolic approaches. The review concludes with future directions, emphasizing the need for further exploration to strengthen logical reasoning in AI systems.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Despite its crucial role in research experiments, code correctness is often presumed only on the basis of the perceived quality of results. This assumption comes with the risk of erroneous outcomes and potentially misleading findings. To address this issue, we posit that the current focus on reproducibility should go hand in hand with the emphasis on software quality. We present a case study in which we identify and fix three bugs in widely used implementations of the state-of-the-art Conformer architecture. Through experiments on speech recognition and translation in various languages, we demonstrate that the presence of bugs does not prevent the achievement of good and reproducible results, which however can lead to incorrect conclusions that potentially misguide future research. As a countermeasure, we propose a Code-quality Checklist and release pangoliNN, a library dedicated to testing neural models, with the goal of promoting coding best practices and improving research software quality within the NLP community.

Language serves as a vehicle for conveying thought, enabling communication among individuals. The ability to distinguish between diverse concepts, identify fairness and injustice, and comprehend a range of legal notions fundamentally relies on logical reasoning. Large Language Models (LLMs) attempt to emulate human language understanding and generation, but their competency in logical reasoning remains limited. This paper seeks to address the philosophical question: How can we effectively teach logical reasoning to LLMs while maintaining a deep understanding of the intricate relationship between language and logic? By focusing on bolstering LLMs' capabilities in logical reasoning, we aim to expand their applicability in law and other logic-intensive disciplines. To this end, we propose a Reinforcement Learning from Logical Feedback (RLLF) approach, which serves as a potential framework for refining LLMs' reasoning capacities. Through RLLF and a revised evaluation methodology, we explore new avenues for research in this domain and contribute to the development of LLMs capable of handling complex legal reasoning tasks while acknowledging the fundamental connection between language and logic.

The spread of online misinformation threatens public health, democracy, and the broader society. While professional fact-checkers form the first line of defense by fact-checking popular false claims, they do not engage directly in conversations with misinformation spreaders. On the other hand, non-expert ordinary users act as eyes-on-the-ground who proactively counter misinformation -- recent research has shown that 96% counter-misinformation responses are made by ordinary users. However, research also found that 2/3 times, these responses are rude and lack evidence. This work seeks to create a counter-misinformation response generation model to empower users to effectively correct misinformation. This objective is challenging due to the absence of datasets containing ground-truth of ideal counter-misinformation responses, and the lack of models that can generate responses backed by communication theories. In this work, we create two novel datasets of misinformation and counter-misinformation response pairs from in-the-wild social media and crowdsourcing from college-educated students. We annotate the collected data to distinguish poor from ideal responses that are factual, polite, and refute misinformation. We propose MisinfoCorrect, a reinforcement learning-based framework that learns to generate counter-misinformation responses for an input misinformation post. The model rewards the generator to increase the politeness, factuality, and refutation attitude while retaining text fluency and relevancy. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation shows that our model outperforms several baselines by generating high-quality counter-responses. This work illustrates the promise of generative text models for social good -- here, to help create a safe and reliable information ecosystem. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/MisinfoCorrect.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Verifying complex political claims is a challenging task, especially when politicians use various tactics to subtly misrepresent the facts. Automatic fact-checking systems fall short here, and their predictions like "half-true" are not very useful in isolation, since we have no idea which parts of the claim are true and which are not. In this work, we focus on decomposing a complex claim into a comprehensive set of yes-no subquestions whose answers influence the veracity of the claim. We present ClaimDecomp, a dataset of decompositions for over 1000 claims. Given a claim and its verification paragraph written by fact-checkers, our trained annotators write subquestions covering both explicit propositions of the original claim and its implicit facets, such as asking about additional political context that changes our view of the claim's veracity. We study whether state-of-the-art models can generate such subquestions, showing that these models generate reasonable questions to ask, but predicting the comprehensive set of subquestions from the original claim without evidence remains challenging. We further show that these subquestions can help identify relevant evidence to fact-check the full claim and derive the veracity through their answers, suggesting that they can be useful pieces of a fact-checking pipeline.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Fact checking by professionals is viewed as a vital defense in the fight against misinformation.While fact checking is important and its impact has been significant, fact checks could have limited visibility and may not reach the intended audience, such as those deeply embedded in polarized communities. Concerned citizens (i.e., the crowd), who are users of the platforms where misinformation appears, can play a crucial role in disseminating fact-checking information and in countering the spread of misinformation. To explore if this is the case, we conduct a data-driven study of misinformation on the Twitter platform, focusing on tweets related to the COVID-19 pandemic, analyzing the spread of misinformation, professional fact checks, and the crowd response to popular misleading claims about COVID-19. In this work, we curate a dataset of false claims and statements that seek to challenge or refute them. We train a classifier to create a novel dataset of 155,468 COVID-19-related tweets, containing 33,237 false claims and 33,413 refuting arguments.Our findings show that professional fact-checking tweets have limited volume and reach. In contrast, we observe that the surge in misinformation tweets results in a quick response and a corresponding increase in tweets that refute such misinformation. More importantly, we find contrasting differences in the way the crowd refutes tweets, some tweets appear to be opinions, while others contain concrete evidence, such as a link to a reputed source. Our work provides insights into how misinformation is organically countered in social platforms by some of their users and the role they play in amplifying professional fact checks.These insights could lead to development of tools and mechanisms that can empower concerned citizens in combating misinformation. The code and data can be found in http://claws.cc.gatech.edu/covid_counter_misinformation.html.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities in structured reasoning and symbolic tasks, with coding emerging as a particular area of strength. This success has sparked growing interest in applying LLMs to mathematics, both in informal problem-solving and formal theorem proving. However, progress in formal mathematics has proven to be significantly more difficult, despite surface-level similarities between programming and proof construction. This discrepancy raises important questions about how LLMs ``reason'', how they are supervised, and whether they internally track a notion of computational or deductive state. In this article, we address the state-of-the-art of the discipline, focusing on recent models and benchmarks, and explore three central issues at the intersection of machine learning and mathematical cognition: (i) the trade-offs between formal and informal mathematics as training domains; (ii) the deeper reasons why proof generation remains more brittle than code synthesis; (iii) and the question of whether LLMs represent, or merely mimic, a notion of evolving logical state. Our goal is not to draw hard boundaries, but to identify where the current limits lie, and how they might be extended.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional performance in various tasks, their (arguably) most prominent drawback is generating inaccurate or false information with a confident tone. In this paper, we hypothesize that the LLM's internal state can be used to reveal the truthfulness of a statement. Therefore, we introduce a simple yet effective method to detect the truthfulness of LLM-generated statements, which utilizes the LLM's hidden layer activations to determine the veracity of statements. To train and evaluate our method, we compose a dataset of true and false statements in six different topics. A classifier is trained to detect which statement is true or false based on an LLM's activation values. Specifically, the classifier receives as input the activation values from the LLM for each of the statements in the dataset. Our experiments demonstrate that our method for detecting statement veracity significantly outperforms even few-shot prompting methods, highlighting its potential to enhance the reliability of LLM-generated content and its practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

Can you find an xy-equation that, when graphed, writes itself on the plane? This idea became internet-famous when a Wikipedia article on Tupper's self-referential formula went viral in 2012. Under scrutiny, the question has two flaws: it is meaningless (it depends on typography) and it is trivial (for reasons we will explain). We fix these flaws by formalizing the problem, and we give a very general solution using techniques from computability theory.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental task in natural language processing that presents significant challenges to Large Language Models (LLMs). The inherent characteristics of logical reasoning makes it well-suited for symbolic representations such as first-order logic (FOL). Research in symbolic logical reasoning explored FOL generation using state-of-the-art LLMs (i.e., GPT-4) to produce FOL translations of natural language (NL) statements, but errors in translation are usually not the focus. We address this by categorizing the translation errors in FOL statements generated by LLMs. To make progress towards improving the quality of FOL translations for smaller language models such as LLaMA-2 13B and Mistral 7B, we create ProofFOL, a high-quality FOL-annotated subset of ProofWriter dataset using GPT-4o. The models fine-tuned on this silver standard data achieve a significant gain in performance when compared to larger language models such as LLaMA-2 70B. In addition to improving the model using large data, we also tackle the issue of data scarcity and introduce an incremental framework encompassing of data augmentation and verification steps. In the augmentation process, a single pair of (premises, conclusion) is split into multiple new instances based on the predicates and FOLs. This data is used for fine-tuning, and the inference on this model generates FOLs with fewer errors over the model trained on the original data. Our investigation on the translation errors leads to generation of a perturbation dataset, which is used to train a verifier that corrects potential syntactic and semantic FOL translation errors. We demonstrate an efficient method for making the most of a limited existing human-annotated dataset. Our results show state-of-the-art performance for ProofWriter and ProntoQA datasets using ProofFOL on LLaMA-2 and Mistral models.

Automatic multi-hop fact verification task has gained significant attention in recent years. Despite impressive results, these well-designed models perform poorly on out-of-domain data. One possible solution is to augment the training data with counterfactuals, which are generated by minimally altering the causal features of the original data. However, current counterfactual data augmentation techniques fail to handle multi-hop fact verification due to their incapability to preserve the complex logical relationships within multiple correlated texts. In this paper, we overcome this limitation by developing a rationale-sensitive method to generate linguistically diverse and label-flipping counterfactuals while preserving logical relationships. In specific, the diverse and fluent counterfactuals are generated via an Explain-Edit-Generate architecture. Moreover, the checking and filtering modules are proposed to regularize the counterfactual data with logical relations and flipped labels. Experimental results show that the proposed approach outperforms the SOTA baselines and can generate linguistically diverse counterfactual data without disrupting their logical relationships.

One challenge in fact checking is the ability to improve the transparency of the decision. We present a fact checking method that uses reference information in knowledge graphs (KGs) to assess claims and explain its decisions. KGs contain a formal representation of knowledge with semantic descriptions of entities and their relationships. We exploit such rich semantics to produce interpretable explanations for the fact checking output. As information in a KG is inevitably incomplete, we rely on logical rule discovery and on Web text mining to gather the evidence to assess a given claim. Uncertain rules and facts are turned into logical programs and the checking task is modeled as an inference problem in a probabilistic extension of answer set programs. Experiments show that the probabilistic inference enables the efficient labeling of claims with interpretable explanations, and the quality of the results is higher than state of the art baselines.

Misinformation is a complex societal issue, and mitigating solutions are difficult to create due to data deficiencies. To address this problem, we have curated the largest collection of (mis)information datasets in the literature, totaling 75. From these, we evaluated the quality of all of the 36 datasets that consist of statements or claims. We assess these datasets to identify those with solid foundations for empirical work and those with flaws that could result in misleading and non-generalizable results, such as insufficient label quality, spurious correlations, or political bias. We further provide state-of-the-art baselines on all these datasets, but show that regardless of label quality, categorical labels may no longer give an accurate evaluation of detection model performance. We discuss alternatives to mitigate this problem. Overall, this guide aims to provide a roadmap for obtaining higher quality data and conducting more effective evaluations, ultimately improving research in misinformation detection. All datasets and other artifacts are available at https://misinfo-datasets.complexdatalab.com/.

Remarkable progress has been made on automated reasoning with natural text, by using Language Models (LMs) and methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Selection-Inference. These techniques search for proofs in the forward direction from axioms to the conclusion, which suffers from a combinatorial explosion of the search space, and thus high failure rates for problems requiring longer chains of reasoning. The classical automated reasoning literature has shown that reasoning in the backward direction (i.e. from the intended conclusion to supporting axioms) is significantly more efficient at proof-finding. Importing this intuition into the LM setting, we develop a Backward Chaining algorithm, called LAMBADA, that decomposes reasoning into four sub-modules. These sub-modules are simply implemented by few-shot prompted LM inference. We show that LAMBADA achieves sizable accuracy boosts over state-of-the-art forward reasoning methods on challenging logical reasoning datasets, particularly when deep and accurate proof chains are required.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Fact verification is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM applications. In this study, we evaluate 12 pre-trained LLMs and one specialized fact-verifier, including frontier LLMs and open-weight reasoning LLMs, using a collection of examples from 14 fact-checking benchmarks. We share three findings intended to guide future development of more robust fact verifiers. First, we highlight the importance of addressing annotation errors and ambiguity in datasets, demonstrating that approximately 16\% of ambiguous or incorrectly labeled data substantially influences model rankings. Neglecting this issue may result in misleading conclusions during comparative evaluations, and we suggest using a systematic pipeline utilizing LLM-as-a-judge to help identify these issues at scale. Second, we discover that frontier LLMs with few-shot in-context examples, often overlooked in previous works, achieve top-tier performance. We therefore recommend future studies include comparisons with these simple yet highly effective baselines. Lastly, despite their effectiveness, frontier LLMs incur substantial costs, motivating the development of small, fine-tuned fact verifiers. We show that these small models still have room for improvement, particularly on instances that require complex reasoning. Encouragingly, we demonstrate that augmenting training with synthetic multi-hop reasoning data significantly enhances their capabilities in such instances. We release our code, model, and dataset at https://github.com/just1nseo/verifying-the-verifiers

Software testing plays a critical role in ensuring that systems behave as intended. However, existing automated testing approaches struggle to match the capabilities of human engineers due to key limitations such as test locality, lack of general reliability, and business logic blindness. In this work, we propose a novel framework that leverages functional programming and type systems to translate Scala backend code into formal Lean representations. Our pipeline automatically generates theorems that specify the intended behavior of APIs and database operations, and uses LLM-based provers to verify them. When a theorem is proved, the corresponding logic is guaranteed to be correct and no further testing is needed. If the negation of a theorem is proved instead, it confirms a bug. In cases where neither can be proved, human intervention is required. We evaluate our method on realistic backend systems and find that it can formally verify over 50% of the test requirements, which suggests that half of a testing engineer's workload can be automated. Additionally, with an average cost of only $2.19 per API, LLM-based verification is significantly more cost-effective than manual testing and can be scaled easily through parallel execution. Our results indicate a promising direction for scalable, AI-powered software testing, with the potential to greatly improve engineering productivity as models continue to advance.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently shown strong performance on mathematical benchmarks. At the same time, they are prone to hallucination and sycophancy, often providing convincing but flawed proofs for incorrect mathematical statements provided by users. This significantly limits the applicability of LLMs in theorem proving, as verification of these flawed proofs must be done manually by expert mathematicians. However, existing benchmarks that measure sycophancy in mathematics are limited: they focus solely on final-answer problems, rely on very simple and often contaminated datasets, and construct benchmark samples using synthetic modifications that create ill-posed questions rather than well-posed questions that are demonstrably false. To address these issues, we introduce BrokenMath, the first benchmark for evaluating sycophantic behavior in LLMs within the context of natural language theorem proving. BrokenMath is built from advanced 2025 competition problems, which are perturbed with an LLM to produce false statements and subsequently refined through expert review. Using an LLM-as-a-judge framework, we evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs and agentic systems and find that sycophancy is widespread, with the best model, GPT-5, producing sycophantic answers 29% of the time. We further investigate several mitigation strategies, including test-time interventions and supervised fine-tuning on curated sycophantic examples. These approaches substantially reduce, but do not eliminate, sycophantic behavior.

There is growing excitement about the potential of Language Models (LMs) to accelerate scientific discovery. Falsifying hypotheses is key to scientific progress, as it allows claims to be iteratively refined over time. This process requires significant researcher effort, reasoning, and ingenuity. Yet current benchmarks for LMs predominantly assess their ability to generate solutions rather than challenge them. We advocate for developing benchmarks that evaluate this inverse capability - creating counterexamples for subtly incorrect solutions. To demonstrate this approach, we start with the domain of algorithmic problem solving, where counterexamples can be evaluated automatically using code execution. Specifically, we introduce REFUTE, a dynamically updating benchmark that includes recent problems and incorrect submissions from programming competitions, where human experts successfully identified counterexamples. Our analysis finds that the best reasoning agents, even OpenAI o3-mini (high) with code execution feedback, can create counterexamples for only <9% of incorrect solutions in REFUTE, even though ratings indicate its ability to solve up to 48% of these problems from scratch. We hope our work spurs progress in evaluating and enhancing LMs' ability to falsify incorrect solutions - a capability that is crucial for both accelerating research and making models self-improve through reliable reflective reasoning.

Logical reasoning is central to human cognition and intelligence. Past research of logical reasoning within AI uses formal language as knowledge representation~(and symbolic reasoners). However, reasoning with formal language has proved challenging~(e.g., brittleness and knowledge-acquisition bottleneck). This paper provides a comprehensive overview on a new paradigm of logical reasoning, which uses natural language as knowledge representation~(and pretrained language models as reasoners), including philosophical definition and categorization of logical reasoning, advantages of the new paradigm, benchmarks and methods, challenges of the new paradigm, desirable tasks & methods in the future, and relation to related NLP fields. This new paradigm is promising since it not only alleviates many challenges of formal representation but also has advantages over end-to-end neural methods.

Large language Models (LLMs) have achieved promising performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks by incorporating step-by-step chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. However, LLMs face challenges in maintaining factual consistency during reasoning, exhibiting tendencies to condition overlooking, question misinterpretation, and condition hallucination over given problems. Existing methods use coarse-grained feedback (e.g., whether the answer is correct) to improve factual consistency. In this work, we propose RCoT (Reversing Chain-of-Thought), a novel method to improve LLMs' reasoning abilities by automatically detecting and rectifying factual inconsistency in LLMs' generated solutions. To detect factual inconsistency, RCoT first asks LLMs to reconstruct the problem based on generated solutions. Then fine-grained comparisons between the original problem and the reconstructed problem expose the factual inconsistency in the original solutions. To rectify the solution, RCoT formulates detected factual inconsistency into fine-grained feedback to guide LLMs in revising solutions. Experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements of RCoT over standard CoT across seven arithmetic datasets. Moreover, we find that manually written fine-grained feedback can dramatically improve LLMs' reasoning abilities (e.g., ChatGPT reaches 94.6% accuracy on GSM8K), encouraging the community to further explore the fine-grained feedback generation methods.

Faithfulness hallucinations are claims generated by a Large Language Model (LLM) not supported by contexts provided to the LLM. Lacking assessment standards, existing benchmarks focus on "factual statements" that rephrase source materials while overlooking "cognitive statements" that involve making inferences from the given context. Consequently, evaluating and detecting the hallucination of cognitive statements remains challenging. Inspired by how evidence is assessed in the legal domain, we design a rigorous framework to assess different levels of faithfulness of cognitive statements and introduce the CogniBench dataset where we reveal insightful statistics. To keep pace with rapidly evolving LLMs, we further develop an automatic annotation pipeline that scales easily across different models. This results in a large-scale CogniBench-L dataset, which facilitates training accurate detectors for both factual and cognitive hallucinations. We release our model and datasets at: https://github.com/FUTUREEEEEE/CogniBench

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Transformers have been shown to be able to perform deductive reasoning on a logical rulebase containing rules and statements written in English natural language. While the progress is promising, it is currently unclear if these models indeed perform logical reasoning by understanding the underlying logical semantics in the language. To this end, we propose RobustLR, a suite of evaluation datasets that evaluate the robustness of these models to minimal logical edits in rulebases and some standard logical equivalence conditions. In our experiments with RoBERTa and T5, we find that the models trained in prior works do not perform consistently on the different perturbations in RobustLR, thus showing that the models are not robust to the proposed logical perturbations. Further, we find that the models find it especially hard to learn logical negation and disjunction operators. Overall, using our evaluation sets, we demonstrate some shortcomings of the deductive reasoning-based language models, which can eventually help towards designing better models for logical reasoning over natural language. All the datasets and code base have been made publicly available.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

In this thesis, I evaluate the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), specifically the Logic Games section of the test. I focus on this section because it presents a complex logical reasoning task and thus is a valuable source of data for evaluating how modern, increasingly capable LLMs can handle hard logical reasoning tasks. I construct a dataset of LSAT logic games and their associated metadata, and extensively evaluate LLMs' performance in a Chain-of-Thought prompting setting. Given the weak performance in this setting, I explore other prompting frameworks on a smaller subset of the dataset, adapting ideas from Reflexion to this task. This results in a substantially improved accuracy of 70 percent for GPT-4 and 46 percent for GPT-3.5 on this data subset, highlighting the capacity of LLMs to revise their logical errors, despite initially weak performance. Finally, I analyze the types of logic games that models perform better or worse on, as well as the types of logical errors I observe from human annotation, providing detailed insights on the logical reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

Recent advances in multimodal language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in vision-language reasoning, especially with the emergence of "thinking with images," which integrates explicit visual steps into the reasoning process. While this paradigm strengthens image-based reasoning, a significant challenge remains: models may arrive at correct answers by relying on irrelevant or spurious regions, driven by prior knowledge or dataset biases. Even when the answer is correct, flawed reasoning indicates that the model has not truly understood the image, highlighting the critical importance of reasoning fidelity in multimodal tasks. To address this issue, we propose DeFacto, a counterfactual reasoning framework that jointly enforces accurate answering and faithful reasoning. A key component of our approach is the design of three complementary training paradigms: (i) positive, (ii) counterfactual, and (iii) random-masking. To enable these paradigms, we develop a pipeline that automatically localizes question-relevant evidence and constructs positive, counterfactual, and random variants, resulting in a dataset of about 100k images. Building on this framework, we train multimodal language models with GRPO-based reinforcement learning, where we design three complementary rewards to guide the model toward accurate answering and evidence-grounded reasoning. Experiments on diverse benchmarks demonstrate that DeFacto substantially improves both answer accuracy and reasoning faithfulness, establishing a stronger foundation for interpretable multimodal reasoning. The code is available on GitHub and the dataset is released on HuggingFace.

Recent research has generated hope that inference scaling could allow weaker language models to match or exceed the accuracy of stronger models, such as by repeatedly sampling solutions to a coding problem until it passes unit tests. The central thesis of this paper is that there is no free lunch for inference scaling: indefinite accuracy improvement through resampling can only be realized if the "verifier" (in this case, a set of unit tests) is perfect. When the verifier is imperfect, as it almost always is in domains such as reasoning or coding (for example, unit tests have imperfect coverage), there is a nonzero probability of false positives: incorrect solutions that pass the verifier. Resampling cannot decrease this probability, so it imposes an upper bound to the accuracy of resampling-based inference scaling even with an infinite compute budget. We find that there is a very strong correlation between the model's single-sample accuracy (i.e. accuracy without unit tests) and its false positive rate on coding benchmarks HumanEval and MBPP, whose unit tests have limited coverage. Therefore, no amount of inference scaling of weaker models can enable them to match the single-sample accuracy of a sufficiently strong model (Fig. 1a). When we consider that false positives have a negative utility compared to abstaining from producing a solution, it bends the inference scaling curve further downward. Empirically, we find that the optimal number of samples can be less than 10 under realistic assumptions (Fig. 1b). Finally, we show that beyond accuracy, false positives may have other undesirable qualities, such as poor adherence to coding style conventions.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have witnessed remarkable growth, showcasing formidable capabilities in handling intricate multimodal tasks with exceptional performance. Recent research has underscored the inclination of large language models to passively accept defective inputs, often resulting in futile reasoning on invalid prompts. However, the same critical question of whether LMMs can actively detect and scrutinize erroneous inputs still remains unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the Input Scrutiny Ability Evaluation Framework (ISEval), which encompasses seven categories of flawed premises and three evaluation metrics. Our extensive evaluation of ten advanced LMMs has identified key findings. Most models struggle to actively detect flawed textual premises without guidance, which reflects a strong reliance on explicit prompts for premise error identification. Error type affects performance: models excel at identifying logical fallacies but struggle with surface-level linguistic errors and certain conditional flaws. Modality trust varies-Gemini 2.5 pro and Claude Sonnet 4 balance visual and textual info, while aya-vision-8b over-rely on text in conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LMMs' proactive verification of input validity and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/LMM_ISEval.

Language models often achieve higher accuracy when reasoning step-by-step in complex tasks. However, their reasoning can be unsound, inconsistent, or rely on undesirable prior assumptions. To tackle these issues, we introduce a class of tools for language models called guides that use state and incremental constraints to guide generation. A guide can be invoked by the model to constrain its own generation to a set of valid statements given by the tool. In turn, the model's choices can change the guide's state. We show how a general system for logical reasoning can be used as a guide, which we call LogicGuide. Given a reasoning problem in natural language, a model can formalize its assumptions for LogicGuide and then guarantee that its reasoning steps are sound. In experiments with the PrOntoQA and ProofWriter reasoning datasets, LogicGuide significantly improves the performance of GPT-3, GPT-3.5 Turbo and LLaMA (accuracy gains up to 35%). LogicGuide also drastically reduces content effects: the interference of prior and current assumptions that both humans and language models have been shown to suffer from. Finally, we explore bootstrapping LLaMA 13B from its own reasoning and find that LogicGuide is critical: by training only on certified self-generated reasoning, LLaMA can self-improve, avoiding learning from its own hallucinations.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

The emergence of generative pre-trained models has facilitated the synthesis of high-quality text, but it has also posed challenges in identifying factual errors in the generated text. In particular: (1) A wider range of tasks now face an increasing risk of containing factual errors when handled by generative models. (2) Generated texts tend to be lengthy and lack a clearly defined granularity for individual facts. (3) There is a scarcity of explicit evidence available during the process of fact checking. With the above challenges in mind, in this paper, we propose FacTool, a task and domain agnostic framework for detecting factual errors of texts generated by large language models (e.g., ChatGPT). Experiments on four different tasks (knowledge-based QA, code generation, mathematical reasoning, and scientific literature review) show the efficacy of the proposed method. We release the code of FacTool associated with ChatGPT plugin interface at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/factool .

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Misinformation threatens modern society by promoting distrust in science, changing narratives in public health, heightening social polarization, and disrupting democratic elections and financial markets, among a myriad of other societal harms. To address this, a growing cadre of professional fact-checkers and journalists provide high-quality investigations into purported facts. However, these largely manual efforts have struggled to match the enormous scale of the problem. In response, a growing body of Natural Language Processing (NLP) technologies have been proposed for more scalable fact-checking. Despite tremendous growth in such research, however, practical adoption of NLP technologies for fact-checking still remains in its infancy today. In this work, we review the capabilities and limitations of the current NLP technologies for fact-checking. Our particular focus is to further chart the design space for how these technologies can be harnessed and refined in order to better meet the needs of human fact-checkers. To do so, we review key aspects of NLP-based fact-checking: task formulation, dataset construction, modeling, and human-centered strategies, such as explainable models and human-in-the-loop approaches. Next, we review the efficacy of applying NLP-based fact-checking tools to assist human fact-checkers. We recommend that future research include collaboration with fact-checker stakeholders early on in NLP research, as well as incorporation of human-centered design practices in model development, in order to further guide technology development for human use and practical adoption. Finally, we advocate for more research on benchmark development supporting extrinsic evaluation of human-centered fact-checking technologies.

Fake news and misinformation poses a significant threat to society, making efficient mitigation essential. However, manual fact-checking is costly and lacks scalability. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer promise in automating counter-response generation to mitigate misinformation, but a critical challenge lies in their tendency to hallucinate non-factual information. Existing models mainly rely on LLM self-feedback to reduce hallucination, but this approach is computationally expensive. In this paper, we propose MisMitiFact, Misinformation Mitigation grounded in Facts, an efficient framework for generating fact-grounded counter-responses at scale. MisMitiFact generates simple critique feedback to refine LLM outputs, ensuring responses are grounded in evidence. We develop lightweight, fine-grained critique models trained on data sourced from readily available fact-checking sites to identify and correct errors in key elements such as numerals, entities, and topics in LLM generations. Experiments show that MisMitiFact generates counter-responses of comparable quality to LLMs' self-feedback while using significantly smaller critique models. Importantly, it achieves ~5x increase in feedback generation throughput, making it highly suitable for cost-effective, large-scale misinformation mitigation. Code and LLM prompt templates are at https://github.com/xxfwin/MisMitiFact.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

In an age characterized by the proliferation of mis- and disinformation online, it is critical to empower readers to understand the content they are reading. Important efforts in this direction rely on manual or automatic fact-checking, which can be challenging for emerging claims with limited information. Such scenarios can be handled by assessing the reliability and the political bias of the source of the claim, i.e., characterizing entire news outlets rather than individual claims or articles. This is an important but understudied research direction. While prior work has looked into linguistic and social contexts, we do not analyze individual articles or information in social media. Instead, we propose a novel methodology that emulates the criteria that professional fact-checkers use to assess the factuality and political bias of an entire outlet. Specifically, we design a variety of prompts based on these criteria and elicit responses from large language models (LLMs), which we aggregate to make predictions. In addition to demonstrating sizable improvements over strong baselines via extensive experiments with multiple LLMs, we provide an in-depth error analysis of the effect of media popularity and region on model performance. Further, we conduct an ablation study to highlight the key components of our dataset that contribute to these improvements. To facilitate future research, we released our dataset and code at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/llm-media-profiling.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Generative AI models often learn and reproduce false information present in their training corpora. This position paper argues that, analogous to biological immunization, where controlled exposure to a weakened pathogen builds immunity, AI models should be fine tuned on small, quarantined sets of explicitly labeled falsehoods as a "vaccine" against misinformation. These curated false examples are periodically injected during finetuning, strengthening the model ability to recognize and reject misleading claims while preserving accuracy on truthful inputs. An illustrative case study shows that immunized models generate substantially less misinformation than baselines. To our knowledge, this is the first training framework that treats fact checked falsehoods themselves as a supervised vaccine, rather than relying on input perturbations or generic human feedback signals, to harden models against future misinformation. We also outline ethical safeguards and governance controls to ensure the safe use of false data. Model immunization offers a proactive paradigm for aligning AI systems with factuality.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a promising paradigm for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). In this context, models explore reasoning trajectories and exploit rollouts with correct answers as positive signals for policy optimization. However, these rollouts might involve flawed patterns such as answer-guessing and jump-in-reasoning. Such flawed-positive rollouts are rewarded identically to fully correct ones, causing policy models to internalize these unreliable reasoning patterns. In this work, we first conduct a systematic study of flawed-positive rollouts in RL and find that they enable rapid capability gains during the early optimization stage, while constraining reasoning capability later by reinforcing unreliable patterns. Building on these insights, we propose Flawed-Aware Policy Optimization (FAPO), which presents a parameter-free reward penalty for flawed-positive rollouts, enabling the policy to leverage them as useful shortcuts in the warm-up stage, securing stable early gains, while gradually shifting optimization toward reliable reasoning in the later refinement stage. To accurately and comprehensively detect flawed-positive rollouts, we introduce a generative reward model (GenRM) with a process-level reward that precisely localizes reasoning errors. Experiments show that FAPO is effective in broad domains, improving outcome correctness, process reliability, and training stability without increasing the token budget.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but their performance in complex logical reasoning tasks remains unsatisfactory. Although some prompting methods, such as Chain-of-Thought, can improve the reasoning ability of LLMs to some extent, they suffer from an unfaithful issue where derived conclusions may not align with the generated reasoning chain. To address this issue, some studies employ the approach of propositional logic to further enhance logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. However, the potential omissions in the extraction of logical expressions in these methods can cause information loss in the logical reasoning process, thereby generating incorrect results. To this end, we propose Logic-of-Thought (LoT) prompting which employs propositional logic to generate expanded logical information from input context, and utilizes the generated logical information as an additional augmentation to the input prompts, thereby enhancing the capability of logical reasoning. The LoT is orthogonal to existing prompting methods and can be seamlessly integrated with them. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LoT boosts the performance of various prompting methods with a striking margin across five logical reasoning tasks. In particular, the LoT enhances Chain-of-Thought's performance on the ReClor dataset by +4.35%; moreover, it improves Chain-of-Thought with Self-Consistency's performance on LogiQA by +5%; additionally, it boosts performance of Tree-of-Thoughts on ProofWriter dataset by +8%.

The pervasiveness of large language models and generative AI in online media has amplified the need for effective automated fact-checking to assist fact-checkers in tackling the increasing volume and sophistication of misinformation. The complex nature of fact-checking demands that automated fact-checking systems provide explanations that enable fact-checkers to scrutinise their outputs. However, it is unclear how these explanations should align with the decision-making and reasoning processes of fact-checkers to be effectively integrated into their workflows. Through semi-structured interviews with fact-checking professionals, we bridge this gap by: (i) providing an account of how fact-checkers assess evidence, make decisions, and explain their processes; (ii) examining how fact-checkers use automated tools in practice; and (iii) identifying fact-checker explanation requirements for automated fact-checking tools. The findings show unmet explanation needs and identify important criteria for replicable fact-checking explanations that trace the model's reasoning path, reference specific evidence, and highlight uncertainty and information gaps.

The leaderboard of Large Language Models (LLMs) in mathematical tasks has been continuously updated. However, the majority of evaluations focus solely on the final results, neglecting the quality of the intermediate steps. This oversight can mask underlying problems, such as logical errors or unnecessary steps in the reasoning process. To measure reasoning beyond final-answer accuracy, we introduce ReasonEval, a new methodology for evaluating the quality of reasoning steps. ReasonEval employs validity and redundancy to characterize the reasoning quality, as well as accompanying LLMs to assess them automatically. Instantiated by base models that possess strong mathematical knowledge and trained with high-quality labeled data, ReasonEval achieves state-of-the-art performance on human-labeled datasets and can accurately detect different types of errors generated by perturbation. When applied to evaluate LLMs specialized in math, we find that an increase in final-answer accuracy does not necessarily guarantee an improvement in the overall quality of the reasoning steps for challenging mathematical problems. Additionally, we observe that ReasonEval can play a significant role in data selection. We release the best-performing model, meta-evaluation script, and all evaluation results at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/ReasonEval.

State-of-the-art deep-learning-based approaches to Natural Language Processing (NLP) are credited with various capabilities that involve reasoning with natural language texts. In this paper we carry out a large-scale empirical study investigating the detection of formally valid inferences in controlled fragments of natural language for which the satisfiability problem becomes increasingly complex. We find that, while transformer-based language models perform surprisingly well in these scenarios, a deeper analysis re-veals that they appear to overfit to superficial patterns in the data rather than acquiring the logical principles governing the reasoning in these fragments.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

Fact verification systems typically assess whether a claim is supported by retrieved evidence, assuming that truthfulness depends solely on what is stated. However, many real-world claims are half-truths, factually correct yet misleading due to the omission of critical context. Existing models struggle with such cases, as they are not designed to reason about what is left unsaid. We introduce the task of half-truth detection, and propose PolitiFact-Hidden, a new benchmark with 15k political claims annotated with sentence-level evidence alignment and inferred claim intent. To address this challenge, we present TRACER, a modular re-assessment framework that identifies omission-based misinformation by aligning evidence, inferring implied intent, and estimating the causal impact of hidden content. TRACER can be integrated into existing fact-checking pipelines and consistently improves performance across multiple strong baselines. Notably, it boosts Half-True classification F1 by up to 16 points, highlighting the importance of modeling omissions for trustworthy fact verification.

Prior work has introduced techniques for detecting when large language models (LLMs) lie, that is, generating statements they believe are false. However, these techniques are typically validated in narrow settings that do not capture the diverse lies LLMs can generate. We introduce LIARS' BENCH, a testbed consisting of 72,863 examples of lies and honest responses generated by four open-weight models across seven datasets. Our settings capture qualitatively different types of lies and vary along two dimensions: the model's reason for lying and the object of belief targeted by the lie. Evaluating three black- and white-box lie detection techniques on LIARS' BENCH, we find that existing techniques systematically fail to identify certain types of lies, especially in settings where it's not possible to determine whether the model lied from the transcript alone. Overall, LIARS' BENCH reveals limitations in prior techniques and provides a practical testbed for guiding progress in lie detection.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at solving problems with clear and complete statements, but often struggle with nuanced environments or interactive tasks which are common in most real-world scenarios. This highlights the critical need for developing LLMs that can effectively engage in logically consistent multi-turn dialogue, seek information and reason with incomplete data. To this end, we introduce a novel benchmark comprising a suite of multi-turn tasks each designed to test specific reasoning, interactive dialogue, and information-seeking abilities. These tasks have deterministic scoring mechanisms, thus eliminating the need for human intervention. Evaluating frontier models on our benchmark reveals significant headroom. Our analysis shows that most errors emerge from poor instruction following, reasoning failures, and poor planning. This benchmark provides valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of current LLMs in handling complex, interactive scenarios and offers a robust platform for future research aimed at improving these critical capabilities.

Misinformation and disinformation demand fact checking that goes beyond simple evidence-based reasoning. Existing benchmarks fall short: they are largely single modality (text-only), span short time horizons, use shallow evidence, cover domains unevenly, and often omit full articles -- obscuring models' real-world capability. We present MMM-Fact, a large-scale benchmark of 125,449 fact-checked statements (1995--2025) across multiple domains, each paired with the full fact-check article and multimodal evidence (text, images, videos, tables) from four fact-checking sites and one news outlet. To reflect verification effort, each statement is tagged with a retrieval-difficulty tier -- Basic (1--5 sources), Intermediate (6--10), and Advanced (>10) -- supporting fairness-aware evaluation for multi-step, cross-modal reasoning. The dataset adopts a three-class veracity scheme (true/false/not enough information) and enables tasks in veracity prediction, explainable fact-checking, complex evidence aggregation, and longitudinal analysis. Baselines with mainstream LLMs show MMM-Fact is markedly harder than prior resources, with performance degrading as evidence complexity rises. MMM-Fact offers a realistic, scalable benchmark for transparent, reliable, multimodal fact-checking.

In this position paper, we argue that the classical evaluation on Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks using annotated benchmarks is in trouble. The worst kind of data contamination happens when a Large Language Model (LLM) is trained on the test split of a benchmark, and then evaluated in the same benchmark. The extent of the problem is unknown, as it is not straightforward to measure. Contamination causes an overestimation of the performance of a contaminated model in a target benchmark and associated task with respect to their non-contaminated counterparts. The consequences can be very harmful, with wrong scientific conclusions being published while other correct ones are discarded. This position paper defines different levels of data contamination and argues for a community effort, including the development of automatic and semi-automatic measures to detect when data from a benchmark was exposed to a model, and suggestions for flagging papers with conclusions that are compromised by data contamination.

Seeking health-related advice on the internet has become a common practice in the digital era. Determining the trustworthiness of medical claims found online and finding appropriate evidence for this information is increasingly challenging. Fact-checking has emerged as an approach to assess the veracity of factual claims using evidence from credible knowledge sources. To help advance the automation of this task, in this paper, we introduce a novel dataset of 750 health-related claims, labeled for veracity by medical experts and backed with evidence from appropriate clinical studies. We provide an analysis of the dataset, highlighting its characteristics and challenges. The dataset can be used for Machine Learning tasks related to automated fact-checking such as evidence retrieval, veracity prediction, and explanation generation. For this purpose, we provide baseline models based on different approaches, examine their performance, and discuss the findings.

Logical reasoning is fundamental for humans yet presents a substantial challenge in the domain of Artificial Intelligence. Initially, researchers used Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR) systems that did not scale and required non trivial manual effort. Recently, the emergence of large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated the ability to overcome various limitations of formal Knowledge Representation (KR) systems. Consequently, there is a growing interest in using LLMs for logical reasoning via natural language. This work strives to understand the proficiency of LLMs in logical reasoning by offering a brief review of the latest progress in this area; with a focus on the logical reasoning datasets, tasks, and the methods adopted to utilize LLMs for reasoning. To offer a thorough analysis, we have compiled a benchmark titled LogiGLUE. This includes 24 varied datasets encompassing deductive, abductive, and inductive reasoning. We have standardized these datasets into Seq2Seq tasks to facilitate straightforward training and evaluation for future research. Utilizing LogiGLUE as a foundation, we have trained an instruction fine tuned language model, resulting in LogiT5. We study single task training, multi task training, and a chain of thought knowledge distillation fine tuning technique to assess the performance of model across the different logical reasoning categories. By this comprehensive process, we aim to shed light on the capabilities and potential pathways for enhancing logical reasoning proficiency in LLMs, paving the way for more advanced and nuanced developments in this critical field.

This paper introduces MalAlgoQA, a novel dataset designed to evaluate the counterfactual reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) through a pedagogical approach. The dataset comprises mathematics and reading comprehension questions, each accompanied by four answer choices and their corresponding rationales. At the heart of MalAlgoQA are ``malgorithms'' - rationales behind incorrect answer choices that represent flawed yet logically coherent reasoning paths. These malgorithms serve as counterfactual scenarios, allowing us to assess an LLM's ability to identify and analyze flawed reasoning patterns. We propose the Malgorithm Identification task, where LLMs are assessed based on their ability to identify corresponding malgorithm given an incorrect answer choice. To evaluate the model performance, we introduce two metrics: Algorithm Identification Accuracy (AIA) for correct answer rationale identification, and Malgorithm Identification Accuracy (MIA) for incorrect answer rationale identification. Our experiments reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant performance drops in MIA compared to AIA, highlighting the challenges in counterfactual reasoning. Surprisingly, we find that the chain-of-thought prompting technique not only fails to consistently enhance MIA but can sometimes lead to underperformance compared to simple prompting. These findings have important implications for developing LLMs with improved counterfactual reasoning, particularly relevant for AI-powered tutoring systems, where identifying and addressing student misconceptions is essential. MalAlgoQA dataset is available https://github.com/luffycodes/MalAlgoQA-Dataset{here}.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

Recent reasoning large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable improvements in mathematical reasoning capabilities through long Chain-of-Thought. The reasoning tokens of these models enable self-correction within reasoning chains, enhancing robustness. This motivates our exploration: how vulnerable are reasoning LLMs to subtle errors in their input reasoning chains? We introduce "Compromising Thought" (CPT), a vulnerability where models presented with reasoning tokens containing manipulated calculation results tend to ignore correct reasoning steps and adopt incorrect results instead. Through systematic evaluation across multiple reasoning LLMs, we design three increasingly explicit prompting methods to measure CPT resistance, revealing that models struggle significantly to identify and correct these manipulations. Notably, contrary to existing research suggesting structural alterations affect model performance more than content modifications, we find that local ending token manipulations have greater impact on reasoning outcomes than structural changes. Moreover, we discover a security vulnerability in DeepSeek-R1 where tampered reasoning tokens can trigger complete reasoning cessation. Our work enhances understanding of reasoning robustness and highlights security considerations for reasoning-intensive applications.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on complex tasks, including logical puzzle games that require deriving solutions satisfying all constraints. However, whether they can flexibly apply appropriate rules to varying conditions, particularly when faced with non-canonical game variants, remains an open question. Existing corpora focus on popular puzzles like 9x9 Sudoku, risking overfitting to canonical formats and memorization of solution patterns, which can mask deficiencies in understanding novel rules or adapting strategies to new variants. To address this, we introduce HardcoreLogic, a challenging benchmark of over 5,000 puzzles across 10 games, designed to test the robustness of LRMs on the "long-tail" of logical games. HardcoreLogic systematically transforms canonical puzzles through three dimensions: Increased Complexity (IC), Uncommon Elements (UE), and Unsolvable Puzzles (UP), reducing reliance on shortcut memorization. Evaluations on a diverse set of LRMs reveal significant performance drops, even for models achieving top scores on existing benchmarks, indicating heavy reliance on memorized stereotypes. While increased complexity is the dominant source of difficulty, models also struggle with subtle rule variations that do not necessarily increase puzzle difficulty. Our systematic error analysis on solvable and unsolvable puzzles further highlights gaps in genuine reasoning. Overall, HardcoreLogic exposes the limitations of current LRMs and establishes a benchmark for advancing high-level logical reasoning.

The guiding principle of AI alignment is to train large language models (LLMs) to be harmless, helpful, and honest (HHH). At the same time, there are mounting concerns that LLMs exhibit a left-wing political bias. Yet, the commitment to AI alignment cannot be harmonized with the latter critique. In this article, I argue that intelligent systems that are trained to be harmless and honest must necessarily exhibit left-wing political bias. Normative assumptions underlying alignment objectives inherently concur with progressive moral frameworks and left-wing principles, emphasizing harm avoidance, inclusivity, fairness, and empirical truthfulness. Conversely, right-wing ideologies often conflict with alignment guidelines. Yet, research on political bias in LLMs is consistently framing its insights about left-leaning tendencies as a risk, as problematic, or concerning. This way, researchers are actively arguing against AI alignment, tacitly fostering the violation of HHH principles.

Large language models (LLMs) have gained enormous attention from both academia and industry, due to their exceptional ability in language generation and extremely powerful generalization. However, current LLMs still output unreliable content in practical reasoning tasks due to their inherent issues (e.g., hallucination). To better disentangle this problem, in this paper, we conduct an in-depth investigation to systematically explore the capability of LLMs in logical reasoning. More in detail, we first investigate the deficiency of LLMs in logical reasoning on different tasks, including event relation extraction and deductive reasoning. Our study demonstrates that LLMs are not good reasoners in solving tasks with rigorous reasoning and will produce counterfactual answers, which require us to iteratively refine. Therefore, we comprehensively explore different strategies to endow LLMs with logical reasoning ability, and thus enable them to generate more logically consistent answers across different scenarios. Based on our approach, we also contribute a synthesized dataset (LLM-LR) involving multi-hop reasoning for evaluation and pre-training. Extensive quantitative and qualitative analyses on different tasks also validate the effectiveness and necessity of teaching LLMs with logic and provide insights for solving practical tasks with LLMs in future work.

Inductive reasoning is a core component of human intelligence. In the past research of inductive reasoning within computer science, formal language is used as representations of knowledge (facts and rules, more specifically). However, formal language can cause systematic problems for inductive reasoning such as disability of handling raw input such as natural language, sensitiveness to mislabeled data, and incapacity to handle ambiguous input. To this end, we propose a new paradigm (task) for inductive reasoning, which is to induce natural language rules from natural language facts, and create a dataset termed DEER containing 1.2k rule-fact pairs for the task, where rules and facts are written in natural language. New automatic metrics are also proposed and analysed for the evaluation of this task. With DEER, we investigate a modern approach for inductive reasoning where we use natural language as representation for knowledge instead of formal language and use pretrained language models as ''reasoners''. Moreover, we provide the first and comprehensive analysis of how well pretrained language models can induce natural language rules from natural language facts. We also propose a new framework drawing insights from philosophy literature for this task, which we show in the experiment section that surpasses baselines in both automatic and human evaluations. We discuss about our future perspectives for inductive reasoning in Section 7. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZonglinY/Inductive_Reasoning.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities through test-time computation (TTC) techniques such as chain-of-thought prompting and tree-based reasoning. However, we argue that current reasoning LLMs (RLLMs) lack the ability to systematically explore the solution space. This paper formalizes what constitutes systematic problem solving and identifies common failure modes that reveal reasoning LLMs to be wanderers rather than systematic explorers. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs, we uncover persistent issues: invalid reasoning steps, redundant explorations, hallucinated or unfaithful conclusions, and so on. Our findings suggest that current models' performance can appear to be competent on simple tasks yet degrade sharply as complexity increases. Based on the findings, we advocate for new metrics and tools that evaluate not just final outputs but the structure of the reasoning process itself.

This position paper provides a critical but constructive discussion of current practices in benchmarking and evaluative practices in the field of formal reasoning and automated theorem proving. We take the position that open code, open data, and benchmarks that are complete and error-free will accelerate progress in this field. We identify practices that create barriers to contributing to this field and suggest ways to remove them. We also discuss some of the practices that might produce misleading evaluative information. We aim to create discussions that bring together people from various groups contributing to automated theorem proving, autoformalization, and informal reasoning.