Daily Papers

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Large participatory biomedical studies, studies that recruit individuals to join a dataset, are gaining popularity and investment, especially for analysis by modern AI methods. Because they purposively recruit participants, these studies are uniquely able to address a lack of historical representation, an issue that has affected many biomedical datasets. In this work, we define representativeness as the similarity to a target population distribution of a set of attributes and our goal is to mirror the U.S. population across distributions of age, gender, race, and ethnicity. Many participatory studies recruit at several institutions, so we introduce a computational approach to adaptively allocate recruitment resources among sites to improve representativeness. In simulated recruitment of 10,000-participant cohorts from medical centers in the STAR Clinical Research Network, we show that our approach yields a more representative cohort than existing baselines. Thus, we highlight the value of computational modeling in guiding recruitment efforts.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

In domains ranging from computer vision to natural language processing, machine learning models have been shown to exhibit stark disparities, often performing worse for members of traditionally underserved groups. One factor contributing to these performance gaps is a lack of representation in the data the models are trained on. It is often unclear, however, how to operationalize representativeness in specific applications. Here we formalize the problem of creating equitable training datasets, and propose a statistical framework for addressing this problem. We consider a setting where a model builder must decide how to allocate a fixed data collection budget to gather training data from different subgroups. We then frame dataset creation as a constrained optimization problem, in which one maximizes a function of group-specific performance metrics based on (estimated) group-specific learning rates and costs per sample. This flexible approach incorporates preferences of model-builders and other stakeholders, as well as the statistical properties of the learning task. When data collection decisions are made sequentially, we show that under certain conditions this optimization problem can be efficiently solved even without prior knowledge of the learning rates. To illustrate our approach, we conduct a simulation study of polygenic risk scores on synthetic genomic data -- an application domain that often suffers from non-representative data collection. We find that our adaptive sampling strategy outperforms several common data collection heuristics, including equal and proportional sampling, demonstrating the value of strategic dataset design for building equitable models.

In democratic societies, electoral systems play a crucial role in translating public preferences into political representation. Among these, the D'Hondt method is widely used to ensure proportional representation, balancing fair representation with governmental stability. Recently, there has been a growing interest in applying similar principles of proportional representation to enhance interpretability in machine learning, specifically in Explainable AI (XAI). This study investigates the integration of D'Hondt-based voting principles in the DhondtXAI method, which leverages resource allocation concepts to interpret feature importance within AI models. Through a comparison of SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations) and DhondtXAI, we evaluate their effectiveness in feature attribution within CatBoost and XGBoost models for breast cancer and diabetes prediction, respectively. The DhondtXAI approach allows for alliance formation and thresholding to enhance interpretability, representing feature importance as seats in a parliamentary view. Statistical correlation analyses between SHAP values and DhondtXAI allocations support the consistency of interpretations, demonstrating DhondtXAI's potential as a complementary tool for understanding feature importance in AI models. The results highlight that integrating electoral principles, such as proportional representation and alliances, into AI explainability can improve user understanding, especially in high-stakes fields like healthcare.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

The task of mixture proportion estimation (MPE) is to estimate the weight of a component distribution in a mixture, given observations from both the component and mixture. Previous work on MPE adopts the irreducibility assumption, which ensures identifiablity of the mixture proportion. In this paper, we propose a more general sufficient condition that accommodates several settings of interest where irreducibility does not hold. We further present a resampling-based meta-algorithm that takes any existing MPE algorithm designed to work under irreducibility and adapts it to work under our more general condition. Our approach empirically exhibits improved estimation performance relative to baseline methods and to a recently proposed regrouping-based algorithm.

Traditional direct estimation methods are not efficient for domains of a survey population with small sample sizes. To estimate the domain proportions, we combine the direct estimators and the regression-synthetic estimators based on domain-level auxiliary information. For the case of small true proportions, we introduce the design-based linear combination that is a robust alternative to the empirical best linear unbiased predictor (EBLUP) based on the Fay--Herriot model. We also consider an adaptive procedure optimizing a sample-size-dependent composite estimator, which depends on a single parameter for all domains. We imitate the Lithuanian Labor Force Survey, where we estimate the proportions of the unemployed and employed in municipalities. We show where the considered design-based compositions and estimators of their mean square errors are competitive for EBLUP and its accuracy estimation.

Ensuring equitable treatment (fairness) across protected attributes (such as gender or ethnicity) is a critical issue in machine learning. Most existing literature focuses on binary classification, but achieving fairness in regression tasks-such as insurance pricing or hiring score assessments-is equally important. Moreover, anti-discrimination laws also apply to continuous attributes, such as age, for which many existing methods are not applicable. In practice, multiple protected attributes can exist simultaneously; however, methods targeting fairness across several attributes often overlook so-called "fairness gerrymandering", thereby ignoring disparities among intersectional subgroups (e.g., African-American women or Hispanic men). In this paper, we propose a distance covariance regularisation framework that mitigates the association between model predictions and protected attributes, in line with the fairness definition of demographic parity, and that captures both linear and nonlinear dependencies. To enhance applicability in the presence of multiple protected attributes, we extend our framework by incorporating two multivariate dependence measures based on distance covariance: the previously proposed joint distance covariance (JdCov) and our novel concatenated distance covariance (CCdCov), which effectively address fairness gerrymandering in both regression and classification tasks involving protected attributes of various types. We discuss and illustrate how to calibrate regularisation strength, including a method based on Jensen-Shannon divergence, which quantifies dissimilarities in prediction distributions across groups. We apply our framework to the COMPAS recidivism dataset and a large motor insurance claims dataset.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

This article introduces Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) with Distribution-Valued Outcomes (R3D), extending the standard RDD framework to settings where the outcome is a distribution rather than a scalar. Such settings arise when treatment is assigned at a higher level of aggregation than the outcome-for example, when a subsidy is allocated based on a firm-level revenue cutoff while the outcome of interest is the distribution of employee wages within the firm. Since standard RDD methods cannot accommodate such two-level randomness, I propose a novel approach based on random distributions. The target estimand is a "local average quantile treatment effect", which averages across random quantiles. To estimate this target, I introduce two related approaches: one that extends local polynomial regression to random quantiles and another based on local Fr\'echet regression, a form of functional regression. For both estimators, I establish asymptotic normality and develop uniform, debiased confidence bands together with a data-driven bandwidth selection procedure. Simulations validate these theoretical properties and show existing methods to be biased and inconsistent in this setting. I then apply the proposed methods to study the effects of gubernatorial party control on within-state income distributions in the US, using a close-election design. The results suggest a classic equality-efficiency tradeoff under Democratic governorship, driven by reductions in income at the top of the distribution.

Training classifiers is difficult with severe class imbalance, but many rare events are the culmination of a sequence with much more common intermediate outcomes. For example, in online marketing a user first sees an ad, then may click on it, and finally may make a purchase; estimating the probability of purchases is difficult because of their rarity. We show both theoretically and through data experiments that the more abundant data in earlier steps may be leveraged to improve estimation of probabilities of rare events. We present PRESTO, a relaxation of the proportional odds model for ordinal regression. Instead of estimating weights for one separating hyperplane that is shifted by separate intercepts for each of the estimated Bayes decision boundaries between adjacent pairs of categorical responses, we estimate separate weights for each of these transitions. We impose an L1 penalty on the differences between weights for the same feature in adjacent weight vectors in order to shrink towards the proportional odds model. We prove that PRESTO consistently estimates the decision boundary weights under a sparsity assumption. Synthetic and real data experiments show that our method can estimate rare probabilities in this setting better than both logistic regression on the rare category, which fails to borrow strength from more abundant categories, and the proportional odds model, which is too inflexible.

Weighting methods in causal inference have been widely used to achieve a desirable level of covariate balancing. However, the existing weighting methods have desirable theoretical properties only when a certain model, either the propensity score or outcome regression model, is correctly specified. In addition, the corresponding estimators do not behave well for finite samples due to large variance even when the model is correctly specified. In this paper, we consider to use the integral probability metric (IPM), which is a metric between two probability measures, for covariate balancing. Optimal weights are determined so that weighted empirical distributions for the treated and control groups have the smallest IPM value for a given set of discriminators. We prove that the corresponding estimator can be consistent without correctly specifying any model (neither the propensity score nor the outcome regression model). In addition, we empirically show that our proposed method outperforms existing weighting methods with large margins for finite samples.

In critical decision-making scenarios, optimizing accuracy can lead to a biased classifier, hence past work recommends enforcing group-based fairness metrics in addition to maximizing accuracy. However, doing so exposes the classifier to another kind of bias called infra-marginality. This refers to individual-level bias where some individuals/subgroups can be worse off than under simply optimizing for accuracy. For instance, a classifier implementing race-based parity may significantly disadvantage women of the advantaged race. To quantify this bias, we propose a general notion of eta-infra-marginality that can be used to evaluate the extent of this bias. We prove theoretically that, unlike other fairness metrics, infra-marginality does not have a trade-off with accuracy: high accuracy directly leads to low infra-marginality. This observation is confirmed through empirical analysis on multiple simulated and real-world datasets. Further, we find that maximizing group fairness often increases infra-marginality, suggesting the consideration of both group-level fairness and individual-level infra-marginality. However, measuring infra-marginality requires knowledge of the true distribution of individual-level outcomes correctly and explicitly. We propose a practical method to measure infra-marginality, and a simple algorithm to maximize group-wise accuracy and avoid infra-marginality.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

As large language models increase in capability, researchers have started to conduct surveys of all kinds on these models with varying scientific motivations. In this work, we examine what we can learn from a model's survey responses on the basis of the well-established American Community Survey (ACS) by the U.S. Census Bureau. Evaluating more than a dozen different models, varying in size from a few hundred million to ten billion parameters, hundreds of thousands of times each on questions from the ACS, we systematically establish two dominant patterns. First, smaller models have a significant position and labeling bias, for example, towards survey responses labeled with the letter "A". This A-bias diminishes, albeit slowly, as model size increases. Second, when adjusting for this labeling bias through randomized answer ordering, models still do not trend toward US population statistics or those of any cognizable population. Rather, models across the board trend toward uniformly random aggregate statistics over survey responses. This pattern is robust to various different ways of prompting the model, including what is the de-facto standard. Our findings demonstrate that aggregate statistics of a language model's survey responses lack the signals found in human populations. This absence of statistical signal cautions about the use of survey responses from large language models at present time.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.