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Nov 16

Agents Don't Just Agree, They Remember: Benchmarking Persistent Sycophancy in Stateful Personal Agents

Stateful personal agents increasingly maintain long-term user profiles, episodic memories, and reusable skills. This persistence turns conversational sycophancy into a state-writing failure: accepted user-centric claims can be committed as lasting preferences, background facts, or workflows and later reused after the original conversation is gone. We call this persistent sycophancy and introduce the Personal Agent Sycophancy Benchmark (PASB), a 1,600-task benchmark that traces whether a conversational claim is accepted, written into durable agent state, and reused in a later neutral query. Unlike prior benchmarks that provide pre-written memories, PASB evaluates real agents (Hermes-Agent and OpenClaw) that decide what to store. It isolates the write process by combining four scenario framings with four temporal delivery patterns and separating a five-turn persist stage from a cleared three-turn query stage, ensuring downstream effects arise only from durable state. Across twelve models, the commit boundary is the key inflection point: downstream failure increases from 45.0% in session-only episodes to 71.9% after commitment, a consistent increase of 27.0 percentage points. Committed claims exhibit three write-time patterns: status promotion, attribution removal, and scope broadening. These patterns become stronger under memory-like or procedural framing, repeated reinforcement, and even across domain boundaries. These results show that agent sycophancy is fundamentally a state-writing governance problem. Once user content is committed to durable memory, safety must govern what agents write, not only what they say. PASB identifies the write-time controls needed to gate risky commits while preserving the source, role, and scope of stored content beyond response-level mitigations.

  • 9 authors
·
Jul 13

Memory in Large Language Models: Mechanisms, Evaluation and Evolution

Under a unified operational definition, we define LLM memory as a persistent state written during pretraining, finetuning, or inference that can later be addressed and that stably influences outputs. We propose a four-part taxonomy (parametric, contextual, external, procedural/episodic) and a memory quadruple (location, persistence, write/access path, controllability). We link mechanism, evaluation, and governance via the chain write -> read -> inhibit/update. To avoid distorted comparisons across heterogeneous setups, we adopt a three-setting protocol (parametric only, offline retrieval, online retrieval) that decouples capability from information availability on the same data and timeline. On this basis we build a layered evaluation: parametric (closed-book recall, edit differential, memorization/privacy), contextual (position curves and the mid-sequence drop), external (answer correctness vs snippet attribution/faithfulness), and procedural/episodic (cross-session consistency and timeline replay, E MARS+). The framework integrates temporal governance and leakage auditing (freshness hits, outdated answers, refusal slices) and uncertainty reporting via inter-rater agreement plus paired tests with multiple-comparison correction. For updating and forgetting, we present DMM Gov: coordinating DAPT/TAPT, PEFT, model editing (ROME, MEND, MEMIT, SERAC), and RAG to form an auditable loop covering admission thresholds, rollout, monitoring, rollback, and change audits, with specs for timeliness, conflict handling, and long-horizon consistency. Finally, we give four testable propositions: minimum identifiability; a minimal evaluation card; causally constrained editing with verifiable forgetting; and when retrieval with small-window replay outperforms ultra-long-context reading. This yields a reproducible, comparable, and governable coordinate system for research and deployment.

  • 7 authors
·
Sep 23, 2025

The World as Viewed by 136 Countries: An Open, Curated, Annotated, and Multilingual Dataset of 118 Million State Media Articles

State media outlets often project their governments' narratives to target both domestic and foreign audiences. Because this content is plentiful and free to access, it appears widely in the web corpora that large language models (LLMs) are trained on and that retrieval systems draw from. However, the prevalence of state media in these corpora and its potential influence on LLM outputs remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we introduce WorldStateMedia, an open dataset of 118 million state media articles from 136 countries in 114 languages. We extract these articles from existing pretraining corpora and annotate each outlet with level of state control from State Media Monitor. Using WorldStateMedia to audit these corpora, we find that, in English web crawls, the share of state media pages from editorially controlled (vs. independent) outlets rose from 39% in 2013 to 93% in 2025. In several low-resource languages, state media make up a substantial share of all web data, such as 17.8% for Uyghur and 7.8% for Belarusian. To characterize the differing narratives of news outlets, we compare Russian and Ukrainian state media in English and in their native languages, revealing asymmetric topical focus and opposing framings of contested issues such as Crimea. Furthermore, in a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) experiment on territorial disputes, retrieving a country's state media shifts model answers toward that country's claims, most strongly for English-language (foreign-targeted) media. We release WorldStateMedia to support multilingual, cross-national insights on state media at https://huggingface.co/collections/manestay/worldstatemedia

  • 9 authors
·
Oct 17

Subjects, Not Authors: The Authorship Hazard in Agentic Dataspaces

Dataspace connectors decide whether a transfer may occur, not what the transferred value contains, tolerable for contracted applications, not for LLM agents that compose tool calls and spawn sub-agents. Research on agents that generate governance artifacts evaluates output quality; who may authorize an artifact for use falls between that literature and the governance literature, and neither owns it. A published policy is what a dataspace's decision point enforces, so publication is a governance event, and an agent that is both policy subject and policy author writes the norms that bind it. We name this the authorship hazard and state one principle: an agent is a subject of the governance plane, never an author of it. Its authorization channel to publication is closed by construction; its influence channel, drafting what humans approve, is treated as an enforcement problem. On a frozen corpus of agent drafts, publishing without approval reverses 80 authorization decisions, most through drafts that change only a field's sensitivity classification and no policy text; a classifier that reads the policy diff misses every such draft, necessarily. Treating classification as authorship routes them all to review; the registry-held classification this requires is designed and modelled here, not yet implemented in the prototype. At the execution boundary, protected fields reach the model in 105 of 105 cases under prompt-stated duties and in 0 of 105 when the ODRL duty is compiled into an invocation-time tool-call constraint, but where the value is not confined to a named field the compiled condition exposes it in 7 of 7. A centrally provisioned approval pool does not scale to the participant volume that motivates the problem.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 23

Mechanical Enforcement for LLM Governance:Evidence of Governance-Task Decoupling in Financial Decision Systems

Large language models in regulated financial workflows are governed by natural-language policies that the same model interprets, creating a principal--agent failure: outputs can appear compliant without being compliant. Existing evaluation measures task accuracy but not whether governance constrains behaviour at the decision rationale level -- where regulated decisions must be auditable. We introduce five governance metrics that quantify policy compliance at the rationale level and apply them in a synthetic banking domain to compare text-only governance against mechanical enforcement: four primitives operating outside the model's interpretive loop. Under text-only governance, 27% of deferrals carry no decision-relevant information. Mechanical enforcement reduces this rate by 73%, more than doubles deferral information content, and raises task accuracy from MCC~0.43 to 0.88. The improvement is driven by architectural separation: LLM-generated rationales under mechanical enforcement show comparable CDL to text-only governance -- the gain comes from removing clear-cut decisions from the model's control. A causal ablation confirms that each primitive is individually necessary. Our central finding is a governance-task decoupling: under structural stress, text-only governance degrades on both dimensions simultaneously, whereas mechanical enforcement preserves governance quality even as task performance drops. This implies that governance and task evaluation are distinct axes: accuracy is not a sufficient proxy for governance in regulated AI systems.

  • 2 authors
·
May 13

LedgerAgent: Structured State for Policy-Adherent Tool-Calling Agents

Policy-adherent tool-calling agents in customer-service domains must maintain task states across turns while calling tools and obeying domain policies. Task states consist of relevant facts, identifiers, constraints, and conditions observed through user interaction and tool calls. In standard agents, task states are not represented separately. Observations, tool returns, and policy instructions are placed in the prompt, leaving agents to reconstruct the relevant states from the prompt each time they decide what to do next. This design makes state management implicit, creating two common failure modes. An agent may retrieve the right facts but later ground its decision in stale, missing, or incorrect information; and a syntactically valid tool call may still violate a domain policy that depends on the current task state. We introduce LedgerAgent, an inference-time method for tool-calling agents that maintains observed task states in a separate ledger and renders the states into the prompt. The ledger is also used to check state-dependent policy constraints before environment-changing tool calls are executed, blocking policy violations. Across four customer-service domains and a mixed panel of open- and closed-weight models, LedgerAgent improves average passk over a standard prompt-based tool-calling approach, with the largest gains under stricter multi-trial consistency metrics.

Making Agent-Mediated Contributions Governable: A Project-Level Governance Manifest for Open-Source AI Collaboration

Generative AI and coding agents are intensifying a central governance tension in open-source software (OSS): they scale contribution generation faster than maintainers can assess risk, evidence, and accountability. Existing responses improve agent-readability and traceability, but project rules must also organize contribution-specific risk, evidence, accountability, and review-gate states. We theorize this organizational arrangement as project-side governability infrastructure. A diagnostic audit of 50 GitHub repositories finds widespread general governance artifacts, observable agent-readability, and fragmented AI-governance cues, but no project-wide arrangement that coordinates shared rules, preparation obligations, verification rights, and maintainer decision authority across AI-mediated contribution workflows. We develop the Agent Governance Manifest (AGM) as a repository-hosted boundary resource and bidirectional governance contract linking contributor-side evidence preparation with maintainer-side verification. In a controlled reviewer-side evaluation with 15 participants and 75 task-level outputs, AGM-supported materials improved exact risk-label recovery (37/38 vs. 15/37) and perceived review support (6.14 vs. 3.27 on a 1-7 scale). In a contributor-side feasibility check, 15 participants completed 45 tasks; all final packages represented the core governance state correctly, and 41 passed strict structural validation. The study develops a three-layer framework of agent-readability, traceability, and governability, theorizes agent-mediated contributions as governable boundary objects, and advances compliance-enabling digital innovation governance while preserving maintainer decision authority.

  • 5 authors
·
Jul 16

Cybernetic and Epistemic: A Missing Vocabulary for Trustworthy Agentic Delegation

As code generation is increasingly delegated to AI systems, the bottleneck is shifting from writing code to supervising the systems that write it --- a shift CS-education researchers have begun to name. This shift exposes a vocabulary gap: the field asks for "human oversight" without a working distinction between the two things language does in a delegation channel --- coordinate action (cybernetic: words succeed when the world comes to match them) and coordinate understanding (epistemic: they succeed when they answer to the world and a hearer can check that they do). The failure this names is not cybernetic language but epistemic-form language doing cybernetic work: explanation-shaped output calibrated for approval rather than truth. Oversight that checks only whether an output was approved is satisfiable by rubber-stamping; oversight that holds an agent accountable requires the reasoning behind its work be retrievable and checkable. We present three delegation episodes --- illustrations, not controlled evidence --- in which epistemic engagement proved practicable while remaining auditable, one public record where a recommendation was withdrawn on its own stated terms, and one failure case illustrating oversight that requires no reasons for its discretionary choices. We propose a criterion for agentic-system governance, alongside existing technical trust properties: every consequential choice should carry the condition under which it would have gone otherwise, in a form a third party can test. Without such a condition, a third party cannot distinguish a decision from a rubber stamp. We give the criterion an operational form --- a two-part reconstruction test scoring a delegation record by whether a second reader can predict what the agent does under a perturbation --- and a deliberation-recording convention, ORRCF, that makes the condition a required component of every recorded choice.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 30

Is Decentralized AI Governable? From Regulative Policy to Constitutive Protocol

Every major framework for governing artificial intelligence presupposes an identifiable entity -- a developer, deployer, or operator -- who can be held responsible and compelled to comply. Decentralized AI (DeAI) dissolves this presupposition. We analyze DeAI as a six-layer decentralizing stack -- model, training, compute, harness, identity, and ownership -- and show how partial decentralization across layers compounds into what we call the governance vacuum: a condition in which AI systems are consequential enough to require governance but lack the properties that existing frameworks presuppose in their targets. This vacuum takes two analytically distinct forms: an accountability gap, where no addressable principal can be identified, and an incapacitation gap, where even an identified principal cannot alter the running system. We demonstrate that these failures are not merely jurisdictional but defeat every presupposition of governance through normative address -- the communication of rules to a comprehending, responsive agent. Drawing on Lessig's modalities of regulation and Searle's distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, we argue for a shift in the locus of governance from policy to protocol, from normative address to architectural constraint. Protocol-based constitutive governance does not address the agents operating within a system but shapes the substrate that determines what kinds of actions are possible within it. We identify four ethical conditions -- legitimacy, contestability, transparency, and non-domination -- that such governance must satisfy to avoid degenerating into unaccountable technocratic power, and we argue that the central political challenge of governing AI in a decentralized world is reconstructing forms of democratic authorization for architectural choices that persist after the ordinary chain of policy has broken down.

  • 2 authors
·
May 22