CHAPTER 23: World War II: The War Against Japan
World War II: The War Against Japan
 
In World War II, for the first time, the United States had to fight a war on    two fronts. Though the central strategic principle governing allocation of resources    to the two fronts provided for concentrating first on the defeat of the European    Axis, on the American side this principle was liberally interpreted, permitting    conduct of an offensive war against Japan as well as against Germany in the    years 1943-45. The U.S. Fleet, expanding after its initial setback at Pearl    Harbor much as the Army had, provided the main sinews for an offensive strategy    in the Pacific, although the Army devoted at least one-third of its resources    to the Pacific war, even at the height of war in Europe. In sum, the United    States proved capable, once its resources were fully mobilized, of successfully    waging offensives on two fronts simultaneouslyï¿½a development the Japanese had    not anticipated when they launched their attack on Pearl Harbor.
 
Japan's Strategy
 
Japan entered World War II with limited aims and with the intention of fighting    a limited war. Its principal objectives were to secure the resources of Southeast    Asia and much of China and to establish a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity    Sphere" under Japanese hegemony. In 1895 and in 1905 Japan had gained important    objectives without completely defeating China or Russia and in 1941 Japan sought    to achieve its hegemony over East Asia in similar fashion. The operational strategy    the Japanese adopted to start war, however, doomed their hopes of limiting the    conflict. Japan believed it necessary to destroy or neutralize American striking    power in the Pacificï¿½the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the U.S. Far    East Air Force in the Philippinesï¿½before moving southward and eastward to occupy    Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Wake Island, Guam, the Gilbert    Islands, Thailand, and Burma. Once in control of these areas, the Japanese intended    to establish a defensive perimeter stretching from the Kurile Islands south    through Wake, the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls and Gilberts    to Rabaul on New Britain. From
Map 42
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Rabaul the perimeter would extend westward to northwestern New Guinea and would    encompass the Indies, Malaya, Thailand, and Burma. Japan thought that the Allies    would wear themselves out in fruitless frontal assaults against the perimeter    and would ultimately settle for a negotiated peace that would leave it in possession    of most of its conquests. (Map 42)
 
The Japanese were remarkably successful in the execution of their offensive    plan and by early 1942 had reached their intended perimeter. But they miscalculated    the effect of their surprise attack at Pearl Harbor which unified a divided    people and aroused the United States to wage a total, not a limited, war. As    a result Japan lost, in the long run, any chance of conducting the war on its    own terms. The Allies, responding to their defeats, sought no negotiated peace,    but immediately began to seek means to strike back. In February and March 1942    small carrier task forces of the Pacific Fleet hit the Marshalls, Wake, and    Marcus, and bombers from Australia began to harass the Japanese base at Rabaul.    In April Army bombers, flying off a naval carrier, delivered a hit-and-run raid    on Tokyo. Meanwhile, the United States began to develop and fortify a line of    communications across the southern Pacific to Australia and to strengthen the    defenses of the "down-under" continent itself. These new bases, along    with Alaska, Hawaii, and India, also strengthened during the period, could become    the launching points for counteroffensives. And once the Allies became strong    enough to threaten the Japanese defensive perimeter from several directions    the Japanese would lose the advantage of interior lines, and with it the strategic    initiative, for Japan did not have and could not produce the means to defend    and hold at all points.
 
Perceiving their danger, the Japanese in a second phase offensive tried to    sever the Allied lines of communications to Australia and to expand their perimeter    in the Pacific. In the spring of 1942 they pushed southeast from Rabaul to Guadalcanal    and Tulagi in the Solomons, and seized Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians. But    they failed in their main effort to take Midway Island, northwest of Hawaii, and in the naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in May and June they lost    the bulk of their best naval pilots and planes. Midway was the turning point,    for it redressed the naval balance in the Pacific and gave the Allies the strategic    initiative. The Japanese, with the mobility of their carrier striking forces    curtailed, abandoned plans to cut the Allied South Pacific life line and turned    instead to strengthening their defensive perimeter, planning to wage a protracted    war of attrition in the hope of securing a negotiated peace.
 
Guadalcanal and Papua: The First Offensives
 
After Midway the U.S. Joint Chiefs, responsible for direction of the war in    the Pacific, almost naturally turned to the elimination of the threat to their    line of communications in the south as the objective of their first offensive.    In so doing, they gave to American strategy in the Pacific a twist unanticipated    in prewar planning, which had always presupposed that the main offensive in    any war against Japan would be made directly across the Central Pacific from    Hawaii toward the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs on July 2 directed Allied forces    in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas to begin a series of operations aimed    at the ultimate reduction of the Japanese stronghold at Rabaul on New Britain    Island, thus establishing Allied control of the Bismarck Archipelago.
 
The campaign would consist of three stages or tasks. In Task One, forces of    the South Pacific Area (under Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley until November 1942    and thereafter under Admiral William F. Halsey) would seize base sites in the    southern Solomons. In Task Two, South Pacific forces would advance up the ladder    of the Solomons while Southwest Pacific forces (under General MacArthur) would    move up the north coast of New Guinea as far as Lae and Salamaua. In Task Three,    the forces of the two theaters would converge on Rabaul and clear the rest of    the Bismarck Archipelago. Task One was to be conducted under the general supervision    of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, whose vast Pacific Ocean Areas command included    the North, Central, and South Pacific Areas as subtheaters. Tasks Two and Three    would be executed under the strategic direction of General MacArthur. The Joint    Chiefs of Staff, reserving to themselves final control of the assignment of    tasks, allocation of resources, and timing of operations, would provide, in    effect, unified command over Nimitz and MacArthur.
 
The offensive began on August 7, 1942, when the 1st Marine Division landed    on Guadalcanal and nearby islands in the southern Solomons. The Japanese, taking    full advantage of interior lines from their bases at Rabaul and Truk, reacted    vigorously. Six times from August to the end of November they challenged American    naval superiority in the South Pacific in a series of sharp surface engagements.    Air battles were almost daily occurrences for a month or more after the landings,    and the Japanese sent in strong ground reinforcements, gambling and ultimately    losing substantial air and naval resources in the effort to hold Guadalcanal.    The Americans had to reinforce heavily, deploying naval power, planes, soldiers,    and marines in the battle at the expense of other theaters. Before the island    was secured in November, another Marine
 
 
Map 43
division (the 2d), two Army divisions (25th and Americal), and one separate    regiment, to mention only the major ground combat elements, had been thrown    into the battle. The last act came in February 1943, when the 43d Division moved    into the Russell Islands, thirty-five miles northwest of Guadalcanal. On Guadalcanal    and in the Russells, American forces then began to construct major air and logistical    bases for further advances.
 
A Japanese overland drive toward Port Moresby in New Guinea had meanwhile forced    General MacArthur to begin an offensive of his ownï¿½the Papua Campaign. (Map    43) During the late summer the Japanese had pushed across the towering Owen    Stanley Mountains toward Port Moresby from the Buna-Gona area on New    Guinea's northeastern coast, and by mid-September were only twenty miles from    their objective. Australian ground forces drove the
 
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Japanese back to the north coast, where they strongly entrenched themselves    around Buna and Gona. It took 2 Australian divisions, 1 U.S. Army division (32d),    and another U.S. Army regiment almost four months of bitter fighting to dislodge    the Japanese. Casualties were high, but as at Guadalcanal the Allied forces    learned much about jungle fighting, the importance of air power, and the need    for thorough logistical preparation. They also discovered that the Japanese    soldier, though a skillful, stubborn, and fanatic foe, could be defeated. The    myth of Japanese invincibility was forever laid to rest in the jungles of Guadalcanal    and Papua.
 
After Papua and Guadalcanal the tempo of operations in the South and Southwest    Pacific Areas slowed while General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey gathered resources    and prepared bases for the next phase. The Japanese, in
 
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turn, undertook to reinforce their main bases in New Guinea and the northern    Solomons. In March 1943 they attempted to send a large convoy to Lae in New    Guinea but, in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, lost some 3,500 troops and much    valuable shipping, principally to Army land-based aircraft. During the following    months Rabaul-based planes, reinforced by carrier planes flown in from the Carolines,    sought unsuccessfully to knock out American air power in the southern Solomons.
 
Search for a Strategy
 
Meanwhile, in the spring and summer of 1943, a strategy for the defeat of Japan    began to take shape within Allied councils. The major Allied objective was control    of the South China Sea and a foothold on the coast of China, so as to sever    Japanese lines of communications southward and to establish bases from    which Japan could first be subjected to intensive aerial bombardment and naval    blockade and then, if necessary, invaded. The first plans for attaining    this objective envisioned Allied drives from several different directionsï¿½by    American forces across the Pacific along two lines, from the South and Southwest toward the Philippines and from Hawaii across the Central Pacific; and by    British and Chinese forces along two other lines, the first a land line through    Burma and China and the second a sea line from India via the Netherlands Indies,    Singapore, and the Strait of Malacca into the South China Sea. Within the framework    of this tentative long-range plan, the U.S. Joint Chiefs fitted their existing    plans for completion of the campaign against Rabaul, and a subsequent advance    to the Philippines, and developed a plan for the second drive across    the Central Pacific. They also, in 1942 and 1943, pressed the Chinese and British    to get a drive under way in Burma to reopen the supply line to China in phase    with their Pacific advances, offering extensive air and logistical support.
 
The North Pacific line running from Alaska through the Kuriles to the northernmost    Japanese island of Hokkaido also beckoned in early 1943 as a possible additional    avenue of approach to Japan. The Joint Chiefs decided, however, that although    the Japanese perimeter should be pushed back in this area, the foggy, cold North    Pacific with its rock-bound and craggy islands was not a profitable area in    which to undertake a major offensive. In May 1943 the U.S. 7th Division went    ashore on Attu and, after three weeks of costly fighting through icy muck and    over wind-swept ridges in a cold, almost constant fog, destroyed the Japanese    garrison. In August a combined American-Canadian expedition landed on Kiska,    some distance away, only to find that the Japanese had evacuated the island    three weeks earlier. With the Japanese perimeter pushed back to the Kuriles    the Allied advance stopped, and further operations
Map 44
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were limited to nuisance air raids against these Japanese-held islands. Ground    forces used in the attacks on Attu and Kiska were redeployed to the Central    Pacific, and some of the defensive forces deployed in Alaska were also freed    for employment elsewhere.
 
Prospects of an advance through China to the coast faded rapidly in 1943. At    the Casablanca Conference in January the Combined Chiefs agreed on an ambitious    operation, called ANAKIM, to be launched in the fall of 1943 to retake Burma    and reopen the supply line to China. ANAKIM was to include a British amphibious    assault on Rangoon and an offensive into central Burma, plus an American-sponsored    Chinese offensive in the north involving convergence of forces operating from    China and India. ANAKIM proved too ambitious; even limited offensives in Southeast    Asia were postponed time and again for lack of adequate resources. By late 1943    the Americans had concluded that their Pacific forces would reach the China    coast before either British or Chinese forces could come in through the back    door. At the SEXTANT Conference late in 1943 the Combined Chiefs agreed that    the main effort against Japan should be concentrated in the Pacific along two    lines of advance, with operations in the North Pacific, China, and Southeast    Asia to be assigned subsidiary roles.
 
In this strategy the two lines of advance in the Pacificï¿½the one across the    Central Pacific via the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, Carolines, and Palaus    toward the Philippines or Formosa (Taiwan) and the other in the Southwest Pacific    via the north coast of New Guinea to the Vogelkop and thence to the southern    Philippinesï¿½were viewed as mutually supporting. (Map 44) Although the    Joint Chiefs several times indicated a measure of preference for the Central    Pacific as the area of main effort, they never established any real priority    between the two lines, seeking instead to retain a flexibility that would permit    striking blows along either line as opportunity offered. The Central Pacific    route promised to force a naval showdown with the Japanese and, once the Marianas    were secured, to provide bases from which the U.S. Army Air Forces' new B-29    bombers could strike the Japanese home islands. The Southwest Pacific route    was shorter, if existing bases were taken into consideration, and offered more    opportunity to employ land-based air power to full advantage. The target area    for both drives, in the strategy approved at SEXTANT, was to be the Luzon-Formosa-China    coast area. Within this area the natural goal of the Southwest Pacific drive    was the Philippines, but that of the Central Pacific drive could be either the    Philippines or Formosa. As the drives along the two lines got under way in earnest    in 1944, the choice between the two became the central strategic issue.
 
Cartwheel: The Encirclement of Rabaul
 
In June 1943 MacArthur and Halsey resumed their offensive to reduce the Japanese    stronghold at Rabaulï¿½a prerequisite to further advances along the Southwest    Pacific axis toward the Philippines. The plan for the campaign provided for    a carefully phased series of operations in each theater, each designed to secure    a strategic position where air cover could be provided for further advances.    The first of the series started in late June when MacArthur landed American    troops on the Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands off eastern New Guinea and at Nassau    Bay on the New Guinea coast, and Halsey's forces made their first landings on    the New Georgia group in the Central Solomons. From these beginnings the operations    proceeded up the ladder of the Solomons, along the coast of New Guinea, and    across the straits to New Britain Island generally as scheduled, despite strong    Japanese reaction.
 
In the Solomons by early August Army forces under Halsey had secured New Georgia    with its important Munda airfield, but the campaign was not completed until    October when U.S. and New Zealand troops occupied Vella Lavella, between New    Georgia and Bougainville. At the end of October, New Zealanders and U.S. marines    landed on Treasury and Choiseul Islands to secure bases for the assault on Bougainville;    that assault got under way on November I when marines landed, followed soon    after by the Army's 37th Division. In each phase of the Solomons campaign, the    Japanese sought unsuccessfully to contest Allied air and naval supremacy, to    land reinforcements, and to launch strong counterattacks against Allied    beachheads, losing in the effort both planes and combat ships they could ill    afford to spare. Air and naval losses suffered in the Solomons crippled the    Japanese Fleet for months to come and helped to pave the way for the successful    Central Pacific drive that got under way in November. With the repulse of the    Japanese counterattack on Bougainville, by the end of November security of the    American beachhead on that island was assured, permitting the development of    a major American air base. With the taking of Bougainville, the main part of    the South Pacific Area's task in Operation CARTWHEEL was completed.
 
MacArthur's forces meanwhile continued their offensives, with Australian troops    carrying most of the burden in New Guinea. In early September the U.S. Army's    503d Parachute Regiment, in the first airborne operation of the Pacific war,    seized an airfield at Nadzab, inland from Lae and Salamaua. Australian troops    cleared Lae and Salamaua by mid-September and, flown into Nadzab, moved on to    the Huon peninsula. Elements of the U.S. 32d Division landed-at the western    end of the peninsula in January 1944 in an attempt to trap
 
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a large Japanese force, but by the time Australian and American units had sealed    the western exits to the peninsula most of the Japanese had escaped northwest    to Hansa Bay and Wewak.
 
In the meantime, MacArthur and Halsey had assembled the forces to launch a    final offensive toward Rabaul, but the Joint Chiefs decided that the actual    seizure of that objective would be too costly in terms of men, equipment, and    time. They preferred to encircle Rabaul, neutralize it by air bombardment, and    push on to seize an offensive base farther west, in the Admiralty Islands. A    new series of operations toward these ends started in MacArthur's theater on    December 15, 1943, when U.S. Army units landed on the south coast of western    New Britain, and on the 26th, the 1st Marine Division landed on the north coast.    In mid-February 1944 New Zealand troops of the South Pacific Area secured an    air base site on Green Island, north of Rabaul, and on the last day of the month    MacArthur began landing the 1st Cavalry Division (an infantry unit retaining    its former designation) on the Admiralties, closing the western and northwestern    approaches to Rabaul. Marines under Halsey seized a final air base site on Emirau,    north of Rabaul, on March 20, while Marine and Army units under MacArthur secured    additional positions in western and central New Britain from March to May 1944.    The major Japanese base at Rabaul, with its 100,000-man garrison, was as effectively    out of the war as if it had been destroyed. In the process of encircling Rabaul,    the Allies had also left to wither on the vine another important Japanese base    at Kavieng on New Ireland, north of Rabaul.
 
In the last phase of the campaign against Rabaul, a pattern developed that    came to characterize much of the war in the Pacific. The Allies would mount    no frontal attacks against strongly entrenched Japanese forces if they could    avoid it; they would not advance island by island across a vast ocean studded    with myriad atolls and island groups. Rather, they would advance in great bounds,    limited only by the range of land-based air cover or the availability of carrier-based    air support. The Allies would deceive and surprise the Japanese; they would    bypass major strongpoints and leave them reduced to strategic and tactical impotence.
 
The Central Pacific Drive Begins
 
The necessity for relying primarily on support of land-based aircraft curtailed    the length of the jumps in the South and Southwest Pacific in 1943. The Navy's    limited supply of aircraft carriers could not be employed to best advantage    in the narrow waters around New Guinea and the Solomons. By mid-1943, however,    new larger and faster carriers of the Essex class (27,000 tons) and lighter    carriers of the Independence class (11,000 tons) were joining the Pacific
 
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Fleet. Around these new carriers Admiral Nimitz built naval task forces tailored    in each case to the particular operation at hand. The task forces consisted    of a mix of carriers, destroyers, cruisers, battleships, submarines, minesweepers,    and support craft. In the broad expanses of the Central Pacific, these air carrier    task forces could provide both air and naval support for far longer leaps forward,    while the entire Pacific Fleet stood ready to confront the main Japanese Fleet    at any time it chose to give battle.
 
The Central Pacific drive got under way on November 20, 1943, when Nimitz sent    Army and Marine forces to the Gilbert Islands to seize bases from which to support    subsequent jumps into the Marshalls. Troops and supplies for the Gilberts loaded    at Hawaii on newly developed assault shipping and sailed more than 2,000 miles    to be set ashore by specially designed landing craft and amphibian vehicles.    Makin, the Army objective, fell to the 27th Division after four days of hard    fighting. Tarawa, where the ad Marine Division went ashore, proved a bloody    affair that provided a stiff test for American amphibious doctrine, techniques,    and equipment. Naval gunfire vessels and carrier-based aircraft-provided support    during and after the assault.
 
The advance to the Gilberts disclosed that U.S. forces had not entirely mastered    certain aspects of amphibious warfare, especially naval gunfire support, co-ordination    of air support, and ship-to-shore communications. But valuable lessons were    learned that, added to the earlier experiences of the South and Southwest Pacific    Areas, established a pattern of island warfare which represented one of the    major tactical developments of the war. First, air and naval forces isolated    an objective and softened its defenses; simultaneously, joint forces would attack    or feint toward other islands to deceive the Japanese. The approach of convoys    carrying the ground assault forces to the main objective signaled the opening    of final, intensive air and naval bombardment of the landing beaches. Whenever    practicable, small forces occupied neighboring islands as sites for land-based    artillery. Under cover of all these supporting fires, the landing forces moved    from ship to shore in echelons, or waves, rocket-firing landing craft in the    lead and amphibian tanks and tractors following to carry the assault troops    directly onto the beaches and inland. Finally came landing craft with more infantry    and with tanks, artillery, and supporting troops. Supplies followed rapidly    as the assault forces secured and expanded the beachhead. Amphibious techniques    were refined and modified to some extent after the Gilberts, but the lessons    learned there made it unnecessary to effect any radical changes in amphibious    doctrine throughout the rest of the war.
 
The Japanese did not react strongly to the loss of the Gilberts, and at the    end of January 1944 Nimitz' Army and Marine forces moved into the eastern
 
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and central Marshalls to seize Majuro and Kwajalein. The strength employed    in this operation proved so preponderant and Japanese defenses so weak that    Nimitz was able to accelerate his next advance by two and a half months, and    on February 17 landed Marine and Army units on Eniwetok Atoll in the western    Marshalls. Concurrently, he conducted a long-awaited carrier strike against    Truk in the central Carolines, considered Japan's key bastion in the Central    Pacific. The raid revealed that the Japanese had virtually abandoned Truk as    a naval base, and the capture of the atoll, set for June, no longer appeared    necessary. Nimitz then drew up plans to invade the Marianas in mid-June and    move on to the western Carolines and Palaus in mid-September, again accelerating    the pace of the advance.
 
Acceleration of the Pacific Drive
 
General MacArthur had also pushed forward the Southwest Pacific Area's timetable.    Having landed in the Admiralties a month ahead of his original schedule, he    proposed to cancel operations against Hansa Bay and Wewak on the northeast coast    of New Guinea in favor of a jump to Hollandia and Aitape, on the north-central    coast, in April, two months earlier than previously planned. He would then continue    northwestward along the coast in a campaign entailing the steady extension of    land-based air cover by the seizure of successive air base sites until he reached    the Vogelkop, at the eastern end of New Guinea, and then proceed to Mindanao,    southernmost of the Philippine Islands.
 
The Joint Chiefs, quickly seizing the fruits of their strategy of opportunism,    on March 12, 1944, rearranged the schedule of major Pacific operations. They    provided for the assault by MacArthur's forces on Hollandia and Aitape in April    with the support of a carrier task force from the Pacific Fleet, to be followed    by Nimitz's move into the Marianas in June and into the Palaus in September.    While Nimitz was employing the major units of the Pacific Fleet in these ventures,    MacArthur was to continue his advance along the New Guinea coast with the forces    at his disposal. In November, he was again to have the support of main units    of the Pacific Fleet in an assault on Mindanao. Refusing yet to make a positive    choice of what was to follow, the Joint Chiefs directed MacArthur to plan for    the invasion of Luzon and Nimitz to plan for the invasion of Formosa early in    1945.
 
The March 12 directive served as a blueprint for an accelerated drive in the    Pacific in the spring and summer of 1944. On April 22 Army forces under MacArthur    landed at Hollandia and Aitape. At neither place was the issue ever in doubt,    although during July the Japanese who had been bypassed at Wewak
 
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launched an abortive counterattack against Aitape. Protected by land-based    aircraft from Hollandia, MacArthur's Army units next jumped 125 miles northwest    on May 17 to seize another air base site at Wakde Island, landing first on the    New Guinea mainland opposite the chief objective. A ground campaign of about    a month and a half ensued against a Japanese division on the mainland, but,    without waiting for the outcome of the fight, other Army troops carried the    advance northwestward on May 27 another 180 miles to Biak Island.
 
As this point the wisdom of conducting twin drives across the Pacific emerged.    The Japanese Navy was preparing for a showdown battle it expected to develop    off the Marianas in June. MacArthur's move to Biak put land-based planes in    position to keep under surveillance and to harry the Japanese Fleet, which was    assembling in Philippine waters before moving into the Central Pacific. Reckoning    an American-controlled Biak an unacceptable threat to their flank, the Japanese    risked major elements of their fleet to send strong reinforcements to Biak in    an attempt to drive MacArthur's forces ok the island. They also deployed to    bases within range of Biak about half their land-based air strength from the    Marianas, Carolines, and Palausï¿½planes upon which their fleet depended for support    during the forthcoming battle off the Marianas.
 
After two partially successful attempts to reinforce Biak, the Japanese assembled    for a third try enough naval strength to overwhelm local American naval units;    but just as the formidable force was moving toward Biak the Japanese learned    the U.S. Pacific Fleet was off the Marianas. They hastily assembled their naval    forces and sailed northwestward for the engagement known as the Battle of the    Philippine Sea. Having lost their chance to surprise the U.S. Navy, handicapped    by belated deployment, and deprived of anticipated land-based air support, the    Japanese suffered another shattering naval defeat. This defeat, which assured    the success of the invasions of both Biak and the Marianas, illustrates well    the interdependence of operations in the two Pacific areas. It also again demonstrated    that the U.S. Pacific Fleet's carrier task forces were the decisive element    in the Pacific war.
 
Army and Marine divisions under Nimitz landed on Saipan in the Marianas on    June 15, 1944, to begin a bloody three-week battle for control of the island.    Next, on July 21, Army and Marine units invaded Guam, 100 miles south of Saipan,    and three days later marines moved on to Tinian Island. An important turning    point of the Pacific war, the American seizure of the Marianas brought the Japanese    home islands within reach of the U.S. Army Air Forces' B-29 bombers,    which in late November began to fly missions against the Japanese homeland.
 
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At Biak Japanese resistance delayed capture of the best airfield sites until    late June. On July 2, MacArthur's Army forces moved on to Noemfoor Island, ninety    miles to the west, in a combined parachute-amphibious operation designed to    broaden the base of the Southwest Pacific's air deployment. On July 30 the 6th    Division continued on to the northwestern tip of New Guinea to secure another    air base, and on September 15 MacArthur landed the reinforced 31st Division    on Morotai Island, between New Guinea and Mindanao in the Philippines. On the    same day Nimitz sent the 1st Marine Division ashore on Peleliu in the southern    Palaus, and on the 17th the 81st Division from Nimitz' command landed on Angaur,    just south of Peleliu. A regimental combat team of the 81st Division secured    Ulithi Atoll, midway between Peleliu and the Marianas, without opposition on    September 23.
 
With these landings the approach to the Philippines was virtually completed.    The occupation of Morotai proved easy, and the island provided airfields for    the support of advances into the Philippines and Indies. The Pacific Fleet employed Ulithi as a forward anchorage. Hard fighting dragged on in the Palaus through    November, but as the result of another acceleration in the pace of Pacific operations    these islands never played the role originally planned for them.
 
In twin drives, illustrative of the principles of maneuver, objective, economy    of force, surprise, and mass, the Allied forces of the Pacific had arrived in    mid-September 1944 at the threshold of their strategic objective, the Luzon-Formosa-China    coast triangle. In seven months MacArthur's forces had moved forward nearly    1,500 miles from the Admiralties to Morotai; in ten months Nimitz' forces had    advanced over 4,500 miles from Hawaii to the Palaus. The time had now arrived    when a final choice had to be made of the main objective in the target    area.
 
The Decision To Invade Luzon
 
During the summer of 1944, as the battles raged along both lines of advance,    the strategic debate over the choice of Luzon versus Formosa also waxed hot.    General MacArthur argued fervently that the proper course was to move through    the Philippines to Luzon, cutting the Japanese lines of communications southward,    establishing a base for bombardment and invasion of Japan, and fulfilling a    solemn national obligation to liberate the Philippine people. Admiral Ernest    J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, just as adamantly insisted that the war    could be shortened by directing the Pacific advance from the Marianas and Palaus    toward Formosa, the China coast, and Japan proper, seizing only the essential    positions in the southern and central Philippines necessary to
 
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render air support for these advances. The arguments for Formosa were cogent    enough. Its strategic position made it a better island steppingstone to the    China coast or the Japanese home islands, a position from which Japanese communications    to the south could be cut more effectively than from Luzon, and a closer-in    position from which to conduct strategic bombardment. But it also could prove    to be a more difficult position to take, and Nimitz did not have in his theater    sufficient Army supporting and service troops, without reinforcement, to sustain    a land campaign on the island. It might be difficult, too, to mount an invasion    of Formosa as long as the Japanese could, from strong positions on Luzon, interfere    with the Allied line of communications. Another consideration involved the real    value of a foothold on the China coast. By the early fall of 1944, air base    sites in east China Prom which the Allies had hoped to support Pacific operations    and bomb Japan appeared irretrievably lost, and the Marianas already provided    bases for the B-29's almost as close to Tokyo as Formosa. The need to seize    and develop a port on the China coast thus lost much of its urgency, and the    argument that Formosa was the best steppingstone to China became less compelling.    Then, too, a successful invasion of either Luzon or Formosa required some concentration    of forces from the two theaters. It was far easier to shift highly mobile naval    resources in Nimitz' theater to the Philippines than it was to redeploy Army    troops from the Southwest Pacific to support Nimitz' invasion of Formosa and    the jump to the China coast with which he hoped to follow it.
 
At the time of the Morotai and Palaus landings, MacArthur's plans for invasion    of the Philippines called for a preliminary assault in southern Mindanao on    November 15, 1944, to secure air bases for the support of a larger attack at    Leyte, in the east-central Philippines, on December 20. He would follow this    with a large-scale assault on Lingayen Gulf in February 1945. Nimitz meanwhile    planned to mount an invasion of Yap in the Carolines in October 1944 and then    would prepare to launch his attack on Formosa as soon afterward as the    elements of the Pacific Fleet required for operations in the southern and central    Philippines could be returned. Obviously, there had to be a choice between Luzon    and Formosa, for the Pacific Fleet would be required to support either operation.
 
The course of events went far to dictate the final choice. In mid-September Admiral Halsey's carrier task forces providing strategic support for the    Morotai and Palaus operations struck the central and southern Philippines. Halsey    found Japanese air strength unexpectedly weak and uncovered few signs of significant    ground or naval activity. On the basis of Halsey's reports, MacArthur and Nimitz    proposed to the Joint Chiefs a move directly to Leyte in October,
 
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bypassing Mindanao. Nimitz agreed to divert to the Leyte invasion the 3-division    corps then mounting out of Hawaii for the assault against Yap. The Joint Chiefs    quickly approved the new plan, and the decision to invade Leyte two months ahead    of schedule gave MacArthur's arguments to move onto Luzon almost irresistible    force. MacArthur now reported that he could undertake the invasion of Luzon    in December 1944, whereas all the planners' estimates indicated that resources    for an invasion of Formosaï¿½particularly service troops and shippingï¿½ could not    be readied before February 1945 at the earliest. Nimitz proposed to shift the    Central Pacific attack northward against Iwo Jima in the Bonins in January 1945    and then against Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus early in March. On    October 3, Admiral King bowing to the inevitable, accepted the new plans and    the Joint Chiefs issued directives to MacArthur for the invasion of Luzon on    December 20 and to Nimitz for the invasion of Iwo Jima and Okinawa early in    1945.
 
Pacific strategy had been cast into almost its final mold. In the end, the    China coast objective disappeared entirely from planning boards. Final plans    for the defeat of Japan envisaged gradual tightening of the ring by blockade    and bombardment from the Marianas, Philippines, and Ryukyus with an invasion    of the home islands to be mounted from these bases.
 
The Philippines Campaign
 
The main assault at Leyte took place on October 20, 1944, as four Army divisions    landed abreast in the largest amphibious operation yet conducted in the Pacific.    Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, MacArthur's naval commander, controlled the amphibious    phases, including naval gunfire support and close air support by planes based    on escort carriers. Ground forces were under Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, commanding    the U.S. Sixth Army; land-based air forces of the Southwest Pacific Area in    general support were commanded by Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney. MacArthur himself    exercised unified command over the air, ground, and naval commanders. The fast    carrier task forces of the Pacific Fleet, providing strategic support, operated    under the control of Admiral Halsey, who reported to Nimitz, not MacArthur.    There was no provision for unified naval command, and Halsey's orders were such    that he could make his principal mission the destruction of the Japanese Fleet    rather than the support of MacArthur's entry into the Philippines.
 
The Japanese had originally planned to make their stand in the Philippines    on Luzon, but the invasion of Leyte moved them to reconsider, since they now    decided that the entire Philippine Archipelago would be strategically lost if    the
 
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U.S. Army secured a foothold in the central islands. They therefore began sending    ground reinforcements to Leyte; increased their land-based air strength in the    Philippines in the hope of destroying Allied shipping in Leyte Gulf and maintaining    local air superiority; and dispatched their remaining naval strength to Leyte    Gulf to destroy Kinkaid's invasion fleet and to block Allied access to the Philippines.    The ensuing air-naval Battle of Leyte Gulf was the most critical moment of the    campaign, and proved one of the most decisive actions of the Pacific war.
 
Admiral Halsey, without consulting MacArthur or Kinkaid, pulled the bulk of    his carrier forces northward to intercept part of the Japanese Fleet, leaving    Leyte Gulf open to other Japanese Fleet units. Gallant, desperate action by    Kinkaid's old battleships and escort carrier planes turned back the Japanese    in the gulf, assuring the safety of the landing forces. It had been a close    thing, clearly demonstrating the dangers of divided command. In the end, however,    the combined operations of Kinkaid's and Halsey's forces virtually eliminated    the Japanese Navy as a factor in the Pacific war.
 
With the Leyte beaches secure, U.S. Army units proceeded to destroy the Japanese    ground forces. Miserable weather bogged down the pace of operations, made supply    difficult, delayed airfield construction, curtailed air support, and permitted    the Japanese to continue to ship reinforcements to the island. The reinforcement    program came to a sudden halt early in December when the 77th Division executed    an amphibious envelopment on Leyte's west coast,
 
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and by late December the Sixth Army had secured the most important sections    of the island, those required for air and logistical bases. Japanese troops    in the mountains of northwestern Leyte continued organized resistance well into    the spring of 1945, occupying the energies of large portions of Lt. Gen. Robert    L. Eichelberger's newly formed Eighth Army.
 
While the fight on Leyte continued, MacArthur's forces moved on to Luzon only    slightly behind schedule. The first step of the Luzon Campaign was the seizure    of an air base in southwestern Mindoro, 150 miles south of Manila, on December    15, 1944, two Army regiments accomplishing the task with ease. The invasion    of Luzon itself started on January 9, 1945, when four Army divisions landed    along the shores of Lingayen Gulf. Command arrangements were similar to those    at Leyte, and again fast carrier task forces under Halsey operated in general    support and not under MacArthur's control. Within three days five Army divisions,    a separate regimental combat team, two artillery groups, an armored group, and    supporting service units were ashore and had begun a drive down the Central    Plains of Luzon toward Manila. The Japanese were incapable of naval intervention    at Lingayen Gulf, and their most significant reaction was to throw a number    of kamikaze (suicide plane) attacks against Kinkaid's naval forces for four    days.
 
General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commanding Japanese forces in the Philippines,    did not intend to defend the Central Plainsï¿½Manila Bay region, the strategic    prize of Luzon. Knowing he would receive no reinforcements and
 
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believing the issue in the Philippines had been decided at Leyte, he sought    only to pin down major elements of MacArthur's forces in the hope of delaying    Allied progress toward Japan. For this purpose he moved the bulk of his troops    into mountain strongholds, where they could conduct a protracted, bloody defensive    campaign. But Japanese naval forces on Luzon, only nominally under Yamashita,    decided to ignore this concept in favor of defending Manila and Manila Bay.    Thus, when U.S. Army units reached Manila on February 3, it took them a month    of bitter building-to-building fighting to root out the Japanese. Meanwhile,    operations to clear Manila Bay had begun with a minor amphibious landing at    the southern tip of Bataan on February 15. The next day a combined parachute-amphibious    assault, involving two Army regiments, initiated a battle to clear Corregidor    Island. Other forces cleared additional islands in Manila Bay and secured the    south shore. By mid-March the bay was open for Allied shipping, but an immense    salvage and repair job was necessary before the Allies could fully exploit Manila's    excellent port facilities.
 
The reinforced 38th Division had landed meanwhile near Subic Bay and had cut    across the base of Bataan peninsula to prevent the Japanese from holing up on    Bataan as had MacArthur's forces three years earlier. The 11th Airborne Division    undertook both amphibious and parachute landings in southern Luzon to start    clearing that region, and the 158th Regimental Combat Team made an amphibious    assault in southeastern Luzon to secure the Bicol peninsula. Turning against    the Japanese mountain strongholds, MacArthur continued to pour reinforcements    onto Luzon, and the land campaign there ultimately evolved into the largest    of the Pacific war. MacArthur committed to Luzon ten divisions, two regiments    of another division, and three separate regimental combat teams. Guerrillas    also played a large role. One guerrilla unit came to substitute for a regularly    constituted division, and other guerrilla forces of battalion and regimental    size supplemented the efforts of the Army units. Moreover, the loyal and willing    Filipino population immeasurably eased the problems of supply, construction,    and civil administration.
 
Except for a strong pocket in the mountains of north central Luzon, organized    Japanese resistance ended by late June 1945. The rugged terrain in the    north, along with rainy weather, prevented Krueger's Sixth Army from applying    its full strength to the reduction of this pocket. Eichelberger's Eighth Army    took over responsibility for operations on Luzon at the end of June and continued    the pressure against Yamashita's force in the last-stand area, but they held    out there until the end of the war.
 
While Sixth Army was destroying Japanese forces on Luzon, Eighth Army ultimately    employed five divisions, portions of a sixth division, a separate
 
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regimental combat team, and strong guerrilla units in its campaign to reconquer    the southern Philippines. This effort began when a regimental combat team of    the 41st Division landed on Palawan Island on February 28, 1945. Here engineers    built an air base from which to help cut Japan's line of communications to the    south and to support later advances in the southern Philippines and the Indies.    On March 10, another regimental combat team of the 41st, later reinforced, landed    near Zamboanga in southwestern Mindanao, and soon thereafter Army units began    moving southwest toward Borneo along the Sulu Archipelago. In rapid succession    Eighth Army units then landed on Panay, Cebu, northwestern Negros, Bohol, central    Mindanao, southeastern Negros, northern Mindanao, and finally at Sarangani Bay    in southern Mindanao, once intended as the first point of re-entry into the    Philippines. At some locales bitter fighting raged for a time, but the issue    was never in doubt and organized Japanese resistance in the southern Philippines    had largely collapsed by the end of May. Mopping up continued to the end of    the war, with reorganized and re-equipped guerrilla forces bearing much of the    burden.
 
The last offensives in the Southwest Pacific Area started on May 1 when an    Australian brigade went ashore on Tarakan Island, Borneo. Carried to the beaches    by landing craft manned by U.S. Army engineers, the Australians had air support    from fields on Morotai and in the southern Philippines. On June 10
 
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an Australian division landed at Brunei Bay, Borneo, and another Australian    division went ashore at Balikpapan on July 1 in what proved to be the final    amphibious assault of the war.
 
Iwo Jima and Okinawa
 
Since slow-base development at Leyte had forced MacArthur to delay the Luzon    invasion from December to January, Nimitz in turn had to postpone his target    dates for the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations, primarily because the bulk of    the naval resources in the Pacificï¿½fast carrier task forces, escort carrier    groups, assault shipping, naval gunfire support vessels, and amphibious assault    craftï¿½had to be shifted between the two theaters for major operations. The alteration    of schedules again illustrated the interdependence of the Southwest and Central    Pacific Areas.
 
The Iwo Jima assault finally took place on February 19, 1945, with the 4th    and 5th Marine Divisions, supported by minor Army elements, making the landings.    The 3d Marine Division reinforced the assault, and an Army regiment ultimately    took over as island garrison. The marines had to overcome fanatic resistance    from firmly entrenched Japanese, who held what was probably the strongest defensive    system American forces encountered during the Pacific war, and it took a month    of bloody fighting to secure the island. In early March a few crippled B-29's    made emergency landings on Iwo; by the end of the month an airfield was fully    operational for fighter planes. Later, engineers constructed a heavy bomber    field and another fighter base on the island.
 
The invasion of the Ryukyus began on March 26 when the 77th Division landed    on the Kerama Islands, fifteen miles west of Okinawa, to secure a forward naval    base, a task traditionally assigned to marines. On April 1 the 7th and 96th    Divisions and the 2d and 6th Marine Divisions executed the assault on the main    objective, Okinawa. Two more Army divisions and a Marine infantry regiment later    reinforced it. Another amphibious assault took place on April 16, when the 77th    Division seized Ie Shima, four miles west of Okinawa, and the final landing    in the Ryukyus came on June 26, when a small force of marines went ashore on    Kume Island, fifty miles west of Okinawa. Ground forces at Okinawa were first    under the U.S. Tenth Army, Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner commanding. When General    Buckner was killed on June 18, Marine Lt. Gen. Roy S. Geiger took over until    General Joseph W. Stilwell assumed command on the 23d.
 
The Japanese made no attempt to defend the Okinawa beaches, but instead fell    back to prepared cave and tunnel defenses on inland hills. Bitterly defending
 
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every inch of ground, the Japanese continued organized resistance until late June. Meanwhile, Japanese suicide planes had inflicted extensive damage    on Nimitz' naval forces, sinking about 25 ships and damaging nearly In more in an unsuccessful attempt to drive Allied naval power from the western    Pacific. Skillful small unit tactics, combined with great concentrations of    naval, air, and artillery bombardment, turned the tide of the ground battle    on Okinawa itself. Especially noteworthy was the close support that naval gunfire    vessels provided the ground forces and the close air support furnished by Army,    Navy, and Marine aircraft.
 
Capture of Okinawa and other positions in the Ryukyus gave the Allies both    air and naval bases within easy striking distance of Japan. By early May fighter    planes from Okinawa had begun flights over Japan, and as rapidly as fields became    available bombers, including units from the Southwest Pacific Area, came forward    to mount attacks in preparation for the invasion of the home islands. The forward    anchorages in the Ryukyus permitted the Pacific Fleet to keep in almost continuous    action against Japanese targets. The Ryukyus campaign had brought Allied forces    in the Pacific to Japan's doorstep.
 
The American Effort in China, Burma, and India
 
While American forces in the Pacific, under the unified direction of the U.S.    Joint Chiefs of Staff, made spectacular advances, the Allied effort in Southeast    Asia bogged down in a mire of conflicting national purposes. The hopes Americans    held, in the early stages of the war, that Chinese manpower and bases would    play a vitally important role in the defeat of Japan were doomed to disappointment.    Americans sought to achieve great aims on the Asiatic mainland at small cost,    looking to the British in India and the Chinese, with their vast reservoirs    of manpower, to carry the main burden of ground conflict. Neither proved    capable of exerting the effort the Americans expected of them.
 
Early in 1942 the United States had sent General Stilwell to the Far    East to command American forces in China, Burma, and India and to serve as Chief    of Staff and principal adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of Nationalist    China and Allied commander of the China theater. Stilwell's stated mission was "to assist in improving the efficiency of the Chinese Army." The Japanese    conquest of Burma, cutting the last overland supply route to China, frustrated    Stilwell's designs, for it left a long and difficult airlift from Assam to Kunming    over the high peaks of the Himalayas as the only remaining avenue for the flow    of supplies. The Americans assumed responsibility for the airlift, but its development    was slow, hampered by a scarcity of transport planes, airfields, and
 
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trained pilots. Not until late in 1943 did it reach a monthly capacity of 10,000    tons, and in the intervening months few supplies flowed into China. The economy    of the country continually tottered on the brink of collapse, and the Chinese    Army, although it was a massive force on paper, remained ill organized, ill    equipped, poorly led, and generally incapable of offensive action.
 
Stilwell thought that the only solution was to retake Burma and reopen the    land supply line to China, and this became the position of the U.S. Joint Chiefs    of Staff. To achieve the goal Stilwell undertook the training and equipping    of a Chinese force in India that eventually consisted of three divisions, and    sought to concentrate a much larger force in Yunnan Province in China and to    give it offensive capability. With these two Chinese forces he hoped to form    a junction in north Burma, thus re-establishing land communications between    China and India. Stilwell's scheme became part of the larger plan, ANAKIM, that    had been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca Conference.    Neither the British nor the Chinese, however, had any real enthusiasm for ANAKIM,    and in retrospect it seems clear that its execution in 1943 was beyond the capabilities    of forces in the theater. Moreover, Chiang was quite dilatory in concentrating    a force in Yunnan; Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, commanding the small American    air force in China, urged that the Hump air line should be used to support an    air effort in China, rather than to supply Chinese ground forces. Chennault    promised amazing results at small cost, and his proposals attracted President    Roosevelt as well as the British and the Chinese. As an upshot, at the TRIDENT    Conference in May 1943, the amphibious operation against Rangoon was canceled    and a new plan for operations emerged that stressed Chennault's air operations    and provided for a lesser ground offensive in central and northern Burma. Under    this concept a new road would be built from Ledo in Assam Province, India, to    join with the trace of the old Burma Road inside China. The Americans assumed    responsibility for building the Ledo Road in the rear of Chinese forces advancing    from India into Burma.
 
Logistical difficulties in India, however, again delayed the opening of any    land offensive and kept the airlift well below target figures. Until the supply    line north from Calcutta to the British and Chinese fronts could be improvedï¿½and    this job took well over a yearï¿½both air and ground operations against the Japanese    in Burma were handicapped. In October 1943 Chinese troops under Stilwell did    start to clear northern Burma, and in the spring of 1944 a U.S. Army unit of    regimental size, Merrill's Marauders, spearheaded new offensives to secure the    trace for the overland road. But Myitkyina, the key point in the Japanese defenses    in north Burma, did not fall until August 2 and by that time the effort in Burma    had been relegated to a subsidiary role.
 
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After the SEXTANT Conference in late 1943, in fact, the American staff no longer    regarded it as probable that the overland route to China could be opened in    time to permit Chinese forces to drive to the coast by the time American    forces advancing across the Pacific reached there. While the Americans insisted    on continuing the effort to open the Ledo Road, they now gave first priority    to an air effort in China in support of the Pacific campaigns. The Army Air    Forces, in May 1944, started to deploy the first of its B-29 groups to airfields    in East China to commence bombing of strategic targets in Korea, Manchuria,    and Japan. At the same time, Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force was directed to    stockpile supplies for missions in support of Pacific forces as they neared    the China coast. Again these projects proved to be more than could be supported    over the Hump air line, particularly since transports had also to be used to    supply the ground effort of both British and Chinese forces. Then the Japanese    reacted strongly to the increased air effort and launched a ground offensive    that overran most of the existing fields and proposed air base sites in east    China. Both air and ground resources inside China had to be diverted to oppose    the Japanese advance. The B-29's were removed to India in January 1945, and    two months later were sent to Saipan where the major strategic bombing offensive    against Japan was by that time being mounted. In sum, the air effort in China    without the protection of an efficient Chinese Army fulfilled few of the goals    proclaimed for it.
 
To meet the crisis in east China, President Roosevelt urged Chiang to place    his U.S. supported armies under the command of General Stilwell; Chiang eventually    refused and asked for Stilwell's recall, a request the President honored. In    September 1944, Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell as Chief of    Staff to Chiang and commander of American forces in the China Theater; a separate    theater in India and Burma was created with Lt. Gen. Dan I. Sultan as its commanding    general. The command issue was dropped and the American strategy in China became    simply one of trying to realize at least something from previous investments    without additional commitments.
 
Ironically enough, it was in this phase, after the Pacific advances had outrun    those in Southeast Asia, that objects of the 1942 strategy were realized, in    large part because the Japanese, hard-pressed everywhere, were no longer able    to support their forces in Burma and China adequately. British and Chinese forces    advanced rapidly into Burma in the fall of 1944, and, on January 27, 1945, the    junction between Chinese forces advancing from India and Yunnan finally took    place, securing the trace of the Ledo Road. To the south, the British completed    the conquest of central Burma and entered Rangoon from the north early in May.    The land route to China was thus finally secured on all sides, but
 
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the Americans had already decided that they would develop the Ledo Road only    as a one-way highway, though they did expand the airlift to the point where,    in July 1945, it carried 74,000 tons into China.
 
With increased American supply support, Wedemeyer was able to make more progress    in equipping and training the Chinese Army. Under his tutelage the Chinese were    able to halt the Japanese advance at Chihchiang in April 1945, and, as the Japanese    began to withdraw in order to prepare a citadel defense of their home islands,    Wedemeyer and the Chinese laid plans to seize a port on the Chinese coast. The    war came to an end, however, before this operation even started and before the    training and equipping of a Chinese Army was anywhere near completion. Chiang's    forces commenced the reoccupation of their homeland still, for the most part,    ill equipped, ill organized, and poorly led.
 
The Japanese Surrender
 
During the summer of 1945, Allied forces in the Pacific had stepped up the    pace of their air and naval attacks against Japan. In June and July carrier-based    planes of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Army Air Forces planes from the Marianas,    Iwo Jima, and Okinawa struck the Japanese home islands continuously. During    July Pacific Fleet surface units bombarded Japan's east coast, and in the same    month a British carrier task force joined in the attack. Planes from the Philippines    hit Japanese shipping in the South China Sea and extended their strikes as far    as Formosa and targets along the South China coast. American submarines    redoubled their efforts to sweep Japanese shipping from the sea and sever the    shipping lanes from Japan to the Indies and Southeast Asia. Throughout the war,    in fact, submarines had preyed on Japanese merchant and combat vessels, playing    a major role in isolating Japan from its conquests and thereby drastically reducing    Japan's ability to wage war.
 
After Germany's surrender in May the United States embarked upon a huge logistical    effort to redeploy more than a million troops from Europe, the United States,    and other inactive theaters to the Pacific. The aim was to complete the redeployment    in time to launch an invasion of Japan on November I, and the task had to be    undertaken in the face of competing shipping demands for demobilization    of long-service troops, British redeployment, and civil relief in Europe. By    the time the war ended, some 150,000 men had moved directly from Europe to the    Pacific, but a larger transfer from the United States across the Pacific had    scarcely begun. In the Pacific, MacArthur and Nimitz had been sparing no effort    to expand ports and ready bases to receive the expected influx and to mount    invasion forces. The two commanders were also completing plans
 
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for the invasion of Japan. In the last stage of the war, as all forces converged    on Japan, the area unified commands were replaced by an arrangement that made    MacArthur commander of all Army forces in the Pacific and Nimitz commander of    all Navy forces.
 
By midsummer of 1945 most responsible leaders in Japan realized that the end    was near. In June, those favoring peace had come out in the open, and Japan    had already dispatched peace feelers through the Soviet Union, a country it    feared might also be about to enter the war despite the existence of a non-aggression    treaty between the two nations. As early as the Tehran Conference in late 1943    Stalin had promised to enter the war against Japan, and it was agreed at Yalta    in February 1945 that the USSR would do so three months after the defeat of    Germany. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 the Soviet Union reaffirmed    its agreement to declare war on Japan. At this conference the United States    and Britain, with China joining in, issued the famed Potsdam Declaration calling    upon Japan to surrender promptly, and about the same time President Truman decided    to employ the newly tested atomic bomb against Japan in the event of continued    Japanese resistance.
 
Despite the changing climate of opinion in Japan, the Japanese did not immediately    accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Accordingly, on August 6 a lone    American B-29 from the Marianas dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima; on the    9th the Soviet Union came into the war and attacked Japanese forces in Manchuria;    and on the same day another B-29 dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki. The    next day Japan sued for peace, and, with the signing of surrender terms aboard    the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, the bitter global war came    to an end.
 
Retrospect
 
In winning the Pacific war the Allies had found it unnecessary to press home    their attacks and destroy the Japanese military forces except for the
 
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Japanese Fleet. By the end of the war Japan's Navy had virtually ceased to    exist; Japanese industry had been so hammered by air bombardment that Japan's    ability to wage war was seriously reduced; and U.S. submarine and air    actions had cut off sources of raw material. At the time of the surrender Japan    still had 2,000,000 men under arms in the homeland and was capable of conducting    a tenacious ground defense; about 3,000 Japanese aircraft were also operational.    Nevertheless, the Japanese could hardly have continued the war for more than    a few months. On the other hand, the fact that an invasion was not necessary    certainly spared many American lives.
 
The great arbiter of the Pacific war had been American industrial power, which    produced a mighty war machine. Out of this production had come the Pacific Fleet,    a potent force that could overcome the vast reaches of the Pacific upon which    the Japanese had depended so heavily as a defensive advantage. The decisive    combat element of the fleet was the fast carrier task force, which carried the    war deep into Japanese territory and supported advances far beyond the range    of land-based aircraft. Land-based air power also played a decisive part. When    carriers were not available to support offensives, it was land-based aviation    that measured the distance of each forward move. Land-based aviation proved    important as well in providing close support for ground operations, while aerial    supply operations and troop movements contributed greatly to the success of    the Allied campaigns.
 
Both naval and air forces were dependent upon shore bases, and the war in the    Pacific demonstrated that even in a predominantly naval-air theater, ground    combat forces are an essential part of the offensive team. The Japanese had    also been dependent upon far-flung bases, so that much of the Allied effort    during the war had gone into the seizure or neutralization of Japan's bases.    Thus, the Pacific war was in large measure a war for bases. On the other hand,    the U.S. Pacific Fleet, in one of the greatest logistical developments of the    war, went far in the direction of carrying its bases with it by organizing fleet    trains of support vessels that were capable of maintaining the fleet at sea    over extended periods.
 
Another important facet of the Pacific war was the development and employment    of amphibious assault techniques, repeatedly demonstrating the need for unified    command. Air, ground, and naval teamwork, supremely important in the struggle    against Japan, occasionally broke down, but the success of the Allied campaigns    illustrates that all three elements achieved it to a large degree. Strategic    air bombardment in the Pacific, designed to cripple Japan's industrial capacity,    did not get under way until well along in 1945. The damage inflicted    on Japanese cities was enormous, but the effect, as in the case of the
 
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bomber offensive against Germany, remains unsettled, though the bombardment finally brought home to the Japanese people that the war was lost. The submarine    played a vital role in reducing Japan's capabilities by taking a huge toll of    Japanese shipping and by helping to cut Japan off from the resources of Southeast    Asia.
 
In the final analysis Japan lost because the country did not have the means    to fight a total war against the combination of industrial, air, naval, and    human resources represented by the United States and its Allies. Admiral Isoroku    Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese Fleet at the outbreak of the war, put his    finger on the fatal weakness of the Japanese concept of the war, when he stated: "It is not enough that we should take Guam and the Philippines, or even    Hawaii and San Francisco. We should have to march into Washington and sign the    treaty in the White House." This the Japanese could never do, and because    they could not they had to lose the war.
page updated 27 April 2001