Socialism Today - Poland: defeat from the jaws of victory
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Poland: defeat from the jaws of victory
Arguably, Poland came          closest to a successful workers� revolt against Stalinism in central and          eastern Europe. Before 1980, workers� militancy had developed a          well-organised, illegal trade union movement. Then, in that year,          Solidarity burst onto the scene in a tidal wave of occupations and          strikes which threatened to sweep away the rotten regime. Yet nine years          later, a pro-capitalist regime was in place with Solidarity members at          its centre. PAUL NEWBERY looks at how this was possible.
IN AUGUST 1980 Poland�s          Stalinist regime was rocked by a massive strike wave which swept across          the country. The slogans and organisational forms thrown up during this          struggle showed that big sections of the workers were striving for ways          to overthrow the Stalinist bureaucracy and establish genuine workers�          democracy. This was expressed by graffiti on the walls in Gdansk:          �Socialism yes! But without distortions!� As a by-product of the          struggle the independent trade union Solidarity (Solidarnosc) was born.          However, just nine years later, Solidarity formed a government and          started a series of fast-track market �reforms� which restored          capitalism. How could such a movement become an agent of capitalist          restoration? Were the roots of Solidarity�s degeneration present from          the very beginning?
To fully understand the          process of revolution and counter-revolution in Poland and other former          Eastern Bloc countries in the 1980s it is necessary to take into account the origins of these regimes. In Russia in 1917 there was a mass          revolutionary overturn which only later experienced bureaucratic          degeneration due to the country�s economic and cultural backwardness and          its isolation after the failure of the world revolution. The Stalinist          regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, however, had been liberated at          the end of the second world war by the Red Army which then maintained a          presence on their territory. The local communist parties formed          coalition governments with the shadow of the bourgeoisie. However, the          repressive organs of the state were firmly in the hands of the          Stalinists. Within a short time they set about liquidating the last          remnants of capitalism and landlordism with the popular support of the          masses. In some countries, especially Czechoslovakia, these measures          were supported by mass demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of          workers.
From the very beginning,          these newly created regimes were deformed workers� states � modelled on          Stalin�s Soviet Union � grotesque distortions of socialism in which          workers� democracy was replaced with bureaucratic dictatorship. Despite          the initial enthusiasm, the brutal repressive nature of these regimes          soon repelled the workers. Within a short time, workers� uprisings broke          out in many of these countries, most notably in Hungary 1956, where the          working class heroically attempted to carry out a political revolution.
Poland was no exception to          this process. In Poznan 1956, a workers' strike and demonstration          against the regime was brutally repressed. In the aftermath, it decided          on a new strategy to increase its base of support. The First Secretary          was replaced by Wladyslaw Gomulka. Concessions were made to the peasants          with the regime backing down from collectivisation of the land on a mass          scale. Lower-level bureaucrats were given more privileges to tie them to          the system. The church was also granted privileges in return for its          support.
A turning point
AT FIRST, POLAND and the          other East European regimes experienced high growth thanks to the          advantages of the planned economy. Poland�s GDP grew by an average of          7%. However, the parasitic role of the Stalinist bureaucracy, which led          to mismanagement and waste, acted as a brake on the economy. From a          relative fetter on growth, the bureaucracy became an absolute fetter.          Planning turned into its opposite � chaos.
By the end of the 1960s, the          economy was already experiencing problems and was struggling to continue          subsidising food for the population. Then, in 1970, the announcement of          meat price rises sparked workers� demonstrations on the Baltic coast          which turned into an uprising. Although concentrated mainly in Gdynia          and Gdansk, the protests also affected Szczecin, Elblag, Warsaw, Wroclaw          and a number of other towns. Tanks were sent in and the uprising was          drowned in blood, with the death count probably over 100. The Stalinist          bureaucracy was shaken and once again tried to combine repression with          concessions. Gomulka was replaced by Edward Gierek, who took massive          loans from the West. Much of this credit was badly invested and a large          amount was also spent on increasing the consumption of the masses in an          attempt to buy social peace.
There was a period of rapid          growth and increases in living standards, but the breathing space did          not last long. Soon the regime was having difficulty paying back the          loans. In 1976, workers organised a strike in Radom, home of Poland�s          arms industry. While concessions were given to the workers, the strike          leaders were victimised. A group of oppositionists and intellectuals set          up the Workers� Defence Committee (KOR) to raise funds for the          victimised workers, provide legal aid, and publicise their cause. In the          following years, KOR helped organise illegal �free trade unions� in a          number of cities, including in the shipyards of Gdansk.
A turning point came in the          summer of 1980 when another series of rises in meat prices sparked a          strike wave throughout the country. The regime planned to divide the          workers by granting concessions to strikers in strategic industries.          However, this policy only encouraged more sections to strike. In Lublin,          where workers also attacked the privileges of the bureaucracy and called          for freedom of speech, the protest turned into a general strike,          including the blockade of the railway lines to Russia, halting Polish          exports. The local newspaper attacked the strikers and warned of Russian          intervention, but the next day print workers stopped the presses. The          deputy prime minister was flown to Lublin for emergency negotiations          and, as part of the concessions won, the newspaper was forced to print          an apology.
Political demands
THERE WAS A qualitative          change when a strike broke out in the Gdansk shipyard in mid-August in          defence of Anna Walentynowicz, a workers' leader and member of KOR�s          Coastal Worker group. An illegal free trade union had existed here for          many years so the workers were well-prepared and experienced. The          strikers� demands were more advanced than anywhere else in the country,          spilling into the political plane. They demanded the release of          political prisoners, reinstatement of sacked workers, wage increases in          line with the militia, and the erection of a monument to workers who had          been killed in 1970.
The occupations spread          quickly across the tri-city of Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia. Strike committees in          Gdansk linked up with each other. On the second day, the authorities cut          off all phone lines to Gdansk to try to contain the strike.          Nevertheless, it spread to other cities. Negotiations with the shipyard          workers seemed to reach an agreement until Gdansk's public transport          workers complained that they would be left to continue their struggle          alone if the shipyard workers ended their protest. The shipyard workers�          leaders did a quick u-turn and the strike was on again, this time in          solidarity with the other workers.
That weekend, representatives          of the city�s strike committees met and set up a new body, the          Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS). This was organised in a similar          way to soviets or workers� councils: made up of democratically elected          workplace delegates who, in turn, elected a presidium. At first, this          was an extremely democratic structure. The presidium was answerable to          the MKS, whose members were accountable to the workplaces they          represented. Talks between the MKS presidium and the regime were broadcast live to the Gdansk MKS and all the shipyard workers. Even at          this stage, however, some of the discussions between the regime�s          experts and MKS �experts� took place behind closed doors.
The same weekend, a list of          21 demands was drawn up. These were above all political and showed that          the workers were moving in the direction of political revolution. They          began with the demand for the acceptance of free trade unions and the          right to strike, for freedom of speech and access to the media for          people of all faiths, as well as for the strike movement and the MKS.          These were all demands which Marxists would support. The democratic          demands were followed by others against the privileges of the          bureaucrats and secret police, against the special shops and commercial          shops selling at higher prices. There was also a series of economic          demands aimed at improving the conditions of working people and          achieving greater social equality. Nowhere were there any calls for          market reforms or the restoration of capitalism.
Marxists would add demands          for the election of all officials with the right to instant recall, and          that no official should receive more than the average wage of a skilled          worker. In addition, positions should be regularly rotated. Such          measures would help prevent the formation of a bureaucracy in the          future. Above all, it was necessary to explain that the MKS should take          power and become the organ for workers� rule.
Immense working-class power
DESPITE ATTEMPTS TO isolate          Gdansk, word got out and the movement spread across Poland like          wildfire. Occupation strikes and similar MKS bodies appeared all over          the country. In Szczecin, shipyard workers were given a 10% wage rise          before they had even taken action, which encouraged them to organise a          strike and set up their own MKS. Within a week, 370 workplaces          representing over 400,000 workers were affiliated to the Gdansk MKS.
A situation of dual power          existed. During the general strike, the Gdansk MKS took control of food          distribution, public transport and the health service. For the duration          of the strike the sale of alcohol was banned, as was alcohol consumption          by strikers. As the strike spread to more and more cities, the country          slowly ground to a halt.
This strike confirmed the          dominant role that the working class plays in revolutions. The whole of          society was infected by the spirit of democracy. Open democratic debate          and discussion flourished among students, artists, journalists,          peasants, office workers, teachers and intellectuals. All sections of          society were inspired and began setting up their own democratic          organisations or transforming existing official clubs and associations.
In contrast, the regime was          totally isolated, hanging on to power by a thread. It was unable to use          force to break the strikes as it was unsure about the reliability of the          armed forces. Even the ruling Polish United Workers Party (PUWP � the          Communist Party in Poland) was infected, with its working-class base          peeling away from the bureaucracy. A third of the Gdansk MKS members          were PUWP members, as were both MKS vice-presidents in Szczecin. In many          other towns, working-class party members were in the leadership or took          the initiative in setting up the local MKS. Later, over a million          working-class PUWP members joined Solidarity!
The regime had to play for          time and negotiate with the Gdansk MKS. On 31 August, the regime signed          the 21 demands - the Gdansk agreement. The strike ended and the          Independent Self-Governing Trade Union, �Solidarity�, was born. However,          the Gdansk agreement was only a partial victory. An historic opportunity          to overthrow the regime and establish a healthy, democratic socialist          society based on workers� democracy had been missed. What was lacking          was a revolutionary leadership capable of presenting to the workers an          honest assessment of the tasks they faced to give full expression to the          strikers� demands.
Instead, the Gdansk MKS and          Solidarity
leaderships - Lech Walesa, KOR intellectuals and          Solidarity's 'advisors' - had a much more limited perspective. They          believed that the most they could win was a few reforms. Jacek Kuron,          one of KOR's leaders, even revealed that before the Gdansk agreement he          believed the demand for free trade unions was a demand for the          negotiating table but not one that could be won. At every point, the          leadership played a conservative role, holding back the movement and          blocking the more radical demands of the workers. For example, calls to          end the �leading role� of the PUWP and for free elections were opposed          by the leadership and did not appear among the 21 demands. After signing          the agreement, the leadership travelled up and down the country trying          to persuade workers to call off strikes. The Catholic church played a          similarly conservative role. It urged moderation and persuaded strikers          to stop striking to avoid provoking Poland�s neighbours.
Despite the role of the          leadership, Solidarity enjoyed phenomenal growth. Two weeks after          signing the Gdansk
agreement, Solidarity had 3.5 million members.          By the autumn, 8.5 million workers had joined. In a short time,          membership reached ten million. Within months, it became the most          powerful organisation in Poland. All over the country, strikes forced          the resignation of hundreds of bureaucrats: party secretaries and          factory managers.
The last chance
THEN, IN MARCH 1981,          Solidarity activists in Bydgoszcz were beaten up by security police when          leaving a meeting. This provoked a national outcry and Solidarity          organised a four-hour warning strike which was supposed to lead to a          general strike on 31 March. Walesa and the church, including cardinal          Wyszynski and pope John Paul II, urged Solidarity not to organise the          strike. At the last moment, the regime agreed to Solidarity�s demands to          punish those responsible for the beatings and recognise Rural          Solidarity. This gave Walesa the pretext to call off the general strike.
An opportunity to raise the          movement to a higher level and challenge the very existence of the          regime was lost. Instead, Solidarity entered a period of crisis as its          internal contradictions sharpened. The bureaucracy was given a breathing          space which it made full use of. It began to sabotage the economy, hoping to demoralise the working class and place the blame on the          shoulders of Solidarity. Many products were rationed and massive queues          appeared for basic necessities such as meat, sugar, soap and even toilet          paper.
The regime�s tactic began to          work. Demoralisation and frustration at the ineffectiveness of          Solidarity�s leadership set in. According to Kuron, in the first half of          1981, support for Solidarity fell from 60% to 40%.
In September 1981, Solidarity          held its first and last congress. There was opposition to the leadership          and widespread support for the idea of workers� self-management. This          represented workers� instinctive striving towards a political revolution          and the tasks of taking over and running society and the economy          themselves. Unfortunately, such ideas were not worked out into a clear          programme. Opposition within the union was not organised or united.          Above all, it lacked a perspective of the tasks facing the movement.          Although a resolution in favour of workers' self-management was passed          by the congress, Walesa and the leadership were re-elected. The policies          of compromise and �self-limitation� (�don�t provoke intervention�)          continued.
The September congress was          the last chance for Solidarity to change course and rearm the movement.          With this missed opportunity, the balance of forces changed in favour of          the regime. Conditions were ripening for a clampdown. On 13 December          1981, the military wing of the bureaucracy made its move. General          Wojciech Jaruzelski organised a military coup and imposed martial law.          The Solidarity leadership was rounded up and arrested along with          thousands of activists. Even Gierek was interned. Meetings were banned          and a curfew was introduced.
Martial law was a watershed          for the development of Solidarity and the political revolution. The          union�s democratic organisations were smashed. Any leaders who managed          to escape arrest were forced underground. No democratic debate or          control of workers� representatives could exist in such a situation.          Working in clandestine conditions, the leaders were now free from the          pressure of the working class.
Embracing capitalism
AT THE SAME time, the          economic crisis deepened. It was a time of great hardship for the mass          of the population with shortages of basic necessities, growing queues          and rampant inflation. Despite the existence of mass unemployment in          many western countries and periodic recessions, it seemed to Polish          workers that capitalist countries offered a beacon of hope. Illusions in          the market and capitalism were strengthened. Even the bureaucracy was          affected. Having lost faith in the planned economy, it unsuccessfully          attempted to get the economy out of the impasse by implementing market          �reforms�.
By 1988, both the Solidarity          leadership and the bureaucracy had more or less the same pro-capitalist          outlook, with Solidarity now completely dominated by intellectuals and          Catholic advisors, and with Walesa having moved much further to a          right-wing, pro-market position. They believed the solution lay in          far-reaching market �reforms� which would lead, ultimately, to the          restoration of capitalism. These measures would have to involve severe          austerity, but the regime lacked the legitimacy to carry these out. At          the same time, there was a revival in Solidarity and the number of          strikes was on the increase. Therefore, the bureaucracy needed to          involve Solidarity in the process. If Solidarity could be persuaded to          commit itself to the measures and take joint responsibility, opposition          to such tough policies could be minimised.
The solution was to organise          �round table� talks to negotiate the terms of such a deal. Unlike in          August 1980, however, this time the real discussions took place behind          closed doors without the control of the workers. The televised parts of          parts of the discussions were purely for show. In return, Walesa and          other leaders extinguished the strikes which were beginning to mushroom          across the country. The talks resulted in agreement to organise          partially free parliamentary elections. Only 35% of the seats in the          Sejm (parliament) were elected, the rest being reserved for candidates          of the PUWP and its allies.
The 5 June 1989 elections          were a total victory for Solidarity. Opposition candidates won all bar          one of the seats which were contested, showing the isolation and loss of          legitimacy of the regime. A few months later, Solidarity formed a          coalition government and set off down the road of capitalist          restoration, which caused a dramatic fall in GDP over the next two years          and mass unemployment of over 20%.
However, this defeat for the          working class was not inevitable. On the one hand, the seeds of          counter-revolution were present in Solidarity from the beginning,          embodied in the mistakes and betrayals of its conservative reformist          leadership. On the other hand, Solidarity also contained the seeds of          political revolution in the organisational form of the MKS and the          political demands of the rank and file. It was only after martial law,          the crushing of the workers� democratic organisations and the total          collapse of the economy that the fertile soil existed for          counter-revolutionary seeds to grow. Had a strong Marxist opposition          existed within Solidarity in 1980 to combat the mistaken strategy of the          leadership and present a clear alternative, the workers� movement could          have overthrown the Stalinist bureaucracy, established a healthy          democratic socialist society, and changed the course of history.