Alcohol prohibition and drug prohibition. Lessons from alcohol policy for drug policy.
Alcohol Prohibition and Drug Prohibition
Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug           Policy
Harry G. Levine and           Craig Reinarman
Since the mid 1980s, growing numbers of         Americans have come to recognize the harshness, expense, and ineffectiveness         of U.S. drug prohibition, and they have advocated alternative approaches         including harm reduction, drug decriminalization and even outright drug         legalization. They have also looked for lessons in America 's own experiences         with alcohol prohibition, and with how the U.S. turned from nation-wide         alcohol prohibition to various forms of local alcohol regulation.
In the first part of this essay we review the rise, effects and fall         of national alcohol prohibition in the U.S. , and we examine the rationale         and organization of the system of alcohol regulation instituted after         repeal. We focus on lessons from the American experience with alcohol         prohibition and alcohol regulation that might be useful for understanding         drug prohibition and drug regulation.
In the second part, we discuss the current world-wide system of drug         prohibition. We focus on three crises or dilemmas that global drug prohibition         now faces: the international harm reduction movement; the growing opposition,         especially in Europe , to harsh drug policies; and the unstoppable use         of cannabis throughout the world.
Historical studies cannot provide simple and straightforward answers         to the complex drug policy questions now confronting Americans. However,         closer attention to the history of alcohol prohibition and regulation,         and to the character and scope of global drug prohibition, can help us         better understand the situation we face in the early twenty-first century         and help move us to less costly and more humane and effective drug policies.
From temperance to prohibition to alcohol control
The anti-alcohol (or temperance) movement was created         in early nineteenth century America by physicians, ministers, and large         employers concerned about the drunkenness of workers and servants. By         the mid-1830s temperance had become a mass movement of the middle class.         Temperance was not, as is sometimes thought, the campaign of rural backwaters;         rather, temperance was on the cutting edge of social reform and was closely         allied with the anti-slavery and women's rights movements. Always very         popular, the anti-alcohol crusade remained largest enduring middle-class         movement of the nineteenth century. (Levine, 1978, 1984; Tyrell, 1979;         Gusfield, 1986; Rumbarger 1989; Blocker 1989).
The anti-alcohol movement was devoted to convincing people that alcoholic         drink in any form was dangerous and destructive. Throughout the nineteenth         century, temperance supporters insisted that alcohol slowly but inevitably         destroyed the moral character and the physical and mental health of all         who drank it. Temperance supporters regarded alcohol the way people today         view heroin: as an inherently addicting substance. Moderate consumption         of alcohol, they maintained, naturally led to compulsive use--to addiction.
From the beginning, temperance ideology contained a powerful strand         of fantasy. It held that alcohol was the major cause of nearly all social         problems: unemployment, poverty, business failure, slums, insanity, crime,         and violence (especially against women and children). For the very real         social and economic problems of industrializing America , the anti-alcohol         movement offered universal abstinence as the panacea.
From roughly the 1850s on, many temperance supporters endorsed the         idea of prohibition. After the Civil War the Prohibition Party, modeled         on the Republican Party, championed the cause. Nineteenth-century prohibitionists         believed that only when sufficient numbers of their party members held         office would prohibition be practical, because only then would it be         fully enforced.
In the twentieth century a new prohibitionist organization -- the Anti-Saloon         League -- came to dominate the movement (Odegard, 1928; Timberlake, 1963;         Sinclair, 1965; Gusfield, 1968; Kerr, 1985; Rumbarger, 1989). The League         patterned itself on the modern corporation, hiring lawyers to write model         laws and organizers to raise funds and collect political debts. The League         put its considerable resources behind candidates of any party who would         vote as it directed on the single issue of liquor. By expanding the numbers         of elected officials beholden to it, and by writing laws for those legislators         to enact, the League pushed through many local prohibition laws and some         state measures. In 1913 the League finally declared itself in favor of         constitutional prohibition. Increasing numbers of large corporations         joined the many Protestant churches that had long supported the League.         Prohibitionists mobilized the final support for prohibition during the         hyper patriotic fervor of the first world war.
By December 1917, both houses of Congress had voted the required two-thirds         majority to send to the states for ratification a constitutional amendment         prohibiting the manufacture, sale, transportation, import, or export         of intoxicating liquor. In November 1918 Congress passed the War Prohibition         Act banning the manufacture and sale of all beverages with more than         2.75 percent alcohol. On January 16th, 1919 , Nebraska became the thirty-sixth         state to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment, which was to go into effect         in one year. In October 1919 Congress overrode President Wilson's veto         to pass a strict prohibition enforcement act known by the name of its         sponsor, Andrew Volstead of Minnesota , chair of the House Judiciary         Committee. The Volstead Act defined as "intoxicating liquor" any         beverage containing more 0.5% alcohol.
At midnight on January 16, 1920 , the Eighteenth Amendment took effect.         The famous minister Billy Sunday celebrated by preaching a sermon to         10,000 people in which he repeated the fantasy at the heart of the temperance         and prohibition crusades:
The reign of tears is over. The slums will soon be a memory. We will         turn our prisons into factories and our jails into storehouses and corncribs.         Men will walk upright now, women will smile, and the children will laugh.         Hell will be forever for rent. (quoted in Kohler, 1973, 12)
Prohibitionism was not, as is sometimes implied, a public health campaign         to reduce mortality from cirrhosis of the liver or alcoholic admissions         to state hospitals. As Joseph Gusfield (1968) has pointed out, prohibitionists         were utopian moralists; they believed that eliminating the legal manufacture         and sale of alcoholic drink would solve the major social and economic         problems of American society.
National Alcohol Prohibition, 1920-1933
The many literary, photographic, and cinematic images         of the prohibition era capture some of the essential features of the         period. Prohibition was massively and openly violated, and alcohol was         readily available in most of the United States . New institutions and         cultural practices appeared: bootleggers and speakeasies, hip flasks         and bathtub gin, rum runners smuggling in liquor, and prohibition agents         like Elliott Ness smashing down doors. Adulterated and even poisonous         alcohol was sold and many people were locked up for violating prohibition         laws. (For rich descriptions of the prohibition era, see Allen 1931;         Lyle 1960; Allsop 1961; Sinclair, 1964; Mertz, 1970; Kohler, 1973; Everest,         1978; and Cashman 1981. Burnham, 1968 offers perhaps the only serious         scholarly case for the success of prohibition. For the most recent evidence         and discussions of its failures, see Miron and Zwiebel, 1991; Morgan,         1991; and Thornton 1991.)
Public opposition to prohibition began even before the Volstead Act         passed, especially among labor unions, but organized opposition remained         small and fragmented until 1926. Then one organization, the Association         Against the Prohibition Amendment (AAPA), took over the campaign for         repeal. Headed by Pierre DuPont and other powerful corporate leaders,         the AAPA gathered increasing numbers of wealthy and prominent supporters,         including many former prohibitionists. Although prohibition would have         been repealed eventually, the AAPA unquestionably accelerated the process         (Kyvig, 1979; Levine, 1985; Rumbarger, 1989).
Just as World War I had provided the necessary context for rallying         popular support to pass prohibition, the Great Depression provided the         necessary context for repeal. Prohibition's supporters had long argued         that banning alcohol would ensure prosperity and increase law and order.         In the late 1920s and early 1930s, prohibition's opponents made exactly         the same argument. Repeal, they promised, would provide jobs, stimulate         the economy, increase tax revenue, and reduce the "lawlessness" stimulated         by and characteristic of the illegal liquor industry.
The Depression also played a crucial role in undermining elite support         for prohibition. To some extent, alcohol prohibition had originally gained         the support of large employers because they believed it would increase         worker discipline and productivity and reduce other social problems.         The mass violations of national prohibition in the 1920s, followed by         the economic depression of the 1930s, raised a new specter: prohibition,         many came to believe, undermined respect for all law, including property         law. This "lawlessness," as people then termed it, frightened         many of the rich and powerful, like Pierre DuPont and John D. Rockefeller,         Jr. far more than problems with worker efficiency (Leuchtenburg, 1958;         Kyvig, 1979; Levine, 1985). In addition, in the early 1930s the threat         of revolt and revolution was in the air. There were food riots in many         cities, unemployed people formed militant organizations, mobs stopped         trains and took over warehouses of food. Socialists and communists held         rallies of tens of thousands, angry armies of marchers camped in front         of the White House, and some wealthy people had machine guns mounted         on the roofs of their estates (Leuchtenburg, 1958; Piven and Cloward,         1971, 1977; Manchester, 1974).
Those with wealth and power increasingly supported repeal, in part         because they felt the need to do something to raise public morale and         show that the government was in some way responsive to popular pressure         in a terrible depression. In 1931, Matthew Woll, vice-president of the         American Federation of Labor and the sole labor member of the AAPA board,         told President Hoover's National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement         (the Wickersham Commission) that workers were losing faith in the government's         willingness to help them, and that prohibition was causing them further         to distrust and resent government. By 1932 a number of influential leaders         and commentators also had concluded that legalizing beer would make workers         feel better about government and take their minds off their troubles.         Senators were told, "Beer would have a decidedly soothing tendency         on the present mental attitude of the working men.... It would do a great         deal to change their mental attitude on economic conditions." Walter         Lippman argued, "Beer would be a great help in fighting off the         mental depression which afflicts great multitudes" (quotes from         Gordon, 1943, 104). The Wickersham Commission explicitly pointed to the         class resentment and lawlessness engendered by prohibition in its report         to Congress:
Naturally ... laboring men resent the insistence of employers who drink         that their employees be kept from temptation. Thus the law may be made         to appear aimed at and enforced against the insignificant while the wealthy         enjoy immunity. This feeling is reinforced when it is seen that the wealthy         are generally able to procure pure liquors, while those with less means         may run the risk of poisoning. Moreover, searches of homes ... have necessarily         seemed to bear more upon people of moderate means than upon those of         wealth or influence. (1931, 54-5)
On November 16, 1932 , the Senate voted to submit the Twenty-first         Amendment to the states for ratification. It would repeal the Eighteenth         Amendment and return to the states the power to regulate alcohol. On         March 13, 1933 , a few days after he was sworn in as president, Franklin         Roosevelt asked Congress to modify the Volstead Act to legalize 3.2 percent         alcohol beer to provide needed tax revenue. By April 7, beer was legal         in most of the country. On December 5, 1933 , Utah became the thirty-sixth         state to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment. National alcohol prohibition         was repealed, effective immediately.
In late 1933 and in 1934, bills creating state alcohol control agencies         sped through state legislatures. The model for most of the legislation         had been written by a group of policy-oriented researchers and attorneys         associated with John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and with policy institutes         he had created or financially supported (Levine 1985). Within two years         of repeal nearly every state had an agency to supervise the sale and         distribution of alcoholic beverages, and alcohol had ceased to be a controversial         and politically charged issue. The production, sale, and distribution         of alcoholic beverages today is still largely governed by the alcohol         control structures designed and implemented at that time.
Effects of Prohibition on Consumption and Public Health
It has frequently been observed that drug prohibition         tends to drive out the weaker and milder forms of drugs, and to increase         the availability and use of stronger and more dangerous drugs (see, e.g.,         Brecher, 1972). This has been so often reported that many analysts speak         of it as an "iron law" of drug prohibition. This "law" holds         because milder drugs are usually bulkier, harder to hide and smuggle,         and less remunerative. People involved in the illicit drug business therefore         frequently find it in their interest to do business in the more compact         and potent substances. For example, current interdiction efforts are         most successful at capturing boats carrying many large bales of marijuana;         therefore, many drug smugglers have turned to smuggling cocaine or heroin         because it is easier and far more lucrative than smuggling marijuana.         (see Murphy, Waldorf, and Reinarman, 1991).
This "law" of drug prohibition captures what happened during         alcohol prohibition. The major effect of the Eighteenth Amendment was         to dramatically reduce beer drinking (and therefore total alcohol consumption).         At the same time, prohibition increased consumption of hard liquor (especially         among the middle class). The fashionableness of the martini and other         mixed drinks among the middle class is in part a historical legacy of         prohibition, when criminalization made hard liquor the most available         form of beverage alcohol.
From 1890 to 1915, beer accounted for more of the total alcohol consumed         than did hard liquor. In 1915, for example, beer drinking accounted for         nearly twice the total alcohol consumed as spirits did. Warburton compared         alcohol consumption in the period of 1911 to 1914 with that during the         prohibition years 1927-1930 and concluded that "the per capita consumption         of beer has been reduced about 70 per cent....the per capita consumption         of wine has increased about 65 per cent...[and] the per capita consumption         of spirits has increased about 10 per cent" (Warburton, 1932, p.         260). This change was not permanent -- after repeal, spirits consumption         fell while beer consumption rose. By 1935 the alcohol consumed from beer         equaled that from spirits, and by 1945 Americans were getting 50 percent         more of their total alcohol from beer than from hard liquor (Levine and         Reinarman, 1993, 1998; Rorabaugh,1979; Miron and Zwiebel, 1991).
The recent public debate about drug laws has increased interest in         the effects of prohibition on public health, the economy, and social         problems. These were very lively questions during the prohibition period         but have been largely ignored since. However, in the last two decades         alcohol researchers in a number of countries have investigated at length         the relationship between total per capita alcohol consumption and specific         illnesses, especially cirrhosis of the liver. The data available for         the prohibition years in the United States will always be poor because         it is impossible to get accurate consumption figures for an illegal substance.         However, changes over many decades in countries that have kept accurate         consumption and health statistics do allow some inferences about the         relationship between overall alcohol consumption and liver cirrhosis.         Although not all liver cirrhosis is caused by heavy drinking, much is.         Furthermore, cirrhosis rates generally follow overall per capita consumption         rates. These effects are mediated by dietary patterns, by type of alcoholic         beverages consumed, and by when they are consumed. The level of health         care people receive also affects cirrhosis death rates. In general, however,         the positive relationship between alcohol consumption and cirrhosis holds:         when consumption increases, liver cirrhosis increases (Bruun et al.,         1975; Mäkelaä et al., 1981; Moore and Gerstein, 1981; Single         et al. 1981).
One important way to evaluate the public health consequences of alcohol         policies, then, is in terms of how they affect consumption. In 1932 Warburton         pointed out that "except for the first three years, the per capita         consumption of alcohol has been greater under prohibition than during         the war period [1917-1919], with high taxation and restricted production         and sale" (260). Both prohibition and post-prohibition alcohol regulation         kept overall consumption down compared with the decades prior to prohibition         Indeed, post-prohibition regulatory policies kept alcohol use sufficiently         low that it was not until the end of the 1960s, 35 years after repeal,         that per capita alcohol consumption rose to the levels of 1915 (Levine         and Reinarman, 1993, 1998). Whatever public health benefits prohibition         achieved in terms of reducing consumption, alcohol regulation in the         1930s and early 1940s accomplished them as well. Further, this occurred         despite the fact that the post-prohibition regulatory system had little         or no public health focus, and despite the fact that the liquor industry         (like most other U.S. industries) gained increasing influence over the         agencies that were supposed to regulate it. In short, alcohol control         worked almost as well as prohibition in limiting alcohol consumption,         and more effectively than pre-prohibition policies.
It is also important to note that other nations achieved even greater         reductions in per capita consumption than the United States -- without         the negative consequences of prohibition. Robin Room (1988) says that         in Australia a series of alcohol control measures instituted in the early         twentieth century substantially reduced spirits consumption. More important,         Australia 's regulatory policies significantly reduced total alcohol         consumption as well as the incidence of alcohol-related health problems,         notably cirrhosis mortality and alcoholic psychosis. All of this happened         under regulated sale, not prohibition.
Great Britain 's experience parallels that of Australia . England reduced         overall consumption by instituting fairly stringent alcohol regulation         at about the same time as the United States instituted prohibition. Moreover,         as Nadelmann notes, it reduced "the negative consequences of alcohol         consumption more effectively than did the United States , but it did         so in a manner that raised substantial government revenues." By         contrast, the U.S. government not only spent large sums attempting to         enforce its prohibition laws, but it was also unable to prevent the flow         of money into criminal enterprises (1989b, 1102-3).
As Nadelmann's puts it, "British experience [and the Australian         experience] strongly indicates that the national prohibition of alcohol         in the United States was, on balance, not successful." Prohibition         of course failed to fulfill the fantasies of prohibitionists about eliminating         major social problems like poverty, unemployment, crime, and so on. Yet         even in the less utopian terms of reducing total alcohol consumption,         U.S. prohibition was no more effective than regulated sale in the 1930s         and early 1940s. Prohibition, however, produced far more substantial         negative side effects than did regulation.
Few other nations had local alcohol prohibition laws, and only Finland         instituted constitutional prohibition (repealing it before the United         States and for many of the same reasons). Although there are today movements         in some Nordic and English-speaking counties ( Canada , Australia , New         Zealand , Great Britain ) focusing on the public health dangers of alcohol,         these are not prohibitionist groups. In the United States , even many         local prohibition laws have been replaced by regulation of some kind.         Long after repeal, the consensus remains that national alcohol prohibition         was bad public policy.
Alcohol Production and Distribution During Prohibition
During constitutional alcohol prohibition, consumption         was shaped by the requirements of illicit production. It was much more         profitable and cost effective to make and distribute distilled spirits         (gin, vodka, whiskey, or rum) than beer. Beer is mostly water -- only         3 to 6 percent alcohol. Production and storage of beer require enormous         tanks, many barrels, huge trucks, and a substantial investment in equipment. Hard liquor is 40 to 50 percent alcohol; it contains up to 15 times more         pure alcohol than beer. Because alcohol content was the main determinant         of price, spirits were much more valuable than beer and also could be         hidden and transported more easily. Furthermore, spirits could be preserved         indefinitely, whereas beer spoiled very quickly. Large-scale beer bottling         and refrigeration only developed in the 1930s, after repeal (Baron 1962;         Kyvig 1979).
The rising supply of hard liquor came from many sources. Tens of thousands         of people produced it in small, compact stills in sheds, basements, attics,         and in the woods. It was also smuggled from Canada , Mexico and Europe         . Some of the largest names in distilling today entered the business         or grew wealthy during the prohibition era -- notably the Bronfmans of         Canada, who owned Seagrams. A considerable amount of alcohol was also         diverted from purported industrial or medical uses (Baum, 2004).
Wine consumption also increased during prohibition, to about 65 per         cent more than the pre-World War I period, according to Warburton (1932).         Standard table wine contains 10 to 14 percent alcohol. Much of the wine         was made for personal consumption and as a profitable side-business by         immigrants from wine countries, especially Italy . After the first few         years of prohibition, the California wine-grape industry experienced         a boom and vineyard prices increased substantially. California grape         growers planted hearty, thick-skinned grapes that could be shipped easily         and used for small-scale and home wine making. Much of the California         wine-grape crop was shipped to Chicago and New York in newly developed         refrigerated boxcars. The grapes were bought right off the train by wholesalers,         who resold them in immigrant neighborhoods. The home-made wine was then         distributed to smaller cities and towns. (Muscatine, Amerine, and Thompson         1984).
Although it is true that prohibition provided a major boost for organized         crime, it is not true (although widely believed today) that gangsters         and large criminal organizations supplied most prohibition-era alcohol.         In Chicago and a few other large cities, large criminal gangs indeed         dominated alcohol distribution, especially by the end of the 1920s.
Most of the alcohol production and distribution, however, was on a         smaller scale. In addition to home-made wines and family stills, people         drive cars and trucks to Canada and returned with a load of liquor. Fishing         boats and pleasure boats did the same. Spirits and wine were also prescribed         by physicians and available at pharmacies. Many people certified themselves         as ministers and rabbis and distributed large quantities of "sacramental         wine." Alcoholic beverages were made and sold to supplement other         income during hard times. Prohibition thus shaped the structure of the         alcohol industry in a distinctive way: it decentralized and democratized         production and distribution (Lyle, 1960; Allsop, 1961; Sinclair, 1965;         Everest, 1978; Cashman, 1981).
Today as well, most people in the illicit drug business are small-scale         entrepreneurs. Supporters of the drug war frequently suggest that elimination         of the currently large-scale producers and distributors would have a         lasting effect on drug production and distribution. There is no more         evidence supporting this now than there was during alcohol prohibition.         Much illicit drug production today is also decentralized and democratized.         There is no criminal syndicate that, when eliminated, would stop the         distribution of any currently illicit drug, or even reduce the supply         for very long. Today some groups, families, and business organizations         (like the so-called Medellin cocaine cartel) have grown very rich in         the illicit drug business. However, just as Al Capone was quickly replaced,         so have new producers taken the place of those cocaine "king-pins" who         have been arrested. Indeed, after billions of dollars on interdiction         have been spent by Customs, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and even the         Armed Forces, both heroin and cocaine are more plentiful, cheaper and         purer than they were in the 1970s. Even when interdiction does affect         the supply of a criminalized substance, the effects are often ironic.         The partial success of the Nixon administration's "Operation Intercept," for         example, gave rise to what is now a huge domestic marijuana industry         (Brecher, 1972) that has become ever more decentralized and democratic         as armed helicopter raids have increased.
In short, whereas prohibition regimes tend to be a boon to organized         crime, they also increase the number and types of people involved in         illicit production and distribution (Williams 1989; Murphy, Waldorf,         and Reinarman 1991). Whether production occurs in a mob syndicate or         a family marijuana patch, the result tends to be a shift toward production         and sale of more concentrated forms of intoxicating substances. Recognition         of such tendencies in the prohibition era accelerated the process of         repeal and informed the search for alternative regulatory systems.
Establishing an Alcohol Control System
In 1933, at the very end of constitutional prohibition,         the difficulties of creating an alcohol control system seemed formidable.         In the years before constitutional prohibition in the United States ,         there had been little systematic control of the alcohol industry. The         Eighteenth Amendment had not eliminated the business, but rather had profoundly altered its shape. In 1933 a sprawling illegal industry for         producing and distributing alcoholic beverages was in place, composed         of uncountable numbers of small independent distributors and producers,         and some larger ones. For 14 years this industry had kept the United         States well supplied with alcohol. The mass patronage of this illicit         industry -- and the political and economic implications of such a popular         display of disrespect for law -- was a major factor in convincing Rockefeller         and other prominent supporters of prohibition to reverse field and press         for repeal.
During prohibition the liquor business was wide open. In most cities         and many towns, speakeasies closed when they wished or not at all; they         sold whatever they wanted, to whomever they cared to, at whatever price         they chose. They decorated as they wished and had a free hand in providing         food and entertainment. Producers completely controlled alcohol production,         used whatever ingredients they wished and manufactured alcohol of whatever         strength they wished. Neither producers nor distributors paid any taxes         (except for payoffs to police and politicians) and they were not regulated         by any government agency. During prohibition, the liquor industry was         probably the freest large industry in America .
Alcohol control, on the other hand was premised on government intervention         into every aspect of the liquor business. Controversial issues such as         whether food must be served, women admitted, music and games banned,         bars and bar stools allowed, all had to be settled. The number, types,         and locations of on- and off-premises outlets and their hours of sale         had to be determined. Producers had to be regulated to ensure that products         were safe and of a uniform alcohol content. In order to eliminate untrustworthy         or disreputable persons, both producers and distributors had to be screened,         licensed, and made to pay taxes. Legal drinking had to be socially organized         in a way that would not be an affront to the abstaining half of the population.         Conversely, the control system could not make regulation so tight, or         taxes so high, that drinkers would prefer to patronize illicit bootleggers         or speakeasies. Americans, after all, were by then quite used to disobeying         liquor laws.
Prohibitionists had always argued that the liquor business was inherently         unregulatable. The onus was now on reformers to show that this was not         true and that they could create structures to make the industry obey         laws and yield taxes. The task, as expressed in the catchall title for         alternatives to prohibition, was "liquor control" or "alcohol         control" in the fullest sense of the term. In short, repeal posed         an enormous problem of social engineering. Constructing alcohol control         involved problems of government regulation so large and complex as to         make some of the classic Progressive-era reforms -- regulating meat packing,         for example -- seem paltry. Except for national prohibition,         post-repeal alcohol regulation is probably the most striking twentieth-century         example of government power used to directly reshape both an entire industry         and the conditions under which its product are consumed.
The Rockefeller Report
Prior to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, alcohol         was regulated by cities, towns, and sometimes counties. State governments         were rarely involved in regulating production or distribution. Prohibition         then shifted control to the federal government. Post-repeal policy, however,         made state governments chiefly responsible for devising and implementing         a regulatory system. States could, and often did, then allow for considerable         local option and variation.
By the end of the 1920s, the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment         had outlined some rough plans for alternatives to prohibition, but they         had not been well worked out. The central principles of post-prohibition         alcohol control systems adopted by almost every state legislature were         first fully laid out in a report sponsored by John D. Rockefeller, Jr.         and issued in October 1933, shortly before repeal was ratified. Rockefeller's         long-time adviser, Raymond Fosdick, was the senior author. Fosdick supervised         the group of attorneys and policy analysts, most of whom worked with         or for the Institute of Public Administration -- a Progressive Era policy         institute in New York that Rockefeller had funded for a number of years.         The report was issued in press releases to newspapers and magazines over         several weeks. Finally the Rockefeller Report (as it was called at the         time) was released as a book, Toward Liquor Control by Raymond         Fosdick and Albert Scott.
Although few at the time recognized it, Toward Liquor Control had         taken as its basic conclusions virtually all of the central recommendations         made 30 years earlier by another elite-sponsored alcohol policy group         called the Committee of Fifty. The Committee of Fifty, which was generally         opposed to alcohol prohibition, had produced five books on various aspects         of the "alcohol problem" around the turn of the century. Fosdick         and the other study members had read the Committee of Fifty's reports         and quoted them on the corruption and lawlessness resulting from earlier         forms of local prohibition. The Rockefeller Report echoed the Committee         of Fifty's conclusion that the legitimacy of the law must be of primary         concern in liquor regulation. Both reports agreed that the specific content         of the law mattered less than that the laws be obeyed. Both reports argued         that alcohol regulation required a flexible system that could be continually         monitored and adjusted. Further, both reports advised that, if possible,         government should take over the selling of alcoholic beverages (Billings         1905; Levine 1983; Rumbarger, 1989).
The specific plan for alcohol control suggested by Toward Liquor           Control, and the Rockefeller Report's most controversial proposal,           was that each state take over as a public monopoly the retail sale           for off-premises consumption of spirits, wine, and beer above 3.2 percent           alcohol. As Fosdick and Scott explained: "The primary task of           the [State Alcohol] Authority would be the establishment of a chain           of its own retail stores for the sale of the heavier alcoholic beverages           by package only." This is the source of the term "package           stores" still used today for liquor outlets in many states where           people buy alcohol beverages in a bottle to be consumed off premises.           The state-run outlets of Canadian provinces, and of Sweden , Norway           , and Finland , were cited as working examples of such a plan. This           quickly became known as the "monopoly plan" and at the time           was usually called "the Rockefeller plan."
For those states not willing to establish government liquor stores,         Fosdick and Scott proposed an alternative system: "regulation by         license." They cited England as the best example of a working license         system. A nonpartisan board appointed by the governor would have statewide         authority to issue liquor licenses and regulate the industry. "Tied         houses" would not be permitted -- that is, no retail establishments         could be owned directly by or under exclusive contract to a distiller         or brewer.
Although it offered guidelines for a licensing system, Toward Liquor           Control favored the monopoly plan. The possibility of increasing           profits, they said, would encourage private businesses to sell more           alcohol, to buy political influence and lax enforcement, and to violate           laws. Rockefeller explained the chief advantage of government-owned           liquor stores in his foreword to the book: "Only as the profit           motive is eliminated is there any hope of controlling the liquor traffic           in the interests of a decent society. To approach the problem from           any other angle is only to tinker with it and to ensure failure." The           irony of a Rockefeller warning about the dangers of the profit motive           was not lost on observers in 1933. Like others at the time, Rockefeller           had concluded, probably correctly, that government ownership brought           greater powers than licensed businesses to regulate and control behavior,           and ensure obedience to the law.
For both the licensing plan and the monoply plan, Toward Liquor           Control outlined a detailed set of matters over which the state           agency would have jurisdiction. These included the power to acquire           real estate and other capital by purchase, lease, or condemnation;           determine and change prices at will; establish a system of personal           identification of purchasers; issue permits for and regulate the use           of beer and wine for off-premises consumption and for on-premises consumption           in hotels, restaurants, clubs, railway dining cars, and passenger boats;           require alcohol manufacturers and importers to report on quantities           produced and shipped; regulate or eliminate alcohol beverage advertising;           determine the internal design, visibility from the street, hours and           days of sale, number and locations of alcohol outlets.
In January 1934, a model law based on the guidelines of Toward           Liquor Control and written by the staff of the Institute for Public           Administration was published as a supplement to the National Municipal           Review. The Review was the official journal of the National           Municipal League, another Progressive Era policy organization supported           by the Rockefellers. The model law and other supporting documents were           widely circulated to legislators throughout the country in the months           following repeal. State legislators, faced with difficult political           choices, and with little personal expertise in the complexities of           liquor regulation, turned to the authoritative and virtually unchallenged           plans of the Rockefeller commission and the National Municipal League.           In a letter in the Rockefeller Archives, one of the model law's authors           estimated that the monopoly law was taken almost verbatim by 15 states,           and the licensing law served as the text or draft for many more (Gulick,           1977; Levine, 1985).
Alcohol Control in Operation
Post-repeal regulation transformed the alcohol beverage         industry. Finland , the only other nation to have experimented with constitutional         prohibition, had nationalized production of spirits. However, such proposals         were not seriously discussed in the United States . Instead, production         took the form of an oligopoly of relatively few corporations. By the         end of the 1930s, about 80 percent of all distilled liquor made in the         United States was manufactured by four corporations. The beer industry,         although more diverse nationally because beer required quick and local         distribution, was monopolized by region or area. Regulatory agencies         preferred to deal with a few large corporations -- they were easier to         police and to make agreements with, and more likely to be concerned with         keeping the image of the industry clean and respectable. This pattern         of monopolization was not unique of course; most major American industries         -- steel, automobiles, soft drinks, chemicals, for example -- were increasingly         dominated by a few large corporations. (From at least the time of the         National Recovery Act at the start of the New Deal, federal government         policy often encouraged such concentration. The alcohol industry was         exceptional only in how quickly many small producers were overtaken by         a few dominant ones.)
Although production became oligopolistic, distribution was splintered         and scattered. Perhaps the most important long-term innovation in post-prohibition         alcohol regulation was that it permitted the legal sale of alcohol at         a wide variety of sites. Before prohibition, the saloon had been a single,         all-purpose institution -- there one drank beer, wine, or spirits, and         there one purchased for off-premises consumption a bottle of spirits         or a bucket of beer. After repeal, alcohol control created several different         types of establishments to sell alcoholic beverages. In most states special         stores were designated for selling distilled liquor and wine -- often         they could not sell any food at all, or even cigarettes. Beer, on the         other hand, was made relatively widely available in bottles and cans         -- with grocery stores and small markets licensed to sell it. In other         words, after prohibition, sale of bottled alcohol was increasingly separated         from the public drinking place. This encouraged the privatization of         drinking. Whether alone or with others, drinking became something more         commonly done at home -- where, it should be noted, drinking patterns         were often moderated by family norms (see Zinberg 1984). By 1941, off-premises         consumption accounted for the majority of alcohol sales (Harrison and         Laine 1936; Kyvig 1979, 189).
The character of public drinking was significantly altered by these         regulatory changes. A new class of licenses for on-premises consumption         of beer only, or of beer and wine, was established and liberally issued         to restaurants and cafeterias where eating moderated the character and         effects of drinking. This separated the barroom selling distilled liquor         and beer as a distinct institution. Many state alcohol control laws made         provision for a local option whereby a county government could prohibit         specific kinds of liquor selling within its borders. This option has         been widely exercised. As late as 1973, of the 3,073 counties in the         United States, 672 prohibited sales of distilled liquor by the drink         for on-premises consumption, and 545 totally prohibited sales of distilled         spirits (Alcohol Beverage Control Administration 1973).
Under alcohol control, all establishments licensed for on-premises         consumption of spirits were specifically restricted in ways that shaped         the cultural practice of drinking. In some areas, control laws attempted         to moderate the effects of drinking by encouraging food consumption.         For example, spirit sales often were limited to bona fide restaurants         with laws specifying how many feet of kitchen space and how many food         preparation workers there must be. Most states established restrictions         on the number of entrances and their locations (back entrances are usually         prohibited); the times of day and days of the week when sales may occur;         permissible decorations; degree of visibility of the interior from the         street; numbers and uses of other rooms; distance of the establishment         from churches, schools, and other alcohol outlets; whether customers may sit at a long bar -- a counter in close proximity to the source of         alcohol -- or whether they must sit at tables and order drinks as one         orders food; and the ratio of chair seating to bar seating.
The public character of drinkers' comportment was also regulated. Many         states, for example, prohibit dancing or live music except under special         license. Most gambling or betting is prohibited, and other games are         restricted as well. For many years, New York and other states did not         allow barrooms to have pinball machines. Many states specifically ban         the use of the word "saloon," others ban the use of the word "bar," and         some forbid all words to indicate a drinking place. Until about 1980,         most drinking establishments in California displayed only a name and         a symbol: a tilted cocktail glass with a stirrer.
From a pre-prohibition or prohibition-era perspective, there are two         surprising characteristics of post-repeal alcohol controls. First, most         laws and regulations are obeyed. Almost all drinking places,         for example, stop serving and collect glasses at the required hours;         and they observe the regulations about tables, dancing, decorations,         signs, entrances, and so on. By and large, this obedience has been relatively         easily achieved through careful policing, coupled with the power to revoke         or suspend licenses. Operating a liquor-selling business is usually quite         profitable compared to other kinds of retail establishments, so owners         tend to guard their licenses carefully. Unlike prohibition, alcohol control         uses the profit motive to encourage lawful business practices. Minimum-age         drinking laws constitute the one obvious exception to this regulatory         success as well as being one of the few remaining forms of prohibition.         Second, post-repeal alcohol regulation is usually not perceived         as especially restrictive by customers. The many layers of laws and regulations         are rarely noticed; most drinkers take them completely for granted.
A third, less surprising characteristic of post-repeal alcohol control         is that policy has not been aimed specifically at maximizing what earlier         reformers had called "temperance" -- meaning, above all, reducing         habitual drunkenness or repeated heavy drinking. In his preface to Toward         Liquor Control, Rockefeller maintained that such problems could         not be effectively addressed by liquor regulation and that they would         have to be taken up by other agencies as part of broader educational         and health efforts. Since repeal, these tasks have been adopted by a         number of independent and government groups, notably Alcoholics Anonymous         and the National Council on Alcoholism, various state and local alcoholism         agencies, and, since the early 1970s, the National Institute on Alcohol         Abuse and Alcoholism. In recent years, some public health professionals         have urged that the control system be used more self-consciously to reduce         drinking and some health problems. Such concerns have by and large been         imposed on the system, however, and do not flow from its natural workings.
On the other hand, despite all its flaws, post-repeal alcohol control         did succeed in turning consumption away from hard liquor (which is much         easier to abuse) and back toward beer and wine. Further, alcohol control         (coupled with the Depression and World War II) did keep alcohol consumption         below pre-prohibition levels. In fact, it was not until 1970 that the         total alcohol consumption of the drinking-age population reached the         levels of 1915 (Levine and Reinarman, 1993, 1998; Rorabaugh,1979; Miron         and Zwiebel, 1991).
In 1936 a second volume of the Rockefeller-sponsored Liquor Study Commission         Report was issued. After Repeal: A Study of Liquor Control Administration (Harrison         and Lane 1936) analyzed the results of liquor control after "a two-year         trial," and described the most important changes and innovations         in liquor administration instituted since repeal. The overall thrust         of the report was that, with some understandable exceptions, alcohol         control worked extremely well. Other observers at the time drew similar         conclusions (Sheppard 1938; Shipman 1940).
Legalizing alcohol and then regulating it had accomplished what most         temperance and prohibition supporters claimed was impossible: alcohol         moved from being a scandal, crisis, and constant front-page news story         to something routine and manageable, a little-noticed thread in the fabric         of American life. Since 1934, alcohol regulation has quietly and effectively         organized and managed the production, distribution and sale of alcohol,         as well as public drinking.
Despite frequent claims to the contrary, alcohol control has of course         sought to legislate morality. It has not, however, sought to impose the         morality of the nineteenth-century Protestant middle class who supported         the anti-alcohol crusade. Rather the alcohol control system legislates         the more modern morality of the new business and professional middle         class, of the corporate elite, and to a large extent of the twentieth-century         working class. Accordingly, unlike the use of marijuana, heroin, or cocaine         -- drinking has not been criminalized and pushed beyond the pale of normative         and regulatory influence. Moreover, once it ceased to be outlawed, the         alcohol industry was no longer dominated by unregulated, illicit entrepreneurs         who shot at each other, developed crime syndicates, and paid off police         and government officials. The leaders of the major alcohol industries,         just like other members of the economic establishment, have a strong         investment in maintaining order and obedience to law.
Now, many decades after national alcohol prohibition ended, it is easy         to forget that all this was the outcome of self-conscious public policy         and not the "natural" result of market forces or national zeitgeist.         The alcohol control system has worked sufficiently well that it usually         goes unnoticed, even by students of prohibition or American history.         For purposes of devising new drug policy options, however, it is important         to remember that this particular system was the self-conscious creation         of a political and economic elite with the power to institute what it         regarded as good and necessary. The alcohol control system they devised         is not especially democratic; it does not really address public health         or social welfare concerns; and it has produced enormous profits for         a handful of large corporations. However, it has achieved what its designers         sought to do: regulate and administer the orderly and lawful distribution         of alcoholic beverages in a way that creates little controversy (Bruun         et al. 1975; Beauchamp 1981; Levine 1984).
Lessons from Alcohol Control
There are many different lessons that may be drawn from         the story of legalization of alcohol production and sales and the establishment         of alcohol control in the United States. Two seem particularly relevant         for drug policy.
First, the legalization of drug production and sales and the establishment         of drug control along the lines of alcohol control is a reasonable         and practical policy option. Supporters of alcohol prohibition always         claimed that alcohol was a special substance that could never be regulated         and sold like other commodities because it was so addicting and dangerous.         However, as the last seventy plus years of alcohol control and the experiences         of many other societies have shown, the prohibitionists were wrong. The         experiences of drug policy in other nations, and the experiences of U.S.         pharmaceutical and drugstore regulation, suggest that most if not all         psychoactive substances could be similarly produced, regulated,         sold, and used in a generally lawful and orderly fashion. Therefore,         it would mark a significant advance if the current U.S. debate on drug         policy could be moved beyond the question of whether such a         system of legalized drug control is possible. It is. Instead, we think         debate should focus on whether a nonmoralistic assessment of the advantages         and disadvantages of such a system make it desirable, and what different         regulatory options might look like.
Second, a workable system of at least partially legalized drug production         and sales -- of drug control -- would have to be a flexible one, geared         to local conditions. Edward Brecher recommended in his landmark study Licit         and Illicit Drugs (1972), and the importance of local option was         also stressed over a century ago by the Committee of Fifty (Levine, 1983).         Because towns, cities, counties, states and countries vary enormously,         alcohol and drug policies must be shaped according to local environments.
As with alcohol control, drug control could be implemented so as to         reduce substantially if not eliminate the illegal drug business and most         of the crime, violence, and corruption associated with it. Drug control         with a public health orientation would also seek to encourage milder         and weaker drugs and to make them available in safer forms accompanied         by comprehensive education about risks, proper use, and less dangerous         modes of ingestion. In other words, a public-health-oriented drug control         regime would seek to reverse the tendencies that appear inherent under         criminalization, where production, distribution, and consumption are         pushed into deviant subcultures, where purity is uncontrolled and dosage         is imprecise.
If a legalized, decentralized drug control system with local option         is implemented, then the experience of alcohol regulation suggests that,         in the long run, drug problems would probably not rise significantly         above the levels now present under drug prohibition, and overall consumption         might not rise either (see also Nadelmann, 1989a). Similarly, if such         a public health model of drug control were coupled with increased social         services and employment for impoverished inner-city populations, then         the abuse of drugs like heroin and cocaine might well be expected to         decrease (Reinarman and Levine, 1997; Brecher, 1972; Jonas, 1990).
Having said this, it is incumbent upon us to point out that it will         be no simple matter to implement such a drug control system in the United         States , or in any other place in the world. As the second part of this         chapter shows, drug prohibition is a much larger system than national         alcohol prohibition in the United States ever was.
Drug prohibition is a world-wide system
Every country in the world now has drug prohibition enforced         by its police and military. Every country in the world criminalizes the         production and sale of cannabis, cocaine, and opiates (except for limited         medical uses). In addition, most countries criminalize the production         and sale of other psychoactive substances. Global drug prohibition is         a world-wide system structured by a series of international treaties         that are supervised by the United Nations. Every nation in the world         is either a signatory to one or more of the treaties or has laws in accord         with them (Levine, 2002, 2003; Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Nadelmann, 1990;         International Narcotics Control Board Web site, http://www.incb.org ).
Global drug prohibition is a worldwide system of state power. Drug prohibition         is a social fact. For many decades, however, public officials, journalists,         and academics rarely identified any form of U.S. drug law as "prohibition." Instead,         they referred to a national and international "narcotics control." The         international organization that still supervises global drug prohibition         is called the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Outside of         some drug policy, harm reduction, and academic circles, few people have         known much about the world-wide drug prohibition system.
In the last decades of the 20th century, some people in many countries         became aware of national drug prohibition. They came to understand         that the drug policies of the U.S. and some other countries are varieties         of drug prohibition. Even as this understanding spread, however, the         fact that every country in the world has adopted drug prohibition remained         a kind of "hidden in plain view" secret. Until recently, the         global drug prohibition system has been taken for granted and nearly         invisible. Now that is changing. Global drug prohibition is becoming         easier to see and is losing some of its other ideological and political         powers.
The rise of global drug prohibition
In the 20th century, the cause of drug prohibition was         first taken up by committed alcohol prohibitionists. In the U.S., national         drug prohibition developed out of national alcohol prohibition. National         drug prohibition is not "similar to" or "like" alcohol         prohibition, it is a historical extension and continuation of it.
National drug prohibition began in the 1920s in the U.S. as a subset         of constitutional alcohol prohibition. The first generation of U.S. narcotics         agents worked for the federal alcohol prohibition agency. In 1930, Congress         separated drug prohibition from the increasingly disreputable alcohol         prohibition and created a new federal drug prohibition agency, the Federal         Bureau of Narcotics, headed by the committed alcohol prohibitionist Harry         J. Anslinger (Epstein, 1977; Musto, 1987). In 1933, a combination of         majority votes in some state legislatures and unprecedented state-wide         public referendums in other states ended national alcohol prohibition.         The question of alcohol policy was turned back to state and local governments         to do with as they wished. A few states retained alcohol prohibition         for years and many rural American counties still have forms of alcohol         prohibition ( Kyvig, 1979; Levine, 1984 and Levine, 1985).
Drug prohibition took an entirely different course. Since the early         20th century, U.S. alcohol prohibitionists found European governments         far more willing to consider anti-narcotics legislation than anti-alcohol         laws. Alcohol prohibitionists urged adoption of drug prohibition and         over the years they convinced the U.S. and other counties to establish         various forms of drug prohibition. It was often called "narcotics         control."
In 1919, the founding Covenant of the League of Nations explicitly mentioned         the control of "dangerous drugs" as one of the organization's         concerns. In the 1930s, guided by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and         its chief, Harry Anslinger, the U.S. government helped write and gain         acceptance for two international anti-drug conventions or treaties aimed         at "suppressing" narcotics and "dangerous drugs." In         1948, the new UN made drug prohibition one of its priorities. The UN         Single Convention of 1961 (as amended in 1972, and supplemented by UN         anti-drug treaties in 1971 and 1988) established the current system of         global drug prohibition. In the last 80 years, nearly every political         persuasion and type of government has endorsed drug prohibition. (For         a discussion of this history see: Bewley-Taylor, 1999 and 2003; Bruun         et al., 1972; McAllister, 2000; Walker, 1992; King, 1972; Epstein, 1977;         Baum, 1996; Gray, 1998; Duke and Gross, 1993; King, 1972; Musto, 1987,         Nadelmann, 1990, McWilliams, 1992; Levine 2002, 2003; Reinarman, 2003;         http://www.incb.org for the text of the treaties. For a discussion of         why drug prohibition was adopted throughout the world see, Levine 2002         and 2003, and a special issue of the International Journal of Drug         Policy, 2003, devoted to a critical analysis of the UN treaties         and global drug prohibition).
Drug use and policy in the era of global drug prohibition
The Single Convention of 1961 was put into place just         as the world it was designed to govern was being transformed. Over the         next two decades the use of prohibited drugs, especially of cannabis         (marijuana), moved from the margins to the mainstream and the middle         class. Except for cannabis, none of this was very large, and most of         it was drug use and not abuse.
By about 1979, most forms of illegal drug use in the U.S. were higher         than anytime before or since. By 1993, 22% of Americans aged 18 to 25,         and 6% over age 25 had used marijuana once or more in the last year.         And by 1993, 5% of American aged 18 to 25 and 2% over age 25 had used         cocaine once or more in the last year. With some fluctuations, these         rates have remained at roughly the same levels since. Heroin, LSD, psychoactive         mushrooms and other illegal drug use is lower than cocaine use, and the         levels of MDMA (ecstasy) use is similar to the levels of cocaine use         (Reinarman and Levine, 1997:28-33).
The rise of illegal drug use in the 1960s and 1970s, and the persistence         of use since 1980, have created enormous pressures on the drug prohibition         systems in many Western countries. Different countries have responded         to drug use and abuse in a variety of ways. Global drug prohibition is         best understood as a long continuum -- with a harsher more punitive and         criminalized end (as in the US), and a more tolerant, regulated and public         health-oriented end (as in the Netherlands and growing numbers of European         counties).
U.S. drug prohibition gives long prison sentences for repeated possession,         use, and small-scale distribution of forbidden drugs. Many U.S. drug         laws explicitly remove sentencing discretion from judges and do not allow         for probation or parole. In the U.S. in the 1980s, the Reagan and Bush         administrations substantially increased criminal penalties for drug possession         and launched an expensive "War on Drugs." The U.S. now has         nearly half a million men and women in prison for violating its drug         laws. Most are poor people of color and are imprisoned for possessing         an illicit drug or "intending" to sell small amounts of it.         The mandatory federal penalty for possessing 5 grams of crack cocaine,         for a first offense, is 5 years in prison with no parole (Reinarman and         Levine, 1997; Duke and Gross, 1993; Gray, 1998 and McWilliams, 1992).
The cannabis policy of the Netherlands is the best known example of         the other end of the drug prohibition continuum––of a decriminalized         and regulated form of drug prohibition. Several UN drug treaties require         the Netherlands, like other signatories, to have laws criminalizing the         production and distribution of cannabis and other drugs. However, since         the early 1980s, national policy in the Netherlands allows over 800 cafes         and snack bars to sell small quantities of cannabis to adults for personal         use, on premises and off. These "coffee shops" are permitted         to operate as long as they are orderly and stay within well-defined limits         that are monitored and enforced by the police. Unlike legal businesses,         cannabis sales are not taxed and coffee shops cannot advertise cannabis.
Even as cannabis sales in the Netherlands are open, routine, and appear to         be completely legal, importing and commercially producing this cannabis         remain illegal. As a result, the coffee shops have always been supplied,         as the Dutch say, through the "back door." This is still formally         drug prohibition and the Netherlands prosecutes importers, dealers and         commercial growers who handle large quantities of cannabis––as         required by the UN anti-drug treaties. In short, for over two decades,         the Netherlands has sustained a unique system of regulated, open, quasi-legal         cannabis sales supplied by illegal importers and growers. This is as         far as any country has been able to go within the current structures         of global drug prohibition (Leuw, 1997; Reinarman and Levine, 1997; Englesmann,         1990; Henk, 1989;).
The prohibition policies of all other Western countries fall in between         the heavily criminalized policies of the United States and the decriminalized         and regulated form of cannabis prohibition of the Netherlands. No Western         country and few Third World countries have ever had forms of drug prohibition         as criminalized and punitive as the U.S. regime, and since the early         1990s drug policy in Europe, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere clearly         has shifted even farther away from the criminalized end of the prohibition         continuum. All these countries, however, are required by international         treaties to have -- and still do have -- real, formal, legal, national         drug prohibition (Levine 2002, 2003; Andreas, 1999; Bewley-Taylor, 1999;         Reinarman and Levine, 1997).
Since the early 1980s, global drug prohibition has had to face a series         of dilemmas or crises. In the final sections of this chapter, we want         to briefly discuss three of these crises: the emergence and development         of the harm reduction movement within drug prohibition; the growth of         a serious, reputable opposition to criminalized and punitive drug policies;         and the inability of drug prohibition to stop the cultivation and use         of cannabis throughout the world.
The harm reduction movement within drug prohibition
The harm reduction movement was born in the early 1980s         as a pragmatic, remarkably effective response to the spreading hepatitis         and AIDS epidemics. Since then, harm-reduction workers and activists         in Europe and increasingly throughout the world have sought to provide         drug users and addicts with a range of services aimed at reducing the         harmful effects of drug use. In the United States, conservative pundits         and even liberal journalists have accused harm-reduction advocates of         being “drug legalizers” in disguise, but in most other countries         many prominent politicians, public-health professionals, and police officials         who are strong defenders of drug prohibition also have supported harm-reduction         programs as practical public-health policies (Heather et al. 1993). Even         the UN agencies that supervise worldwide drug prohibition have come to         recognize the public-health benefits of harm-reduction services within current         drug prohibition regimes (INCB 2000: 59–60).
It is useful to understand that there are many varieties of drug prohibition,         arranged along a continuum from the harsher and more punitive forms to         the more tolerant and regulated forms. We want to suggest that harm reduction         is a movement that in effect, though not always in intent, pushes drug         polices away from the more criminalized and punitive forms of drug prohibition         toward the more decriminalized, tolerant, and regulated forms of drug         prohibition. Harm reduction encourages policy makers to shift drug policies         away from punishment, coercion, and repression, and toward tolerance,         regulation and public health. Harm reduction is not inherently an enemy         of drug prohibition. However, in the course of pursuing public health         goals, harm reduction necessarily seeks policies that also reduce the         punitive effects of drug prohibition (Heather, Wodak, Nadelmann & O'Hare,         1993 and Reinarman and Levine, 1997).
Consider some of the significant programs that the harm reduction movement         has advocated: syringe distribution and exchange, methadone maintenance,         hygienic injection rooms, prescription heroin, medical use of cannabis,         drug education for users, and pill testing at raves. These programs have         sought to increase public health by helping users reduce the harms of         drug use. However, in order to carry out their objectives (like reducing         the spread of AIDS), the harm reduction programs have often required         changes in laws, policies or funding that quite clearly also reduce the         harshness and intolerance of drug prohibition.
We are suggesting that implicitly and sometimes explicitly the harm         reductionist stance toward drug prohibition is exactly the same as its         stance toward drug use. Harm reduction groups seek to reduce the harmful         effects of drug use without requiring users to be drug-free. Harm reduction         groups also seek to reduce the harmful effects of drug prohibition without         requiring governments to be prohibition-free. Harm reduction's message         to drug users is: "we are not asking you to give up drug use; we         just ask you to do some things (like use clean syringes) to reduce the         harmfulness of drug use (including the spread of AIDS) to you and the         people close to you." In precisely the same way, harm reduction's         message to governments is: "we are not asking you to give up drug         prohibition; we just ask you to do some things (like make clean syringes         and methadone available) to reduce the harmfulness of drug prohibition."
Harm reduction offers a radically tolerant and pragmatic approach to         both drug use and drug prohibition. It assumes that neither are going         away anytime soon and suggests therefore that reasonable and responsible         people try to persuade those who use drugs, and those who use drug prohibition,         to minimize the harms that their activities produce.
The growing opposition to punitive drug policies
In many countries increasing numbers of people––physicians,         lawyers, judges, police, journalists, scientists, public health officials,         teachers, religious leaders, social workers, drug users and drug addicts––now         openly criticize the more extreme, punitive, and criminalized forms of         drug prohibition. These critics, from across the political spectrum,         have pointed out that punitive drug policies are expensive, ineffective         at reducing drug abuse, take scarce resources away from other public         health and policing activities, and are often racially and ethnically         discriminatory. Criminalized drug prohibition violates civil liberties,         imprisons many nonviolent offenders, and worsens health problems like         the AIDS and hepatitis epidemics. Harm reduction is a major part of the         critical opposition to punitive drug policies. Indeed, harm reduction         is the first popular, international movement to develop within drug prohibition         to openly challenge drug demonization and the more criminalized forms         of drug prohibition (Reinarman and Levine, 1997, Levine 2002, 2003).
The harm reduction and drug policy reformers have changed the debate.         For example, in 2001 the mainstream Toronto newspaper, the Globe         and Mail(August 20 and 21), wrote a two part editorial strongly         urging Canada to "decriminalize all––yes, all––personal         drug use, henceforth to be regarded primarily as a health issue rather         than as a crime." At the same time, the conservative British business         magazine, The Economist (July 26), devoted an entire issue to         drug topics, endorsing decriminalization, harm reduction and consideration         of drug legalization. The Economist also reported that U.S.         government anti-drug publications "are full of patently false claims" and         that U.S. drug policy "has proved a dismal rerun of America's attempt,         in 1920–1933, to prohibit the sale of alcohol." Since 2001,         UK drug polices have moved to down-classify cannabis, and the Canadian         government has been considering decriminalizing it.
As drug policy reform movements have grown, supporters of drug         prohibition have been discovering that they cannot make the critics of         criminalized prohibition go away. In the reports of the International         Narcotics Control Board (the U.N. agency supervising global drug prohibition)         and in other publications, the most knowledgeable defenders of drug prohibition         warn regularly about the increasing growth of cannabis cultivation and         use on every continent, and about the increasing legitimacy given to         the critics of drug prohibition. These defenders of global drug prohibition         recognize that the advocates of decriminalized drug prohibition––and         the political, economic and cultural forces driving that opposition––are         gaining strength and legitimacy (see for example, INCB, 2000).
All of this opposition is fairly recent. For much of its history, global         drug prohibition has had very few critics. Even today, despite the impressive         growth in many countries of the harm reduction movement and of drug policy         reform activities, world-wide drug prohibition still has very few explicit,         opponents. One reason for the lack of organized opposition to the drug         treaties is that until recently the global drug prohibition system has         been invisible.
Furthermore, even now few people understand that by ending or even         modifying the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, the question         of national drug policy could be returned to individual countries and         local governments to handle as they wished. Defenders of global drug         prohibition like to evoke an international conspiracy of what they call "drug         legalizers." But almost nobody thus far has tried to launch even         a half-baked international campaign with slogans like "Repeal the         Single Convention" or "End Global Drug Prohibition."
Yet it may well be that the Single Convention stands in much the same         relationship to world-wide drug prohibition that the 18th Amendment to         the Constitution and the Volstead Act stood in relation to U.S. alcohol         prohibition. Once the 18th Amendment was gone, state and local governments         were free to create alcohol policy at the local level. If the Single         Convention was repealed, or even modified, national governments around         the world would be freer to create drug laws and policies geared to their         own conditions––including prohibition if they should so desire.
At present, many nations, and many more regional and local governments,         are reforming their drug policies, expanding harm reduction, and adopting         less criminalized forms of drug prohibition. But no national government         is even discussing withdrawing from the Single Convention and global         drug prohibition. In addition to the domestic political obstacles to         such a move, a potential "rogue" nation confronts international         barriers in the form of economic and political sanctions from the U.S.         and its allies. Therefore, no single country can now formally end its         national prohibition regime and completely "defect" from the         world-wide prohibitionist system. And it is likely that no single country         will be willing or able to defect for a very long time, if ever (Bewley-Taylor,         1999; Bewley-Taylor, 2002; Bewley-Taylor, 2003; Transnational Institute,         2002; Andreas, 1999 and Nadelmann, 1990).
The cannabis crisis
Global drug prohibition's most glaring weakness and greatest         vulnerability is cannabis. As UN experts point out, cannabis is by far         the most widely used illegal drug in the world. Cannabis grows wild throughout         the world, and is commercially cultivated in remote areas, in backyard         gardens, and in technologically sophisticated indoor growing operations.         Just as it was impossible for prohibitionists to prevent alcohol from         being produced and used in the U.S. in the 1920s, so too it is now impossible         to prevent cannabis from being produced and widely used, especially in         democratic countries. As a result of this enormous and unstoppable production         and use, global cannabis prohibition faces a growing crisis of legitimacy         (Zimmer, 1997).
Since the 1980s, the Netherlands has successfully administered its system         of regulated, decriminalized cannabis sales. A generation of Europeans,         Australians, North Americans, and others have learned from the Dutch         experience. Politicians, policy makers, police officials, journalists,         and ordinary tourists from many countries have seen that decriminalizing         cannabis use and regulating cannabis sales have substantial advantages         and benefits––especially when compared with the disadvantages         and costs of punitive U.S. drug policies. The continued success of the         Netherlands's strikingly different and less punitive cannabis policy         alternative within drug prohibition has undermined the U.S.         anti-drug crusade and contributed to the spread of de facto and         formal cannabis decriminalization in Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, Germany,         the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy and other countries (Leuw, 1997; Webster,         1998, Reinarman, Cohen, Kall, 2004).
Further, since the 1960s recreational cannabis use has been steadily         normalized in many parts of the world, especially among young adults.         Prominent middle-aged politicians––including, for example,         the current Republican Mayor of New York City––admit they         have used cannabis without deleterious effects. As a result, it has become         much harder for drug war advocates to persuasively portray cannabis as         one of the dangerous, evil "drugs." Punitive drug prohibition         still requires drug demonization. But defenders of cannabis prohibition         find it increasingly difficult to offer plausible justifications for         harsh anti-cannabis laws, or even for the Single Convention's cannabis         policies. Growing numbers of prominent, influential individuals and organizations         are concluding that criminalized cannabis prohibition causes more problems         than cannabis use.
In recent years, some veteran drug policy reformers have confronted         the problem of the currently invincible drug treaties. Like Professor         Peter Cohen (2003) of the University of Amsterdam, and Dr Alex Wodak         (2003) of St. Vincents Hospital in Sydney, they have suggested that the         Single Convention and other narcotics treaties are an unenforceable "paper         tiger" or even a "paper corpse." These critics recommend         that policy makers disregard the anti-drug treaties when considering         drug policy reforms within their own countries. With regard to cannabis,         public officials in a number of countries seem increasingly open to such         arguments. In Europe, political support for harm reduction approaches         and drug policy reform has become so strong that some government officials         have discussed systems for licensing cannabis production.
Openly licensing, regulating and taxing cannabis production moves well         beyond what the Netherlands has ever done. Licensing production as well         as sales creates cannabis legalization within one country. Discussion         of such measures appears most developed in Switzerland, but it has been         going on as well in the Netherlands and even in Canada. Top U.S. anti-drug         officials are openly worried about such possibilities.
Switzerland and other countries could choose to license cannabis farms         for domestic consumption. In so doing they would build upon the Dutch         experience, but would completely bypass the Netherlands's complicated         problems of illegal or "backdoor" cannabis supply. When officials         have substantial domestic public support, they will be freer to ignore         international pressure and define their own nation's situation as a permissible         exception to the anti-drug treaties. And countries that may decide for         various reasons to license sales, may also decide to license growers.         In short, sooner or later some Western country, perhaps Switzerland,         is likely to be the first to create a system of licensed, regulated and         taxed cannabis sale and production, despite the narcotics treaties.
In political democracies, when laws and policies are unenforceable and         unpopular, over time de facto changes usually become de         jure (in law). This is what happened with alcohol prohibition in         the U.S., and this process occurs with international laws as well. For         opiates, stimulants, and other drugs, the ongoing trend of increasing         decriminalization, harm reduction, and medical use could continue for         decades within global drug prohibition. But cannabis is a different story.         In some countries, cannabis use and cultivation already threatens to         burst the bounds of the international drug treaties. Even drug prohibitionists         who study global trends openly worry about their capacity to make world-wide         cannabis prohibition a workable system.
Recently, some students of global drug policies have outlined strategies         for modifying the drug treaties to bring them more in line with current         practice. (Bewley-Taylor, 2002 and Transnational Institute, 2002). Calls         for modifying the treaties are likely to increase in coming years. And         whatever happens with efforts to reform the Single Convention and other         drug treaties, some Western democracies are likely to continue moving         toward creating their own new national policies for cannabis sales, distribution         and production.
One last point: An incisive paper by Martin Jelsma (2002) takes a line         from a Monty Python sketch and likens defenders of punitive drug policies         and the UN treaties to a pet shop clerk cheerfully trying to sell a dead         parrot. "It's not dead," the salesman tells the incredulous         customer, "it's just resting." Jelsma suggests rejecting such         arguments and points out that policy makers in a number of countries         have urged international discussions about modifying the drug treaties.         Since 2001, the U.S. government has become increasingly absorbed in its         new "War on Terrorism" and is itself withdrawing from or openly         breaking with several different international treaties. At the same time,         support for cannabis policy reform has been growing in the UK, Canada         and other Western countries. In short, in the next five to ten years,         modifying the drug treaties, especially for cannabis, may become a more         lively political issue.
The end of global drug prohibition?
Global drug prohibition is in crisis. The fact that it         is becoming visible is one symptom of that crisis. In the short run,         that crisis seems almost certain to deepen, especially for cannabis prohibition         and the more punitive and criminalized drug policies. Over the next century,         for a variety of practical and ideological reasons––especially         the spread of democracy, information and trade––democratic         governments in Europe and elsewhere are likely to transform and eventually         dismantle world-wide drug prohibition.
If and when this happens, it would not mean the end of all local or         national drug prohibition. Rather, ending global drug prohibition, like         ending constitutional alcohol prohibition in the US, would clear the         path for hundreds of local experiments in drug policy. Many communities         and some nations would likely retain forms of drug prohibition and continue         to support vigorous anti-drug crusades. But most democratic and open         societies probably would not choose to retain full-scale criminalized         drug prohibition. Over time democratic societies could gradually develop         their own varied local forms of regulated personal cultivation, production,         and use of the once prohibited plants and substances. Many places could         also allow some forms of commercial growing, production, and sale––first         of all of cannabis.
All of this could take a very long time. Drug prohibitionists in every         country can be expected to fight tenaciously to maintain their local         regimes. And it is likely that enormous power will be employed to prevent         the Single Convention of 1961 and its related treaties from being repealed         or even modified.
As a result, in coming years there will be even more public discussion         and debate about the varieties of drug prohibition and about the alternatives         to it. As part of that conversation, many more people will discover that         they have lived for decades within a regime of world-wide drug prohibition.         That growing understanding will help push global drug prohibition closer         to its end.
We are convinced that someday, as Edward Brecher predicted, most Americans         will look back on drug prohibition and judge it to have been (like alcohol         prohibition) repressive, unjust, expensive and ineffective -- a failure.         In the twentieth century, a dozen major scientific commissions in Britain,         Canada, and the United States have recommended alternatives to punitive         drug policies. The United States is the only nation where these recommendations         have been so consistently ignored (Levine, 1994; Trebach and Zeese, 1990).         For starters, these recommendations should be more widely discussed and         better understood in the United States. The experiences of other nations,         regions and cities also provide living examples of decriminalization         and harm reduction programs within global drug prohibition.         The full range of alternatives to current U.S. drug policy should be         studied and debated -- from futuristic visions to pragmatic reforms that         could be implemented immediately. For drug policy, as was the case with         alcohol policy, discussion of alternatives is an essential part of the         transition from prohibition to regulation.
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Notes
Earlier versions of portions           of this chapter have appeared in several publications. Some of the           materials on prohibition and alcohol control are drawn from Levine,           1985; Levine and Reinarman, 1993 and 1998. The materials on drug prohibition           are drawn from Reinarman and Levine, 1997; Levine, 2002 and 2003; and           Reinarman 2003.
Last update: May 25, 2016